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Overkill
Israeli Bombardment and Destruction of
Palestinian Civilian Homes and
Infrastructure
Researched and Written by:
Ann
Kristin Brunborg
Consultant on weaponry issues: David B. Holley
Field research: Ann Kristin Brunborg, Gabriel Carmel,
Roula Haddad, Rustom Khalayleh, Bassem Eid, Ghassan Khader and Abdel
Rahman Ahmar
Edited by: Gabriel Carmel and Walid Hady
Table of Contents
Legal Background - Military
Necessity And Collective Punishment
- Israeli Occupation and
International Humanitarian Law
"Military Necessity" and
"Suffering for the sake of Suffering"
Collective Punishment and
Reprisals
United Nations Resolutions
Case Studies from the West
Bank and Gaza
- Types of Weapons Used
- Indiscriminate Weapons
- Shelling of Civilian
Homes and Infrastructure
- Jericho: Aqbet Jaber
Refugee Camp
- Bethlehem
- Beit Jala and Beit
Sahour
- Hebron
- Ramallah and al-Bireh
- Nablus
- Gaza
- Khan Yunis Refugee
Camp
- Rafah
- Damages to Public
Buildings and Institutions
- Destruction of
Commercial and Agricultural Property
- Summary
Indiscriminate Fire,
Excessive Force and Collective Punishment
- Military Necessity?
- Targeting in West
Bank and Gaza: Discriminate Fire?
- Breaking New Ground
- Palestinian
Responsibilities
- Clear Cases of
Collective Punishment
- "Superfluous Injury" and
"Unnecessary Suffering" - Suspected Israeli use of DU
- The Lack of Warnings
before Bombardment
- Terrorizing a People:
Humanitarian Problems deriving from the Israeli Shelling Attacks
- Summary
Conclusion
- Recommendations
Return to the Table of
Contents
I. INTRODUCTION
When demonstrations against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza erupted again on September 29, 2000, few believed that the Israeli
army would deploy attack helicopters, Navy ships, heavy tank fire, mortar
fire, anti tank rockets and even high explosive grenades targeting wide
areas, against densely populated civilian residential areas. Since the
beginning of the Al Aqsa intifada, Palestinian villages, towns and refugee
camps in Gaza and the West Bank have been subjected to thousands of
prolonged bombing attacks by the Israeli army. Israel has responded to
shots fired by Palestinian gunmen at Israeli army posts and settlements
throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip with light to heavy machinegun
ammunition and artillery. Direct fire weapons systems have been used
indiscriminately, and the Israeli army have used indirect fire weapons
like automatic grenade launchers and ship artillery. The shelling has
resulted in 25 killed innocent civilians and 729 wounded in their homes.
More than one million Palestinians live in areas that have been exposed to
Israeli fire - targeting wider areas. The worst affected areas have been
the Old city of Hebron, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Bethlehem, Jericho, Al-Bireh,
Ramallah, Jericho, Qalqilia, Tulkarem and Nablus in the West Bank and
Rafah, Khan Yunis refugee camp and Dir al-Balah in Gaza. More than 3 000
Palestinian civilian homes have sustained damages from Israeli
bombardment. Further 2 400 dunums of agricultural land have been
destroyed, 25 000 olive and fruit trees have been uprooted, and commercial
and industrial buildings have been hit sustaining millions of US dollars
worth of damage. 1
Lastly, 93 public buildings, including schools, clinics, hospitals,
churches, mosques, PA offices, police stations, electric power
infrastructure and municipal buildings have been damaged, sometimes with
serious consequences for the civilian populations these institutions are
intended to serve.
The purpose of this report is to present the Israeli destruction of
Palestinian civilian property and infrastructure and to determine whether
these Israeli actions constitute a serious violation of Palestinian human
rights. The basic assumption that informs this investigation is that
international humanitarian law and, in particular, the Hague Regulations
and the Fourth Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols, are
applicable to the ongoing situation of low-intensity warfare in the
Palestinian Occupied Territories.
The spokesperson's office of the Israeli army claims that the Israeli
use of force against the Palestinian uprising is proportionate and
justified by military necessity, an argument recognized by the Fourth
Geneva Convention. The basis for this argument is that the Israeli army's
aim is to deter Palestinian gunmen from directing fire at settlements and
by-pass roads and causing injury to Israeli civilians. In this report, the
PHRMG has endeavored to test this claim. After surveying the evidence of
damage done to housing, agricultural land, commercial buildings and other
civilian infrastructure, the PHRMG finds the Israeli army's argument hard
to believe. On the contrary - the mass of evidence gathered by PHRMG field
research, other Palestinian human rights organizations, United Nations
bodies, municipalities, PA Ministries, international organizations and
Israeli organizations suggest a different interpretation:
First, the Palestinian shootings against Israeli targets are in the
vast majority of the cases directed at Israeli army outposts and Israeli
military installations, according to the Israeli army's own statements
between September 29 and December 31, 2000. Second, the large scope of the
damage caused by the Israeli shelling point to the fact that it has not
been justified by "military necessity" in its definition in international
humanitarian law. Third, the Israeli army's "method of combat", i.e. the
way in which different weapons have been used, have been totally
indiscriminate and have targeted thousands of houses not involved in
gunfire or threats to the lives of Israeli soldiers or civilians. Fourth,
the Israeli army's strategy is to exert pressure on the Palestinian
population in order for them to exert pressure on Palestinian gunmen
shooting at Israeli military posts and settlements - and more generally on
Palestinian political leaders to make concessions in the peace
negotiations. They do this by targeting and causing extensive damage to
civilian homes, commerce, economy and infrastructure. This is a strategy
with a long history in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Its essence is to
use violence against civilians (state terrorism) in order to put pressure
on Palestinian political groups within Palestinian society.
Regardless of whether this interpretation of Israeli strategy is
correct, the vast amount of damage caused to civilian property and
infrastructure constitutes collective punishment. Collective
punishment is the punishment of the many for the crimes of a few. It is
generally perceived as immoral, and is explicitly prohibited by the Geneva
Convention (articles 33, 53), which forms part of international law.
Destruction of civilian property and infrastructure is just one form of
collective punishment usually used by the Israeli government. Other forms
include the closures and their devastating economic consequences, the
demolition of agricultural land, and the draconian permit policies and
closures.
The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter two contains a
brief discussion of the legal principles enshrined in the Fourth Geneva
Convention. The principle of "military necessity" and what criteria should
be used to judge whether a military action or retaliation was indeed
necessary will be outlined, together with the issues of indiscriminate
fire and collective punishment. Chapter three uses case studies of weapons
used and damage inflicted on Palestinian civilian property and
infrastructure to illustrate the reasons for our skepticism toward the
Israeli army's justifications. The case studies are organized under three
categories: civilian housing, public buildings and installations, and
commercial and agricultural property. Chapter four presents an in-depth
analysis of our findings and their implications.
This report will not dwell on the many and complex reasons for the
outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. 2
However, in order to properly understand the Israeli shelling attacks, it
is important to analyze it in the context of the ongoing demonstrations
and clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli army over
the issues of Jerusalem, settlements, refugee rights and
self-determination.
Finally, it is relevant to state that it has been hard to collect
information, data and statistics for this report. A huge amount of sources
have been used, including Israeli sources. But the disinformation on both
sides has made the process of collecting information difficult. Some
Palestinian human rights organizations and other NGOs, PA municipalities,
Israeli and Palestinian media, and the Israeli Defense Ministry and the
Israeli military spokesperson's office have issued inaccurate reports and
sometimes deliberately false information as to the various incidents of
violence throughout the Occupied territories.
We found it necessary to ask for the assistance of the British military
consultant David B. Holley, 3
in order to get an accurate picture of the type of weapons used - and more
importantly - how they have been used. Given our own extensive field
investigations and the variety of sources quoted in this report, we can
within a good margin claim that the facts presented in this report are
accurate. PHRMG wishes to thank Al Haq for sharing their documentation and
providing us with assistance from their field workers in some cases. A
high number of other organizations have been consulted, like the Israeli
army, Amnesty International, United Nations Relief and Works Agency, UN
Special Coordinator of the Occupied Territories, the reports of Palestine
Center for Human Rights in Gaza4,
B'tselem, Defense for Children International - Palestine Section, the Red
Crescent Society in Hebron and Ramallah, The Medical Relief Committees,
the municipalities of al-Bireh, Hebron, Rafah, Nablus, Ramallah and
Tulkarem, Hebron Rehabilitation Committee, Health Development Information
and Policy Institute (HDIP), the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights and
Israeli and Palestinian newspapers.
Return to the Table of Contents
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND - MILITARY NECESSITY AND
COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT
a. Israeli Occupation and International Humanitarian Law
Until recently, Israel defined the situation in the Occupied
Territories as "belligerent occupation", in accordance with section 43 of
the Hague Regulations. The occupying power is responsible for damage
caused by actions undertaken for military purposes, such as the seizure of
property belonging to a resident in a conquered area. In the beginning of
January 2001, Israel officially "redefined" the conflict as
"hostilities" 5.
It altered its official designation of the situation in the occupied
territories, arguing that under "new conditions" of violence it should be
exempted from responsibility of paying compensation for damages caused by
necessary military action. This attempt to claim an exemption from
compensation requirements has not met any international support. It is
widely accepted that the West Bank and Gaza constitutes occupied territory
within the compass of Hague IV and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and that
these treaty instruments constitute legal undertakings that are
declaratory of customary international law. International humanitarian
law, of which the Fourth Geneva Convention is an integral part, is
intended to safeguard the interests of the civilian population in times of
belligerency and occupation, and prohibits attacks on places of civilian
habitation.
A private
house in Beit Jala hit by helicopter fire
Photo by: A.K. Brunborg
|
Israel's Foreign Ministry has repeatedly launched intensive diplomacy
aimed at thwarting international conferences and UN sessions likely to end
with a condemnation of Israeli policies in the occupied territories. The
last time Israel was lobbying against this was when the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution calling for convening a conference on July
15, 2000 in Geneva to consider Israel's continued violations of the 1949
Geneva Convention in the occupied Arab lands, particularly the ban on
settlements. Since 1967, Israel has maintained that the Convention is not
applicable to the occupied territories, and has repeatedly denied all
legal responsibilities for their actions against Palestinians in the
territories.
Return to the Table of
Contents
b. "Military Necessity" and "Suffering for the sake of
Suffering"
The spokesperson's office of the Israeli army claims that the Israeli
use of force against the Palestinian uprising is proportionate and can be
justified by military necessity.
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War states:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or
to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction
is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.
In humanitarian law, the legality of force is based on the balance
between military necessity and humanity. Military necessity has been
defined as: "Measures of regulated force not forbidden by international
law, which are indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the
enemy, with the least possible expenditure of economic and human
resources". 6
"Military
necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor for maiming or
wounding except in fight, not the torture to extort confessions".7
Firstly, there are some actions that do not have any military value at
all and are therefore simply prohibited. For example, sadistic acts of
cruelty, pillage and other private rampages by soldiers which, far from
helping the military purpose of the army, tend to undermine professional
disciplined behavior. In this respect, it is worth questioning the ongoing
destruction of Palestinian agricultural land and theft of fruit and
vegetables from occupied territory, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Secondly, concerning actions that do have a certain military value, the
law of war insists absolutely upon the principle of humanity over that of
military necessity, emphasizing the principles of discrimination and
proportionality as described below. 8
The rule of proportionality in attacks, accepts that civilians
will suffer "incidental damage", but that such attacks must not take place
if the incidental damage would be excessive in relation to the value of
the target (the limitation with respect to military needs). It means that
Israel's military operations as well as the methods used must be
proportionate to the military objectives intended to be achieved.
The principle of discrimination is defined in Article 51, paragraphs 4
and 5 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
Israel's military operations must therefore discriminate between non-
military (civilian) and military targets, and discriminate in the use of
force with regard to methods and weapons so that damage and suffering will
be minimized.
Return to the Table of Contents
c. Collective Punishment and Reprisals
The Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 52, paragraph 1:
Civilian objects shall not be the objects of attack or of
reprisals.
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that:
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has
not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures
of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.
Retaliation shall never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge.
Article 33 derives from Article 50 of the Hague Regulations: "No general
penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on
account of the acts of individuals for which they can not be regarded as
jointly and severally responsible". The Geneva Convention Article 33,
however, takes a great step forward: Responsibility is personal and it
will no longer be possible to inflict penalties on persons who have not
committed the acts complained of. 9
Also, Protocol I to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 54, states
that "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited".
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such
as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works.
