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The
Policy of Assassinations: Methods and Rationale
On 15 November 2000,
Ha’aretz reported that Israeli soldiers carried out a massive arrest
operation in the villages of Kusra, Talfit and el-Mouaier, which are
located in the West Bank in Area B, where Israelis and Palestinian share
responsibility for security. 15 Fatah activists were arrested in that
operation. Prime Minister Ehud Barak was quoted in the above article as
having said, “The security forces will continue these operations in the
framework of the policy of not allowing those who carry out attacks to get
away with them. Just as the Israeli Army laid its hands on some of those
involved in the lynching and the commanders of those who are firing on
Gilo, so it will strike at anyone who harms Israeli citizens and soldiers.”
However, it soon appeared that
arrest campaigns would not be the only means by which Israel intended to
extract those who “harm Israeli citizens and soldiers.” A few weeks later,
on 4 December 2000, Ha’aretz military correspondent Amos Harel quoted a
senior defense official as saying: “From the moment that it became clear
that the confrontation would continue for a long time, Israel had to free
itself from the pattern of ‘incidents and responses.’ When the fighting is
continuous, it is no longer a question of immediate response to each
attack, but rather a continuum of actions over time.” The same source
noted that this new approach would enable Israel “to take advantage of
places where there is a relative advantage in order to hit a Palestinian
target, even if this is not done immediately after an attack against us.”
It seems that the decision had been taken to shift the Israeli strategy
from “immediate responses to attacks” to preemptive hits at Palestinian
“targets” that would avert the attacks. Hussein Abayat and Jamal
Abdel-Razek seem to have been test cases, and as the operations were
deemed successful, Israel appears to have decided to resort regularly to
such tactics.
This seems also to be the
justification given by the Israeli Army to the PHRMG in response to our
inquiry on the policy of assassinations, although the policy of
assassination is only implied in this carefully worded statement:
The supreme task and the duty
of the Israeli security forces is to secure the safety of the citizens of
Israel; thus they work tirelessly to prevent terrorist activity. The
preventive policy of the security forces consists of a wide range of
activities and means which include, among other things, improved
operational deployment, arrests, legal proceedings and attempts at
achieving cooperation with the Palestinian security forces. Thus,
preventive activities are carried out as part of the security activity in
this current conflict; many of these activities are directed toward the
arrest of suspects. - - - It should be noted, regarding the activity of
the IDF and the security forces, that these preventive activities are not
routine policy. These are unusual steps, to which the security forces and
the IDF believe have no alternative in order to save lives; it is that
simple.
How are these “preventive activities” carried out?
In his article, Amos Harel claims that a number of elite army units are
now deployed in the territories to target senior activists of Fatah and
other Palestinian organizations. One of his later reports, dated 17
December 2000, further details these special army units: “All IDF special
units have taken part in the targeted operations aimed at senior activists
. . .. In the most complicated operations, the special anti-terror police
unit, known by its Hebrew acronym, Yamam, has taken a salient role.
. . . The operational unit and the GSS function directly through the
district commander or the divisional commander. Lower-level brigade
commanders mostly direct back-up, rescue support and are not always
apprised of other details.”
On 6 June 2001, Israeli
security sources told Ha’aretz that the ceasefire declared by Israel “does
not mean an absolute ban on assassinating Palestinian terrorists, should
this be necessary to prevent an imminent attack.” Indeed, if it were
“necessary to stop a terrorist cell on its way to commit an attack,” the
kitchen cabinet gave the Israeli army and the Shin Bet security service
permission to kill the “gang members” despite the ceasefire. The Israeli
government does not label this a policy of assassination. On 25 June 2001,
Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer appeared in front of the
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Asked by Meretz MK Ran
Cohen if the policy of assassinating terrorists was still in force, he
answered “no, but if we have information about a terrorist action we’ll
move.”
On 3 July 2001, the Israeli
“kitchen cabinet” gave the Israeli army an even wider margin to maneuver
in the policy of assassination. Formerly, the Israeli army was only
permitted to assassinate “ticking bombs,” i.e. Palestinians en route to
commit a major attack. The new guidelines now permit the army to act
against known militants even if they are not on the verge of committing a
major attack. This guideline will evidently be open to interpretation, and
since the term “terrorist” has been widely applied to Palestinians
fighting the occupation, it is feared that the new rule amounts to giving
a green light to the army to kill “preventively” whomever it sees fit.
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