February 2001: Report on use of Force by Israel During Al Aqsa Uprising

 

 

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The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor
The Bi-monthly publication of the PHRMG:

 
 

Overkill
Israeli Bombardment and Destruction of Palestinian Civilian Homes and Infrastructure

Researched and Written by: Ann Kristin Brunborg

Consultant on weaponry issues: David B. Holley

Field research: Ann Kristin Brunborg, Gabriel Carmel, Roula Haddad, Rustom Khalayleh, Bassem Eid, Ghassan Khader and Abdel Rahman Ahmar

Edited by: Gabriel Carmel and Walid Hady

Table of Contents


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I. INTRODUCTION
 

When demonstrations against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza erupted again on September 29, 2000, few believed that the Israeli army would deploy attack helicopters, Navy ships, heavy tank fire, mortar fire, anti tank rockets and even high explosive grenades targeting wide areas, against densely populated civilian residential areas. Since the beginning of the Al Aqsa intifada, Palestinian villages, towns and refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank have been subjected to thousands of prolonged bombing attacks by the Israeli army. Israel has responded to shots fired by Palestinian gunmen at Israeli army posts and settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip with light to heavy machinegun ammunition and artillery. Direct fire weapons systems have been used indiscriminately, and the Israeli army have used indirect fire weapons like automatic grenade launchers and ship artillery. The shelling has resulted in 25 killed innocent civilians and 729 wounded in their homes. More than one million Palestinians live in areas that have been exposed to Israeli fire - targeting wider areas. The worst affected areas have been the Old city of Hebron, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Bethlehem, Jericho, Al-Bireh, Ramallah, Jericho, Qalqilia, Tulkarem and Nablus in the West Bank and Rafah, Khan Yunis refugee camp and Dir al-Balah in Gaza. More than 3 000 Palestinian civilian homes have sustained damages from Israeli bombardment. Further 2 400 dunums of agricultural land have been destroyed, 25 000 olive and fruit trees have been uprooted, and commercial and industrial buildings have been hit sustaining millions of US dollars worth of damage.1 Lastly, 93 public buildings, including schools, clinics, hospitals, churches, mosques, PA offices, police stations, electric power infrastructure and municipal buildings have been damaged, sometimes with serious consequences for the civilian populations these institutions are intended to serve.

The purpose of this report is to present the Israeli destruction of Palestinian civilian property and infrastructure and to determine whether these Israeli actions constitute a serious violation of Palestinian human rights. The basic assumption that informs this investigation is that international humanitarian law and, in particular, the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols, are applicable to the ongoing situation of low-intensity warfare in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

The spokesperson's office of the Israeli army claims that the Israeli use of force against the Palestinian uprising is proportionate and justified by military necessity, an argument recognized by the Fourth Geneva Convention. The basis for this argument is that the Israeli army's aim is to deter Palestinian gunmen from directing fire at settlements and by-pass roads and causing injury to Israeli civilians. In this report, the PHRMG has endeavored to test this claim. After surveying the evidence of damage done to housing, agricultural land, commercial buildings and other civilian infrastructure, the PHRMG finds the Israeli army's argument hard to believe. On the contrary - the mass of evidence gathered by PHRMG field research, other Palestinian human rights organizations, United Nations bodies, municipalities, PA Ministries, international organizations and Israeli organizations suggest a different interpretation:

First, the Palestinian shootings against Israeli targets are in the vast majority of the cases directed at Israeli army outposts and Israeli military installations, according to the Israeli army's own statements between September 29 and December 31, 2000. Second, the large scope of the damage caused by the Israeli shelling point to the fact that it has not been justified by "military necessity" in its definition in international humanitarian law. Third, the Israeli army's "method of combat", i.e. the way in which different weapons have been used, have been totally indiscriminate and have targeted thousands of houses not involved in gunfire or threats to the lives of Israeli soldiers or civilians. Fourth, the Israeli army's strategy is to exert pressure on the Palestinian population in order for them to exert pressure on Palestinian gunmen shooting at Israeli military posts and settlements - and more generally on Palestinian political leaders to make concessions in the peace negotiations. They do this by targeting and causing extensive damage to civilian homes, commerce, economy and infrastructure. This is a strategy with a long history in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Its essence is to use violence against civilians (state terrorism) in order to put pressure on Palestinian political groups within Palestinian society.

Regardless of whether this interpretation of Israeli strategy is correct, the vast amount of damage caused to civilian property and infrastructure constitutes collective punishment. Collective punishment is the punishment of the many for the crimes of a few. It is generally perceived as immoral, and is explicitly prohibited by the Geneva Convention (articles 33, 53), which forms part of international law. Destruction of civilian property and infrastructure is just one form of collective punishment usually used by the Israeli government. Other forms include the closures and their devastating economic consequences, the demolition of agricultural land, and the draconian permit policies and closures.

The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter two contains a brief discussion of the legal principles enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention. The principle of "military necessity" and what criteria should be used to judge whether a military action or retaliation was indeed necessary will be outlined, together with the issues of indiscriminate fire and collective punishment. Chapter three uses case studies of weapons used and damage inflicted on Palestinian civilian property and infrastructure to illustrate the reasons for our skepticism toward the Israeli army's justifications. The case studies are organized under three categories: civilian housing, public buildings and installations, and commercial and agricultural property. Chapter four presents an in-depth analysis of our findings and their implications.

This report will not dwell on the many and complex reasons for the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada.2 However, in order to properly understand the Israeli shelling attacks, it is important to analyze it in the context of the ongoing demonstrations and clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli army over the issues of Jerusalem, settlements, refugee rights and self-determination.

Finally, it is relevant to state that it has been hard to collect information, data and statistics for this report. A huge amount of sources have been used, including Israeli sources. But the disinformation on both sides has made the process of collecting information difficult. Some Palestinian human rights organizations and other NGOs, PA municipalities, Israeli and Palestinian media, and the Israeli Defense Ministry and the Israeli military spokesperson's office have issued inaccurate reports and sometimes deliberately false information as to the various incidents of violence throughout the Occupied territories.

We found it necessary to ask for the assistance of the British military consultant David B. Holley,3 in order to get an accurate picture of the type of weapons used - and more importantly - how they have been used. Given our own extensive field investigations and the variety of sources quoted in this report, we can within a good margin claim that the facts presented in this report are accurate. PHRMG wishes to thank Al Haq for sharing their documentation and providing us with assistance from their field workers in some cases. A high number of other organizations have been consulted, like the Israeli army, Amnesty International, United Nations Relief and Works Agency, UN Special Coordinator of the Occupied Territories, the reports of Palestine Center for Human Rights in Gaza4, B'tselem, Defense for Children International - Palestine Section, the Red Crescent Society in Hebron and Ramallah, The Medical Relief Committees, the municipalities of al-Bireh, Hebron, Rafah, Nablus, Ramallah and Tulkarem, Hebron Rehabilitation Committee, Health Development Information and Policy Institute (HDIP), the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights and Israeli and Palestinian newspapers.


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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND - MILITARY NECESSITY AND COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT

a. Israeli Occupation and International Humanitarian Law

Until recently, Israel defined the situation in the Occupied Territories as "belligerent occupation", in accordance with section 43 of the Hague Regulations. The occupying power is responsible for damage caused by actions undertaken for military purposes, such as the seizure of property belonging to a resident in a conquered area. In the beginning of 

January 2001, Israel officially "redefined" the conflict as "hostilities"5. It altered its official designation of the situation in the occupied territories, arguing that under "new conditions" of violence it should be exempted from responsibility of paying compensation for damages caused by necessary military action. This attempt to claim an exemption from compensation requirements has not met any international support. It is widely accepted that the West Bank and Gaza constitutes occupied territory within the compass of Hague IV and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and that these treaty instruments constitute legal undertakings that are declaratory of customary international law. International humanitarian law, of which the Fourth Geneva Convention is an integral part, is intended to safeguard the interests of the civilian population in times of belligerency and occupation, and prohibits attacks on places of civilian habitation.

A private house in Beit Jala hit by helicopter fire A private house in Beit Jala hit by helicopter fire      Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

Israel's Foreign Ministry has repeatedly launched intensive diplomacy aimed at thwarting international conferences and UN sessions likely to end with a condemnation of Israeli policies in the occupied territories. The last time Israel was lobbying against this was when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for convening a conference on July 15, 2000 in Geneva to consider Israel's continued violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention in the occupied Arab lands, particularly the ban on settlements. Since 1967, Israel has maintained that the Convention is not applicable to the occupied territories, and has repeatedly denied all legal responsibilities for their actions against Palestinians in the territories.

 

 

 

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b. "Military Necessity" and "Suffering for the sake of Suffering"

The spokesperson's office of the Israeli army claims that the Israeli use of force against the Palestinian uprising is proportionate and can be justified by military necessity.

Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War states:

 

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

In humanitarian law, the legality of force is based on the balance between military necessity and humanity. Military necessity has been defined as: "Measures of regulated force not forbidden by international law, which are indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the enemy, with the least possible expenditure of economic and human resources".6

 

"Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor for maiming or wounding except in fight, not the torture to extort confessions".7

Firstly, there are some actions that do not have any military value at all and are therefore simply prohibited. For example, sadistic acts of cruelty, pillage and other private rampages by soldiers which, far from helping the military purpose of the army, tend to undermine professional disciplined behavior. In this respect, it is worth questioning the ongoing destruction of Palestinian agricultural land and theft of fruit and vegetables from occupied territory, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Secondly, concerning actions that do have a certain military value, the law of war insists absolutely upon the principle of humanity over that of military necessity, emphasizing the principles of discrimination and proportionality as described below.8

The rule of proportionality in attacks, accepts that civilians will suffer "incidental damage", but that such attacks must not take place if the incidental damage would be excessive in relation to the value of the target (the limitation with respect to military needs). It means that Israel's military operations as well as the methods used must be proportionate to the military objectives intended to be achieved.

The principle of discrimination is defined in Article 51, paragraphs 4 and 5 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions:

 

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

Israel's military operations must therefore discriminate between non- military (civilian) and military targets, and discriminate in the use of force with regard to methods and weapons so that damage and suffering will be minimized.


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c. Collective Punishment and Reprisals

The Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 52, paragraph 1:

Civilian objects shall not be the objects of attack or of reprisals.

Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that:

No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.

Retaliation shall never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge. Article 33 derives from Article 50 of the Hague Regulations: "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they can not be regarded as jointly and severally responsible". The Geneva Convention Article 33, however, takes a great step forward: Responsibility is personal and it will no longer be possible to inflict penalties on persons who have not committed the acts complained of.9

Also, Protocol I to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 54, states that "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited".

It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.


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d. United Nations Resolutions

Several UN resolutions and International Law treaties and basic principles are relevant to the situation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that:

Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 17/2: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Article 25/1: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services…. '

In addition to the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 1322 of the 7 October 2000 condemned "Israel's use of excessive force against Palestinians resulting in injury and loss of life". Further, the UN General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 1979, Article 3, clearly states that:

"Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty".

Relevant principles to this report can be found in the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESC), the Covenant of the Child and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law enforcement Officials (8th UN Crime Congress, 1990).


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III. CASE STUDIES FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

In examining specific cases we have focused on the following factors: Degree of damage to houses and infrastructure, the scope and intensity of the Israeli army's attack, Palestinian gunfire towards illegal Jewish settlements and Israeli army outposts in the occupied territories, and the type of weapons used by the Israeli army and “methods of combat”, meaning the way in which the weapons have been used. Comments will be made regarding the situation of the different cities and villages (for example the geographical layout and placement of settlements and military posts). Further analysis of the cases with regard to discriminate fire, military necessity and collective punishment will be presented in Chapter 4.

a. Type of Weapons used

“The only thing the Israeli's haven't used against us yet is the Atomic bomb” (Colonel Mohammed Dahlan, Head of Preventive Security, Gaza

Major misunderstandings and misinformation about type of weapons and bullet sizes exist among Palestinian organizations, doctors and health organizations, governmental institutions and Palestinian newspapers who repeatedly claim that Palestinians are hit – sometimes several places in the body – by 500 mm or 800 mm bullets. No such guns exits. PHRMG can assure that no Palestinian has been hit by a 500 mm or 800 mm “bullet” during this intifada.

