June 2000: Political Arrest....... What for?

 

 

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The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor
The bi-monthly publication of the PHRMG:

 Political Arrest....... What for?
Volume 4, Issue 3: The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor

 

7. Legality of Political Arrest

 a) Legality of Content

The Oslo Agreement signed on 13 September 1993 has led to considerable changes in the life of Palestinians. It was considered the most important event in the Arab (Palestinian) – Israeli conflict, because it created a division among Palestinians: supporters and opposers of the Agreement. The “Palestinian Opposition” became a term that represented political factions or groups opposed to the Oslo Agreement and the peace process. Some of these groups were from within the PLO such as the PFLP and DFLP, while others were from the Islamic opposition movement such as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), the Islamic Jihad and the Islamic National Salvation Party. Still others were political figures from the PLO and from the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).

The Peace Agreements not only created this division in the Palestinian community but also put restrictions on the activities of the political opposition:

Under the title of “Security Actions”, Article 2(a) of the Wye River Memorandum (signed by Israel and the PA in 1998) provides:

 

1. Outlawing and Combating Terrorist Organizations

          a) The Palestinian side will make known its policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence   against both sides.

          b) A work plan developed by the Palestinian side will be shared with the U.S. and thereafter implementation will begin immediately to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure.

          c) In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all organizations (or wings of the organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them operating in areas under its jurisdiction.

[The Wye River Memorandum, JMCC document series, December 1998]

 

1. If we look at the pattern of arrest that the Palestinian Authority has carried out in the Palestinian Autonomous Areas against Palestinian citizens, we can identify the existence of political motivation. Arrest is carried out not because the arrested individuals oppose the PA, but because of the involvement of a third party:  the Israeli Occupation. We thus have a group which believes that has a right to resist the occupier (Israel) and another group which is committed to the Peace Agreements and which considers such resistance a threat to the Agreements. It is therefore not fair of the group which has signed the Peace Agreements to outlaw and fight against the other group.

Numerous decisions of the UN confirm the right to resist an occupier. Such resistance is not terrorism: it seeks to achieve freedom and self-rule, the basic driving-force of the Arab – Israeli conflict.

2. When the term “terrorism” is no longer used to describe the opposing group, then according to national and international laws - which guarantee the right to form political parties - such a group automatically becomes legal. It is not acceptable for the provisions of a Peace Agreement to violate national laws. Political arrest of Palestinians represents a clear breach of Palestinian and International Law.

3. Moreover, many Palestinians are being punished through arrest for past actions undertaken during the Israeli occupation. This means that those people are punished twice for the same action. This is illegal.

4. Article 16(2) of the Oslo Peace Agreement (under the title: Confidence Building Measures) states that: “Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli Authorities will not be subjected to acts of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate ongoing measures will be taken, in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their protection”. If the Peace Agreements represent a commitment to the Palestinian Authority, then why does the PA arrest people who cooperated with Israel in the past?

It seems that the PA feels sorry for itself because it has discontinued the prosecution of collaborators with Israel. It also seems that the PA uses this reason as an excuse to deprive the “security prisoners” of their right to a fair trial. When the PA states that the Peace Agreement does not provide for the fair trial of security prisoners, then it should also be pointed out that the Peace Agreements do not provide for their arrest.

b) Legality of Measures

Married with three children, Farouk Abu Hassan from Gaza City was an employee in the local post office and was arrested by the Palestinian Authority on 8 November 1994. Thus the “Political Arrest Marathon” of political detainees began.

Soon after that date, Palestinian prisons became overcrowded with political detainees whose freedom was taken away in contravention of Palestinian law which provides that the arrest and detention of a person shall only be permitted for a maximum of 30 days and then only pursuant to an order issued by the responsible official (Article 10, Penal Law of 1924, Gaza, and Article 114 of the 1961 Penal Law, West Bank).

The law also stated that reasons for detaining a person have to be investigated within 3 days of his apprehension.

(Article 100 of the Principles of Penal Courts Law for the year 1961) stated:

“A member of the judicial police will attend to the detained suspect within 48 hours of arrest and shall, if not convinced, refer him to the General Prosecutor who will in turn and within 24 hours hear him and decide to order his arrest or release”.

This has not been respected in the case of Palestinian detainees: people are arrested without a written detention order and without a clear charge having been brought. They are not questioned by the General Prosecution.

In all cases of political arrest by the PA, the detainees are not presented before a judge and are not presented before civil courts. They are detained for long periods of time determined by the Head of the Security Service responsible for the detention. In some cases such detention lasts for up to four years under very bad conditions.

Article 113 of the 1961 Penal Law provides that “if the complainee has been brought in  pursuant to a detention order and has remained in the detention centre for more than 24 hours without being questioned and without being brought before the General Prosecutor (according to provisions of the previous Article), his detention shall be considered as  unjust. The official responsible for the [“] crime of arresting the personal freedom [”] will be prosecuted according to the Law of Punishments”.

The Palestinian Security Services have invented a new method by which to increase human rights violations: they use political arrest as a measure for collective punishment by arresting entire families.  Such action  constitutes a clear violation of Article 15 of the Palestinian Basic Law which provides that: “Punishment must be individual: collective punishment is not allowed. No crime or punishment is to be determined unless on the basis of a lawful text and on the basis of a judicial judgment...”