Return to the Table of Contents
d. United Nations Resolutions
Several UN resolutions and International Law treaties and basic
principles are relevant to the situation in the Palestinian Occupied
Territories. The UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states
that:
Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person. Article 17/2: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property. Article 25/1: Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services…. '
In addition to the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the
United Nations Security Council in its resolution 1322 of the 7 October
2000 condemned "Israel's use of excessive force against Palestinians
resulting in injury and loss of life". Further, the UN General Assembly
resolution 34/169 of 1979, Article 3, clearly states that:
"Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly
necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty".
Relevant principles to this report can be found in the Hague
Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESC), the Covenant of the Child
and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
enforcement Officials (8th UN Crime Congress, 1990).
Return to the Table of Contents
III. CASE STUDIES FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
In examining specific cases we have focused on the following factors:
Degree of damage to houses and infrastructure, the scope and intensity of
the Israeli army's attack, Palestinian gunfire towards illegal Jewish
settlements and Israeli army outposts in the occupied territories, and the
type of weapons used by the Israeli army and “methods of combat”, meaning
the way in which the weapons have been used. Comments will be made
regarding the situation of the different cities and villages (for example
the geographical layout and placement of settlements and military posts).
Further analysis of the cases with regard to discriminate fire, military
necessity and collective punishment will be presented in Chapter 4.
a. Type of Weapons used
“The only thing the Israeli's haven't used against us yet is the
Atomic bomb” (Colonel Mohammed Dahlan, Head of Preventive Security,
Gaza
Major misunderstandings and misinformation about type of weapons and
bullet sizes exist among Palestinian organizations, doctors and health
organizations, governmental institutions and Palestinian newspapers who
repeatedly claim that Palestinians are hit – sometimes several places in
the body – by 500 mm or 800 mm bullets. No such guns exits. PHRMG can
assure that no Palestinian has been hit by a 500 mm or 800 mm “bullet”
during this intifada.
However, the type of weapons used by the Israeli forces to shell
Palestinian civilian homes and infrastructure is symptomatic of the
excessive use of force. Israel's most sophisticated weaponry
(helicopter-launched missiles, long-range sniper rifles and hidden bombs)
has been used in the attacks. According to the Israeli army regulations,
live ammunition is to be used only when there is an immediate danger to
life. But the Israeli forces overused live ammunition, but have resorted
to weapons of war, including missiles from Apache helicopters, tank fire
and even ship artillery and 40 mm machineguns firing high explosive
grenades. Such weapons have been used against densely populated civilian
residential areas. The Israeli army has used the following weapons from
September 29, to December 31, 2000:
The Casino in
Jericho hit by dozens of 120mm tank rounds
Photo by: A.K. Brunborg
|
The category of “small arms” includes revolvers
and self- loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault
rifles and light machine guns. Bullets are referred to with caliber or mm
(millimeter). “Calibre” refers to the diameter of the bullet in inches
(7,62 mm = .30 caliber). Bullets from the Israeli machine guns carried by
soldiers are 5,56 mm, 7,62 mm, and 9 mm. 5,56 mm (.223 caliber) are
mostly fired by a M-16 weapon, which is widely used by the Israeli army.
It causes extensive damage to muscle, nerves and blood vessels, and will
fracture bones. The entrance wounds are small (no greater than 1/8 inch in
diameter). An exit wound is very large. 7,62 mm bullets can be
fired from a general-purpose machine gun (GPMG). Most Arab countries, and
Palestinians, fire 7,62 mm bullets from AK-47 and 5,45 mm from AK-74
(Kalashnikovs)10.
A 7,62 mm bullet is more stable and tends to go directly through a body
without breaking up (unless bones are hit). Israeli snipers have been
using 7,62 mm bullets that have a 600-meter guaranteed headshot, probably
fired from a Galil sniper rifle. 9 mm bullets are normally fired by
Luger or Uzi when coming from Israeli soldiers or police. Bullets used by
the Israeli army have been mistakenly identified as the internationally
banned (exploding) dumdum bullets. They are in fact from
high-velocity bullets used by the Israeli army. Such bullets cause
very serious wounds, not only in the tracks of the different fragments of
the bullet, but also as a result of the shock wave created by the impact,
due to the high speed of a bullet that reaches 1 000 meters per second.
The Israeli army has also been using blank rounds with the aim of
scaring people. Finally, many of the burnt out houses can be explained by
the “tracer round” bullets fired by the M-16, these “lights” can observed
at night. In other cases, exploding missiles or grenades have caused fire.
“Light weapons” include heavy machine guns,
hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable
anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable
launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of caliber less
than 100 mm.11
The Geneva Convention does not allow the use of bigger than 12,7 mm (50
caliber) automatic machinegun against personnel. Many Palestinian victims
of Israeli snipers have been hit by .50 caliber bullets (12,7 mm) fired
from either a M82 Barrett sniper rifle (semiautomatic) or 50 Browning
Machine Guns. During our field investigations, we found that the 12,7
mm armor piercing bullets, also referred to as “concrete busters”,
have been widely used to shell houses, fired from fully automatic
machineguns in military posts or from armored vehicles and tanks or from
sniper rifles.
The 12,7 mm sniper rifles are widely used by
almost every Israeli military outpost. They can easily engage a target at
1 500 meters. In Hebron, one can observe several of them in just one
bunker. In many cases, this effective weapon would prevent Palestinian
gunmen from firing at Israeli military posts, either by taking them out or
by preventative cover fire from a machinegun. However, in many cases,
heavier and less accurate weapons have been used instead:
Light Antitank Weapons (LAW) are
shoulder-fired, anti-armor weapons with 84 mm or 94 mm rockets. LAW
rockets are normally used against armored vehicles, but in the occupied
territories they are also used within urban structures against buildings
and people.
20 mm and 30 mm airborne cannons have been widely
used. Israel's attack helicopters are exclusively U. S. -supplied. The
AH-1F Huey Cobra attack helicopters (Israel has 40 helicopters (Tsefha))
have three barreled 20 mm cannons in a little turret in the nose of the
helicopter, firing 675 rounds per minute. The pilot controls the aim with
a reticule over his eyes. Apache attack helicopters (Israel has 42
AH-64 helicopters, expecting another 10)12
are more accurate in hitting its target, so they would be used if the
Israeli army wanted to “miss” a civilian house but hit the neighboring
Force-17 offices. The Apache uses 30 mm chain guns situated under
the body of the helicopter, also with 675 rounds per minute. Hitting
accuracy is 3,0 millirands, i.e. the bullets will fall within 3 meters
radius of the aim point, at a range of 1 000 meter. The helicopters also
have the Hellfire Air-to-Ground Missile System, which provides
heavy capability firepower. The shaped charge causes extreme damage to a
house. The Israeli army claims that they have preferred to use the
Hellfire missile instead of the 30 mm cannon, because the Hellfire is
accurate and “can go through a window”. It has been used on several
occasions in Gaza and the West Bank. However, data collected show that the
30 mm canon often has been used in addition to the Hellfire missile, or
alone.
120mm tank ammunition |
40 mm shells have been fired from grenade launchers underneath
the M-16 rifle (M203). This is not a particular accurately weapon, but has
been widely used against housing. See below for more details.
The Israeli Merkava tanks have as a main armament the 105 mm or 120
mm canons. The tank cannons fire FSDS dart rounds (an armored piercing
Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot round), HESH (High Explosive Squash Head)
rounds or HE (High Explosive) rounds. It has been used in the Bethlehem
area, Rafah, Jericho, Khan Yunis, Ramallah, Nablus and Tulkarem. In
Jericho, dozens of Tungsten Carbide FSDS round s have destroyed the
Casino. This is a very heavy metal armor piercing ammunition, and can be
dangerous to human beings if vaporized.
Further, old technology TOW rockets (TOW M114) have been used
against Ramallah, Beit Jala, Nablus and Gaza, fired from armored personnel
carriers.
RDX (Rapid Detonating Explosives) was used in two missiles to
shell two buildings in Netzarim, Gaza in early October 2000. The French
expert, Jack Frank Crispino, from Institute of Criminal Research helped to
set up a Palestinian Anti-terrorism Laboratory in Gaza, and was the one
who conducted the test on one of the missiles that did not explode. He
found several hundred grams of RDX in the hollow head of one of the
engines of the missile. After the finding, a European ballistic expert
expressed the view that: “This discovery proves scientifically the
excessive use of force: Israel would use military explosives if it were in
a state of war with Iraq or Syria, but you do not quell street
demonstrations with RDX”. 13
The Israeli army have not denied the report, which has been submitted to
the International Fact Finding Commission.
Return to the Table of Contents
Indiscriminate Weapons
Indirect fire weapons include artillery units equipped with either
field guns (howitzers), or heavy mortars. Artillery is that part of an
army that controls the bigger, long range weapons, formerly referred to as
cannons. In battle, the artillery's role is to provide fire support for
the infantry, cavalry, armor and other units. The projectile, rocket,
missile, and bomb are the weapons of indirect-fire systems. Indirect fire
can cause casualties to troops, inhibit mobility, suppress or neutralize
weapon systems, damage equipment and installations, and demoralize the
enemy. Historically, more combat deaths have been caused by indirect fire
weapons than by any other means, hence the designation of artillery as the
King of Battle. 14
The Israeli army have denied the use of Mortars. But mortar carrier
shells ranging from 40 mm to 90 mm have been found in several Palestinian
cities. We have also found shrapnel from indirect high explosive artillery
shells.
The Israeli Navy fired 76 mm high explosive rounds from their
Reshef patrol boats (ZAR 4) against Gaza on November 20, 2000. 15
Shells fired from boats are very inaccurate, and would not have been used
if the Israeli army wanted to avoid civilian casualties.
120mm tank
ammunition being prepared |
In Rafah, extremely inaccurate field artillery and M203 grenades
have been used. The M203 Grenade launcher can use several types of
grenades – we have found M406 High-Explosive (HE) grenades in Beit Jala,
Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron and Gaza. We also know that Israel has air burst
capability, M379 and M379A1 Air Burst grenades. Disturbing testimonies and
pictures were taken after a shelling attack against Rafah. On 20.12.00, 15
year-old Hani Yusuf Sofi was killed, and six other boys wounded, by
shrapnel in his head from what we believe came from an air burst shell
type of artillery or a 40 mm grenade. 16
Field artillery has a long range, is extremely inaccurate and is fired
without targeting anything in particular. It explodes in the air (air
burst shells), dispatching small, lethal shrapnel over a wide area. The
“kill radius” can be 50 meters. Testimonies collected by Amnesty
International show that there was an extremely loud bang, followed by a
big yellow flash and air pressure pushing people to the ground. In Rafah,
several roofs have small holes from shells that must have come from above,
as the corrugated roofs have been twisted all around the entry point.
These weapons were used in areas of narrow streets where Israeli
machinegun fire cannot reach. Using this type of ammunition constitutes a
severe breach of international law regarding indiscriminate fire. These
weapons have been developed to work over larger areas. In Rafah they have
been launched against civilians in refugee camps, killing a small boy.
Mu'az Ahmad Muhammad Abu Hadwan (11) was killed in a narrow street in the
al-Sheikh area of Hebron by what could well have been the same type of
indiscriminate weapon on January 1, 2001.
We have evidence that MK19 40 mm grenade launchers (also referred to
as a 40 mm Machine Gun) have been used in Nablus, and probably also in
Hebron and Gaza. Up to now the Israeli army has justified and admitted to
using “direct fire weapons systems” against targets (except the 76 mm gun
fired from Israeli patrol boats). Although the 40 mm grenade launcher,
M203, is inaccurate over ranges of 150 meter it is still classed as a
direct fire weapon. The Israeli army has consistently denied using any
indirect fire weapons against civilians. However, PHRMG has found
evidence, unexploded rounds, of 40 mm high explosive M383 grenades that
have been fired from the belt-fed MK 19 Machine Gun. This machine gun
delivers the same ammunition as the M203 but is belt fed (48 rounds belts)
and it has a range of 2200 meters. The M203 fires single shot rounds that
can be aimed, but the MK19, by definition, is a “machine gun” that
delivers high explosive indiscriminately over a large area: The blast
radius of each round is 15 meter. In Nablus, the Israeli army has been
using the MK19 to fire high explosive grenades from the Altour Mountain
against UNRWA Balata Girls School, where 31 grenades were found. One of
these grenades exploded when 10-year old Khalil Abdul-Nasser Attallah
picked it up and started playing with it. Further, the 40 mm machine
guns have been used to fire high explosive grenades against demonstrators
in Al Quds street, one of the major clash points between Palestinians and
Israeli soldiers. Fouad Adnan Dwekat (30) from Balata was killed by
such a grenade on 25 November 2000. This is one of the worst examples of
indiscriminate fire we have found so far, and it cannot be justified by
military necessity. This weapon is designed to kill enemy soldiers over
large areas (see Annex I). The Israeli army denied using grenades, but
admitted later in a letter to PHRMG using grenades “only in a few
incidents when needed”. 17
However, the large amounts of grenade shells found suggest that they have
in fact been widely used.