However, the type of weapons used by the Israeli forces to shell Palestinian civilian homes and infrastructure is symptomatic of the excessive use of force. Israel's most sophisticated weaponry (helicopter-launched missiles, long-range sniper rifles and hidden bombs) has been used in the attacks. According to the Israeli army regulations, live ammunition is to be used only when there is an immediate danger to life. But the Israeli forces overused live ammunition, but have resorted to weapons of war, including missiles from Apache helicopters, tank fire and even ship artillery and 40 mm machineguns firing high explosive grenades. Such weapons have been used against densely populated civilian residential areas. The Israeli army has used the following weapons from September 29, to December 31, 2000:

The Casino in Jericho hit by dozens of 120mm tank rounds The Casino in Jericho hit by dozens of 120mm tank rounds        Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

The category of “small arms” includes revolvers and self- loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. Bullets are referred to with caliber or mm (millimeter). “Calibre” refers to the diameter of the bullet in inches (7,62 mm = .30 caliber). Bullets from the Israeli machine guns carried by soldiers are 5,56 mm, 7,62 mm, and 9 mm. 5,56 mm (.223 caliber) are mostly fired by a M-16 weapon, which is widely used by the Israeli army. It causes extensive damage to muscle, nerves and blood vessels, and will fracture bones. The entrance wounds are small (no greater than 1/8 inch in diameter). An exit wound is very large. 7,62 mm bullets can be fired from a general-purpose machine gun (GPMG). Most Arab countries, and Palestinians, fire 7,62 mm bullets from AK-47 and 5,45 mm from AK-74 (Kalashnikovs)10. A 7,62 mm bullet is more stable and tends to go directly through a body without breaking up (unless bones are hit). Israeli snipers have been using 7,62 mm bullets that have a 600-meter guaranteed headshot, probably fired from a Galil sniper rifle. 9 mm bullets are normally fired by Luger or Uzi when coming from Israeli soldiers or police. Bullets used by the Israeli army have been mistakenly identified as the internationally banned (exploding) dumdum bullets. They are in fact from high-velocity bullets used by the Israeli army. Such bullets cause very serious wounds, not only in the tracks of the different fragments of the bullet, but also as a result of the shock wave created by the impact, due to the high speed of a bullet that reaches 1 000 meters per second. The Israeli army has also been using blank rounds with the aim of scaring people. Finally, many of the burnt out houses can be explained by the “tracer round” bullets fired by the M-16, these “lights” can observed at night. In other cases, exploding missiles or grenades have caused fire.

“Light weapons” include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of caliber less than 100 mm.11 The Geneva Convention does not allow the use of bigger than 12,7 mm (50 caliber) automatic machinegun against personnel. Many Palestinian victims of Israeli snipers have been hit by .50 caliber bullets (12,7 mm) fired from either a M82 Barrett sniper rifle (semiautomatic) or 50 Browning Machine Guns. During our field investigations, we found that the 12,7 mm armor piercing bullets, also referred to as “concrete busters”, have been widely used to shell houses, fired from fully automatic machineguns in military posts or from armored vehicles and tanks or from sniper rifles.

The 12,7 mm sniper rifles are widely used by almost every Israeli military outpost. They can easily engage a target at 1 500 meters. In Hebron, one can observe several of them in just one bunker. In many cases, this effective weapon would prevent Palestinian gunmen from firing at Israeli military posts, either by taking them out or by preventative cover fire from a machinegun. However, in many cases, heavier and less accurate weapons have been used instead:

Light Antitank Weapons (LAW) are shoulder-fired, anti-armor weapons with 84 mm or 94 mm rockets. LAW rockets are normally used against armored vehicles, but in the occupied territories they are also used within urban structures against buildings and people.

20 mm and 30 mm airborne cannons have been widely used. Israel's attack helicopters are exclusively U. S. -supplied. The AH-1F Huey Cobra attack helicopters (Israel has 40 helicopters (Tsefha)) have three barreled 20 mm cannons in a little turret in the nose of the helicopter, firing 675 rounds per minute. The pilot controls the aim with a reticule over his eyes. Apache attack helicopters (Israel has 42 AH-64 helicopters, expecting another 10)12 are more accurate in hitting its target, so they would be used if the Israeli army wanted to “miss” a civilian house but hit the neighboring Force-17 offices. The Apache uses 30 mm chain guns situated under the body of the helicopter, also with 675 rounds per minute. Hitting accuracy is 3,0 millirands, i.e. the bullets will fall within 3 meters radius of the aim point, at a range of 1 000 meter. The helicopters also have the Hellfire Air-to-Ground Missile System, which provides heavy capability firepower. The shaped charge causes extreme damage to a house. The Israeli army claims that they have preferred to use the Hellfire missile instead of the 30 mm cannon, because the Hellfire is accurate and “can go through a window”. It has been used on several occasions in Gaza and the West Bank. However, data collected show that the 30 mm canon often has been used in addition to the Hellfire missile, or alone.

120mm tank ammunition  120mm tank ammunition

40 mm shells have been fired from grenade launchers underneath the M-16 rifle (M203). This is not a particular accurately weapon, but has been widely used against housing. See below for more details.

The Israeli Merkava tanks have as a main armament the 105 mm or 120 mm canons. The tank cannons fire FSDS dart rounds (an armored piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot round), HESH (High Explosive Squash Head) rounds or HE (High Explosive) rounds. It has been used in the Bethlehem area, Rafah, Jericho, Khan Yunis, Ramallah, Nablus and Tulkarem. In Jericho, dozens of Tungsten Carbide FSDS round s have destroyed the Casino. This is a very heavy metal armor piercing ammunition, and can be dangerous to human beings if vaporized.

Further, old technology TOW rockets (TOW M114) have been used against Ramallah, Beit Jala, Nablus and Gaza, fired from armored personnel carriers.

RDX (Rapid Detonating Explosives) was used in two missiles to shell two buildings in Netzarim, Gaza in early October 2000. The French expert, Jack Frank Crispino, from Institute of Criminal Research helped to set up a Palestinian Anti-terrorism Laboratory in Gaza, and was the one who conducted the test on one of the missiles that did not explode. He found several hundred grams of RDX in the hollow head of one of the engines of the missile. After the finding, a European ballistic expert expressed the view that: “This discovery proves scientifically the excessive use of force: Israel would use military explosives if it were in a state of war with Iraq or Syria, but you do not quell street demonstrations with RDX”.13 The Israeli army have not denied the report, which has been submitted to the International Fact Finding Commission.


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Indiscriminate Weapons

Indirect fire weapons include artillery units equipped with either field guns (howitzers), or heavy mortars. Artillery is that part of an army that controls the bigger, long range weapons, formerly referred to as cannons. In battle, the artillery's role is to provide fire support for the infantry, cavalry, armor and other units. The projectile, rocket, missile, and bomb are the weapons of indirect-fire systems. Indirect fire can cause casualties to troops, inhibit mobility, suppress or neutralize weapon systems, damage equipment and installations, and demoralize the enemy. Historically, more combat deaths have been caused by indirect fire weapons than by any other means, hence the designation of artillery as the King of Battle.14 The Israeli army have denied the use of Mortars. But mortar carrier shells ranging from 40 mm to 90 mm have been found in several Palestinian cities. We have also found shrapnel from indirect high explosive artillery shells.

The Israeli Navy fired 76 mm high explosive rounds from their Reshef patrol boats (ZAR 4) against Gaza on November 20, 2000.15 Shells fired from boats are very inaccurate, and would not have been used if the Israeli army wanted to avoid civilian casualties.

120mm tank ammunition being prepared 120mm tank ammunition being prepared

In Rafah, extremely inaccurate field artillery and M203 grenades have been used. The M203 Grenade launcher can use several types of grenades – we have found M406 High-Explosive (HE) grenades in Beit Jala, Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron and Gaza. We also know that Israel has air burst capability, M379 and M379A1 Air Burst grenades. Disturbing testimonies and pictures were taken after a shelling attack against Rafah. On 20.12.00, 15 year-old Hani Yusuf Sofi was killed, and six other boys wounded, by shrapnel in his head from what we believe came from an air burst shell type of artillery or a 40 mm grenade.16 Field artillery has a long range, is extremely inaccurate and is fired without targeting anything in particular. It explodes in the air (air burst shells), dispatching small, lethal shrapnel over a wide area. The “kill radius” can be 50 meters. Testimonies collected by Amnesty International show that there was an extremely loud bang, followed by a big yellow flash and air pressure pushing people to the ground. In Rafah, several roofs have small holes from shells that must have come from above, as the corrugated roofs have been twisted all around the entry point. These weapons were used in areas of narrow streets where Israeli machinegun fire cannot reach. Using this type of ammunition constitutes a severe breach of international law regarding indiscriminate fire. These weapons have been developed to work over larger areas. In Rafah they have been launched against civilians in refugee camps, killing a small boy. Mu'az Ahmad Muhammad Abu Hadwan (11) was killed in a narrow street in the al-Sheikh area of Hebron by what could well have been the same type of indiscriminate weapon on January 1, 2001.

We have evidence that MK19 40 mm grenade launchers (also referred to as a 40 mm Machine Gun) have been used in Nablus, and probably also in Hebron and Gaza. Up to now the Israeli army has justified and admitted to using “direct fire weapons systems” against targets (except the 76 mm gun fired from Israeli patrol boats). Although the 40 mm grenade launcher, M203, is inaccurate over ranges of 150 meter it is still classed as a direct fire weapon. The Israeli army has consistently denied using any indirect fire weapons against civilians. However, PHRMG has found evidence, unexploded rounds, of 40 mm high explosive M383 grenades that have been fired from the belt-fed MK 19 Machine Gun. This machine gun delivers the same ammunition as the M203 but is belt fed (48 rounds belts) and it has a range of 2200 meters. The M203 fires single shot rounds that can be aimed, but the MK19, by definition, is a “machine gun” that delivers high explosive indiscriminately over a large area: The blast radius of each round is 15 meter. In Nablus, the Israeli army has been using the MK19 to fire high explosive grenades from the Altour Mountain against UNRWA Balata Girls School, where 31 grenades were found. One of these grenades exploded when 10-year old Khalil Abdul-Nasser Attallah picked it up and started playing with it. Further, the 40 mm machine guns have been used to fire high explosive grenades against demonstrators in Al Quds street, one of the major clash points between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers. Fouad Adnan Dwekat (30) from Balata was killed by such a grenade on 25 November 2000. This is one of the worst examples of indiscriminate fire we have found so far, and it cannot be justified by military necessity. This weapon is designed to kill enemy soldiers over large areas (see Annex I). The Israeli army denied using grenades, but admitted later in a letter to PHRMG using grenades “only in a few incidents when needed”.17 However, the large amounts of grenade shells found suggest that they have in fact been widely used.


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b. Shelling of Civilian Homes and Infrastructure

1. Jericho: Aqbet Jaber Refugee Camp

Totally destroyed building in Jericho Totally destroyed building in Jericho       Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

The 5 500 residents of the camp have lived under heavy shelling since the outbreak of the intifada from Israeli army posts outside the Vered Yeriho settlement – south of the refugee camp. Most of the houses facing the Israeli military post had bullet holes made by 5,56 mm, 7,62 mm and the 12,7 mm “concrete buster” bullets. Several houses have been hit with more than 20 rounds. 40 mm grenades were found in the house of Zuhdi and Abdallah Khatib, together with shrapnel from 90 mm Mortar carrier shells and shrapnel from artillery. They have dug a bomb shelter in the garden to hide from the shelling at night. Several 120 mm tank dart rounds that have gone through 20-30 walls and exited on the other side of the building have destroyed the Casino in Jericho.

