|
VII.
Specific Problems of the Oslo Process
While this
report contends that Palestinian workers are in worse shape following the
Oslo process than they were prior to September 1993, neither the Oslo
Accords nor the Gulf War can properly be seen as the genesis of the
violations of the rights of Palestinian workers. The Israeli government
has, since Palestinian workers first entered the Israeli workforce,
created a wide range of obstacles to the efforts of Palestinian workers to
support their families and exercise their rights. Many of the obstacles
predated the Gulf War and the Oslo process while others are unique to the
post-Oslo period. Those problems which predate Oslo have, without question
been affected by the process, in particular the seemingly permanent
closures, such that these old problems have been exacerbated by new
realities. We now describe ten specific phenomena, some predating and some
postdating the Oslo process, which contribute to the violation of
Palestinian workers’ rights.
A. Employer
Underreporting and Non-Reporting
Because the
employment of all Palestinian workers in Israel is supervised by the
Israeli Employment Service, Israeli employers are obliged, each pay
period, to notify the Employment Service about the terms of each worker’s
employment. In this way, Palestinian workers supposedly receive the proper
compensation and benefits for the work they have performed. But in an
effort to shortchange their Palestinian employees, many Israeli employers
have circumvented the system by misreporting or even wholly failing to
report certain information such as the number of days worked, the per day
salary, or even a worker’s amount of children. The employer thereby saves
money, contributing less for benefits, while the worker suffers in the
long run as his benefits are calculated according to the very figures
which employers are fudging.
Although it is
difficult to establish the exact frequency of this practice, the PHRMG
examined evidence of over one hundred instances of employer underreporting
from the files of the PGFTU in Nablus and the Democracy and Workers’
Rights Center (DWRC) in Ramallah. In addition, tens of workers complained
of the practice to the PHRMG in its investigation in the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank. One example of the practice and its harmful effects is the
case of “Raed,”
a worker in
the construction industry from Qalqilia. Pictured are 1) his work card,
filled out daily by the employer and kept by the worker and 2) the wage
statement which reflects the figures reported by the employer to the
Israeli Employment Service, which tabulates benefits. Raed explains:
I work for a
construction company in Kfar Saba (a city in central Israel). I am 34
years old and have six children. My salary is 165 shekels per day but on
the statement it is reported as just 97 shekels. In March, which is when
these reports are for, I worked 26 days, which is shown on my work card.
But on the statement it says I only worked 20 days. It says I worked no
overtime but the card shows that I often worked more than nine hours. And
the statement says I don’t have any kids but I have six. Obviously I must
have kids or else I wouldn’t have gotten a permit.
Now I
m injured
[Raed had severed the tip of his finger in a work accident] and I can’t
work but I don’t get the full benefits. You get 70% of your daily salary.
Since he only reported 97 NIS, I only get 70% of that instead of the 165
NIS, which was my real salary. It’s not enough to feed my family.
Workers are
unlikely to complain for several reasons. For one, the worker receives his
proper salary from the employer, so he does not feel an immediate dent in
his income. Workers may not even be aware of all the benefits and rights
of which they deserve. Additionally, due to the power imbalance between
employers and Palestinian employees who face high unemployment in the
Territories, employees are commonly afraid, if they are aware of the
rights they are being denied, to alert the Israeli authorities to their
bosses’ manipulation.
Aharon Barzani
of the Employment Service, the agency which administers and supervises
relations between Israeli employers and Palestinian workers, acknowledged
the existence of the practice but refused to comment on its frequency. The
Israeli authorities, Barzani explained, lack the resources to effectively
police Israeli employers: “We cannot catch employers who cheat workers of
benefits, if the workers do not complain.”
Yet the
closure has placed such a high premium on jobs that most workers are
thankful to bring home any salary, and do not want to confront their
employers over benefits or to be responsible for the employer getting in
trouble with the Authorities. Rather, the Israeli government should
allocate sufficient resources to the enforcement of its labor laws.
B. Enforcement
Problems
Even where a
Palestinian worker’s rights and entitlements have clearly been abridged by
Israeli employers, the odds that a worker will recover from the employer
are slim for two main reasons, one a product of the closure, and the other
a product of an unfair and discriminatory policy of the Israeli labor
court system.