Return to the Table of Contents
b. Shelling of Civilian Homes and Infrastructure
1. Jericho: Aqbet Jaber Refugee Camp
Totally destroyed
building in Jericho Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
The 5 500 residents of the camp have lived under heavy shelling since
the outbreak of the intifada from Israeli army posts outside the Vered
Yeriho settlement – south of the refugee camp. Most of the houses facing
the Israeli military post had bullet holes made by 5,56 mm, 7,62 mm and
the 12,7 mm “concrete buster” bullets. Several houses have been hit with
more than 20 rounds. 40 mm grenades were found in the house of Zuhdi and
Abdallah Khatib, together with shrapnel from 90 mm Mortar carrier shells
and shrapnel from artillery. They have dug a bomb shelter in the garden to
hide from the shelling at night. Several 120 mm tank dart rounds that have
gone through 20-30 walls and exited on the other side of the building have
destroyed the Casino in Jericho.
The shelling took place at night, and people were afraid to sleep
there. They never know which side of the camp will be hit next, as the
Israeli fire have been directed at all parts of the camp. The Israeli
army's fire has sometimes been in response to Palestinian fire, but on
other occasions the army has initiated attacks. In general, Israeli
gunfire or tank rounds have targeted civilian houses regardless of the
location of the Palestinian machinegun fire. Also, Israeli gunfire has
continued after the Palestinian gunmen left the area. This strongly
suggests indiscriminate firing by the Israeli army. The children in the
camp could not sleep, thus schools started later in the day than usual.
People of the camp went to sleep by the roadside or outside buildings
closer to the center of Jericho, because any movement in the camp at night
could trigger Israeli fire. People were also afraid of an event where the
settlers would come to the camp, as they have no defense. They called upon
the United Nations to protect them.
The main types of damage observed were destroyed walls, windows, doors,
water tanks, electricity, furniture, and agricultural land. In one attack
15 000 chickens were killed when an Israeli shell hit the water tanks on a
farm, drowning the chickens.
The settlement of Vered Yeriho is situated some 200 meters above the
refugee camp. Below the settlement lies an Israeli military post.
Palestinian machineguns are fired at random at the settlement. PHRMG was
not allowed to enter Vered Yeriho to review the damages done by
Palestinian gunfire.
Return to the Table of Contents
2. Bethlehem
The main area of clashes has been around Rachel's Tomb, were the
Israeli army have deployed soldiers to give Jews easier access to the holy
site. This military post is placed close to the center of Bethlehem, with
the nearest Palestinian refugee camp located 200 meters away.
The areas targeted by Israeli shelling are mostly Aida and al-Azza (Beit
Jibrin) refugee camps, Bethlehem city, along with the western villages of
Houssan and Nahalin. The southern village of al-Khader has also sustained
considerable damage. The villages of Beit Jala and Beit Sahour will be
analyzed separately. Again, the main type of weapons have been light and
medium machine guns, together with 30 mm shells from attack helicopters,
tank rounds, grenades and TOW rockets.
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3. Beit Jala and Beit Sahour
The small Christian village of Beit Jala outside Bethlehem suffered
from Israeli shelling almost every night from early October. It was
bombarded by the Israeli army from locations at the Gilo settlement
opposite to Beit Jala. The total number of shelled civilian homes and
public buildings in Beit Jala is to this date 438, three people have been
killed and 300 injured in the shelling. 18
House hit by tank
fire in Beir Jala Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
The official Israeli position is that Palestinian gunfire targeting the
Gilo settlement from private houses in Beit Jala has triggered the Israeli
army's extensive use of tank rounds, grenade launchers, 20 mm and 30 mm
canon fire from helicopter gun ships and machinegun fire against the
Palestinian village. Light and medium machinegun fire (also 12,7 mm
bullets from sniper rifles) have been widely used. Gilo is situated
approximately 900 meters away from Beit Jala, and using light machine guns
have not had a great impact in many of the cases, except causing many
stray bullets. However, some parts of Beit Jala are closer to Gilo than
others. TOW rockets have also been used against Beit Jala, together with
anti-tank rockets. Debris from heavy artillery was found.
It is obvious that the large numbers of homes and families that have
been shelled are unlikely to have been involved in Palestinian shooting
incidents. Further, our studies of the shelling of Beit Jala shows clear
cases of indiscriminate fire. In several cases, Palestinian gunmen have
fired three or four rounds against Gilo and run away. The Israeli army has
responded to the fire for a long time after the gunmen left, also in those
cases where the Israeli military spokesperson claim, “they positively
identified the target and returned fire”.
Gilo is an Israeli settlements that lie on land that was seized from
the Palestinian town of Beit Jala. It was built in violation of
international law. On our field visit to the Gilo settlement, we observed
a small number of bullet holes in the walls of the houses facing Beit Jala.
Around ten windows were covered with sandbags for protection. We did not
observe damaged windows, although Palestinian bullets probably smashed
those with sandbags.
Along the roadside facing Beit Jala, the Gilo settlement is equipped
with concrete barriers for protection against Palestinian gunfire. No such
protection exists in Beit Jala. Further, the civilian houses of Beit Jala
are situated far below the borders of the Gilo settlement from where the
Israeli army is firing its shells. This makes it easy for the Israeli
soldiers to hit their targets, while Palestinian machineguns are fired at
random.
Destroyed houses in
Beit Sahour Photo by: Glen Widing |
Beit Sahour have been fired at from the Israeli military camp Shidma,
dividing areas A and C. The camp is approximately 300 meters from the
heavily shelled houses. Eight homes in Beit Sahour have been completely
destroyed so far, while 253 homes have been damaged to varying degrees.
130 families have had to evacuate their homes due to damage from Israeli
fire. Those who have been unable to move in with family or friends were
moved to an emergency camp set up by the Beit Sahour Emergency Committee.
Machinegun fire, helicopter cannons and tank fire have hit Beit Sahour.
Shrapnel from mortar carrier shells was found, together with heavier
pieces of artillery. On October 25, a Palestinian civil defense vehicle
coming to put out a fire started because of the shelling was shot at and
prevented from reaching the house. In the assassination case of Hussein
Abayat on November 9, 2000, three Hellfire missiles were launched, killing
two Palestinian women walking in the street when two attack helicopters
and 200 soldiers were deployed to hit one car. 19
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4. Hebron
During the 63 days between October 1 and December 3, the residents in
the Hebron area experienced only 7 days without shelling from the Israeli
army. People live in a state of terror at night, while closure, curfew and
limited medical relief make their lives even more difficult. 20 % of the
city is under Israeli control (H2 Area), where 50 000 Palestinians live.
Families live in shelters in wet basements of their buildings to avoid
casualties.
Destroyed water
tanks Photo by: Glen Widing |
During three days, 1 – 3 October 2000, the Israeli army occupied three
Palestinian schools; Johar Basic School for Girls, Osama Basic School for
girls and Al-Ma'aref Basic school for boys. 20
They transformed the schools into military camps, setting up tanks and
putting machineguns on the roofs. These schools offer strategic positions
overlooking al-Sheikh, Abu Sneineh, Jabal al Rahme and Jabal Johar
neighborhoods in the center of Hebron city. Abdel Aziz Abu Sneineh (58)
was killed by a missile from Jabal Jauhar to the Abu Sneineh area on
October 23, 2000. On January 1, 2001, Muath Ahmad Abu-Hadwan (11) was
killed in al-Sheikh when a high explosive grenade or air burst shell hit a
wall close to where he was standing. Fragments hit his head. Two brothers
were injured the same day. There was Palestinian shooting from the area,
but the Israeli retaliation hit housing where no gunmen were located.
Civilian houses in Hebron have been fired at by Israeli military
positions from military posts or settlements since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa
intifada. These neighborhoods are specially targeted: Haret Abu Sneineh,
Haret Al Shekh and Bab Ezzauwi. Regarding the heart of Hebron city, the
Israeli gunfire and grenades have been launched from the three occupied
schools, Tal Rumeida, Hadassa, Daboia, from the roofs of four settlement
houses in central Hebron and from the Israeli military post on top of
Haret el-Sheikh. Palestinian gunmen shoot from the streets and from houses
toward Israeli military posts in the H2 area.
Evidence of indiscriminate fire has been collected. Normally,
retaliation to Palestinian gunfire from one isolated place have come from
all or many of the abovementioned Israeli military posts – firing
on a wide area of Palestinian housing. Shots have also been fired at
people moving in the streets, at cars and towards houses where lights have
been turned on at night.
Two tanks at the military post at the Beit Hajay settlement have fired
their light and medium machineguns towards Dhait el Seitun, Al Haraig area
and Wadi il Hari. The woman Areej Sadeq al-Jabaly (19), living in Hazeitin
area under Israeli control in Hebron, was hit by a bullet fired from the
Israeli military post in Beit Hajay settlement on January 5, 2001. Ahlam
Jibreel al-Jabaly (18) was seriously wounded in the same attack. The
Israeli army's spokesperson stressed, “Palestinian gunshots fired from
civilian sites endanger the life of local residents”. However, the two
women were on their roof to collect the washing in the afternoon when the
Israeli army opened fire. There was no shooting from this house. The women
would not have gone to the roof if there was, given the experience with
indiscriminate Israeli gunfire in the past.
Further, other neighborhoods are shelled from the Hajay settlement, and
from Jabal Jachar. In Dura, in Khallet Sinjer, Fayzeh Mustafa Amro (26)
was injured in her head by a 7,62 mm bullet during a shelling attack. The
Israeli military post in Dura has been firing towards the town of Dura,
Singer, and El Majnuneh.
The type of weapons used includes light machineguns (5,56 mm and 7,62
mm), medium machineguns (12,7 mm) and 30 mm shells and missiles from
attack helicopters. 40 mm grenades have been widely used. The main
armament of the tanks situated in the occupied school grounds has not been
put to use yet (105 mm and 120 mm cannons).
A committee was formed to review the damages caused by Israeli shelling
of civilian houses and infrastructure, consisting of The Hebron
Municipality, the Ministry of Housing and Hebron Rehabilitation Committee.
Their survey shows that 721 civilian private houses have been hit,
together with 57 other public and private buildings. The estimated cost of
damage is not as high as in for example Beit Jala. It might be explained
by the wide use of 40 mm grenades, which spread a huge amount of small
fragments, lethal to human beings but causing less damage to walls and
furniture. The grenades are normally launched through windows. Also, the
houses in Beit Jala have been built of more expensive material. However,
water tanks and the electricity supply have been hit, with many
uninhabitable homes as a result. And the scope of the shelling has been
broad, spreading fear among large number of residents in the city. Some
inhabitants have evacuated their homes, while around 300 people have left
their homes to sleep in safer places at night – returning to their
residence during the day. The municipality has provided new glass for the
windows, but the repair to electricity and waterlines has been slow, due
to the curfew and ongoing shelling.
Haroun Al-Joulani, Director of the Palestine Red Crescent Society in
Hebron confirmed that one ambulance was targeted and destroyed by Israeli
military forces at a checkpoint between the H1 and H2 areas in Hebron. The
tires of the vehicle were damaged, along with other minor damage. Al-Joulani
testified that it is not safe for the Red Crescent staff to move around in
the city to help wounded Palestinian civilians.
Defense for Children International (DCI) in Hebron has initiated an
emergency program because of the intifada and the bombardment of
residential areas in Hebron. It was started in the beginning of October
with a range of activities for children and their families. DCI gives
lectures at schools to guide teachers in ways to observe the children and
deal with those who have disorders because of the shelling. They also give
lectures to parents in those areas where the bombing is severe on how to
help their children (in Al Sheikh, Abu Sneineh and the Old City). They let
the parents talk about their children's symptoms, and give them
information and advice. In group activities for the children they organize
“festivals” with drawing, face paint, music, plays, lectures and group
meetings where the children can talk and express their feelings. Medical
checks are performed during these festivals. Festivals have so far been
held in Al Aroub and Al Fawwar refugee camps.