The shelling took place at night, and people were afraid to sleep there. They never know which side of the camp will be hit next, as the Israeli fire have been directed at all parts of the camp. The Israeli army's fire has sometimes been in response to Palestinian fire, but on other occasions the army has initiated attacks. In general, Israeli gunfire or tank rounds have targeted civilian houses regardless of the location of the Palestinian machinegun fire. Also, Israeli gunfire has continued after the Palestinian gunmen left the area. This strongly suggests indiscriminate firing by the Israeli army. The children in the camp could not sleep, thus schools started later in the day than usual. People of the camp went to sleep by the roadside or outside buildings closer to the center of Jericho, because any movement in the camp at night could trigger Israeli fire. People were also afraid of an event where the settlers would come to the camp, as they have no defense. They called upon the United Nations to protect them.

The main types of damage observed were destroyed walls, windows, doors, water tanks, electricity, furniture, and agricultural land. In one attack 15 000 chickens were killed when an Israeli shell hit the water tanks on a farm, drowning the chickens.

The settlement of Vered Yeriho is situated some 200 meters above the refugee camp. Below the settlement lies an Israeli military post. Palestinian machineguns are fired at random at the settlement. PHRMG was not allowed to enter Vered Yeriho to review the damages done by Palestinian gunfire.


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2. Bethlehem

The main area of clashes has been around Rachel's Tomb, were the Israeli army have deployed soldiers to give Jews easier access to the holy site. This military post is placed close to the center of Bethlehem, with the nearest Palestinian refugee camp located 200 meters away.

The areas targeted by Israeli shelling are mostly Aida and al-Azza (Beit Jibrin) refugee camps, Bethlehem city, along with the western villages of Houssan and Nahalin. The southern village of al-Khader has also sustained considerable damage. The villages of Beit Jala and Beit Sahour will be analyzed separately. Again, the main type of weapons have been light and medium machine guns, together with 30 mm shells from attack helicopters, tank rounds, grenades and TOW rockets.


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3. Beit Jala and Beit Sahour

The small Christian village of Beit Jala outside Bethlehem suffered from Israeli shelling almost every night from early October. It was bombarded by the Israeli army from locations at the Gilo settlement opposite to Beit Jala. The total number of shelled civilian homes and public buildings in Beit Jala is to this date 438, three people have been killed and 300 injured in the shelling.18

House hit by tank fire in Beit Jala House hit by tank fire in Beir Jala    Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

The official Israeli position is that Palestinian gunfire targeting the Gilo settlement from private houses in Beit Jala has triggered the Israeli army's extensive use of tank rounds, grenade launchers, 20 mm and 30 mm canon fire from helicopter gun ships and machinegun fire against the Palestinian village. Light and medium machinegun fire (also 12,7 mm bullets from sniper rifles) have been widely used. Gilo is situated approximately 900 meters away from Beit Jala, and using light machine guns have not had a great impact in many of the cases, except causing many stray bullets. However, some parts of Beit Jala are closer to Gilo than others. TOW rockets have also been used against Beit Jala, together with anti-tank rockets. Debris from heavy artillery was found.

It is obvious that the large numbers of homes and families that have been shelled are unlikely to have been involved in Palestinian shooting incidents. Further, our studies of the shelling of Beit Jala shows clear cases of indiscriminate fire. In several cases, Palestinian gunmen have fired three or four rounds against Gilo and run away. The Israeli army has responded to the fire for a long time after the gunmen left, also in those cases where the Israeli military spokesperson claim, “they positively identified the target and returned fire”.

Gilo is an Israeli settlements that lie on land that was seized from the Palestinian town of Beit Jala. It was built in violation of international law. On our field visit to the Gilo settlement, we observed a small number of bullet holes in the walls of the houses facing Beit Jala. Around ten windows were covered with sandbags for protection. We did not observe damaged windows, although Palestinian bullets probably smashed those with sandbags.

Along the roadside facing Beit Jala, the Gilo settlement is equipped with concrete barriers for protection against Palestinian gunfire. No such protection exists in Beit Jala. Further, the civilian houses of Beit Jala are situated far below the borders of the Gilo settlement from where the Israeli army is firing its shells. This makes it easy for the Israeli soldiers to hit their targets, while Palestinian machineguns are fired at random.

Destroyed houses in Beit Sahour Destroyed houses in Beit Sahour   Photo by: Glen Widing

Beit Sahour have been fired at from the Israeli military camp Shidma, dividing areas A and C. The camp is approximately 300 meters from the heavily shelled houses. Eight homes in Beit Sahour have been completely destroyed so far, while 253 homes have been damaged to varying degrees. 130 families have had to evacuate their homes due to damage from Israeli fire. Those who have been unable to move in with family or friends were moved to an emergency camp set up by the Beit Sahour Emergency Committee. Machinegun fire, helicopter cannons and tank fire have hit Beit Sahour. Shrapnel from mortar carrier shells was found, together with heavier pieces of artillery. On October 25, a Palestinian civil defense vehicle coming to put out a fire started because of the shelling was shot at and prevented from reaching the house. In the assassination case of Hussein Abayat on November 9, 2000, three Hellfire missiles were launched, killing two Palestinian women walking in the street when two attack helicopters and 200 soldiers were deployed to hit one car.19


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4. Hebron

During the 63 days between October 1 and December 3, the residents in the Hebron area experienced only 7 days without shelling from the Israeli army. People live in a state of terror at night, while closure, curfew and limited medical relief make their lives even more difficult. 20 % of the city is under Israeli control (H2 Area), where 50 000 Palestinians live. Families live in shelters in wet basements of their buildings to avoid casualties.

Destroyed water tanks Destroyed water tanks    Photo by: Glen Widing

During three days, 1 – 3 October 2000, the Israeli army occupied three Palestinian schools; Johar Basic School for Girls, Osama Basic School for girls and Al-Ma'aref Basic school for boys.20 They transformed the schools into military camps, setting up tanks and putting machineguns on the roofs. These schools offer strategic positions overlooking al-Sheikh, Abu Sneineh, Jabal al Rahme and Jabal Johar neighborhoods in the center of Hebron city. Abdel Aziz Abu Sneineh (58) was killed by a missile from Jabal Jauhar to the Abu Sneineh area on October 23, 2000. On January 1, 2001, Muath Ahmad Abu-Hadwan (11) was killed in al-Sheikh when a high explosive grenade or air burst shell hit a wall close to where he was standing. Fragments hit his head. Two brothers were injured the same day. There was Palestinian shooting from the area, but the Israeli retaliation hit housing where no gunmen were located.

Civilian houses in Hebron have been fired at by Israeli military positions from military posts or settlements since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. These neighborhoods are specially targeted: Haret Abu Sneineh, Haret Al Shekh and Bab Ezzauwi. Regarding the heart of Hebron city, the Israeli gunfire and grenades have been launched from the three occupied schools, Tal Rumeida, Hadassa, Daboia, from the roofs of four settlement houses in central Hebron and from the Israeli military post on top of Haret el-Sheikh. Palestinian gunmen shoot from the streets and from houses toward Israeli military posts in the H2 area.

Evidence of indiscriminate fire has been collected. Normally, retaliation to Palestinian gunfire from one isolated place have come from all or many of the abovementioned Israeli military posts – firing on a wide area of Palestinian housing. Shots have also been fired at people moving in the streets, at cars and towards houses where lights have been turned on at night.

Two tanks at the military post at the Beit Hajay settlement have fired their light and medium machineguns towards Dhait el Seitun, Al Haraig area and Wadi il Hari. The woman Areej Sadeq al-Jabaly (19), living in Hazeitin area under Israeli control in Hebron, was hit by a bullet fired from the Israeli military post in Beit Hajay settlement on January 5, 2001. Ahlam Jibreel al-Jabaly (18) was seriously wounded in the same attack. The Israeli army's spokesperson stressed, “Palestinian gunshots fired from civilian sites endanger the life of local residents”. However, the two women were on their roof to collect the washing in the afternoon when the Israeli army opened fire. There was no shooting from this house. The women would not have gone to the roof if there was, given the experience with indiscriminate Israeli gunfire in the past.

Further, other neighborhoods are shelled from the Hajay settlement, and from Jabal Jachar. In Dura, in Khallet Sinjer, Fayzeh Mustafa Amro (26) was injured in her head by a 7,62 mm bullet during a shelling attack. The Israeli military post in Dura has been firing towards the town of Dura, Singer, and El Majnuneh.

The type of weapons used includes light machineguns (5,56 mm and 7,62 mm), medium machineguns (12,7 mm) and 30 mm shells and missiles from attack helicopters. 40 mm grenades have been widely used. The main armament of the tanks situated in the occupied school grounds has not been put to use yet (105 mm and 120 mm cannons).

A committee was formed to review the damages caused by Israeli shelling of civilian houses and infrastructure, consisting of The Hebron Municipality, the Ministry of Housing and Hebron Rehabilitation Committee. Their survey shows that 721 civilian private houses have been hit, together with 57 other public and private buildings. The estimated cost of damage is not as high as in for example Beit Jala. It might be explained by the wide use of 40 mm grenades, which spread a huge amount of small fragments, lethal to human beings but causing less damage to walls and furniture. The grenades are normally launched through windows. Also, the houses in Beit Jala have been built of more expensive material. However, water tanks and the electricity supply have been hit, with many uninhabitable homes as a result. And the scope of the shelling has been broad, spreading fear among large number of residents in the city. Some inhabitants have evacuated their homes, while around 300 people have left their homes to sleep in safer places at night – returning to their residence during the day. The municipality has provided new glass for the windows, but the repair to electricity and waterlines has been slow, due to the curfew and ongoing shelling.

Haroun Al-Joulani, Director of the Palestine Red Crescent Society in Hebron confirmed that one ambulance was targeted and destroyed by Israeli military forces at a checkpoint between the H1 and H2 areas in Hebron. The tires of the vehicle were damaged, along with other minor damage. Al-Joulani testified that it is not safe for the Red Crescent staff to move around in the city to help wounded Palestinian civilians.

Defense for Children International (DCI) in Hebron has initiated an emergency program because of the intifada and the bombardment of residential areas in Hebron. It was started in the beginning of October with a range of activities for children and their families. DCI gives lectures at schools to guide teachers in ways to observe the children and deal with those who have disorders because of the shelling. They also give lectures to parents in those areas where the bombing is severe on how to help their children (in Al Sheikh, Abu Sneineh and the Old City). They let the parents talk about their children's symptoms, and give them information and advice. In group activities for the children they organize “festivals” with drawing, face paint, music, plays, lectures and group meetings where the children can talk and express their feelings. Medical checks are performed during these festivals. Festivals have so far been held in Al Aroub and Al Fawwar refugee camps.

DCI testified that more than 500 families have been directly affected by the bombardment. But regarding the psychological and emotional damages, all the people in Hebron are affected by the fear of living under the constant threat of shelling without any prior warning.21


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5. Ramallah and Al-Bireh

One of the areas that are most frequently targeted by Israeli fire in al-Bireh is Jabal Al Tawil opposite the Jewish settlement Psagot. Psagot is located extremely close to the Palestinian city al Bireh, built on confiscated land and blocks the Palestinian natural urban expansion. Al Bireh continues to expand around Psagot, and will, in a few years, partially surround the settlement. An electrician was killed by Israeli fire while working in a building in Jabal al Tawil.22 On November 11, 2000 a missile from an Israeli helicopter killed two persons in al-Bireh (near Jabal al-Tawil), Majdy al-Jarou (30) and Osama al-Bawab (28). There have been several incidents of shooting from Palestinian gunmen towards the Israeli army post in Psagot. The Israeli army post at Psagot fires back, mostly using 12,7 mm bullets, but also 20 or 30 mm shells from helicopters or armored personnel cars. However, unlike in our other cases, it seems that they fire more discriminately against al-Bireh than against for example Khan Yunis, Rafah and Beit Jala. It has even happened that fire has not been returned because they could not positively identify the target (the Palestinian gunmen).

