Conclusion

At the time this report was compiled, Israel had not denied that it has indeed embarked on a policy of assassinations.  This new phase of the al-Aqsa Intifada has triggered a considerable emotion in the media and the international community. Many estimates have been circulated regarding the number of people that have been targeted for assassination. This report has tried to give a detailed account of all probable assassinations to date. In many of the cases, Israeli responsibility for death of the activist cannot be proven.

Most victims of assassinations were activists in Fatah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad, who had engaged in violent, anti-Israel activities during the present intifada. After February 2001, as Ariel Sharon replaced Ehud Barak as Prime Minister of Israel, both the pace and the intensity of assassinations increased steadily. On 27 August 2001, the assassination of Mustafa Zabri, the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, revealed that even senior Palestinian figures are not protected by their position.

 It is also interesting to compare the means by which these alleged assassinations were carried out. Israeli forces act directly and openly in areas under their control, where “wanted” persons are sought out and gunned down. In areas under Palestinian security control, “wanted” persons are often executed either by missiles fired from helicopters, through remote-controlled explosions (car bombs, for example) or in one instance with a ground-to-ground antitank missile.  In some of the early cases, it seemed that Israeli forces came across a “wanted” individual almost by chance, and killed him upon ascertaining his identity.[1]

The policy of assassinations is a blatant violation of human rights, in particular the right to life and the right to a fair trial. If Israel suspects certain individuals of involvement in violent attacks, then it should ensure that these cases are investigated, that the suspects are brought to trial, and that their acts are judged by a court of law. In the cases presented, no attempt was made to arrest the suspects.  

The PHRMG is firmly opposed to the death penalty in all circumstances. It is an irreversible sentence that violates the fundamental right to life and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, and the deterrent value of capital punishment is highly debatable.

 Israel attempts to justify this policy by its efforts to target only those persons responsible for the violence, without causing unnecessary collateral damage. Unfortunately, “collateral” damage does occur. When Hussein Abayat’s car was struck by missiles from an Israeli military helicopter, two women standing on the side of the road were also killed. When soldiers blocked the way in front of Jamal Abdel-Razek’s car in Khan Yunis, a taxi was caught in the line of fire and two of its passengers were killed, as well as Abdel-Razek’s driver. In the case of Hani Abu Bakra, several passengers of the car he was driving were wounded as he was shot; at least one of them died from injuries sustained in the attack. The list goes on. So far, over 25% of the casualties appear not to have been targeted.

 Despite heavy international criticism of the assassination policy, it appears to be widely supported by the Israeli public and defended by Israeli government officials. Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, maintains that the assassination of Palestinian activists is in the interest of national security.[2]  Even Shimon Peres, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs who is often critical of current government policies, defended the 31 July 2001 attack on Nablus in which eight Palestinians were killed, saying that Israel had no choice but to stop potential suicide bombers from reaching Israeli towns.[3]  A public opinion poll conducted by the Gallop Institute and Ma’ariv newspaper in August 2001 showed that an overwhelming majority of the Israeli public, over 75%, supports the assassination policy.[4] 

 Another dimension to the issue of assassinations is the cycle of retaliatory killings of Palestinians suspected of aiding Israel. Palestinians believe that collaborators are widely employed: both to inform the Israeli security services about the moves of the “wanted” persons, and to help Israeli operatives conduct their assassinations when the suspects are in areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority. Alleged collaborators were arrested following the assassinations of Hussein Abayat, Jamal Abdel-Razek and Ibrahim Bani Odeh. Death sentences passed against two of the arrested were carried out on 13 January 2001. Nine such killings of alleged collaborators have occurred as of 20 February 2001, in a pattern reminiscent of the first intifada.

 There is no doubt that the policy of assassinations carried out by the Israeli army has served to fuel the cycle of violence.  The killing of Palestinian leaders and activists has prompted many young Palestinians to consider carrying out suicide attacks against Israeli targets, leading to the death of hundreds of Israeli civilians.  For example, the mother of Izzedin al-Masry issued a statement indicating that her son bore great resentment towards Israel in the aftermath of two attacks near his hometown of Nablus, in which five Palestinian activists targeted for assassination and nine bystanders were killed.[5]  Al-Masry allegedly carried out the suicide attack at Sbarro’s restaurant in West Jerusalem on 9 August 2001 to avenge their deaths.[6]    

 In light of this research, the PHRMG urges Israel to immediately halt its policy of assassinating Palestinians active in resisting the Israeli occupation. Cases in which the circumstances of death are unclear should be thoroughly investigated, and if security forces appear to have used unlawful force, those responsible should be prosecuted.