DCI testified that more than 500 families have been directly affected
by the bombardment. But regarding the psychological and emotional damages,
all the people in Hebron are affected by the fear of living under the
constant threat of shelling without any prior warning. 21
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5. Ramallah and Al-Bireh
One of the areas that are most frequently targeted by Israeli fire in
al-Bireh is Jabal Al Tawil opposite the Jewish settlement Psagot. Psagot
is located extremely close to the Palestinian city al Bireh, built on
confiscated land and blocks the Palestinian natural urban expansion. Al
Bireh continues to expand around Psagot, and will, in a few years,
partially surround the settlement. An electrician was killed by Israeli
fire while working in a building in Jabal al Tawil. 22
On November 11, 2000 a missile from an Israeli helicopter killed two
persons in al-Bireh (near Jabal al-Tawil), Majdy al-Jarou (30) and Osama
al-Bawab (28). There have been several incidents of shooting from
Palestinian gunmen towards the Israeli army post in Psagot. The Israeli
army post at Psagot fires back, mostly using 12,7 mm bullets, but also 20
or 30 mm shells from helicopters or armored personnel cars. However,
unlike in our other cases, it seems that they fire more discriminately
against al-Bireh than against for example Khan Yunis, Rafah and Beit Jala.
It has even happened that fire has not been returned because they could
not positively identify the target (the Palestinian gunmen).
Further, the Sateh Marhaba neighborhood has been shelled from the
Israeli military post in Beit El. Sateh Marhaba lies close to the City Inn
Hotel, where clashes between Palestinian youth and the Israeli army have
been taking place since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Palestinians
have been using buildings under construction in this area to shoot at the
Israeli army vehicles and soldiers, and most of the Israeli shelling has
come as retaliation to this.
On October 12, 2000, the Israeli army launched a heavy attack on
several sites in Ramallah. By their own admission, the attack came as
retaliation for the two Israeli soldiers who were killed in Ramallah
police station by Palestinians. 23
In other words, this was a clear instance of collective punishment.
Israeli attack helicopters bombarded the Palestinian police station, Fateh
offices, Force 17 offices and Ramallah Radio Station, using 30 mm bullets
and Hellfire missiles. 27 Palestinians were injured in these supposedly
“pin-point” attacks.24
Another example of a “pin-point” attack missing its target was when
Zarifeh Zakhar Zarsour's house near the Fateh offices in al-Bireh took a
direct hit from a missile on October 31, 2000. Opposite this house,
another four private homes were lightly damaged by the same bombardment.
The Sharafeh area at the entrance to Ramallah and al Bireh has also been
hit several times.
Burt out house in
Betunia Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
In Betunia and Tiret Ramallah with its new housing projects further
west of Ramallah, the Israeli shelling has taken another form. Here,
civilian homes have been hit when there was no Palestinian gunfire from
these buildings at all. There has been Palestinian shooting in the area,
against vehicles on the by-pass road. Israeli tanks have been deployed
close to this road.
Many of the buildings in the Ramallah area were exposed to gunfire and
shelling several times on different days and nights. The extent of the of
shelling has been heavy, but not of the same scope as against Rafah, Khan
Yunis, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Hebron and Jericho. However, the cases of
clear collective punishment like on October 12, 2000 point in the same
direction as for the other areas. Anti-tank rockets have been used to
answer Palestinian gunfire. Further, our observations of exchange of fire
in the al-Bireh area close to City Inn hotel suggest strongly that both
the Israeli and Palestinian fire in several cases does not target anything
in particular. When fire is opened after dark, both sides keep shooting in
the air – sometimes hitting a house or other installations. During
daytime, however, the Israeli fire is aimed at buildings and installations
in the area from which Palestinian fire is believed to have come. It is
obvious that the Israeli army in many cases is not able to identify the
Palestinian gunmen, but opens fire nonetheless.
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6. Nablus
The areas in Nablus targeted by Israeli fire are situated close to the
checkpoints where Israeli snipers operate and where there have been many
clashes in the last months. The areas with damage from Israeli machinegun
fire and helicopter missiles and 20 mm bullets are al-Dahia, Askar (new
camp), Jabal il-Shamali and Balata refugee camp.
Samples of debris
and shells from Nablus Photo by: Glen Widing |
Grenades have hit Al Quds Open University. Ten helicopter raids have
taken place, where between 50 - 100 20 mm bullets were fired in each raid.
There have been many incidents where the helicopters have hovered above
the city without firing at all. In one incident, two helicopters hovered
over a funeral for Hussam Bkheit on October 2nd, firing at a house where
Palestinian gunmen were located. More than 50 cartridges from 20 mm
bullets fell down on people in the funeral session, near the Elementary
School of Balata. On October 1, 2000, 12 year old Samer Tabanjah was
killed during an attack on the old city by an Israeli helicopter. Samer's
family residence was located at a considerable distance away from the
confrontations going on near Joseph's Tomb.
Most of the damages in Balata come from 12,7 mm machinegun fire,
together with light machinegun fire. The Palestinian police in Nablus have
collected shells and bullets fired by the Israeli army. There are
substantial amounts of shell debris including 40 mm High Explosive
grenades, 50-80 mm mortar carrier shells, TOW missile debris, nose parts
of a Discarding Sabot rounds (105 mm or 120 mm) as well as small and
medium arms bullets. Fire appears to have been extremely indiscriminate
and disproportionate in Nablus, given the use of 40 mm Machine guns firing
grenades over larger areas while demonstrations are taking place.
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7. Gaza
The Israeli army has during this intifada for periods effectively
divided the Gaza Strip into three or four sections – preventing movement
from one section to another. North Gaza and Gaza City have been cut off
from Rafah and Khan Yunis by roadblocks and Israeli military outposts. The
Netzarim area constitutes a constant point of friction between the Israeli
army and the Palestinians, and the Israeli army has been using RDX high
explosive missiles in their shelling attacks on Palestinian police
buildings. Netzarim junction is a key position for the Israeli army,
controlling the main entry route to the Jewish settlement of Netzarim. The
Israeli military spokesperson's office says that the violence that occurs
at the junction “disrupts the daily life in the settlement”. 25
The area around Al-Nadah Towers/Al Shuhada junction has repeatedly been
hit, and more than 40 houses damaged both by shelling and bulldozing. Also
along the Salah El Din street leading to the Al-Matahen junction, where
demolishing took place during October and November last year. Considerable
damage has also been made in Dir el Balah refugee camp, close to Kfar
Darom settlement and the settlement area of Gush Katif.
A cruel act of punishment happened when Israeli soldiers opened fire
randomly as retaliation for an explosion at the Dugit Jewish settlement in
the northern Gaza Strip on January 1, 2001 and killed the Palestinian
farmer Sabri Awad Hader (52).
On November 20, 2000, the Israeli army launched a massive attack
against Gaza as retaliation for the Palestinian bombing of an Israeli
school bus carrying children and grown-ups from a nearby settlement. 76 mm
high explosive rounds were fired from Reshef patrol boats (ZAR 4), and
five Israeli IAF helicopters participated in the attack. Shells from a
ship are extremely inaccurate. Used against the densely populated Gaza
City, it clearly breaches the law about indiscriminate firing and
protection of civilians. Further, since the Israeli army clearly stated
“retaliation” as the sole reason for the attack, 26
this use of force was not justified by military necessity or according to
the law of indiscriminate targeting. It was a clear case of collective
punishment because of the killings of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah.
Dozens of missiles were fired with no prior warning at the headquarter of
the Preventive Security Service, a Palestinian television relay, the
headquarters of Fateh, training installations of PPS, three Force 17
buildings. The targets were located in Rafah, Gaza City, Khan Yunis and
Dir el Balah. The attacks knocked out the electricity in much of the Gaza
Strip. Several civilian houses took hits in the attacks, and one
Palestinian was killed and 120 wounded, strongly suggesting indiscriminate
fire.27
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8. Khan Yunis Refugee Camp
The Israeli military posts are situated as close as 100 to 300 meters
from the outskirts of the refugee camp in Khan Yunis. CCTV's in
surveillance towers surround the whole area, and certain contact points
throughout the city are unsafe even in the daytime because gunfire from
the Israeli posts and surveillance towers come without warning.
Destroyed house in
Khan Yunis Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
The Palestinians living in the area claim that the Israeli army shoot
at anything that moves, so they stay away from the view of the military
posts as far as possible. All the houses facing the military posts had
holes and pockmarks from gunfire. Most of the shelling comes from the
Israeli Ne've Dekalim and el Tufah outposts. House walls had been hit by
everything from light machinegun fire, medium machinegun fire (12,7 mm
“concrete buster”), and heavier caliber like 30 mm bullets from
helicopters, 105 mm and 120 mm tank rounds, and grenades. Several houses
were totally destroyed, while others had so many holes in the walls that
they will have to be rebuilt. Windows were destroyed, water tanks and tens
of electricity generators have been hit. The municipality tries to
maintain the electricity network, but the repair work is slow due to the
repeated shelling. Further, people do not feel safe working in the area.
The average household in the area of Khan Yunis and Rafah has eight
members. The camps are full of children playing outside in sandy streets
full of barricades made of sandbags. They are constantly in danger of
being hit by fragments. In the al-Amal quarter, as many as 100
Palestinians have been lightly or seriously injured by fragments from
shells or bullets. The woman Safiyah Musallam Abu Ubaid (40) was hit in
her arm by a fragment from shells shot from Neve Dekalim opposite Block G
refugee camp. There was no warning before the attack, she was doing
housework when 12,7 mm bullets hit her house.
There has been no Palestinian shooting from the houses in question in
the al-Amal quarter. There has been shooting against the Israeli military
post in the area. However, the shooting has sometimes taken place as far
as 300 - 500 meters from the houses hit by Israeli fire, making the
residents uncertain or not able to clarify if there was Palestinians
shooting or not. More than 300 residents of the area leave their homes at
night to sleep with relatives in safer areas, but return during the day to
go to school, cook, trying to lead a normal life. They are to all intents
and purposes homeless.
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9. Rafah
According to the records of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Ministry of
Housing, a total of 163 houses were completely or partly damaged by the
Israeli bombardment in Rafah District in Gaza in the weeks before November
17, 2000. The shelling has continued after this date, and our field
researcher reports another 41 homes being hit.
House used as
target practice in Rafa Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
The areas targeted by Israeli shelling in Rafah are Tal Sultan, Block O
refugee camp, Barasil, Salah Eddin gate, the area around the Morag
settlement, the whole area along the Egyptian border and Block Q refugee
camp. There are four military towers surrounding Rafah, controlling every
movement, armed with medium machineguns and sniper rifles firing 12,7 mm
bullets. In addition, six military posts surround Rafah, each with 3- 4
tanks. Attack helicopters have been used once to shell Palestinian police
quarters with 30 mm or 20 mm shells, but normally only tanks and light and
heavy artillery have been used against the civilian areas. 40 mm shells
from grenade launchers were found in the Rafah area. These are extremely
inaccurate. Using them against civilian populated areas does not come
under the Israeli army's “security needs” and cannot be justified by
military necessity. Debris from mortar carrier shells was also found.
The use of tanks has resulted in several civilian casualties in the
area close to the Egyptian border. In Block O refugee camp close to Salah
Eddin gate, 15 year old Mustafa Akram Al-Ra'I was injured in his leg by
fragments when a shell hit his family's house. Rafat Muhammed Abulibda
(35) was hit in the chest by fragments from 12,7 mm bullets. Sometimes,
the Israeli shelling has come as retaliation after Palestinian shooting,
sometimes not. Palestinian gunmen are often not from the areas they shoot
from, they come in cars – and leave after they have fired some rounds.
However, the Israeli fire has often continued after the gunmen have left
the area.
In Rafah, several houses have been hit repeatedly, and have marks from
between 50 to 100 rounds of ammunition from light and medium machine guns.
Some houses have more than 500 marks from machinegun fire. Houses close to
the Egyptian border bear clear evidence of being used as “target
practice”, with rounds clustered together in small groups on the walls
(see picture). The Israeli soldiers are firing at this house from a post
no more than 50 meters away. Other houses in Rafah bear the same type of
bullet marks clustered together, suggesting a cruel act of terror against
the residents in the area. Livestock has also been used as target
practice, in one case we found 14 sheep hit by 5,56 mm bullets from
machineguns.
Amnesty International collected extremely disturbing evidence of
indiscriminate fire from a shelling attack against Rafah. On 20.12.00,
shrapnel from what we believe to be an air burst shell or 40 mm grenade
killed 14-year old Hani Yusuf Sofi. 28
(See Chapter 3.1.1 for details).