Further, the Sateh Marhaba neighborhood has been shelled from the Israeli military post in Beit El. Sateh Marhaba lies close to the City Inn Hotel, where clashes between Palestinian youth and the Israeli army have been taking place since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Palestinians have been using buildings under construction in this area to shoot at the Israeli army vehicles and soldiers, and most of the Israeli shelling has come as retaliation to this.

On October 12, 2000, the Israeli army launched a heavy attack on several sites in Ramallah. By their own admission, the attack came as retaliation for the two Israeli soldiers who were killed in Ramallah police station by Palestinians.23 In other words, this was a clear instance of collective punishment. Israeli attack helicopters bombarded the Palestinian police station, Fateh offices, Force 17 offices and Ramallah Radio Station, using 30 mm bullets and Hellfire missiles. 27 Palestinians were injured in these supposedly “pin-point” attacks.24 Another example of a “pin-point” attack missing its target was when Zarifeh Zakhar Zarsour's house near the Fateh offices in al-Bireh took a direct hit from a missile on October 31, 2000. Opposite this house, another four private homes were lightly damaged by the same bombardment. The Sharafeh area at the entrance to Ramallah and al Bireh has also been hit several times.

Burt out house in Betunia   Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

In Betunia and Tiret Ramallah with its new housing projects further west of Ramallah, the Israeli shelling has taken another form. Here, civilian homes have been hit when there was no Palestinian gunfire from these buildings at all. There has been Palestinian shooting in the area, against vehicles on the by-pass road. Israeli tanks have been deployed close to this road.

Many of the buildings in the Ramallah area were exposed to gunfire and shelling several times on different days and nights. The extent of the of shelling has been heavy, but not of the same scope as against Rafah, Khan Yunis, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Hebron and Jericho. However, the cases of clear collective punishment like on October 12, 2000 point in the same direction as for the other areas. Anti-tank rockets have been used to answer Palestinian gunfire. Further, our observations of exchange of fire in the al-Bireh area close to City Inn hotel suggest strongly that both the Israeli and Palestinian fire in several cases does not target anything in particular. When fire is opened after dark, both sides keep shooting in the air – sometimes hitting a house or other installations. During daytime, however, the Israeli fire is aimed at buildings and installations in the area from which Palestinian fire is believed to have come. It is obvious that the Israeli army in many cases is not able to identify the Palestinian gunmen, but opens fire nonetheless.


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6. Nablus

The areas in Nablus targeted by Israeli fire are situated close to the checkpoints where Israeli snipers operate and where there have been many clashes in the last months. The areas with damage from Israeli machinegun fire and helicopter missiles and 20 mm bullets are al-Dahia, Askar (new camp), Jabal il-Shamali and Balata refugee camp. 

Samples of debris and shells from Nablus Samples of debris and shells from Nablus  Photo by: Glen Widing

Grenades have hit Al Quds Open University. Ten helicopter raids have taken place, where between 50 - 100 20 mm bullets were fired in each raid. There have been many incidents where the helicopters have hovered above the city without firing at all. In one incident, two helicopters hovered over a funeral for Hussam Bkheit on October 2nd, firing at a house where Palestinian gunmen were located. More than 50 cartridges from 20 mm bullets fell down on people in the funeral session, near the Elementary School of Balata. On October 1, 2000, 12 year old Samer Tabanjah was killed during an attack on the old city by an Israeli helicopter. Samer's family residence was located at a considerable distance away from the confrontations going on near Joseph's Tomb.

Most of the damages in Balata come from 12,7 mm machinegun fire, together with light machinegun fire. The Palestinian police in Nablus have collected shells and bullets fired by the Israeli army. There are substantial amounts of shell debris including 40 mm High Explosive grenades, 50-80 mm mortar carrier shells, TOW missile debris, nose parts of a Discarding Sabot rounds (105 mm or 120 mm) as well as small and medium arms bullets. Fire appears to have been extremely indiscriminate and disproportionate in Nablus, given the use of 40 mm Machine guns firing grenades over larger areas while demonstrations are taking place.


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7. Gaza

The Israeli army has during this intifada for periods effectively divided the Gaza Strip into three or four sections – preventing movement from one section to another. North Gaza and Gaza City have been cut off from Rafah and Khan Yunis by roadblocks and Israeli military outposts. The Netzarim area constitutes a constant point of friction between the Israeli army and the Palestinians, and the Israeli army has been using RDX high explosive missiles in their shelling attacks on Palestinian police buildings. Netzarim junction is a key position for the Israeli army, controlling the main entry route to the Jewish settlement of Netzarim. The Israeli military spokesperson's office says that the violence that occurs at the junction “disrupts the daily life in the settlement”.25

The area around Al-Nadah Towers/Al Shuhada junction has repeatedly been hit, and more than 40 houses damaged both by shelling and bulldozing. Also along the Salah El Din street leading to the Al-Matahen junction, where demolishing took place during October and November last year. Considerable damage has also been made in Dir el Balah refugee camp, close to Kfar Darom settlement and the settlement area of Gush Katif.

A cruel act of punishment happened when Israeli soldiers opened fire randomly as retaliation for an explosion at the Dugit Jewish settlement in the northern Gaza Strip on January 1, 2001 and killed the Palestinian farmer Sabri Awad Hader (52).

On November 20, 2000, the Israeli army launched a massive attack against Gaza as retaliation for the Palestinian bombing of an Israeli school bus carrying children and grown-ups from a nearby settlement. 76 mm high explosive rounds were fired from Reshef patrol boats (ZAR 4), and five Israeli IAF helicopters participated in the attack. Shells from a ship are extremely inaccurate. Used against the densely populated Gaza City, it clearly breaches the law about indiscriminate firing and protection of civilians. Further, since the Israeli army clearly stated “retaliation” as the sole reason for the attack,26 this use of force was not justified by military necessity or according to the law of indiscriminate targeting. It was a clear case of collective punishment because of the killings of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah. Dozens of missiles were fired with no prior warning at the headquarter of the Preventive Security Service, a Palestinian television relay, the headquarters of Fateh, training installations of PPS, three Force 17 buildings. The targets were located in Rafah, Gaza City, Khan Yunis and Dir el Balah. The attacks knocked out the electricity in much of the Gaza Strip. Several civilian houses took hits in the attacks, and one Palestinian was killed and 120 wounded, strongly suggesting indiscriminate fire.27


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8. Khan Yunis Refugee Camp

The Israeli military posts are situated as close as 100 to 300 meters from the outskirts of the refugee camp in Khan Yunis. CCTV's in surveillance towers surround the whole area, and certain contact points throughout the city are unsafe even in the daytime because gunfire from the Israeli posts and surveillance towers come without warning. 

Destroyed house in Khan Yunis Destroyed house in Khan Yunis  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

The Palestinians living in the area claim that the Israeli army shoot at anything that moves, so they stay away from the view of the military posts as far as possible. All the houses facing the military posts had holes and pockmarks from gunfire. Most of the shelling comes from the Israeli Ne've Dekalim and el Tufah outposts. House walls had been hit by everything from light machinegun fire, medium machinegun fire (12,7 mm “concrete buster”), and heavier caliber like 30 mm bullets from helicopters, 105 mm and 120 mm tank rounds, and grenades. Several houses were totally destroyed, while others had so many holes in the walls that they will have to be rebuilt. Windows were destroyed, water tanks and tens of electricity generators have been hit. The municipality tries to maintain the electricity network, but the repair work is slow due to the repeated shelling. Further, people do not feel safe working in the area. The average household in the area of Khan Yunis and Rafah has eight members. The camps are full of children playing outside in sandy streets full of barricades made of sandbags. They are constantly in danger of being hit by fragments. In the al-Amal quarter, as many as 100 Palestinians have been lightly or seriously injured by fragments from shells or bullets. The woman Safiyah Musallam Abu Ubaid (40) was hit in her arm by a fragment from shells shot from Neve Dekalim opposite Block G refugee camp. There was no warning before the attack, she was doing housework when 12,7 mm bullets hit her house.

There has been no Palestinian shooting from the houses in question in the al-Amal quarter. There has been shooting against the Israeli military post in the area. However, the shooting has sometimes taken place as far as 300 - 500 meters from the houses hit by Israeli fire, making the residents uncertain or not able to clarify if there was Palestinians shooting or not. More than 300 residents of the area leave their homes at night to sleep with relatives in safer areas, but return during the day to go to school, cook, trying to lead a normal life. They are to all intents and purposes homeless.


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9. Rafah

According to the records of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Ministry of Housing, a total of 163 houses were completely or partly damaged by the Israeli bombardment in Rafah District in Gaza in the weeks before November 17, 2000. The shelling has continued after this date, and our field researcher reports another 41 homes being hit.

House used as target practice in Rafa House used as target practice in Rafa  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

The areas targeted by Israeli shelling in Rafah are Tal Sultan, Block O refugee camp, Barasil, Salah Eddin gate, the area around the Morag settlement, the whole area along the Egyptian border and Block Q refugee camp. There are four military towers surrounding Rafah, controlling every movement, armed with medium machineguns and sniper rifles firing 12,7 mm bullets. In addition, six military posts surround Rafah, each with 3- 4 tanks. Attack helicopters have been used once to shell Palestinian police quarters with 30 mm or 20 mm shells, but normally only tanks and light and heavy artillery have been used against the civilian areas. 40 mm shells from grenade launchers were found in the Rafah area. These are extremely inaccurate. Using them against civilian populated areas does not come under the Israeli army's “security needs” and cannot be justified by military necessity. Debris from mortar carrier shells was also found.

The use of tanks has resulted in several civilian casualties in the area close to the Egyptian border. In Block O refugee camp close to Salah Eddin gate, 15 year old Mustafa Akram Al-Ra'I was injured in his leg by fragments when a shell hit his family's house. Rafat Muhammed Abulibda (35) was hit in the chest by fragments from 12,7 mm bullets. Sometimes, the Israeli shelling has come as retaliation after Palestinian shooting, sometimes not. Palestinian gunmen are often not from the areas they shoot from, they come in cars – and leave after they have fired some rounds. However, the Israeli fire has often continued after the gunmen have left the area.

In Rafah, several houses have been hit repeatedly, and have marks from between 50 to 100 rounds of ammunition from light and medium machine guns. Some houses have more than 500 marks from machinegun fire. Houses close to the Egyptian border bear clear evidence of being used as “target practice”, with rounds clustered together in small groups on the walls (see picture). The Israeli soldiers are firing at this house from a post no more than 50 meters away. Other houses in Rafah bear the same type of bullet marks clustered together, suggesting a cruel act of terror against the residents in the area. Livestock has also been used as target practice, in one case we found 14 sheep hit by 5,56 mm bullets from machineguns.

Amnesty International collected extremely disturbing evidence of indiscriminate fire from a shelling attack against Rafah. On 20.12.00, shrapnel from what we believe to be an air burst shell or 40 mm grenade killed 14-year old Hani Yusuf Sofi.28 (See Chapter 3.1.1 for details).


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c. Damages to Public Buildings and Institutions

The Israeli shelling of the center of Hebron as described above was very extensive. Three schools have been damaged,29 the Othman Ibn Affan Mosque, Hebron Library, 31 stores, the offices of 2 private associations, 5 clinics, 1 pharmacy, 2 medical labs, 1 Union, 5 offices, 1 bank, 1 restaurant, the Chamber of Commerce and the Force 17 offices, along with 29 private cars. This suggests a widespread practice of indiscriminate fire. Of these examples, the Force 17 office is the only clear target. Alia Hospital was hit on three different occasions, a patient was wounded and electrical supply was cut off. Also Beit Jala, A-Dibs and French Hospitals were shelled in Bethlehem.