It is difficult to establish the place of detention of detainees: in most cases families discover the place of detention unofficially and through a mediator. There is no formal body within the PA responsible for informing families of the whereabouts of their detained relatives.

This violates Article 104 of the 1961 Penal Law which provides that “prisons and detention centres should be [“] assigned [”] and organised according to the law”. Article 105 provides that “No person shall be imprisoned other than in the appropriate prison and no prison official shall accept any person unless pursuant to an approved order from the authority with jurisdiction [.] He shall not detain [such person] beyond the period specified in the order”.

Detention centers under the authority of the PA have not been organised according to an official decision.

Detention orders are only considered legal if based upon valid legal procedure. Detaining a person can only be considered legal if his arrest is carried out in a legal manner. Article 103 of the 1961 Penal Law provides that “it is prohibited to arrest or imprison any person without an order [having been issued] by the authorities with due jurisdiction”.

Article 7 of the same law provides that “Employees of the criminal justice system are responsible for investigating rimes, collecting evidence, arresting offenders and bringing them before the courts with due punitive jurisdiction”.

Article 8 provides that “duties within the penal justice system are executed according to specific legal provisions by the General Prosecutor, by his assistants and, in Districts without General Prosecutors, by Magistrates”.

Article 9 makes reference to the assistants of the General Prosecutor and that their responsibilities as members of the judicial police shall be carried out in accordance with the law and delegated rules.

We can therefore conclude that all the detention measures carried out by the Security Services of the PA are illegal and invalid.

The abovementioned Articles appear as follows in the Jordanian Legislation:

“Principles of Penal Courts”

Chapter One

Judicial Police and Its Responsibilities

Part One

Judicial Police

Article 7

Employees of the penal justice system are responsible for investigating crimes, collecting evidence, arresting offenders and bringing them before the courts with due punitive jurisdiction.

Article 8

Duties within the penal justice system are executed according to specific legal provisions by the General Prosecutor, by his assistants and, in Districts without General Prosecutors, by Magistrates.

Article 9 (1)

The following may help the General Prosecutor to exercise the duties of the judicial police:

District Governor

Directors of Regions

Director of General Security

Police Directors

Police Officials

Government Employees with delegated powers for the purpose of investigation

Prisons Directors …

Article 9(2)

The above-mentioned government officials shall execute their responsibilities within the limits of the law.”

The common phenomenon in all the cases of political arrest that were presented to the High Court in Gaza and Ramallah is that the Attorney General asked that all cases be referred to the State Security Court, which, he argued, had jurisdiction. In two cases, the High Court agreed to this request: Ibrahim al-Halabi whose judgment was handed down on 7 April 1997 and Ibrahim al-Makadmeh whose judgment was handed down on 20 June 1997.

Yet according to the law, political arrest is an administrative decision and not a judicial decision: thus these cases fall within the jurisdiction of the High Court. The text entitled “Judiciary of Invalidation” provides at page 344 that:

“The State Council does not look into judicial measures that precede judgment. This rule is, however, not absolute, as the procedures related to the case are not the responsibility of the administrative courts. The procedures followed and actions taken by the judicial police, such as arrest and detention, are judicial as long as they are executed by employees of judicial jurisdiction. In other cases they remain administrative.”

Dr. Tamawi, author of the above-mentioned book, quotes the decision of the administrative Egyptian court of the year 1957:

“Procedures, steps and actions carried out by the judicial police with judicial responsibilities according to the law are considered judicial, but other actions not of judicial nature are considered administrative and remain under the supervision of the court.”

Thus we conclude that administrative decisions of a judicial nature fall under the jurisdiction of the administrative court, especially if such orders or procedures have been taken outside the framework of any judicial law. If therefore the High Court does not look into such cases, it will violate one of the basic rights protected by the law and the Palestinian Basic Law.

Consequently, the passive reaction of the prosecution in all political detention cases represents a clear violation of Article 108 which provides that “any person who knows of a person illegally detained or imprisoned or [of a person] detained in an inappropriate place of detention or imprisonment, shall inform a member of the General Prosecution [.] He, in turn, shall immediately go to the place in which the detained or imprisoned person is to be found, shall carry out an investigation, shall order the release of the illegally detained or imprisoned [person] and shall immediately record in writing all of the above.”

In fact, articles of the law were not the only victim of the practices of the Palestinian Authority. The credibility of and respect for the judiciary were squandered as well. The Palestinian Security Services refuse to implement most of the judgments issued by the High Court of Justice ordering the release of political prisoners. In 1999 the High Court looked into 52 cases of political prisoners presented to it and ordered the release of 83 prisoners in 50 of those cases. To-date only 3 of them have been released.

The Executive Authority has ignored the Palestinian judiciary in a very humiliating manner. For example, in August 1997 the High Court, presided over by judge Amin Abdel-Salam, ordered the release of 10 of the Bir-Zeit students on the grounds that they had been detained without legal basis. Soon after the decision of the court, Minister of Justice Freih Abu-Meddein forcibly retired judge Abdel-Salam.

Consequently, political prisoners and their families do not place much hope in the Palestinian courts. Instead, they contact people with political influence to mediate unofficially with the security services in order to secure the release of their detained sons. This process has come to be known as “pleading”. It essentially consists of a letter from the detainees addressed to President Arafat or to the Head of the Security Service, asking him, after much flattery, to interfere in the case and to release the relative concerned. It is normally published in bold on the front pages of local newspapers.

 

       
     
     
 
 

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