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c. Damages to Public Buildings and Institutions
The Israeli shelling of the center of Hebron as described above was
very extensive. Three schools have been damaged, 29
the Othman Ibn Affan Mosque, Hebron Library, 31 stores, the offices of 2
private associations, 5 clinics, 1 pharmacy, 2 medical labs, 1 Union, 5
offices, 1 bank, 1 restaurant, the Chamber of Commerce and the Force 17
offices, along with 29 private cars. This suggests a widespread practice
of indiscriminate fire. Of these examples, the Force 17 office is the only
clear target. Alia Hospital was hit on three different occasions, a
patient was wounded and electrical supply was cut off. Also Beit Jala,
A-Dibs and French Hospitals were shelled in Bethlehem.
The police station
in Ramallah hit by missiles Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
In al-Bireh, the Force 17 office, and several Fateh offices have been
destroyed. The shelling of Al Bireh graveyard on November 8, 2000 cannot
be explained. Further, there is considerable damage to PA ministries and
local government buildings from the shelling attack on November 8. The al
Bireh Islamic primary school was also hit that day.
Palestine Technical College and five schools in Tulkarem were shelled
during the week before November 14, 2000. 30
The top floor was significantly damaged and the holes were approximately
1-2 meters in diameter in the walls,31
suggesting 120 mm tank fire or missiles.
The Force 17 office in Betunia, Ramallah police station, Palestine
Central Bureau of Statistics, Ramallah Radio station was hit on October
12, 2000. Ariay Arabie Medical Center and Ramallah Hospital have also been
targeted. In Jenin, Palestinian police posts have been hit.
In the Gaza Strip, Force 17 offices, police stations, Fateh offices,
training premises for security officers, a college and mosques have been
hit. The Force 17 offices in Khan Yunis were attacked three times with
helicopters, the buildings were totally destroyed. Fragments of shells hit
the nearby UNRWA elementary school, damaging the windows of the building
on the side facing the Force 17 offices. There were no warnings before the
attacks, where four people were injured. In Beit Jala, the Orthodox Club,
one church and three schools 32
have sustained serious to light damage. Bethlehem Tekoa High School has
also sustained damage.
In Nablus, Ma'azouz al Masri Girls Basic School, Bassam al Shak'a Basic
School, Qadri Tuqan Secondary School and Beit Wazan Mixed School and
alQuds Open University have been hit by Israeli fire. All together, 21
schools and educational institutions have been hit, with estimated damage
of close to $ 2 million. The damage caused to electricity networks and
water installations has also been substantial, including a destroyed power
plant in Qalqilia.
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d. Destruction of Commercial and Agricultural
Property
Sheep used as
target practice in Rafah Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
Armored pile drivers and bulldozers have been observed all over the
West Bank and Gaza Strip the past four months, sweeping cultivated land,
uprooting olive and fruit trees and demolishing houses. During the al-Aqsa
intifada we have seen a substantial increase in the demolition of
agricultural land and commercial buildings by the Israeli army, as
collective punishment. Day and night, bulldozers charge around, working on
several sites simultaneously. There are several areas of the occupied
territories that have been especially affected by sweeping of agricultural
land and uprooting of olive trees, and the studies of Palestine Center for
Human Rights (PCHR) show that mort of these areas are close to Israeli
settlements, “by-pass” roads or Israeli military installations. PCHR
reports that 25 000 olive and fruit trees have been uprooted, and 2 400
dunums of agricultural land demolished since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa
intifada. 33
The areas with most damage are Netzarim Junction, Kfar Darom area,
Rafah, Khan Yunis, and Dir el Balah in Gaza. In the West Bank, the Israeli
army have been demolishing cultivated land and uprooting olive trees and
fruit trees in Al Khader village, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Hebron, Tulkarem
and Qalqilia. Israeli settlers have also engaged in the destruction of
Palestinian private property. While the value of such damage is difficult
to calculate, it is at least in the tens of millions of USD. 34
Palestinians who have resisted sweeping of their agricultural land has
been fired at with live bullets by the Israeli army.35
Greenhouses
destroyed in Rafa by the Morag settlement Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
Article 53 of the Geneva Convention contains provisions concerning
property, designed to spare people the suffering resulting from the
destruction of their real and personal property. International law also
prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and
consequently the destruction of their means of survival (Article 54).
Demolition of agricultural land and houses has for a long period been a
common measure used by Israel against Palestinian residents of the
Occupied Territories. This punishment was generally exacted against homes
of Palestinians suspected of attempting or committing violent offences
against security forces or Israeli civilians. Article 53 prohibits the
demolition of agricultural land, commercial buildings or houses as a
punitive measure, and only allows demolition of a structure when the
action is necessary for a military operation. According to the
International Committee of the Red Cross' interpretation, a "military
operation" is defined as "the movements, maneuvers, and other actions
taken by the armed forces with a view to fighting. " These conditions do
not exist in punitive house demolition or sweeping of agricultural land.
International law also prohibits collective punishment of any kind, and
demolition of agricultural land and buildings are a prime example of
collective punishment against people who have no responsibility for the
suspect's acts and were not charged with any offence. Finally, Article 147
of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that extensive destruction of
property, not justified by military necessity, and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly, is one of the “grave breaches” of the Convention, and is
considered to be a war crime.
Return to the Table of Contents
e. Summary
As we have seen from the findings of this report, a few Palestinians
from the West Bank and Gaza have been responsible for attacks on the
Israeli army outposts and Jewish civilian settlers in the Palestinian
occupied territories. According to international law, a general terrorist
threat may justify certain emergency measures from time to time. However,
the doctrine of military necessity has never been internationally
recognized as an unqualified license to disregard the well being of an
occupied people or as a pretext to undermine their sovereignty rights. For
example from the case of Beit Jala, it is obvious from the extensive
damages to private houses, cars, 400 water tanks and electricity
installations that the Israeli army has deliberately targeted Palestinian
civilians, civilian houses and infrastructure, regardless of the location
of Palestinian gunfire. We have seen that the shelling of Gaza has been
especially aggressive, and artillery has been used with the intention of
hitting large residential areas where Israeli machinegun fire could not
reach.
The damage to electricity networks, water installations, municipal
buildings, police stations, schools, hospitals, clinics, churches and
mosques has sometimes had serious consequences for the civilian
populations these institutions are intended to serve. There is no excuse
for targeting police stations, security installations or the offices of
legal political parties. The Israeli revenge attack from the air on cities
in West Bank and Gaza after the killing of two Israeli soldiers in
Ramallah finds no excuse or legality in the laws of warfare, and comes
clearly under the definition of collective punishment, a cruel act
according to international law.
Our findings strongly suggest that the fire from the Israeli army in
too many of the cases has been totally indiscriminate. Retaliation
attacks have been disproportionate in force, and Israeli shelling of
civilian areas has continued for long periods after any threat caused by
Palestinian gunmen has been removed. Further, using extremely inaccurate
grenade machineguns covering wide areas of civilian areas, as a response
to machinegun fire or to quell demonstrations, constitutes a serious
violation of international humanitarian law. It appears that there
might be more professional army commanders in the Psagot settlement by al-Bireh
than in for example Gaza or Beit Jala, as the military post in Psagot has
mostly been firing at identified targets and sometimes holding their fire
if identification was not possible. This could also have something to do
with the Israeli army's own definition of Gilo as a Jerusalem
neighborhood, while Psagot is a more “extreme” illegal settlement close to
one of the biggest Palestinian cities in the occupied West Bank.
There are clear examples of collective punishment against the residents
of Hebron. The number of houses hit, many of them night after night,
suggest indiscriminate fire. However, the shelling of Hebron has more
often than not taken place after Palestinian gunfire, in contrast to our
other case studies. And in more cases, the Israeli fire has ceased after
the Palestinian gunmen have left the area. Further, the main ammunition of
the tanks (105 mm or 120 mm) has not been used. It might be explained by
the presence of international observers in the city (The Temporary
International Presence in Hebron, TIPH), but we have not had the chance to
investigate thoroughly. This should, however, receive further attention by
the relevant UN bodies and the International Fact Finding Commission, and
would (if proven) strengthen the argument that UN observers are needed in
the occupied territories.
As we can see from these case studies, there is an apparent link
between Israeli bombardment of civilian residential areas, Palestinian
shooting and the existence of illegal Jewish settlements on occupied land
which cannot be overlooked in any analysis of the background and causes of
the actions carried out. Israeli settlements in occupied Arab lands, which
are condemned by the UN, are a violation of the Geneva Convention.
According to the Israeli army's own statements, most of the shooting
incidents from Palestinian gunmen are directed at Israeli military bases
and outposts on occupied territory with the purpose of protecting the
settlements, and not so often at Jewish settlements or civilians. However,
one should not underestimate the lethal effect of a “few rounds from
Kalashnikovs”. Israeli civilians have been killed and wounded by
Palestinian gunfire. However, responding by using the whole range of light
artillery, including tank rounds, the air force and navy, old Tow rockets
and grenade launchers does not imply proportionality or discriminate fire.
Military personnel would describe the circumstances around many of the
cases in this study as “overkill”. Six findings are evident in this
report:
1. Sufficient precautions have seldom been taken by the Israeli army
in order to verify that the objects attacked are neither civilians nor
civilian objects.
2. Precautions have not been taken in the choice of methods of
attacks in order to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilian or damage to civilian objects.
3. Attacks have not been cancelled when it was apparent to the
Israeli army that the objective was not military, but civilian
institutions like schools, hospitals, ambulances, churches or mosques.
4. Heavy weaponry and excessive force have been used when threats to
Israeli soldiers or civilians could have been prevented with effective
machinegun fire from the many Israeli military posts.
5. The Israeli army has repeatedly failed to warn the Palestinian
civilian population of attacks.
6. The Israeli army has attacked, destroyed or removed large
quantities of objects indispensable to the civilian population, such as
foodstuffs, crops, livestock and drinking water installations.
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IV. INDISCRIMINATE FIRE, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND
COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT
The Israeli army have routinely been citing “security concerns” for
most of the actions they take, as the functional equivalent of military
necessity. On this basis they justify a number of violations of
international law, such as the heavy shelling of civilian residential
areas and other civilian targets, land confiscation, sweeping of
agricultural land and punitive measures against the Palestinian population
such as restrictions on freedom of movement, harsh curfews,
assassinations, demolition of houses and commercial buildings and other
acts of collective punishment. The official Israeli army mission is “To
defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state
of Israel. …To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms
of terrorism which threaten the daily life. They [The Israeli army] will
use force of arms only for the purpose of subduing the enemy to the
necessary extent and will limit his use of force so as to prevent
unnecessary harm to human life and limb, dignity and property, of both
soldiers and civilians, with special consideration for the defenseless,
whether in wartime, or during routine security operations, or in the
absence of combat, or times of peace.” 36
In an answer to our questions regarding the conduct of the Israeli army
during the al-Aqsa intifada, the military spokesperson argued that:
“The IDF [the
Israeli army] is directed to act according to the principles of
International Humanitarian Law. In the past months, while fighting has
gone on in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the IDF has been directed
to act according to the customary laws of armed conflict. The IDFs
actions are judged, individually, according to the norms of
International Law”.37
This section will analyze the use of weapons in the shelling attacks
against civilian and commercial buildings and infrastructure.
International humanitarian law and the question of “military necessity”
and “collective punishment” will be analyzed in the context of the
findings in the case studies. Further, the lack of warnings before
bombardment and the humanitarian aspects of the military operations by the
Israeli army will be discussed.
Return to the Table of Contents
a. Military Necessity?
Our question is: May Israel invoke security concerns (or military
necessity) to release itself from tortuous and criminal responsibility
that under international humanitarian law results from its treatment of
the Palestinians subject to its military control?
Tanks were deployed around major Palestinian towns since the beginning
of the clashes as a psychological deterrent, and fired (using their main
armament – 120 mm rounds) for the first time on 21 October, 2000 as a
warning to the residents of Beit Jala, next to the Jerusalem settlement of
Gilo. Tanks fired again at Beit Jala on Monday 23 October without prior
warning, in Ramallah on 24 October and in Jericho on 27 or 28 October.
Tank rounds have later been used against Tulkarem and refugee camps in
Khan Yunis, Rafah and Jericho. Later, field artillery, rockets, mortar
fire and high explosive grenades have been used. The use of such powerful
weapons against civilian targets cannot be justified in any circumstances.
Article 53 of the Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits the destruction
of property by occupying authorities in occupied territory “except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.
This article covers destruction of all property, whether it is the
private property or state property, i.e. that of the public authorities
(for example PA municipalities, Force 17 offices, police stations and the
like).