The police station in Ramallah hit by missiles The police station in Ramallah hit by missiles Photo by: A.K. Brunborg 

In al-Bireh, the Force 17 office, and several Fateh offices have been destroyed. The shelling of Al Bireh graveyard on November 8, 2000 cannot be explained. Further, there is considerable damage to PA ministries and local government buildings from the shelling attack on November 8. The al Bireh Islamic primary school was also hit that day.

Palestine Technical College and five schools in Tulkarem were shelled during the week before November 14, 2000.30 The top floor was significantly damaged and the holes were approximately 1-2 meters in diameter in the walls,31 suggesting 120 mm tank fire or missiles.

The Force 17 office in Betunia, Ramallah police station, Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Ramallah Radio station was hit on October 12, 2000. Ariay Arabie Medical Center and Ramallah Hospital have also been targeted. In Jenin, Palestinian police posts have been hit.

In the Gaza Strip, Force 17 offices, police stations, Fateh offices, training premises for security officers, a college and mosques have been hit. The Force 17 offices in Khan Yunis were attacked three times with helicopters, the buildings were totally destroyed. Fragments of shells hit the nearby UNRWA elementary school, damaging the windows of the building on the side facing the Force 17 offices. There were no warnings before the attacks, where four people were injured. In Beit Jala, the Orthodox Club, one church and three schools32 have sustained serious to light damage. Bethlehem Tekoa High School has also sustained damage.

In Nablus, Ma'azouz al Masri Girls Basic School, Bassam al Shak'a Basic School, Qadri Tuqan Secondary School and Beit Wazan Mixed School and alQuds Open University have been hit by Israeli fire. All together, 21 schools and educational institutions have been hit, with estimated damage of close to $ 2 million. The damage caused to electricity networks and water installations has also been substantial, including a destroyed power plant in Qalqilia.



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d. Destruction of Commercial and Agricultural Property

Sheep used as target practice in Rafah Sheep used as target practice in Rafah  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

Armored pile drivers and bulldozers have been observed all over the West Bank and Gaza Strip the past four months, sweeping cultivated land, uprooting olive and fruit trees and demolishing houses. During the al-Aqsa intifada we have seen a substantial increase in the demolition of agricultural land and commercial buildings by the Israeli army, as collective punishment. Day and night, bulldozers charge around, working on several sites simultaneously. There are several areas of the occupied territories that have been especially affected by sweeping of agricultural land and uprooting of olive trees, and the studies of Palestine Center for Human Rights (PCHR) show that mort of these areas are close to Israeli settlements, “by-pass” roads or Israeli military installations. PCHR reports that 25 000 olive and fruit trees have been uprooted, and 2 400 dunums of agricultural land demolished since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada.33

The areas with most damage are Netzarim Junction, Kfar Darom area, Rafah, Khan Yunis, and Dir el Balah in Gaza. In the West Bank, the Israeli army have been demolishing cultivated land and uprooting olive trees and fruit trees in Al Khader village, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Hebron, Tulkarem and Qalqilia. Israeli settlers have also engaged in the destruction of Palestinian private property. While the value of such damage is difficult to calculate, it is at least in the tens of millions of USD.34 Palestinians who have resisted sweeping of their agricultural land has been fired at with live bullets by the Israeli army.35

Greenhouses destroyed in Rafah by the Morag settlement Greenhouses destroyed in Rafa by the Morag settlement   Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

Article 53 of the Geneva Convention contains provisions concerning property, designed to spare people the suffering resulting from the destruction of their real and personal property. International law also prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and consequently the destruction of their means of survival (Article 54). Demolition of agricultural land and houses has for a long period been a common measure used by Israel against Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories. This punishment was generally exacted against homes of Palestinians suspected of attempting or committing violent offences against security forces or Israeli civilians. Article 53 prohibits the demolition of agricultural land, commercial buildings or houses as a punitive measure, and only allows demolition of a structure when the action is necessary for a military operation. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross' interpretation, a "military operation" is defined as "the movements, maneuvers, and other actions taken by the armed forces with a view to fighting. " These conditions do not exist in punitive house demolition or sweeping of agricultural land. International law also prohibits collective punishment of any kind, and demolition of agricultural land and buildings are a prime example of collective punishment against people who have no responsibility for the suspect's acts and were not charged with any offence. Finally, Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity, and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, is one of the “grave breaches” of the Convention, and is considered to be a war crime.


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e. Summary

As we have seen from the findings of this report, a few Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza have been responsible for attacks on the Israeli army outposts and Jewish civilian settlers in the Palestinian occupied territories. According to international law, a general terrorist threat may justify certain emergency measures from time to time. However, the doctrine of military necessity has never been internationally recognized as an unqualified license to disregard the well being of an occupied people or as a pretext to undermine their sovereignty rights. For example from the case of Beit Jala, it is obvious from the extensive damages to private houses, cars, 400 water tanks and electricity installations that the Israeli army has deliberately targeted Palestinian civilians, civilian houses and infrastructure, regardless of the location of Palestinian gunfire. We have seen that the shelling of Gaza has been especially aggressive, and artillery has been used with the intention of hitting large residential areas where Israeli machinegun fire could not reach.

The damage to electricity networks, water installations, municipal buildings, police stations, schools, hospitals, clinics, churches and mosques has sometimes had serious consequences for the civilian populations these institutions are intended to serve. There is no excuse for targeting police stations, security installations or the offices of legal political parties. The Israeli revenge attack from the air on cities in West Bank and Gaza after the killing of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah finds no excuse or legality in the laws of warfare, and comes clearly under the definition of collective punishment, a cruel act according to international law.

Our findings strongly suggest that the fire from the Israeli army in too many of the cases has been totally indiscriminate. Retaliation attacks have been disproportionate in force, and Israeli shelling of civilian areas has continued for long periods after any threat caused by Palestinian gunmen has been removed. Further, using extremely inaccurate grenade machineguns covering wide areas of civilian areas, as a response to machinegun fire or to quell demonstrations, constitutes a serious violation of international humanitarian law. It appears that there might be more professional army commanders in the Psagot settlement by al-Bireh than in for example Gaza or Beit Jala, as the military post in Psagot has mostly been firing at identified targets and sometimes holding their fire if identification was not possible. This could also have something to do with the Israeli army's own definition of Gilo as a Jerusalem neighborhood, while Psagot is a more “extreme” illegal settlement close to one of the biggest Palestinian cities in the occupied West Bank.

There are clear examples of collective punishment against the residents of Hebron. The number of houses hit, many of them night after night, suggest indiscriminate fire. However, the shelling of Hebron has more often than not taken place after Palestinian gunfire, in contrast to our other case studies. And in more cases, the Israeli fire has ceased after the Palestinian gunmen have left the area. Further, the main ammunition of the tanks (105 mm or 120 mm) has not been used. It might be explained by the presence of international observers in the city (The Temporary International Presence in Hebron, TIPH), but we have not had the chance to investigate thoroughly. This should, however, receive further attention by the relevant UN bodies and the International Fact Finding Commission, and would (if proven) strengthen the argument that UN observers are needed in the occupied territories.

As we can see from these case studies, there is an apparent link between Israeli bombardment of civilian residential areas, Palestinian shooting and the existence of illegal Jewish settlements on occupied land which cannot be overlooked in any analysis of the background and causes of the actions carried out. Israeli settlements in occupied Arab lands, which are condemned by the UN, are a violation of the Geneva Convention. According to the Israeli army's own statements, most of the shooting incidents from Palestinian gunmen are directed at Israeli military bases and outposts on occupied territory with the purpose of protecting the settlements, and not so often at Jewish settlements or civilians. However, one should not underestimate the lethal effect of a “few rounds from Kalashnikovs”. Israeli civilians have been killed and wounded by Palestinian gunfire. However, responding by using the whole range of light artillery, including tank rounds, the air force and navy, old Tow rockets and grenade launchers does not imply proportionality or discriminate fire. Military personnel would describe the circumstances around many of the cases in this study as “overkill”. Six findings are evident in this report:

1. Sufficient precautions have seldom been taken by the Israeli army in order to verify that the objects attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects.

2. Precautions have not been taken in the choice of methods of attacks in order to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilian or damage to civilian objects.

3. Attacks have not been cancelled when it was apparent to the Israeli army that the objective was not military, but civilian institutions like schools, hospitals, ambulances, churches or mosques.

4. Heavy weaponry and excessive force have been used when threats to Israeli soldiers or civilians could have been prevented with effective machinegun fire from the many Israeli military posts.

5. The Israeli army has repeatedly failed to warn the Palestinian civilian population of attacks.

6. The Israeli army has attacked, destroyed or removed large quantities of objects indispensable to the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock and drinking water installations.


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IV. INDISCRIMINATE FIRE, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT

The Israeli army have routinely been citing “security concerns” for most of the actions they take, as the functional equivalent of military necessity. On this basis they justify a number of violations of international law, such as the heavy shelling of civilian residential areas and other civilian targets, land confiscation, sweeping of agricultural land and punitive measures against the Palestinian population such as restrictions on freedom of movement, harsh curfews, assassinations, demolition of houses and commercial buildings and other acts of collective punishment. The official Israeli army mission is “To defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state of Israel. …To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of terrorism which threaten the daily life. They [The Israeli army] will use force of arms only for the purpose of subduing the enemy to the necessary extent and will limit his use of force so as to prevent unnecessary harm to human life and limb, dignity and property, of both soldiers and civilians, with special consideration for the defenseless, whether in wartime, or during routine security operations, or in the absence of combat, or times of peace.”36

In an answer to our questions regarding the conduct of the Israeli army during the al-Aqsa intifada, the military spokesperson argued that:

“The IDF [the Israeli army] is directed to act according to the principles of International Humanitarian Law. In the past months, while fighting has gone on in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the IDF has been directed to act according to the customary laws of armed conflict. The IDFs actions are judged, individually, according to the norms of International Law”.37

This section will analyze the use of weapons in the shelling attacks against civilian and commercial buildings and infrastructure. International humanitarian law and the question of “military necessity” and “collective punishment” will be analyzed in the context of the findings in the case studies. Further, the lack of warnings before bombardment and the humanitarian aspects of the military operations by the Israeli army will be discussed.


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a. Military Necessity?

Our question is: May Israel invoke security concerns (or military necessity) to release itself from tortuous and criminal responsibility that under international humanitarian law results from its treatment of the Palestinians subject to its military control?

Tanks were deployed around major Palestinian towns since the beginning of the clashes as a psychological deterrent, and fired (using their main armament – 120 mm rounds) for the first time on 21 October, 2000 as a warning to the residents of Beit Jala, next to the Jerusalem settlement of Gilo. Tanks fired again at Beit Jala on Monday 23 October without prior warning, in Ramallah on 24 October and in Jericho on 27 or 28 October. Tank rounds have later been used against Tulkarem and refugee camps in Khan Yunis, Rafah and Jericho. Later, field artillery, rockets, mortar fire and high explosive grenades have been used. The use of such powerful weapons against civilian targets cannot be justified in any circumstances. Article 53 of the Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits the destruction of property by occupying authorities in occupied territory “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”. This article covers destruction of all property, whether it is the private property or state property, i.e. that of the public authorities (for example PA municipalities, Force 17 offices, police stations and the like).

This report can only provide background analysis for those responsible to judge Israel's actions during the al-Aqsa intifada. According to the Protocol I additional to the Geneva Convention (Article 51, paragraph 5), the following types of attacks are to be considered indiscriminate, and therefore unlawful:

“…. (a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other areas containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects, and (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which could be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. ”


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1. Targeting in West Bank and Gaza: Discriminate Fire?

The Protocols additional to the Geneva Convention are quite clear on what are not legitimate targets, namely, civilians and civilian objects.38 Military objectives, on the other hand, may be attacked. The problem is in defining such an objective. Thus, Article 52(2) limits military objectives to "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."39 Article 48 of Protocol I states that “In order to ensure the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”.

