The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor The bi-monthly publication of the
PHRMG:
PHRMG Report on Assassinations
1. Introduction
On Thursday 9 November 2000,
Hussein Abayat was killed in Beit Sahour when a missile was fired at his
car by an Israeli military helicopter. The Israeli military spokesman
later acknowledged that Abayat had indeed been the target of the strike,
and justified the act by arguing that he had been held responsible for
much of the shooting directed at the time at Gilo, a Jewish settlement
located beyond the Green Line in Jerusalem.
This precision strike opened
up a new chapter in the confrontation between Palestinians and Israeli
security forces. Concluding that large-scale air strikes at various
Palestinian targets had not effectively deterred the upsurge of violence
in the Palestinian occupied territories, the Israeli forces embarked on a
new policy of pin-pointing individuals they held responsible for the
attacks. For Palestinians, this new tactic amounts to an official,
government-sponsored policy of assassinations. Spreading fear and
suspicion among the Palestinian population, the wave of assassinations
parallels a similar series of killings of collaborators who are believed
to inform the Israeli authorities of the moves of “wanted” individuals,
and occasionally carry out the assassinations themselves.
In fact, history seems to
repeat itself. During the first intifada (1987-1993), Israel conducted
numerous undercover operations against “wanted” Palestinians throughout
the Palestinian territories. The stated objective of these undercover
operations – by Israeli army units operating in conjunction with theGeneral Security Service (GSS) – was to capture wanted individuals.
Human rights organizations at the time noted that, in effect, the
undercover units acted as “liquidation squads.”[1]
This conclusion was based on three main findings: most victims had been
shot numerous times, they were shot in the upper part of the body, and
that arrest instead of assassination appeared to have been a viable option
at the time.
After the strike against Abayat,
official Israeli statements never denied that the intent was to kill him.
On the contrary, Major General Yizhak Eitan praised the attack as having
been carried out in a “highly professional way.”[2]
This report also investigates other cases in which
the circumstances of the killings are not as clear-cut, though the
Palestinian media has denounced them as assassinations.
In this report, an
“assassination” will refer to the killing of a “wanted” person who was
purposefully sought out by Israeli security forces. This definition
assumes the existence of a list of “wanted” individuals. It is difficult
to ascertain that all victims were indeed on a “wanted” list, especially
in cases where Israel denies or does not acknowledge its involvement in
the assassination. In some cases, it appears that the apprehension of a
wanted person was not the aim of a particular movement that resulted in
the death of a wanted person. All these cases have been included in the
present report.
This policy of assassination
is a blatant violation of both the right to life and the right to fair
trial. In all societies bound by law, the death penalty can only be
imposed by a court of law. A short legal analysis will be presented in the
first part of this report. An account of the cases of alleged
assassinations will then be presented. The PHRMG has attempted to gather
as many testimonies as possible from witnesses or close relatives of
victims, describing the events that led to the death of the victims. This
version of the event is presented together with the official Israeli
account of the incident, when available. It is worthwhile to mention that
a number of innocent people have also been killed in the operations
targeting these casualties. In addition, several individuals escaped
unsuccessful assassination attempts. In the final section of this
report we provide the details of several “unclear” cases; those which
could plausibly have been “work accidents” as claimed by the Israeli
authorities, and those in which the source of fire is uncertain.
One of the difficulties we
faced in our research is the absence of autopsy reports, since declared
“martyrs” are never autopsied, and are buried as quickly as possible. In
some cases, an autopsy report might have helped clarify the circumstances
of death. The research has also been obscured by the plethora of rumors
circulating among the Palestinian people, especially in this current
climate of fear. Past assassinations are well known and lack of credible
media sources have left uninformed accounts of events circulating among
the Palestinian public. Finally, an additional difficulty we had in
compiling information for this report was the lack of cooperation from the
Israeli Army in providing timely and informative accounts of their
activities. Many of the requests we sent for a statement on an alleged
case of assassination went unanswered.
[1]Yashuvi,
Na’ama. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied
Territories, B’Tselem, Jerusalem, May 1992. See also MIDDLE EAST
WATCH, A license to kill: Israeli Undercover Operations against
“Wanted” and Masked Palestinians, July 1993.