“Every donkey
can be replaced”
Tens of
thousands of Palestinian workers who worked in Israel prior to the closure
are now left without adequate streams of income. Foreign workers now take
many jobs which would once have been filled by Palestinians from the
Territories. Obviously this shortage creates serious demand among
Palestinian laborers for those jobs that remain available. Hence, if an
employer violates the law by, for example, paying less than minimum wage,
or failing to pay overtime, workers are commonly too dependent on their
relationships with the employer to complain, let alone to sue to redeem
his rights. Because of the labor market dynamics created by the closure
and the influx of foreign workers, Palestinian workers are generally
treated by their employers as no more than expendable commodities. This
attitude is revealed in the comment of one Israeli employer who threatened
an employee who had requested fair and legal treatment, “Every donkey can
be replaced.”
Labor Court
Guarantees
Israel’s
National Labor Court held in February 1996 that Palestinian workers from
PNA controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip must provide deposits
in order to sue Israeli employers in Israeli labor courts. The payment of
guarantees, meant to cover court costs in the event that the Palestinian
should lose, has become a major burden to Palestinian workers intent on
acquiring wages and benefits unlawfully denied them. In response to a
request by the Israeli Ministry of Justice to study the issue, Kav La’Oved
(Workers’ Hotline) found that “most judges require a deposit of some 10%
of the total amount of the lawsuit…. The guarantees often reach sums of
many hundreds of dollars – which far exceed the usual amounts awarded for
court expenses by labor courts.”
This policy
creates a chilling effect which deters Palestinians from using the courts
as a means to enforce their rights: “[W]orkers are often forced to give up
their claims or to settle for small out-of-court compromises.”
If the Israeli
government chooses not to adequately police its citizens who employ
Palestinians, it should at least avoid placing obstacles in the path of
workers who surmount the strong disincentives explained in the above
paragraph to act to redeem their rights on their own.
C. Abuse of
Workers
Palestinian
workers suffer various types and degrees of abuse, ranging from
degradation by their employers and Israeli soldiers to physical violence
or at worst killing by the Israeli Defense Forces border police.
1. The
Tarqumia Incident
In one of the
most dramatic and tragic violations of Palestinian workers’ rights, on
March 10, 1998, a van carrying legal Palestinian workers through the
Tarqumia checkpoint near Hebron was the target of gunfire from Israeli
border guards killing three workers and a young bystander. The PHRMG
investigated the incident and now present our analysis of the behavior of
the soldiers in light of the I.D.F. shooting regulations:
On March 10,
1998, at 5:30 p.m., a Ford Transit Van arrived at the Tarqumia checkpoint
carrying the following seven construction workers home from their worksite
in Givatayim, near Tel Aviv: Muhammad al-Sharawneh from Dora, Hebron (the
driver); Adnan al-Sharba, 36, married with nine children from Dorah,
Hebron; Ghaleb al Rujab, 35, married with five children, from Dorah,
Hebron; ‘Iqaab al Sayyed Ahmad, 31, married with five children from Dorah,
Hebron; Ali al-Sharba; Muhammad al-Awawdeh, 25, married from Dorah,
Hebron; and Hamdan al-Rujub, 35, married with eight children, from Dorah,
Hebron. The van encountered a busy checkpoint where four soldiers examined
identity cards from all cars passing in both directions, two soldiers for
each direction.
As related by
‘Iqaab al Sayyed Ahmad, “The soldier to the left of the checkpoint raised
his arm to indicate that we should approach. Then our vehicle moved
several meters, I heard several shots. I saw the driver, whom I was
sitting behind, fall and hit his head on the steering wheel. The car
continued to roll and suddenly, before we hit a cement wall, soldiers shot
at the car with their automatic rifles.”
Three workers
died from the burst of gunfire from the Israeli border guards: Muhammad
al-Sharawneh, Adnan al-Sharba, and Ghaleb al Rujab. ‘Iqaab al-Sayyed Ahmad
sustained injuries to his left thigh and hand. As Muhammad al-Awawdeh
testified to the PHRMG, after the car hit the wall and came to a stop,


I heard ‘Iqaab
telling them in Hebrew and Arabic that we were workers, and he opened the
door about 20 cm wide. When the door opened, the soldier stood in front of
the car door and started shooting into the vehicle hitting ‘Iqaab twice in
his left shoulder. One bullet escaped and the other lodged in his left
lung. Then one of the soldiers screamed in Hebrew, ‘if anyone alive is in
there come out with your hands up. ‘Iqaab left the car wounded and I
followed him. Ali followed me. Once we were out of the car the soldiers
took Ghaleb and Adnan’s bodies out of the car and placed all three bodies
on the side of the road.