International humanitarian law is based on the premise that non-combatants must be protected from the effects of war. This means that Israel's military operations must discriminate between non-military (civilian) and military targets, and discriminate in the use of force in regard to methods and weapons so that damage and suffering will be minimized. Several of the Israeli military statements during this intifada imply discrimination in targeting:

“IDF forces returned fire in those cases when the sources of the shooting were positively identified” (Israeli army statement November 23, 2000).

However, hitting ten houses in one attack where the civilians inside had nothing to do with any shooting or the houses were not fired from does not imply that they were able to locate the exact source of the shots. On another occasion, the Israeli army states that:

“An IDF force responded by firing towards where the attackers were believed to have operated” (Israeli army statement October 4, 2000)

This statement complies more with the facts on the ground, according to our field research and the findings in Chapter 3. Israel has clearly not made a sufficient distinction between persons participating in military operations and those belonging to the civilian population, resulting in massive damage to the lives and properties of thousands of Palestinian civilians.

Article 52, paragraph 3, of the Geneva Convention states that:

In case of doubt whether an object, which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.

Since 21 schools, several hospitals, mosques and churches have been hit by Israeli fire, the Israeli army has clearly not respected the rules of targeting civilian institutions.

The following statement taken from the Israeli army's website seems to indicate that its definition of military objectives is much broader than the one current in international law:

“The Palestinians must understand that firing from one position or another at settlements or IDF forces makes it a legitimate target for attack and destruction” (Israeli army statement 08.10.00).

Moreover, it appears that a clear identification of “military targets” is not made in many cases. Only three days after it issued the previous statement, the army issued yet another statement saying:

“Helicopter gunships fired last night into unpopulated areas in: Salfit, Haret el-Sheikh, Abu Sneneh, west of Beit Hagai and in the Nablus area” (Emphasis added) (Israeli army statement 13.10.00)

This statement demonstrates either disturbing ignorance or cynical misrepresentation of the facts by the Israeli army spokesperson. The neighborhoods of Haret el-Sheikh, Abu Sneineh and areas around the Hajay settlement are among the most densely populated areas in the West Bank. The neighborhoods are situated in central Hebron City, with a population of 119 230 Palestinians. There are no uninhabited houses in these neighborhoods. On the night of October 13, to which the statement refers, 16 civilian houses and one private car was hit by Israeli heavy machinegun fire, grenades and shells from the attack helicopters, while people from the whole area hid in cellars or took refugee in rooms facing away from the sources of fire. Furthermore, this bombardment – like many others – came without any warning. The Israeli army states that this bombardment was part of the punishment for the burning of an ancient Jewish synagogue in Jericho. Thus, according to the Israeli army itself, these are actions of collective punishment, which constitute war crimes according to international law.

The issue arises as to whether the residents of the shelled areas took a "direct part in hostilities". Our field investigation shows that in most of the shelling incidents, the civilians were not involved in any shooting against Israeli military or civilians. Palestinian gunfire from the area has sometimes been located close to the civilian houses hit, but in many cases Israeli soldiers have targeted houses as far away as half a kilometer from the Palestinian shooting. Further, Israeli fire did not cease after the Palestinian gunmen left the area.

Military developments in the twentieth century and the introduction of bombardment by aircraft have seriously jeopardized the customary rule of sparing civilians as much as possible. The Law of Air Warfare affirms that attacks shall be limited to military objectives. It also allows for the occurrence of “incidental loss of civilian life” subject to the principle of proportionality. The assessment of whether an attack may be expected to cause excessive incidental losses or damage to civilians, and therefore should not take place, has to be made by the military commander concerned. Israel has used attack helicopters in order to hit the target without causing incidental casualties or damage. The Israeli army stated in a letter to PHRMG on November 26, 2000 that:

“The IDF acknowledges that the appearance of helicopters may generate fear among the Palestinians as well as bad publicity for the IDF. However, the use of helicopters in fact has saved many Palestinian lives. The use of helicopters allows the IDF to use pin-point attacks on Palestinian sources of fire, which spares the neighboring population from the possibility of being harmed by less accurate weapons”.

However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the use of these weapons has not been in accordance with the goal as explained by the Israeli military spokesperson. If the weapons were used only to hit the specific target, the civilian housing in a 500-meter radius from the target would clearly have been spared. It appears that the military advantage pursued in the Israeli shelling has been to punish many innocent Palestinian civilians for the actions of a few. If so, these actions are illegal according to international law, which clearly underlines that the population must never be used as a target or as a tactical objective.40 It is common for those who make the targeting decisions to exaggerate (knowingly or unknowingly) the contribution to military action of a particular target and the military advantage to be gained from a particular bombing mission and, in addition, to expect the "smart" weapons to produce precision bombing (and thus leave civilians untouched). The reason for this is that Protocol I of the Geneva Convention sets the dividing line between an indiscriminate attack (illegal) and one that is not (legal) on the basis of expectations before the attack is commenced.


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2. Breaking New Ground

In order to assess military necessity, we will have to clarify the sorts of threats the Israeli army have been facing from the Palestinians. According to their own statement, they are up against four main arms: 1. Stones. 2. Petrol bombs. 3. Booby traps. 4. Kalashnikovs. In many of the cases mentioned in Chapter 3, the Israeli military posts or camps have been situated very close to the shelled civilian areas. When threatened by Palestinian machinegun fire, they have resorted to heavy weaponry like tanks, grenade launchers, mortar fire, attack helicopters and missiles instead of using their highly effective machineguns, including the 12,7 mm machineguns and sniper rifles stationed on high strategic points around every Palestinian city, village and refugee camp.

Pockmarked wall in Khan Yunis refugee camp Pockmarked wall in Khan Yunis refugee camp  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

The use of weapons in the vast majority of our cases has certainly not been justifiable under the principles of necessity and proportionality by which Israel has to abide. The Israeli army's claim that combat helicopters are used only when there is no better tactical measure available to them is not supported by our findings.41 These attacks have led to the deaths and injuries of several civilians in their own homes. 12-year-old Samer Sameer Tabenja was shot and killed by a military helicopter outside his house in Nablus. Samer's house was not located in the area where clashes were taking place. Even if the use of military helicopters was warranted, which is highly questionable, it is difficult to determine any acceptable military objective that could be served by firing openly on civilian targets removed from areas of major disturbance. Often, helicopters were also used to retaliate for shots fired by Palestinians at Jewish settlements, as from Beit Jala to Gilo. In this case, it is hard to see how the principle of proportionality has been upheld, since powerful missiles were used to respond to a few rounds from Kalashnikov rifles. Moreover, even when they do not actually fire, the hovering of helicopters above Palestinian towns and villages is enough to instill a sense of terror in the population. The use of blank rounds has the same effect.

Finally, arguments of military necessity or security concerns have no value in the cases where the Israeli army has used automatic grenade launchers against civilians in refugee camps. This weapon is used to kill soldiers in an open field. The effects of such artillery is indiscriminate, they cannot be targeted and generally cause casualties in a large area.

Calls for Israel to respect the laws regarding definition of a military objective in Article 52(2) or the definition of an indiscriminate attack in Article 51 are unlikely to succeed. Israel has shown a long history of ignoring international humanitarian law. Israeli shelling of civilians is not new. During the 18-year long occupation of Southern Lebanon, numerous bomb raids were launched. The most infamous incident was when Israeli artillery shells, fired in retaliation for a rocket barrage, slammed into a United Nations compound of peacekeeping troops where hundreds of civilians had sought refugee in southern Lebanon on April 18, 1996, killing 102 civilians, many of them women and children, and wounding 130 with several 155 mm artillery shells. Israel signed a treaty in January 2001 to establish an international war crimes court, but with the reservation that no Israeli citizen will stand trial. Attorney General Elyakim Rubenstein, and the defense establishment, feared that if Israel joined the court, Arab countries would try to have Israeli army officers indicted for actions they have taken during the current Intifada. The Israeli army opposed signing as long as Israel is in a state of war.42


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3. Palestinian Responsibilities

A damaged private home in Beit Jala A damaged private home in Beit Jala  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

One can argue that few steps have been taken by the Palestinian Authority or the leadership of the intifada to prevent shooting from locations with civilian residents. The Palestinian shooting towards Israeli military posts, settlements and roads has been totally irresponsible. To avoid and minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects by the Israeli army retaliation to their gunfire, PHRMG agrees that shooting should not take place in areas that are not clearly separated from the concentration of civilians.43 However, shooting from Palestinian gunmen towards settlements and military installations in the Occupied Territories does not put Israel, as the belligerent occupying power, in a position to disregard its duties and responsibilities under international law. The Israeli army claims that they fire at Palestinian ambulances because Palestinian gunmen have used them as cover. However, the 67 incidents of Israeli fire at ambulances and health personnel suggest that ambulances have been targeted whether they has been used in Palestinian shooting or not.44 The Health Development Information and Policy Institute in Ramallah reports that 50 PRCS ambulances have been hit by live ammunition.45 Others report that 101 ambulances have been hit, 21 of these are totally destroyed.46

According the statements made by the Israeli military spokespersons office during the period 29 September to 31 December 2000, the vast majority of the Palestinian shooting targeted Israeli military installations and outposts in the occupied territories, and not Israeli settlers or civilians. PHRMG regrets and does not defend those cases where Israeli civilians have been targeted by Palestinian gunfire. However, the existence of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories violates both international law and particular international agreements that Israel has signed. According to Article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention it is prohibited to transfer civilians of an occupying power to the territory occupied. The Palestinian resistance is directed as much against Israel's evident intention to exceed its rights as belligerent occupant and the consequent erosion of Palestinian sovereignty rights as it is against the Israeli occupation per se.


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b. Clear Cases of Collective Punishment

To analyze and decide if clear reprisals have taken place against the civilian population, we should first of all examine the choice of weapons and the methods of combat used. “Method of combat” refers to the way in which different types of weapons are used. Three strong arguments supports the thesis that general punishment was inflicted upon the Palestinian population on account of the acts of individuals for which they were not responsible:

First, 3 064 houses and their 21 455 inhabitants (of them 46, 9 % children under the age of 14) could clearly not all have been involved in terrorist acts or otherwise threatened Israeli soldiers or civilians. Further, 2 400 dunums47 of destroyed agricultural land, 25 000 olive- and fruit trees and the owners of this land could clearly not have been involved in terrorist acts or otherwise threatened Israeli soldier or civilians.

Second, the nature of the bombardment (i.e. the choice of missiles, rockets, tank fire, ship artillery, mortars, grenade launchers and 40 mm grenade machine guns) and methods of combat, against densely populated residential areas indicate that the Israeli army has not discriminated between military and civilian targets.

Third, Israeli army's own public statements give evidence of the fact that their intention behind several of the shelling attacks was to collectively punish thousands of people not responsible for the alleged crime:

Israeli army statement 20.11.00:

“Israeli Navy ships and IAF attack helicopters struck this evening installations in the Gaza Strip, belonging to the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatus…. The attack comes in response to the barbaric and criminal attack, carried out this morning by Palestinians against a civilian bus in the area of Kfar Darom, which was carrying children to school and grownups that were accompanying them. Two civilians were killed in this attack as well as nine wounded, among them five children and three women”.

In this attack on Gaza, 1 person was killed and 120 wounded.

Israeli army statement 12.10.00:

“Lynching of two IDF soldiers in Ramallah: In response to the barbaric acts, IDF helicopters conducted a pin-point attack on strategic PA targets with the aim of passing on to the Palestinian leadership a clear message to end the violence. The sites targeted were: The Palestinian police station in Ramallah, Palestinian police vehicles in Ramallah, the Radio station in Ramallah, Palestinian police boats on the Gaza coast and Fateh offices in Gaza”.