This report can only provide background analysis for those responsible
to judge Israel's actions during the al-Aqsa intifada. According to the
Protocol I additional to the Geneva Convention (Article 51, paragraph 5),
the following types of attacks are to be considered indiscriminate, and
therefore unlawful:
“…. (a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and
distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other
areas containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian
objects, and (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which could be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. ”
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1. Targeting in West Bank and Gaza: Discriminate
Fire?
The Protocols additional to the Geneva Convention are quite clear on
what are not legitimate targets, namely, civilians and civilian objects. 38
Military objectives, on the other hand, may be attacked. The problem is in
defining such an objective. Thus, Article 52(2) limits military objectives
to "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage."39
Article 48 of Protocol I states that “In order to ensure the protection of
the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives”.
International humanitarian law is based on the premise that
non-combatants must be protected from the effects of war. This means that
Israel's military operations must discriminate between non-military
(civilian) and military targets, and discriminate in the use of force in
regard to methods and weapons so that damage and suffering will be
minimized. Several of the Israeli military statements during this intifada
imply discrimination in targeting:
“IDF forces returned fire in those cases when the sources of the
shooting were positively identified” (Israeli army statement
November 23, 2000).
However, hitting ten houses in one attack where the civilians inside
had nothing to do with any shooting or the houses were not fired from does
not imply that they were able to locate the exact source of the shots. On
another occasion, the Israeli army states that:
“An IDF force responded by firing towards where the attackers were
believed to have operated” (Israeli army statement October 4, 2000)
This statement complies more with the facts on the ground, according to
our field research and the findings in Chapter 3. Israel has clearly not
made a sufficient distinction between persons participating in military
operations and those belonging to the civilian population, resulting in
massive damage to the lives and properties of thousands of Palestinian
civilians.
Article 52, paragraph 3, of the Geneva Convention states that:
In case of doubt whether an object, which is normally dedicated to
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling
or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
Since 21 schools, several hospitals, mosques and churches have been hit
by Israeli fire, the Israeli army has clearly not respected the rules of
targeting civilian institutions.
The following statement taken from the Israeli army's website seems to
indicate that its definition of military objectives is much broader than
the one current in international law:
“The Palestinians must understand that firing from one position or
another at settlements or IDF forces makes it a legitimate target for
attack and destruction” (Israeli army statement 08.10.00).
Moreover, it appears that a clear identification of “military targets”
is not made in many cases. Only three days after it issued the previous
statement, the army issued yet another statement saying:
“Helicopter gunships fired last night into unpopulated
areas in: Salfit, Haret el-Sheikh, Abu Sneneh, west of Beit Hagai and in
the Nablus area” (Emphasis added) (Israeli army statement 13.10.00)
This statement demonstrates either disturbing ignorance or cynical
misrepresentation of the facts by the Israeli army spokesperson. The
neighborhoods of Haret el-Sheikh, Abu Sneineh and areas around the Hajay
settlement are among the most densely populated areas in the West Bank.
The neighborhoods are situated in central Hebron City, with a population
of 119 230 Palestinians. There are no uninhabited houses in these
neighborhoods. On the night of October 13, to which the statement refers,
16 civilian houses and one private car was hit by Israeli heavy machinegun
fire, grenades and shells from the attack helicopters, while people from
the whole area hid in cellars or took refugee in rooms facing away from
the sources of fire. Furthermore, this bombardment – like many others –
came without any warning. The Israeli army states that this bombardment
was part of the punishment for the burning of an ancient Jewish synagogue
in Jericho. Thus, according to the Israeli army itself, these are actions
of collective punishment, which constitute war crimes according to
international law.
The issue arises as to whether the residents of the shelled areas took
a "direct part in hostilities". Our field investigation shows that in most
of the shelling incidents, the civilians were not involved in any shooting
against Israeli military or civilians. Palestinian gunfire from the area
has sometimes been located close to the civilian houses hit, but in many
cases Israeli soldiers have targeted houses as far away as half a
kilometer from the Palestinian shooting. Further, Israeli fire did not
cease after the Palestinian gunmen left the area.
Military developments in the twentieth century and the introduction of
bombardment by aircraft have seriously jeopardized the customary
rule of sparing civilians as much as possible. The Law of Air Warfare
affirms that attacks shall be limited to military objectives. It also
allows for the occurrence of “incidental loss of civilian life” subject to
the principle of proportionality. The assessment of whether an attack may
be expected to cause excessive incidental losses or damage to civilians,
and therefore should not take place, has to be made by the military
commander concerned. Israel has used attack helicopters in order to hit
the target without causing incidental casualties or damage. The Israeli
army stated in a letter to PHRMG on November 26, 2000 that:
“The IDF acknowledges that the appearance of helicopters may
generate fear among the Palestinians as well as bad publicity for the
IDF. However, the use of helicopters in fact has saved many Palestinian
lives. The use of helicopters allows the IDF to use pin-point attacks on
Palestinian sources of fire, which spares the neighboring population
from the possibility of being harmed by less accurate weapons”.
However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the use of these weapons has not
been in accordance with the goal as explained by the Israeli military
spokesperson. If the weapons were used only to hit the specific target,
the civilian housing in a 500-meter radius from the target would clearly
have been spared. It appears that the military advantage pursued in the
Israeli shelling has been to punish many innocent Palestinian civilians
for the actions of a few. If so, these actions are illegal according to
international law, which clearly underlines that the population must
never be used as a target or as a tactical objective. 40
It is common for those who make the targeting decisions to exaggerate
(knowingly or unknowingly) the contribution to military action of a
particular target and the military advantage to be gained from a
particular bombing mission and, in addition, to expect the "smart" weapons
to produce precision bombing (and thus leave civilians untouched). The
reason for this is that Protocol I of the Geneva Convention sets the
dividing line between an indiscriminate attack (illegal) and one that is
not (legal) on the basis of expectations before the attack is commenced.
Return to the Table of Contents
2. Breaking New Ground
In order to assess military necessity, we will have to clarify the
sorts of threats the Israeli army have been facing from the Palestinians.
According to their own statement, they are up against four main arms: 1.
Stones. 2. Petrol bombs. 3. Booby traps. 4. Kalashnikovs. In many of the
cases mentioned in Chapter 3, the Israeli military posts or camps have
been situated very close to the shelled civilian areas. When threatened by
Palestinian machinegun fire, they have resorted to heavy weaponry like
tanks, grenade launchers, mortar fire, attack helicopters and missiles
instead of using their highly effective machineguns, including the 12,7 mm
machineguns and sniper rifles stationed on high strategic points around
every Palestinian city, village and refugee camp.
Pockmarked wall in
Khan Yunis refugee camp Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
The use of weapons in the vast majority of our cases has certainly not
been justifiable under the principles of necessity and proportionality by
which Israel has to abide. The Israeli army's claim that combat
helicopters are used only when there is no better tactical measure
available to them is not supported by our findings. 41
These attacks have led to the deaths and injuries of several civilians in
their own homes. 12-year-old Samer Sameer Tabenja was shot and killed by a
military helicopter outside his house in Nablus. Samer's house was not
located in the area where clashes were taking place. Even if the use of
military helicopters was warranted, which is highly questionable, it is
difficult to determine any acceptable military objective that could be
served by firing openly on civilian targets removed from areas of major
disturbance. Often, helicopters were also used to retaliate for shots
fired by Palestinians at Jewish settlements, as from Beit Jala to Gilo. In
this case, it is hard to see how the principle of proportionality has been
upheld, since powerful missiles were used to respond to a few rounds from
Kalashnikov rifles. Moreover, even when they do not actually fire, the
hovering of helicopters above Palestinian towns and villages is enough to
instill a sense of terror in the population. The use of blank rounds has
the same effect.
Finally, arguments of military necessity or security concerns have no
value in the cases where the Israeli army has used automatic grenade
launchers against civilians in refugee camps. This weapon is used to kill
soldiers in an open field. The effects of such artillery is
indiscriminate, they cannot be targeted and generally cause casualties in
a large area.
Calls for Israel to respect the laws regarding definition of a military
objective in Article 52(2) or the definition of an indiscriminate attack
in Article 51 are unlikely to succeed. Israel has shown a long history of
ignoring international humanitarian law. Israeli shelling of civilians is
not new. During the 18-year long occupation of Southern Lebanon, numerous
bomb raids were launched. The most infamous incident was when Israeli
artillery shells, fired in retaliation for a rocket barrage, slammed into
a United Nations compound of peacekeeping troops where hundreds of
civilians had sought refugee in southern Lebanon on April 18, 1996,
killing 102 civilians, many of them women and children, and wounding 130
with several 155 mm artillery shells. Israel signed a treaty in January
2001 to establish an international war crimes court, but with the
reservation that no Israeli citizen will stand trial. Attorney General
Elyakim Rubenstein, and the defense establishment, feared that if Israel
joined the court, Arab countries would try to have Israeli army officers
indicted for actions they have taken during the current Intifada. The
Israeli army opposed signing as long as Israel is in a state of war. 42
Return to the Table of Contents
3. Palestinian Responsibilities
A damaged private home in Beit Jala Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
One can argue that few steps have been taken by the Palestinian
Authority or the leadership of the intifada to prevent shooting from
locations with civilian residents. The Palestinian shooting towards
Israeli military posts, settlements and roads has been totally
irresponsible. To avoid and minimize incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects by the Israeli army
retaliation to their gunfire, PHRMG agrees that shooting should not
take place in areas that are not clearly separated from the concentration
of civilians. 43
However, shooting from Palestinian gunmen towards settlements and military
installations in the Occupied Territories does not put Israel, as the
belligerent occupying power, in a position to disregard its duties and
responsibilities under international law. The Israeli army claims that
they fire at Palestinian ambulances because Palestinian gunmen have used
them as cover. However, the 67 incidents of Israeli fire at ambulances and
health personnel suggest that ambulances have been targeted whether they
has been used in Palestinian shooting or not.44
The Health Development Information and Policy Institute in Ramallah
reports that 50 PRCS ambulances have been hit by live ammunition.45
Others report that 101 ambulances have been hit, 21 of these are totally
destroyed.46
According the statements made by the Israeli military spokespersons
office during the period 29 September to 31 December 2000, the vast
majority of the Palestinian shooting targeted Israeli military
installations and outposts in the occupied territories, and not Israeli
settlers or civilians. PHRMG regrets and does not defend those cases where
Israeli civilians have been targeted by Palestinian gunfire. However, the
existence of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories violates both
international law and particular international agreements that Israel has
signed. According to Article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention it is
prohibited to transfer civilians of an occupying power to the territory
occupied. The Palestinian resistance is directed as much against Israel's
evident intention to exceed its rights as belligerent occupant and the
consequent erosion of Palestinian sovereignty rights as it is against the
Israeli occupation per se.
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b. Clear Cases of Collective Punishment
To analyze and decide if clear reprisals have taken place
against the civilian population, we should first of all examine the choice
of weapons and the methods of combat used. “Method of combat” refers to
the way in which different types of weapons are used. Three strong
arguments supports the thesis that general punishment was inflicted upon
the Palestinian population on account of the acts of individuals for which
they were not responsible:
First, 3 064
houses and their 21 455 inhabitants (of them 46, 9 % children under the
age of 14) could clearly not all have been involved in terrorist acts or
otherwise threatened Israeli soldiers or civilians. Further, 2 400 dunums47
of destroyed agricultural land, 25 000 olive- and fruit trees and the
owners of this land could clearly not have been involved in terrorist acts
or otherwise threatened Israeli soldier or civilians.
Second, the nature of the bombardment (i.e. the choice of missiles,
rockets, tank fire, ship artillery, mortars, grenade launchers and 40 mm
grenade machine guns) and methods of combat, against densely populated
residential areas indicate that the Israeli army has not discriminated
between military and civilian targets.
Third, Israeli army's own public statements give evidence of the
fact that their intention behind several of the shelling attacks was to
collectively punish thousands of people not responsible for the alleged
crime:
Israeli army statement 20.11.00:
“Israeli Navy ships and IAF attack helicopters struck this evening
installations in the Gaza Strip, belonging to the Palestinian Authority
and its security apparatus…. The attack comes in response to the
barbaric and criminal attack, carried out this morning by Palestinians
against a civilian bus in the area of Kfar Darom, which was carrying
children to school and grownups that were accompanying them. Two
civilians were killed in this attack as well as nine wounded, among them
five children and three women”.
In this attack on Gaza, 1 person was killed and 120 wounded.