In the heavy
shooting, Samer Karameh (13), who had been waiting at the roadside for a
taxi to bring him home from English class, was hit by a rubber bullet in
the forehead. Samer was taken immediately to Alia hospital and then to
al-Ahli hospital where he died of a brain malfunction on March 15, 1998.
The behavior
of the border police in the Tarqumia incident shows not only an utter
disregard for Palestinian life, but also a violation of the IDF
regulations for opening fire at checkpoints on suspicious vehicles.
“Suspicious” vehicles are defined in the IDF Rules of Engagement as a
vehicle which passes through an IDF checkpoint without stopping or
attempts to bypass such checkpoint. Suspicious vehicles are to be fired on
only where:
“there exists
a reasonable suspicion that the reason for breaking through the checkpoint
is connected with a serious felony. When it is clear, or it may be
assumed, that the checkpoint was breached for another reason and not by
hostile elements, it is forbidden to open fire.”
Opening fire
is meant to be only a “last resort,” where all other means to stop the
vehicle have failed. Even if such last resort situation occurs, firing is
not permitted if there is any danger of hitting people or property located
close by. In addition several precautionary steps must be taken before
shots may be fired at a vehicle.
First the
vehicle must be signaled to stop by means of hand gestures or, if it is
dark, with a flashlight. If this is ineffective, a warning must be shouted
in Arabic followed by a warning shot fired in the air; if the vehicle
still fails to stop, fire is to be aimed at the wheels only….Opening fire
with the intent to hit the person is permissible only in cases of
immediate concrete mortal danger to those manning the checkpoint.
In this
incident, the soldiers blatantly flouted the guidelines set up by the IDF
to prevent random killings of Palestinians at checkpoints. The soldiers at
the checkpoint failed to request a stop with a hand gesture, failed to
shout in Arabic and even failed to warn the van with a rifle shot in the
air. Rather the soldiers fired directly through the van’s window, killing
the driver on the spot. It is unfathomable that a rifle shot which hits a
driver as if it were from a sniper’s gun had been intended as a warning
shot or for the wheels of the van. The soldiers unquestionably shot with
intent to hit persons in the van, an action “permissible only in cases of
immediate mortal danger” to the border guards. The border police did not
even request that the van stop. How, then, could it be seen as a mortal
danger to the soldiers? Additionally the killing of Samer Karameh proves
that the soldiers breached the regulation barring shooting where persons
and property nearby would be endangered.
IDF
investigators subsequently cleared the soldiers involved in the incident
of any wrongdoing, despite the irregularities discussed above. Their
failure to hold rogue border police accountable for their abuses plainly
implicates the Israeli authorities in the murder of Palestinian workers on
their way from their jobs in Israel to their homes in the West Bank.
On October 18,
1998, Israeli soldiers opened fire on a vehicle transporting Palestinian
workers on their way home from work near the city of Dahiriyeh, according
to the DWRC and Al-Haq. The van was fired upon as it took a side road
because some of the passengers were working in Israel without permits.
Three workers, Nabil Taleb Hassan al-Qumi (26) from al-Fawwar refugee
camp, Murad Ahmad al-Battat (21) from Dahiriyeh, and Muhammad Khalil
al-Masri (33) from Dura were severely wounded in the attack. The driver of
the vehicle and other eyewitnesses insisted that no warning to stop was
given before the soldiers opened fire. “During the incident, Israeli
forces attacked the three wounded, beat them up, and left them bleeding
for almost half an hour without allowing citizens to approach them for
medical care.”
This incident
starkly demonstrates that the behavior which resulted in three deaths at
Tarqumia is part of a larger pattern of behavior which will continue if
the IDF repeatedly fails to sanction the perpetrators.
2. Release of
Ami Popper
President Ezer
Weizman’s recent decision to commute the sentence of convicted Israeli
killer of Palestinian workers is another even more recent example of the
Israeli government’s disregard for the lives of Palestinian workers. On
May 20, 1990, Ami Popper, a 22 year old Israeli approached a group of
Palestinian workers waiting for work at the Gan Havradim junction in
Rishon Letzion, Israel. As the workers neared his van, thinking Popper was
a potential employer, Popper opened fire with an automatic rifle,
murdering seven workers and wounding an additional ten. When brought to
trial Popper attempted to convince the court of his insanity but the court
rejected that argument when a group of psychiatrists chosen by Popper’s
defense team told the court that he was not mentally ill and was capable
of standing trial. For his crimes Popper was rightfully sentenced to the
severe penalty of seven concurrent life sentences plus an additional 20
years on May 17, 1991.