The attacks were apparently not so pinpointed, as 27 Palestinians were injured in these attacks in Ramallah. 6 were wounded in Gaza, 2 of them seriously. Several civilian homes were hit. Hebron and al-Bireh were also bombarded. One hour later, two targets were hit in Nablus (police stations). The shelling of Ramallah and al-Bireh cut off electricity for the two cities.

Israeli army statement 12.10.00:

“Israel Air Force helicopter gunships attacked the Palestinian Police Academy base in Jericho. The attack came as a response to the burning of the ancient synagogue in Jericho.”

The pilots allegedly reported “direct hits on their targets”, but during this attack, civilian homes were hit in addition to the Police Academy.

Pockmarked walls can be found everywhere in Rafah Pockmarked walls can be found everywhere in Rafah  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg
A home hit by machinegun fire in Rafah A house hit by machinegun fire in Rafah  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

Israel seems not to have kept a sense of proportion in comparing the “military advantages” gained with the damage done. This would provide a basis for war crimes proceedings if Israel were to be tried at an international war crimes court. Article 6 (6) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal describes “wanton” destruction as a war crime. Further, Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention includes among the “grave breaches” liable to penal sanctions under Article 146, “extensive destruction …. of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”.

Israel has resorted to frightening measures to terrorize the population in their hopes to prevent hostile acts against the occupation. They strike at guilty and innocent alike, and far from achieving the desired effect, these practices have (because of their excessive severity and cruelty) kept alive and even strengthened the Palestinian spirit of resistance.48 The prohibition of reprisals is a safeguard for all protected persons whether in the territory of PA or in areas under Israeli control. The provision is absolute and mandatory in character and thus cannot be interpreted as containing tacit reservations with regard to military necessity.49 Therefore, acts of Palestinian terrorism do not warrant violence or retaliation against the Palestinian population as such.


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c. “Superfluous injury” and “Unnecessary suffering”. Suspected Israeli use of DU-ammunition.

What about attacks that can lead to pollution of the environment or health hazards? The Geneva Convention basically bans what is not necessary to achieve the “objective of war”, or in other words what is superfluous. Hence the expressions “superfluous injury” and “unnecessary suffering”,50 fundamental concepts in international humanitarian law. These terms relate to the design-dependent effects of specific weapons on health. The prohibition intends to protect civilians and a combatant from certain weapons which are deemed abhorrent or which inflict more suffering than required for their military purpose. Therefore, according to the law, if injury or suffering resulting from an Israeli weapon's nature or technology can be proved to be excessive compared with the military advantage gained from its use, the weapon is illegal whether the victim is a Palestinian gunman or a Palestinian civilian.

Weighing the Israeli military utility against the suspected effects of DU-ammunition (depleted uranium), the conclusion is that the same purpose could reasonably have been achieved by other lawful means that do not have such effects. It is further vital in international humanitarian law that use of weapons or methods of warfare with indiscriminate effects is illegal. DU-ammunition can affect drinking water, the soil and the air surrounding the area where the shells have hit. This comes under the definition of indiscriminate effects as prohibited in the Geneva Convention.

In an answer to our inquiry of December 7, the Israeli army spokesperson's office claims that DU-ammunition has not been and will not be used.51 Likewise, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom assured the House of Commons Select Committee on foreign affairs that depleted uranium was not used in the NATO bombings of Kosovo in 1999, but it was later confirmed by NATO that it had in fact been used.

However, we have no reason to believe that DU-ammunition has been used during this intifada. No testing by Geiger tellers has been conducted. To quell rumors and gain clarity about the DU- issue, an independent party must conduct investigations.


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d. The Lack of Warnings before Bombardment

“The Israeli army does not give any warning. Therefore, the calmness of the night turns into a hell of bombardment, terrorizing the civilian Palestinians who are sleeping in their homes” (Mohammed Issa Yassin, Hebron).

On November 2, 2000, the Israeli army warned the Palestinians in one Hebron neighborhood to vacate their homes, a sign that heavy fire was planned.52 In the beginning of the intifada, some warnings were given, but dozens of missiles were fired on Gaza on November 20, 2000 without any warning. In general, there was no warning whatsoever given by the Israeli army to the civilian population before bombardment was initiated. This is also true of areas under full Israeli security control (areas B and C). Given the nature of the weaponry used in the shelling attacks, warnings should have been given to the civilian population before tank fire, missiles, rockets, field artillery and grenades were used against their neighborhoods. The lacks of warnings have resulted in incidental losses of civilian lives.

Even during the civil war in Bosnia in 1995, local civilians were warned to leave town before shells rained down on the residents. In October 2000, the Israeli media generated false reports of massive evacuation of Beit Jala.53 The majority of the residents have resisted the pressure, but 272 families have evacuated their homes, though often staying in hotels or with relatives in Beit Jala. The Municipality of Beit Jala has paid for many to stay in hotels, but due to the financial pressure on the municipality, they had to move back to their houses at the end of last year. The Israeli military spokesperson stated on October 10, 2000, that:

“The IDF is not interested in hurting innocent Palestinian residents, and therefore recommends that Palestinians living in the area from which shooting takes place either prevent the shooting or leave the area. ”

Very few Palestinians read the news listings on the Israeli army's homepage. Nothing was published in Palestinian newspapers. Further, the Israeli army's suggestion to the people to “prevent the shooting” itself suggests a disrespect of their special rights of protection under the international laws of belligerent occupation. The same disrespect was shown by the Palestinian PLC-member in Hebron, who suggested that the civilian residents form a special committee to “capture the Palestinian gunmen”, after they complained about the Palestinian gunmen shooting from their neighbourhoods.54

The people of Aqbet Jabet refugee camp stay in shelters at night The people of Aqbet Jabet rafugee camp stay in shelters at night  Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

It is often thought that the obligation, in the 1907 Hague Regulations, of a commander to warn the authorities before commencing a bombardment is a reflection of a past age of warfare. It is, however, replicated in modern form in the Geneva Convention, Article 57 of Protocol I. During World War II such warnings were given, "particularly in the case of objectives situated in occupied territory".55 The Geneva Conventions demand that effective advance warning be given of attacks that may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not allow. If civilians do not or cannot heed these warnings, the attacker is not relieved from the obligation to avoid indiscriminate attacks under Article 51, and the principle of proportionality continues to apply. In the air campaigns against Palestinian cities such warnings might have been given to enable the civilians located within Palestinian gunfire, or close to gunmen, to avoid the consequences of the attack. The often quoted phrase "surprise in attack is the key to victory" does not apply here since Israel has complete supremacy of the air, and defensive measures do not exist among the Palestinians. Thus, avoiding civilian casualties does not seem to have been a priority to the Israeli army.


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e. Terrorizing a People: Humanitarian problems deriving from the Israeli shelling attacks

Article 51 (2) of Protocol I to the Fourth Geneva Conventions reads:

The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population is prohibited.

A life behing sandbags for protection against Israeli machinegun fire in Gaza A life behind sandbags for protection from Israeli machinegun fire in Gaza  Photo by: A.K. Brungborg

The scale of the humanitarian problem resulting from living under siege cannot easily be measured. However, some indications can be given. Injury to civilians or to civilian objects may be direct or indirect. Direct injury or damage needs no further explanation, but indirect damage is often overlooked. For example electricity networks have been destroyed by air attacks and deprived the Palestinians of sources of power. This could lead to the deaths of many civilians (particularly those most vulnerable on health grounds) for a variety of reasons, from the inability of hospitals to carry out their normal functions to sewage appearing on the streets and resultant disease. Destruction of electricity installations serves no military goals as set by the Israeli army, but does function as a form of collective punishment of the people it affects. The same goes for the destruction of the al-Awda water channel in Jericho. Israeli helicopters have deliberately attacked clearly marked ambulances. Fire trucks have repeatedly been shot at. This has prevented them from providing acute health care or putting out fires in homes hit by missiles or rockets in Hebron, al-Bireh, Betunia, Ramallah, Jericho, Rafah and Gaza. Further, the situation of living under constant threat of bombardment without prior warning renders dangerous such essential activities as obtaining food, water and medical care and blocks relief activities on behalf of these populations. In addition, a cruel siege unlike anything imposed before, neither in the previous intifada nor in the days of occupation of the territories is now taking place.

More than 470 000 of the civilians that live in the areas targeted by the Israeli bombardment are children under the age of 14. Defense for Children International (DCI) reports that children whose houses have been shelled by tanks or helicopter gunships show extreme fear of darkness, of sleeping alone, of leaving the house, of staying at home alone, of loud noises and sudden movements. They have developed an increased closeness to family members, cry for the simplest reasons, and avoid places that have been attacked. Other symptoms have been sleep disturbances, hyper-activity, aggressive behavior, isolation and seclusion.56 The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations by its resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. It declares the right to life, survival and development (art. 6): The right-to-life article includes formulations about the right to survival and to development, which should be ensured "to the maximum extent possible". Children exposed to armed conflict shall receive special protection. Children shall not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 37(a)).


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f. Summary

Our study suggests a lack of professionalism in the Israeli army. The following three aims, in addition to Israel's “security concerns”, seems to have been present in the recent shelling attacks of civilian areas, especially in the Gaza Strip:

1. Testing weapons for use in the Palestinian occupied territories.
2. Training Israeli soldiers in hitting targets.
3. Training Israeli soldiers in using different weapons systems.

It would be a positive development if the Israeli army could be encouraged to take a certain pride in the professionalism shown when behaving in accordance with humanitarian law. This law is still largely rooted in its traditional origins, and is not alien to military thinking and has the advantage of being a realistic code for military behavior as well as protecting human rights to the maximum degree possible in the circumstances of the al-Aqsa intifada.

Shrapnel from shellfire has pockmarked a large number of homes. There is extensive general damage to homes in the form of broken windows, doors, and furniture. Several homes and buildings have been completely destroyed in air bombardments or shellfire. Many other homes are scarred by shrapnel. Homes have been damaged by blasts, including: broken glass, blown-in doors, and displaced walls (producing cracks).

Air assaults, intense shelling and rocket attacks, and the indiscriminate use of lethal weapons have caused unnecessary and disproportionate civilian deaths, injuries and destruction. The Israeli army have not even excused these actions as "unfortunate errors", like they did on many occasions during the bomb raids of Lebanon.

Some Palestinian municipalities and ad-hoc committees have been gathering precise evidence and estimated costs of damage after the shelling. However, we find that the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian municipalities in general have not taken this task seriously. Some of the reports we have received are not accurate, but exaggerated to various degrees. Independent engineers and researchers should have been employed in order to supply the authority with accurate statistics and information about the scope of damages caused by the Israeli army, and people suffering from damages to their homes should have received emergency support from the Palestinian Authority. Some municipalities repair broken windows and offer small amounts of money to rebuild houses, but it has not by any means been sufficient. PHRMG does stress, however, that the sole responsibility for financial compensation to the victims rests on Israel alone.


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V. CONCLUSION

Our intention as outlined in the introduction chapter was to test the claim of the Israeli military spokesperson that the Israeli use of force against the Palestinian uprising is proportionate and justified by military necessity and to investigate the scope of collective punishment against Palestinian civilians. As we have seen, extra judicial assassinations57 and the use of combat tactics rather than methods of riot control are only part of the recent Israeli violations of international humanitarian law. Palestinian civilians have also suffered from extreme forms of collective punishment. Heavy military force has been intentionally used to destroy their homes and livelihood. The intention of the Israeli army appears to have been to inflict damage to civilian property, infrastructure and life, using indirect fire weapons systems. This is also illustrated by the number of cases where the same residential areas have been shelled again and again and fire was not stopped after the threat from Palestinian gunmen was removed, and that housing up to half a kilometer away from Palestinian shooting have been hit in the Israeli retaliation attacks.

