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“Collaborators”
New Impetus for an
Old Witch Hunt
Introduction
In its attempt to suppress the al-Aqsa Intifada,
Israel adopted a policy of assassinating key Palestinian activists in
November 2000. The first activist targeted was Hussein Abayat, a Fatah
commander in Bethlehem district, who was killed when a helicopter-launched
rocket hit his car in Beit Sahour on 9 November 2000. Two weeks later, on
22 November 2000, Jamal Abdel-Razek was killed at a temporary roadblock in
the Gaza Strip when the Israeli security forces opened fire at the car he
was riding in. He was one of the leaders of Fatah in the Rafah area. From
that point on, the pace of assassinations quickened and eventually
triggered a massive outcry in the international community against this new
Israeli strategy.
This policy increased fear and suspicion among the
Palestinian people, who believe that such operations could only be
possible with help from within, i.e., by using collaborators. On 12
November 2000, Kassem Khleef was found dead near al-Ram checkpoint, on the
road from Jerusalem to Ramallah. He was suspected of having supplied the
Shabak with information on the movements of Hussein Abayat.
This killing is reminiscent of the pursuit of
collaborators that took place during the first intifada, when more than
1000 Palestinians were killed under suspicion of collaboration, a number
roughly equivalent to the estimated 1100 Palestinians killed by Israeli
soldiers and settlers during the six years of the intifada. However, only
an estimated 40 to 45% of the Palestinians killed as alleged collaborators
indeed maintained contacts with the Israeli authorities. Today, during the
second, al-Aqsa Intifada, the witch-hunt appears to have resumed.
The main difference from the first intifada is the
existence of the Palestinian Authority, which should have a monopoly over
the use of force and which should therefore be responsible for the arrest
and prosecution of suspected collaborators. This should theoretically
prevent the pursuit of collaborators from degenerating to the point where
many innocent people are killed. Indeed, the PA has already arrested
dozens of suspected collaborators, and trials have taken place before the
State Security Courts. However, there are many questions concerning the
degree to which the State Security Courts respect the right to a fair
trial, and it is doubtful that justice will truly prevail. How can the
guilt of a suspected collaborator be proven beyond reasonable doubt after
a few days of investigation and a trial without a proper defense, barely
lasting a few hours? Suspected collaborators are still killed “in the
streets,” usually abducted from their homes by masked men and then shot.
The PHRMG believes that the Palestinian Authority
is responsible for investigating these murders and bringing those guilty
to trial. If the Palestinian Authority does not take firm steps against
such vigilante action, it will send a signal that will encourage more
private settling of accounts.
The present report starts with a brief overview of
international and domestic laws applicable to the issue of collaboration,
both in relation to the recruitment of collaborators by Israel and to
their prosecution by the Palestinian Authority. The second part presents
some historical background on the issue of collaborators. Many lessons can
indeed be drawn from the ways in which the problem was addressed during
the first intifada and after the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority in 1994. This part summarizes the main findings of a
comprehensive report prepared by the PHRMG in September 2000,
just before the start of the second intifada, concerning the fate of
suspected collaborators since the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority. The last section of the report presents five case studies of
alleged collaborators arrested or killed during the al-Aqsa intifada.
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