Despite the
original severity of the sentence, Ami Popper will soon walk away from
jail as a free man, following Weizman’s commutation of Popper’s sentence
along with those of four other Jews convicted of killing or attempting to
kill Palestinians. On February 3, 1999, Weizman signed a recommendation by
Israeli Justice Minister Tzahi Hanegbi which allows Popper to walk free
after serving seven and a half years in jail or approximately one year in
jail for each worker’s life taken, rather than the full life sentence for
each life the court originally ordered. What does this release say about
the lives of Palestinian workers and Palestinians generally? Israel’s
total lack of respect for Palestinian rights, even the most basic right to
life, is made even more stark in the context of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s
refusal “to release Palestinian prisoners ‘with blood on their hands’ as
part of interim peace accords with the Palestinians.”
Netanyahu’s
criticism of the release of Hamas activists by the PNA as a “revolving
door” ring even more hollow in light of his government’s actions.
3. Physical
Abuse
Violence by
Israeli border police is not limited to rare instances of loss of life;
physical abuse of Palestinian workers during the period of the Oslo
process is a well-documented phenomenon. For instance, in October 1996,
two Israeli security officers were captured on videotape as they
repeatedly, over the course of approximately thirty minutes, punched and
kicked six Palestinian workers who had been caught without permits near
the A-Ram checkpoint north of Jerusalem. After Israel television aired the
violence, the two soldiers were sentenced to 20-month jail sentences, of
which twelve months were suspended. As B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights
organization, wrote about the case: “This case is one of the rare
instances in which perpetrators of such violence are charged, sentenced
and actually serve time in prison for their actions. It is likely that the
publicity which this case generated left the authorities no choice but to
thoroughly investigate and prosecute the crimes.”
The head of
the Border Police, Major General Israel Sadan admitted during a Knesset
Interior Committee meeting that “The incident in which the Border Police
officers beat Palestinian workers is not unusual….This is not a solitary
case in this unit. There are not only two rotten apples in this crate of
fresh apples.”
Yet despite
the embarrassment of the public exposure of the beatings at A-Ram,
beatings of Palestinian workers without permits has continued well beyond
October 1996. In August 1997, B’Tselem issued a report documenting
repeated physical assaults by Border Police upon Palestinians found in
Israel without permits. As shown by B’Tselem,
“in spite of
the condemnations and declarations [by Israeli officials], the authorities
have done nothing to alter the conduct of security forces. Beatings, abuse
and degradation remain a common, almost routine occurrence when Border
Police and Police officers deal with Palestinians….
[Of the
fourteen incidents documented], all of the cases involve acts of brutality
against the Palestinian victims. Most were punched and beaten, even in the
head, with rifle butts and other objects for extended periods of time. The
beatings resulted in broken bones in four instances, and the loss of
consciousness in two cases.”
The incident
at Dahiriyeh in which soldiers opened fire on a van and then physically
assaulted the workers (see section VII-B above) demonstrates that physical
violence against workers without permits still remains common practice in
recent months.
Palestinian
workers are additionally subject to physical violence by private Israeli
citizens. The following testimony taken by a worker from Jenin exemplifies
the potential horrors a worker might suffer and the heavy hand with which
the authorities treat all illegal workers.
A Palestinian
Worker Placed in a Grave for Two Hours.
Jenin:
Jast Sunday,
Israeli settlers kidnapped worker Jaber Abdullah Jaber (28) and placed him
in a grave for two hours. Jaber stated: "I was working at a building site
north of Haifa when 8 settlers attacked me with sticks and knives. They
took me to a nearby wood and grabbed me by my beard and accused me of
being from Hamas. They said: 'now we are going to bury you alive.' They
started digging the grave, and when I resisted they beat me up, threw me
in the hole and covered my whole body except for my head. They
interrogated me about Hamas, its activities and how they conduct their
operations. They grabbed me by my hair and beard and said that I would not
come out of this alive. They said that they were going to leave me there
for wild animals to come and tear me to pieces. They told me: 'this is
what you people deserve.' This lasted for two hours. I really felt I was
going to die.
“When my
friends at work came back to the building site they did not find me there.
They started looking for me. When the settlers saw them, they ran away.
They took me out of the ground and took me to hospital. In the hospital,
they refused to admit me because I am Palestinian, and they called the
police who came and arrested me. They refused to provide any treatment
until I was interrogated. They did not believe my story and called me a
liar. They said I was trying to cover up a crime I was going to commit.
When I was insisted upon my story, they took me back to the place where
the incident happened, and back to hospital, and then to jail. I had to
pay a fine of 2,000 NIS.”