Shrapnel of machinegun fire and grenades found in a house in Beit Jala Shrapnel of machinegun fire and grenades found in a house in Beit Jala   Photo by: A.K. Brunborg

Many of the acts carried out by the Israeli army can be defined as war crimes. We can conclude that during this intifada, the well-established principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives has been rendered of little practical significance when some Israeli military “advantage” in the destruction of the object has been discernible. Add to this a political objective of attempting to persuade the PA leadership to take particular actions within its autonomous areas, and it becomes much easier to argue that anything that affects that government's actions becomes a military objective, wherever it is situated. In our case studies, there has in addition been no protection of the civilian population from air-delivered weapons. The fact that relatively few civilians have been killed or injured in these circumstances (compared with an indiscriminate attack using free-fall bombs or poorly guided missiles) is irrelevant. The use of grenade launchers and 40 mm grenade machineguns proves that no attention has been given international standards of discrimination between civilian and military targets. In the occupied territories, Israel has a clear responsibility to prohibit attacks on areas where there is a concentration of civilians. Israel's unjust and unconsidered retaliation against civilians has seriously breached international law and the rules of war. Further, the horrific nature of the recent actions has been made worse by the Israeli Governments refusal to own up to its responsibility under the Geneva Convention. The UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights have repeatedly reaffirmed the de jure applicability to the occupied Palestinian Territories of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War.

25 civilians died and 729 have been wounded as a result of Israeli attacks against Palestinian civilian residential areas between October and December 2000. The killing of unarmed civilians in a deliberate manner in circumstances where they do not pose an imminent threat to the life of soldiers is wilful killing. Wilful killing is a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and is subject to prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is particularly heinous to fire upon targets in civilian areas. The Israeli army's actions appear to have been intended to threaten the civilian populations rather than ensure their safety. More than one million Palestinians in various cities, villages and refugee camps have been living under the constant threat of having their homes bombarded. The unacceptably high number of killed in injured implies severe breaches of international law and cruelty against civilians in a situation of belligerent occupation. In our view, such a record suggests an Israeli attempt to subjugate the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Further, the character of the prolonged Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza challenges international law itself.

In this report, based on PHRMG field investigations in Israel and the Occupied Territories involving a large number of sources and statements from the Israeli army, we state that the available information indicates that the Israeli army intentionally attacked densely populated residential areas in order to inflict collective punishment on civilians. The shelling of residential areas occurred without warning, and excessive and indiscriminate military power was used against a defenseless and unarmed population.

The extent and nature of the Israeli violations against Palestinian children is extremely disturbing. Our conclusion is that there is an immediate need for the international community to safeguard the rights of Palestinian children. Further, all cases of use of lethal force against Palestinian civilians should be investigated and subjected to the processes of justice in order to avoid impunity.

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights established in its Special Session on the Occupied Territories on the 18 October 2000, that the Israeli actions against the Palestinian civilian population constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity and called upon Israel to put an immediate end to the use of force against unarmed civilians. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, expressed her view in a press release on November 27, 2000, that the Israeli security forces have engaged in excessive force, disproportionate to the threat faced by their soldiers. In her report, she recommended that the security forces on both sides should act in full conformity with the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. “Whenever force is used, the principle of proportionality has to be applied, and all necessary measures have to be taken to avoid loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian property”, she urged.

The absence of the Palestinian Authority as an agency capable of offering support to the residents under its authority in the face of measures undertaken by the Israeli army is disturbing. Palestinians are continuing to turn to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Israeli and Palestinian alike, or to seek the assistance of lawyers. No emergency organization has been set up in the PA to coordinate the monitoring of damage and to offer legal and financial aid to the victims. The PA has not initiated a thorough investigation of the shooting and shelling incidents. Most of the updated information can be obtained from NGOs, news sources and even the Israeli army.

Further, the Palestinian focus on suspected Israeli use of depleted uranium has taken the attention away from the massive collateral damage already inflicted by Israeli excessive use of force against civilians. There is no need to exaggerate or dwell on use of weapon types that have not been confirmed by independent sources, when so much evidence of massive damage already exists in every Palestinian village and town.


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Recommendations

The PHRMG demands that the international community ensure that Israel complies with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, where the rights of protected persons in situations of belligerent occupation are safeguarded. We strongly urge the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure Israel's respect of all its relevant provisions.

PHRMG calls on Israel to publicly commit itself to fully respect the laws of war and renounce, in particular, deliberate attacks on civilians or indiscriminate attacks in all circumstances. PHRMG demands effective protection for civilians.

PHRMG condemns, unreservedly, the violation of the right to life. We fear that the brutal regularity of civilian casualties may contribute to the belief that civilian deaths are an inevitable consequence of this conflict, and create an almost casual acceptance of these deaths. As the Israeli army repeatedly failed to warn people to evacuate their homes, the unlawful killing of civilians must be investigated, those responsible for abuses punished, and the victims compensated. We are calling on the Israeli Government to set up a proper judicial inquiry to do so, and to make recommendations to prevent unlawful killings in the future.

PHRMG calls upon the United Nations Security Council to act upon resolution 194, 242 and 338 in order to ensure Israel's compliance with its stipulations concerning the illegal occupation of territory by force.


  1. 1 dunum = 1000 m2.
  2. For further details about the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada and its developments prior to December 2000, see our report “Inhuman Actions Against Humanity”, The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 6, December 2000 (www.phrmg.org).
  3. David B. Holley, a retired captain with the Royal British Army (artillery), with operational experience from Bosnia and the Middle East, conducted independent investigations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in January 2001, on a mission for Amnesty International.
  4. PCHR have extensive documentation on the destruction of agricultural property and have released several detailed reports (www.pchrgaza.org).
  5. Ha'aretz 07.01.01
  6. US Air Force Law of War Manual, Doswald-Beck & Vite (1993): International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, International Review of the Red Cross no. 293, 1993.
  7. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 16.
  8. Falk & Weston (1991): The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada. Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 32, No. I
  9. Uhler, O. & Coursier, H. (1958): Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Volume IV, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.
  10. Some Palestinians are also armed with M-16 machineguns and small arms like .22 weapons.
  11. Greene, Owen (1999): Small Arms, Global Challenge: The Scourge of Light Weapons, Global Dialogue, Vol. 1, No 2, autumn 1999.
  12. FLIGHT International No 4575 Vol. 158, pp 45-99, 28 Nov-4 Dec 2000 and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
  13. Le Figaro, 01.01.2001, Visite du laboratoire palestinien “antiterroriste”, by Geroges Malbrunot.
  14. FAS Military Analysis Network, www.fas.org
  15. The Israeli Navy does not have “warships”, but the term is widely used by both Israeli and Palestinian media.
  16. Israel also has M109 howitzers and M110 howitzers, and more than 2, 469 M204 grenade launchers. Civilian Pawns: Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Human Rights Watch 1996.
  17. See Annex II, letter of January 21, 2001.
  18. PNA, Beit Jala Municipality, Statement Concerning the shelling of Beit Jala, 16.12.2000. Among the killed was the German Dr. Fisher, who was killed in a shelling attack on 15 November 2000.
  19. Rahma Shaheen (51) and Aziza Jubran (56), both from Beit Sahour.
  20. These schools accommodated over 2500 students, and another 30 schools have been shut down as a result of the curfew, leaving over 15 000 students without education (Red Crescent Fact Finding Delegation, Malta: Report on Human Rights Violations by the Israeli Army and Settlers in Hebron District, November 12, 2000).
  21. Interview with Riad Arar, Coordinator of Social Programs, Defense for Children International (DCI), Palestine section.
  22. Shehadeh Mousa el Ga'afari (27), killed on 02.12.2000.
  23. For a detailed description of what happened in this incident, please see www.phrmg.org, press releases.
  24. Rami Khaled Ramadan (23), Mohammed Ibrahim Yousef (24), Yousef Abdel-Rahman (12), Maher Abdel-Razek al-Jamal (22), Iyad Mohammed Amin (28), Muneer Abdeen (25), Ra'ed Mohammed al-Sheikh (26), Daoud al-Deek (27), Ghassan Fathi Diab (27), Mohammed Ayesh Hussein (45), Majed Khader Saqer (22), Majdy Fawzi Abu-Fayyad (25), Fadi Anwar Arif (20), Murshed Abdallah (21), Khalil Hassan (48), Nafez Abu-Fares (36), Samer Abu-Omar (28), Mohammed Salaheddin (29), Izzat Mohammed Ali (24), Maher Bisharat (28), Ayman al-Zein (29), Nihad Barghouthi (25), Tareq Shadid (21), Fawwaz Nassar (31), Ibrahim Mukahal (20), Islam Khalil (20), Mohammed al-Ajrami (22).
  25. Israeli army spokesperson statement 08.10.00.
  26. Israeli army spokesperson statement 20.11.00.
  27. Abdallah Mahmoud Al-Farra (21) was killed. He was a member of the PA National Security.
  28. See Chapter 3. 1.1 for more details, or Amnesty International's report, which will be published in February 2001.
  29. Banat Khadijh Abdin School, Wedad Naser al-Din School and Abu Dih School.
  30. Khadouri Technical College (estimated damages $ 1. 635. 000), Tulkarem Boys High School, Ajnadin Boys Basic School, Ihsan Samara High School, Al-Fadeliya High School, Taha Hussein Boys Basic School (estimated costs of damage for the five schools are $ 90. 135).
  31. The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees update, November 14, 2000 (www.upmrc.org).
  32. Wadi Damis School, Chile Girls School and the Latin School.
  33. MIFTAH operates with higher numbers: 181 000 fruit and olive trees, 3 669 000 square meters of cultivated land (Report: Losses and damages in Palestine, 29.09.00 – 29.12.00, (www.miftah.org)
  34. As of early November the PA Ministry of Finance had estimated the value of destroyed property—both public and private—in the tens of millions of USD. See Minister's statement to the Local Aid Coordination Committee, Gaza, 3 November 2000, p. 2. Since then further amounts of destruction has taken place.
  35. On 29 November 2000, three Palestinians in Al-Qarara were shot and wounded: Mohammed Ahmed El-Eddini (23), Khaled Abdel-Karim Abu E'id (27) and Mohammed Salem Abdel-Karim Abu E'id (25).
  36. http://www.idf.il/english/doctrine/doctrine.htm
  37. Letter of January 14, 2001.
  38. Protocol I, Art. 48, combined with the other provisions of Part IV.
  39. Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, ICRC
  40. International Committee of the Red Cross (1996), The Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva.
  41. Israeli army Spokesperson statement 03.10.00.
  42. Ha'aretz 25.12.00
  43. According to Article 50 (3) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention.
  44. UNSCO Report, September 28 – November 26, 2000, The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of Confrontations, Mobility Restrictions and Border Closures.
  45. Fact Sheet: Palestinian Intifada (Sep 28-Jan 23, 2001). (www.hdip.org)
  46. MIFTAH fact sheet: Losses and damages in Palestine between September 29 – December 29, 2000. (www.miftah.org)
  47. 2.400.000 m2
  48. As for example in Beit Jala, Rafah and Khan Yunis, where the people have stated their will not to leave their homes.
  49. Uhler, O. & Coursier, H. (1958): Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Volume IV, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva
  50. Yves Sandoz, ICRC Involvement in Banning or Restricting the Use of Certain Weapons, ICRC delegation to the UN and New York University School of Law, February 9, 2000.
  51. Letter of 17 December 2000.
  52. Ha'aretz 02.11.00.
  53. Israeli Channel 1News 23.10.00, Jerusalem Post and Lamia Lahoud 24.10.00.
  54. The civilians in Abu Sneineh made a complaint to PA officials visiting the area about the Palestinians who fired from their neighborhood. Abbas Zaki, a PLC member, answered that the residents of these neighborhoods should try to form a committee and try to capture the Palestinian gunmen (PHRMG testimony 13.12.2000).
  55. Rowe, Peter, International Review of the Red Cross No. 837, 31 March 2000.
  56. DCI Palestine Section Report, submitted to UNHCHR, November 13, 2000.
  57. PHRMG published a special report on the ongoing assassinations of several leaders of the al-Aqsa intifada. See www.phrmg.org


     

 
 

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