Israeli army statement 12.10.00:
“Lynching of two IDF soldiers in Ramallah: In response to the
barbaric acts, IDF helicopters conducted a pin-point attack on strategic
PA targets with the aim of passing on to the Palestinian leadership a
clear message to end the violence. The sites targeted were: The
Palestinian police station in Ramallah, Palestinian police vehicles in
Ramallah, the Radio station in Ramallah, Palestinian police boats on the
Gaza coast and Fateh offices in Gaza”.
The attacks were apparently not so pinpointed, as 27 Palestinians were
injured in these attacks in Ramallah. 6 were wounded in Gaza, 2 of them
seriously. Several civilian homes were hit. Hebron and al-Bireh were also
bombarded. One hour later, two targets were hit in Nablus (police
stations). The shelling of Ramallah and al-Bireh cut off electricity for
the two cities.
Israeli army statement 12.10.00:
“Israel Air Force helicopter gunships attacked the Palestinian
Police Academy base in Jericho. The attack came as a response to the
burning of the ancient synagogue in Jericho.”
The pilots allegedly reported “direct hits on their targets”, but
during this attack, civilian homes were hit in addition to the Police
Academy.
Pockmarked walls
can be found everywhere in Rafah Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
A house hit by
machinegun fire in Rafah Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
Israel seems not to have kept a sense of proportion in comparing the
“military advantages” gained with the damage done. This would provide a
basis for war crimes proceedings if Israel were to be tried at an
international war crimes court. Article 6 (6) of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal describes “wanton” destruction as a war
crime. Further, Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention includes among
the “grave breaches” liable to penal sanctions under Article 146,
“extensive destruction …. of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”.
Israel has resorted to frightening measures to terrorize the population
in their hopes to prevent hostile acts against the occupation. They strike
at guilty and innocent alike, and far from achieving the desired effect,
these practices have (because of their excessive severity and cruelty)
kept alive and even strengthened the Palestinian spirit of resistance. 48
The prohibition of reprisals is a safeguard for all protected persons
whether in the territory of PA or in areas under Israeli control. The
provision is absolute and mandatory in character and thus cannot be
interpreted as containing tacit reservations with regard to military
necessity.49
Therefore, acts of Palestinian terrorism do not warrant violence or
retaliation against the Palestinian population as such.
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c. “Superfluous injury” and “Unnecessary suffering”.
Suspected Israeli use of DU-ammunition.
What about attacks that can lead to pollution of the environment or
health hazards? The Geneva Convention basically bans what is not necessary
to achieve the “objective of war”, or in other words what is superfluous.
Hence the expressions “superfluous injury” and “unnecessary suffering”, 50
fundamental concepts in international humanitarian law. These terms relate
to the design-dependent effects of specific weapons on health. The
prohibition intends to protect civilians and a combatant from certain
weapons which are deemed abhorrent or which inflict more suffering than
required for their military purpose. Therefore, according to the law, if
injury or suffering resulting from an Israeli weapon's nature or
technology can be proved to be excessive compared with the military
advantage gained from its use, the weapon is illegal whether the victim is
a Palestinian gunman or a Palestinian civilian.
Weighing the Israeli military utility against the suspected effects of
DU-ammunition (depleted uranium), the conclusion is that the same purpose
could reasonably have been achieved by other lawful means that do not have
such effects. It is further vital in international humanitarian law that
use of weapons or methods of warfare with indiscriminate effects is
illegal. DU-ammunition can affect drinking water, the soil and the air
surrounding the area where the shells have hit. This comes under the
definition of indiscriminate effects as prohibited in the Geneva
Convention.
In an answer to our inquiry of December 7, the Israeli army
spokesperson's office claims that DU-ammunition has not been and will not
be used. 51
Likewise, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom assured the House of
Commons Select Committee on foreign affairs that depleted uranium was not
used in the NATO bombings of Kosovo in 1999, but it was later confirmed by
NATO that it had in fact been used.
However, we have no reason to believe that DU-ammunition has been used
during this intifada. No testing by Geiger tellers has been conducted. To
quell rumors and gain clarity about the DU- issue, an independent party
must conduct investigations.
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d. The Lack of Warnings before Bombardment
“The Israeli army does not give any warning. Therefore, the
calmness of the night turns into a hell of bombardment, terrorizing the
civilian Palestinians who are sleeping in their homes” (Mohammed Issa
Yassin, Hebron).
On November 2, 2000, the Israeli army warned the Palestinians in one
Hebron neighborhood to vacate their homes, a sign that heavy fire was
planned. 52
In the beginning of the intifada, some warnings were given, but dozens of
missiles were fired on Gaza on November 20, 2000 without any warning. In
general, there was no warning whatsoever given by the Israeli army to the
civilian population before bombardment was initiated. This is also true of
areas under full Israeli security control (areas B and C). Given the
nature of the weaponry used in the shelling attacks, warnings should have
been given to the civilian population before tank fire, missiles, rockets,
field artillery and grenades were used against their neighborhoods. The
lacks of warnings have resulted in incidental losses of civilian lives.
Even during the civil war in Bosnia in 1995, local civilians were
warned to leave town before shells rained down on the residents. In
October 2000, the Israeli media generated false reports of massive
evacuation of Beit Jala. 53
The majority of the residents have resisted the pressure, but 272 families
have evacuated their homes, though often staying in hotels or with
relatives in Beit Jala. The Municipality of Beit Jala has paid for many to
stay in hotels, but due to the financial pressure on the municipality,
they had to move back to their houses at the end of last year. The Israeli
military spokesperson stated on October 10, 2000, that:
“The IDF is not interested in hurting innocent Palestinian
residents, and therefore recommends that Palestinians living in the area
from which shooting takes place either prevent the shooting or leave the
area. ”
Very few Palestinians read the news listings on the Israeli army's
homepage. Nothing was published in Palestinian newspapers. Further, the
Israeli army's suggestion to the people to “prevent the shooting” itself
suggests a disrespect of their special rights of protection under the
international laws of belligerent occupation. The same disrespect was
shown by the Palestinian PLC-member in Hebron, who suggested that the
civilian residents form a special committee to “capture the Palestinian
gunmen”, after they complained about the Palestinian gunmen shooting from
their neighbourhoods. 54
The people of Aqbet Jabet rafugee camp stay in shelters at night
Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
It is often thought that the obligation, in the 1907 Hague Regulations,
of a commander to warn the authorities before commencing a bombardment is
a reflection of a past age of warfare. It is, however, replicated in
modern form in the Geneva Convention, Article 57 of Protocol I. During
World War II such warnings were given, "particularly in the case of
objectives situated in occupied territory". 55
The Geneva Conventions demand that effective advance warning be given of
attacks that may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do
not allow. If civilians do not or cannot heed these warnings, the attacker
is not relieved from the obligation to avoid indiscriminate attacks under
Article 51, and the principle of proportionality continues to apply. In
the air campaigns against Palestinian cities such warnings might have been
given to enable the civilians located within Palestinian gunfire, or close
to gunmen, to avoid the consequences of the attack. The often quoted
phrase "surprise in attack is the key to victory" does not apply here
since Israel has complete supremacy of the air, and defensive measures do
not exist among the Palestinians. Thus, avoiding civilian casualties does
not seem to have been a priority to the Israeli army.
Return to the Table of Contents
e. Terrorizing a People: Humanitarian problems
deriving from the Israeli shelling attacks
Article 51 (2) of Protocol I to the Fourth Geneva Conventions reads:
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians,
shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population is prohibited.
A life behind sandbags for protection from Israeli machinegun fire in
Gaza Photo by: A.K. Brungborg |
The scale of the humanitarian problem resulting from living under siege
cannot easily be measured. However, some indications can be given. Injury
to civilians or to civilian objects may be direct or indirect. Direct
injury or damage needs no further explanation, but indirect damage is
often overlooked. For example electricity networks have been destroyed by
air attacks and deprived the Palestinians of sources of power. This could
lead to the deaths of many civilians (particularly those most vulnerable
on health grounds) for a variety of reasons, from the inability of
hospitals to carry out their normal functions to sewage appearing on the
streets and resultant disease. Destruction of electricity installations
serves no military goals as set by the Israeli army, but does function as
a form of collective punishment of the people it affects. The same goes
for the destruction of the al-Awda water channel in Jericho. Israeli
helicopters have deliberately attacked clearly marked ambulances. Fire
trucks have repeatedly been shot at. This has prevented them from
providing acute health care or putting out fires in homes hit by missiles
or rockets in Hebron, al-Bireh, Betunia, Ramallah, Jericho, Rafah and
Gaza. Further, the situation of living under constant threat of
bombardment without prior warning renders dangerous such essential
activities as obtaining food, water and medical care and blocks relief
activities on behalf of these populations. In addition, a cruel siege
unlike anything imposed before, neither in the previous intifada nor in
the days of occupation of the territories is now taking place.
More than 470 000 of the civilians that live in the areas targeted by
the Israeli bombardment are children under the age of 14. Defense for
Children International (DCI) reports that children whose houses have been
shelled by tanks or helicopter gunships show extreme fear of darkness, of
sleeping alone, of leaving the house, of staying at home alone, of loud
noises and sudden movements. They have developed an increased closeness to
family members, cry for the simplest reasons, and avoid places that have
been attacked. Other symptoms have been sleep disturbances,
hyper-activity, aggressive behavior, isolation and seclusion. 56
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations by its resolution 44/25 of 20 November
1989. It declares the right to life, survival and development (art. 6):
The right-to-life article includes formulations about the right to
survival and to development, which should be ensured "to the maximum
extent possible". Children exposed to armed conflict shall receive special
protection. Children shall not to be subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 37(a)).
Return to the Table of Contents
f. Summary
Our study suggests a lack of professionalism in the Israeli army. The
following three aims, in addition to Israel's “security concerns”, seems
to have been present in the recent shelling attacks of civilian areas,
especially in the Gaza Strip:
1. Testing weapons for use in the Palestinian occupied
territories.
2. Training Israeli soldiers in hitting targets.
3. Training Israeli soldiers in using different weapons systems.
It would be a positive development if the Israeli army could be
encouraged to take a certain pride in the professionalism shown when
behaving in accordance with humanitarian law. This law is still largely
rooted in its traditional origins, and is not alien to military thinking
and has the advantage of being a realistic code for military behavior as
well as protecting human rights to the maximum degree possible in the
circumstances of the al-Aqsa intifada.
Shrapnel from shellfire has pockmarked a large number of homes. There
is extensive general damage to homes in the form of broken windows, doors,
and furniture. Several homes and buildings have been completely destroyed
in air bombardments or shellfire. Many other homes are scarred by
shrapnel. Homes have been damaged by blasts, including: broken glass,
blown-in doors, and displaced walls (producing cracks).
Air assaults, intense shelling and rocket attacks, and the
indiscriminate use of lethal weapons have caused unnecessary and
disproportionate civilian deaths, injuries and destruction. The Israeli
army have not even excused these actions as "unfortunate errors", like
they did on many occasions during the bomb raids of Lebanon.
Some Palestinian municipalities and ad-hoc committees have been
gathering precise evidence and estimated costs of damage after the
shelling. However, we find that the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian
municipalities in general have not taken this task seriously. Some of the
reports we have received are not accurate, but exaggerated to various
degrees. Independent engineers and researchers should have been employed
in order to supply the authority with accurate statistics and information
about the scope of damages caused by the Israeli army, and people
suffering from damages to their homes should have received emergency
support from the Palestinian Authority. Some municipalities repair broken
windows and offer small amounts of money to rebuild houses, but it has not
by any means been sufficient. PHRMG does stress, however, that the sole
responsibility for financial compensation to the victims rests on Israel
alone.
Return to the Table of Contents
V. CONCLUSION
Our intention as outlined in the introduction chapter was to test the
claim of the Israeli military spokesperson that the Israeli use of force
against the Palestinian uprising is proportionate and justified by
military necessity and to investigate the scope of collective punishment
against Palestinian civilians. As we have seen, extra judicial
assassinations 57
and the use of combat tactics rather than methods of riot control are only
part of the recent Israeli violations of international humanitarian law.
Palestinian civilians have also suffered from extreme forms of collective
punishment. Heavy military force has been intentionally used to destroy
their homes and livelihood. The intention of the Israeli army appears to
have been to inflict damage to civilian property, infrastructure and life,
using indirect fire weapons systems. This is also illustrated by
the number of cases where the same residential areas have been shelled
again and again and fire was not stopped after the threat from Palestinian
gunmen was removed, and that housing up to half a kilometer away from
Palestinian shooting have been hit in the Israeli retaliation attacks.
Shrapnel of machinegun fire and grenades found in a house in Beit Jala
Photo by: A.K. Brunborg |
Many of the acts carried out by the Israeli army can be defined as
war crimes. We can conclude that during this intifada, the
well-established principle of distinction between civilian objects and
military objectives has been rendered of little practical significance
when some Israeli military “advantage” in the destruction of the object
has been discernible. Add to this a political objective of attempting to
persuade the PA leadership to take particular actions within its
autonomous areas, and it becomes much easier to argue that anything that
affects that government's actions becomes a military objective, wherever
it is situated. In our case studies, there has in addition been no
protection of the civilian population from air-delivered weapons. The fact
that relatively few civilians have been killed or injured in these
circumstances (compared with an indiscriminate attack using free-fall
bombs or poorly guided missiles) is irrelevant. The use of grenade
launchers and 40 mm grenade machineguns proves that no attention has been
given international standards of discrimination between civilian and
military targets. In the occupied territories, Israel has a clear
responsibility to prohibit attacks on areas where there is a concentration
of civilians. Israel's unjust and unconsidered retaliation against
civilians has seriously breached international law and the rules of war.
Further, the horrific nature of the recent actions has been made worse by
the Israeli Governments refusal to own up to its responsibility under the
Geneva Convention. The UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human
Rights have repeatedly reaffirmed the de jure applicability to the
occupied Palestinian Territories of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilians in Time of War.
25 civilians died and 729 have been wounded as a result of Israeli
attacks against Palestinian civilian residential areas between October and
December 2000. The killing of unarmed civilians in a deliberate manner in
circumstances where they do not pose an imminent threat to the life of
soldiers is wilful killing. Wilful killing is a grave breach of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and is subject to prosecution under the principle of
universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is particularly heinous to fire
upon targets in civilian areas. The Israeli army's actions appear to have
been intended to threaten the civilian populations rather than ensure
their safety. More than one million Palestinians in various cities,
villages and refugee camps have been living under the constant threat of
having their homes bombarded. The unacceptably high number of killed in
injured implies severe breaches of international law and cruelty against
civilians in a situation of belligerent occupation. In our view, such a
record suggests an Israeli attempt to subjugate the Palestinian
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Further, the character of the
prolonged Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza challenges
international law itself.
In this report, based on PHRMG field investigations in Israel and the
Occupied Territories involving a large number of sources and statements
from the Israeli army, we state that the available information indicates
that the Israeli army intentionally attacked densely populated
residential areas in order to inflict collective punishment on civilians.
The shelling of residential areas occurred without warning, and excessive
and indiscriminate military power was used against a defenseless and
unarmed population.
The extent and nature of the Israeli violations against Palestinian
children is extremely disturbing. Our conclusion is that there is an
immediate need for the international community to safeguard the rights of
Palestinian children. Further, all cases of use of lethal force
against Palestinian civilians should be investigated and subjected to the
processes of justice in order to avoid impunity.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights established in its
Special Session on the Occupied Territories on the 18 October 2000, that
the Israeli actions against the Palestinian civilian population constitute
war crimes and crimes against humanity and called upon Israel to put an
immediate end to the use of force against unarmed civilians. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, expressed her
view in a press release on November 27, 2000, that the Israeli security
forces have engaged in excessive force, disproportionate to the threat
faced by their soldiers. In her report, she recommended that the security
forces on both sides should act in full conformity with the Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. “Whenever force is
used, the principle of proportionality has to be applied, and all
necessary measures have to be taken to avoid loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian property”, she urged.
The absence of the Palestinian Authority as an agency capable of
offering support to the residents under its authority in the face of
measures undertaken by the Israeli army is disturbing. Palestinians are
continuing to turn to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Israeli and
Palestinian alike, or to seek the assistance of lawyers. No emergency
organization has been set up in the PA to coordinate the monitoring of
damage and to offer legal and financial aid to the victims. The PA has not
initiated a thorough investigation of the shooting and shelling incidents.
Most of the updated information can be obtained from NGOs, news sources
and even the Israeli army.
Further, the Palestinian focus on suspected Israeli use of depleted
uranium has taken the attention away from the massive collateral damage
already inflicted by Israeli excessive use of force against civilians.
There is no need to exaggerate or dwell on use of weapon types that have
not been confirmed by independent sources, when so much evidence of
massive damage already exists in every Palestinian village and town.
Return to the Table of Contents
Recommendations
The PHRMG demands that the international community ensure that Israel
complies with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, where the
rights of protected persons in situations of belligerent occupation are
safeguarded. We strongly urge the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth
Geneva Convention to ensure Israel's respect of all its relevant
provisions.
PHRMG calls on Israel to publicly commit itself to fully respect the
laws of war and renounce, in particular, deliberate attacks on civilians
or indiscriminate attacks in all circumstances. PHRMG demands effective
protection for civilians.
PHRMG condemns, unreservedly, the violation of the right to life. We
fear that the brutal regularity of civilian casualties may contribute to
the belief that civilian deaths are an inevitable consequence of this
conflict, and create an almost casual acceptance of these deaths. As
the Israeli army repeatedly failed to warn people to evacuate their homes,
the unlawful killing of civilians must be investigated, those responsible
for abuses punished, and the victims compensated. We are calling on the
Israeli Government to set up a proper judicial inquiry to do so, and to
make recommendations to prevent unlawful killings in the future.
PHRMG calls upon the United Nations Security Council to act upon
resolution 194, 242 and 338 in order to ensure Israel's compliance with
its stipulations concerning the illegal occupation of territory by force.
- 1 dunum = 1000 m2.
- For further details
about the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada and its developments prior to
December 2000, see our report “Inhuman Actions Against Humanity”, The
Palestinian Human Rights Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 6, December 2000 (www.phrmg.org).
- David B. Holley, a
retired captain with the Royal British Army (artillery), with
operational experience from Bosnia and the Middle East, conducted
independent investigations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in January
2001, on a mission for Amnesty International.
- PCHR have extensive
documentation on the destruction of agricultural property and have
released several detailed reports (www.pchrgaza.org).
- Ha'aretz 07.01.01
- US Air Force Law of War
Manual, Doswald-Beck & Vite (1993): International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, International Review of the Red Cross no. 293,
1993.
- Fourth Geneva
Convention, Article 16.
- Falk & Weston (1991):
The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West
Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada. Harvard
International Law Journal, Volume 32, No. I
- Uhler, O. & Coursier, H.
(1958): Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Volume
IV, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.
- Some Palestinians are
also armed with M-16 machineguns and small arms like .22 weapons.
- Greene, Owen (1999):
Small Arms, Global Challenge: The Scourge of Light Weapons, Global
Dialogue, Vol. 1, No 2, autumn 1999.
- FLIGHT International
No 4575 Vol. 158, pp 45-99, 28 Nov-4 Dec 2000 and the International
Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Le Figaro,
01.01.2001, Visite du laboratoire palestinien “antiterroriste”, by
Geroges Malbrunot.
- FAS Military Analysis
Network,
www.fas.org
- The Israeli Navy does
not have “warships”, but the term is widely used by both Israeli and
Palestinian media.
- Israel also has M109
howitzers and M110 howitzers, and more than 2, 469 M204 grenade
launchers. Civilian Pawns: Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons
on the Israel-Lebanon Border, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Human
Rights Watch 1996.
- See Annex II, letter of
January 21, 2001.
- PNA, Beit Jala
Municipality, Statement Concerning the shelling of Beit Jala,
16.12.2000. Among the killed was the German Dr. Fisher, who was killed
in a shelling attack on 15 November 2000.
- Rahma Shaheen (51) and
Aziza Jubran (56), both from Beit Sahour.
- These schools
accommodated over 2500 students, and another 30 schools have been shut
down as a result of the curfew, leaving over 15 000 students without
education (Red Crescent Fact Finding Delegation, Malta: Report on Human
Rights Violations by the Israeli Army and Settlers in Hebron District,
November 12, 2000).
- Interview with Riad Arar,
Coordinator of Social Programs, Defense for Children International (DCI),
Palestine section.
- Shehadeh Mousa el
Ga'afari (27), killed on 02.12.2000.
- For a detailed
description of what happened in this incident, please see
www.phrmg.org,
press releases.
- Rami Khaled Ramadan
(23), Mohammed Ibrahim Yousef (24), Yousef Abdel-Rahman (12), Maher
Abdel-Razek al-Jamal (22), Iyad Mohammed Amin (28), Muneer Abdeen (25),
Ra'ed Mohammed al-Sheikh (26), Daoud al-Deek (27), Ghassan Fathi Diab
(27), Mohammed Ayesh Hussein (45), Majed Khader Saqer (22), Majdy Fawzi
Abu-Fayyad (25), Fadi Anwar Arif (20), Murshed Abdallah (21), Khalil
Hassan (48), Nafez Abu-Fares (36), Samer Abu-Omar (28), Mohammed
Salaheddin (29), Izzat Mohammed Ali (24), Maher Bisharat (28), Ayman al-Zein
(29), Nihad Barghouthi (25), Tareq Shadid (21), Fawwaz Nassar (31),
Ibrahim Mukahal (20), Islam Khalil (20), Mohammed al-Ajrami (22).
- Israeli army
spokesperson statement 08.10.00.
- Israeli army
spokesperson statement 20.11.00.
- Abdallah Mahmoud Al-Farra
(21) was killed. He was a member of the PA National Security.
- See Chapter 3. 1.1 for
more details, or Amnesty International's report, which will be published
in February 2001.
- Banat Khadijh Abdin
School, Wedad Naser al-Din School and Abu Dih School.
- Khadouri Technical
College (estimated damages $ 1. 635. 000), Tulkarem Boys High School,
Ajnadin Boys Basic School, Ihsan Samara High School, Al-Fadeliya High
School, Taha Hussein Boys Basic School (estimated costs of damage for
the five schools are $ 90. 135).
- The Union of Palestinian
Medical Relief Committees update, November 14, 2000 (www.upmrc.org).
- Wadi Damis School, Chile
Girls School and the Latin School.
- MIFTAH operates with
higher numbers: 181 000 fruit and olive trees, 3 669 000 square meters
of cultivated land (Report: Losses and damages in Palestine, 29.09.00 –
29.12.00, (www.miftah.org)
- As of early November the PA Ministry of Finance had estimated the
value of destroyed property—both public and private—in the tens of
millions of USD. See Minister's statement to the Local Aid Coordination
Committee, Gaza, 3 November 2000, p. 2. Since then further amounts of
destruction has taken place.
- On 29 November 2000, three Palestinians in Al-Qarara were shot and
wounded: Mohammed Ahmed El-Eddini (23), Khaled Abdel-Karim Abu E'id (27)
and Mohammed Salem Abdel-Karim Abu E'id (25).
-
http://www.idf.il/english/doctrine/doctrine.htm
- Letter of January 14,
2001.
- Protocol I, Art. 48,
combined with the other provisions of Part IV.
- Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski
and B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8
June 1977, ICRC
- International Committee
of the Red Cross (1996), The Protocols additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva.
- Israeli army
Spokesperson statement 03.10.00.
- Ha'aretz 25.12.00
- According to Article 50
(3) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention.
- UNSCO Report, September
28 – November 26, 2000, The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of
Confrontations, Mobility Restrictions and Border Closures.
- Fact Sheet: Palestinian
Intifada (Sep 28-Jan 23, 2001). (www.hdip.org)
- MIFTAH
fact sheet: Losses and damages in Palestine between September 29 –
December 29, 2000. (www.miftah.org)
- 2.400.000 m2
- As for example in Beit Jala, Rafah and Khan Yunis, where the people
have stated their will not to leave their homes.
- Uhler, O. & Coursier, H. (1958): Commentary on the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, Volume IV, International Committee of the
Red Cross, Geneva
- Yves Sandoz, ICRC Involvement in Banning or Restricting the Use
of Certain Weapons, ICRC delegation to the UN and New York
University School of Law, February 9, 2000.
- Letter of 17 December 2000.
- Ha'aretz 02.11.00.
- Israeli Channel 1News 23.10.00, Jerusalem Post and Lamia Lahoud
24.10.00.
- The civilians in Abu Sneineh made a complaint to PA officials
visiting the area about the Palestinians who fired from their
neighborhood. Abbas Zaki, a PLC member, answered that the residents of
these neighborhoods should try to form a committee and try to capture
the Palestinian gunmen (PHRMG testimony 13.12.2000).
- Rowe, Peter, International Review of the Red Cross No. 837, 31 March
2000.
- DCI Palestine Section Report, submitted to UNHCHR, November 13,
2000.
PHRMG published a special report on the ongoing
assassinations of several leaders of the al-Aqsa intifada. See
www.phrmg.org
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