4. Emotional
and Psychological Harassment
Palestinian
workers also endure oppressive harassment by soldiers and employers in
order to enter Israel to work. One common form of harassment is the
confiscation of permits and magnetic identification cards. According to
the Palestinian Ministry of Labor, Israeli border police stripped 2,400
workers of their permits or magnetic cards during the first six months of
1998.
In many
instances the confiscation of permits is part of the ongoing campaign of
"security blackmail" described in section VII-G.
Random stops
to check Palestinian workers' papers is another tool of harassment.
Instead of a simple examination of workers' documentation, Israeli
authorities often take the opportunity to intimidate workers. In one
instance,
IDF soldiers
stopped a Ford car on Sunday morning while it was carrying workers near
Arad intersection, and forced them out of the car, stood them against the
wall with their arms up. They searched their ID's and work
permits….[D]espite the fact that these workers followed all necessary
rules and procedures to work in Israel, the soldiers harassed them and
threatened them. They told them that if any incident should take place,
their names are registered.
For Gazan
laborers, the everyday process to enter Israel is a hardship, due to
Israel's border crossing procedures. At the Erez border crossing, the
primary point of entry to Israel, Palestinian workers are forced to walk
two kilometers through a dusty passageway more suitable for cattle than
for human traffic. This passage has been dubbed "the Passageway of Death."
Once through the Passageway of Death, workers are forced to wait in
crowded lines as Israeli soldiers search their clothes and other
belongings. Soldiers regularly verbally abuse workers during exchanges at
the border crossing. Because a worker never knows how long the delay will
be, or how strict the searches will be, on any given morning, he must
leave his house in the dark of night every day to be sure of reaching his
destination in time. For example, one worker from the Jabalya refugee camp
described his routine: "I wake up at 2 a.m., at 3:20 I am at the
checkpoint. Sometimes I get to Tel Aviv at 5:45 even though work starts at
7:00 because you never know how long it will take."
A similar
process awaits workers at the end of their long workday. Several workers
have died of heart attacks while waiting because of the long delays
waiting in cramped lines.
D. Illegal
Workers
Palestinians
entering Israel to work for years have been required to possess a permit
which is issued by the Israeli Employment Service at the request of an
Israeli employer. Yet as long as there have been Palestinians entering
Israel, there have been those who have entered without proper
documentation, known commonly as illegal workers, to find short term
employment with a variety of employers. Illegal workers find their way to
a given site where they join the “black market” of labor, waiting for
Israelis to come by with an offer of work for a day or some other
temporary time frame.
Undocumented
or illegal workers during the post-Oslo period are a phenomenon unique to
the West Bank. Because the Gaza strip has been hermetically sealed,
workers now may enter Israel only through the Erez checkpoint, where a
permit and magnetic card are required for entry. In contrast, the West
Bank border has remained relatively open, such that illegal workers can
enter Israel without great difficulty. These workers are however subject
to arbitrary and sometimes severe physical abuse by border police if
caught (see section VII-B) as well as arrests and fines. According to the
PNA Ministry of Labor’s report on the state of Palestinian workers, issued
in late August 1998, “Israeli forces and Israeli police arrested 2,428
workers for not having permits to work inside the Green Line.” Of those,
260 were tried, convicted and sentenced to fines of over 3,000 NIS.
At times the
Border Police has implemented a program to halt illegal workers’ passage
into Israel. Al-Rissalah reported, in August 1998, on activities designed
to harass workers in the Hebron region: “a month ago, the Israeli forces
began following a policy of pressure on thousands of workers from Hebron.
The forces follow the workers across hills and dirt roads, and closed all
side roads and dirt roads which these workers use to go around
checkpoints.”
Additionally
illegal workers receive none of the protections of Labor or social
benefits law and have, of course, little leverage with employers to demand
benefits or security.
While subject
to harassment by security forces, illegal workers serve an important role
for the Israeli government, which tacitly approves of the workers crossing
the Green Line. With tens of thousands of workers entering Israel from the
West Bank, Israeli authorities must be aware of the practice. Both the PNA
and Palestinian workers suffer from this arrangement:
“the PNA has
no way of deducting income tax or social security. On the other hand, the
desperate need to ensure at least a minimal livelihood for Palestinians
has made the Authority economically dependent on Israel, thus tying their
hands.
The
permit-less workers provide unusually cheap labor for Israeli
employers….Though they are nominally entitled to the same legal protection
as workers holding permits, their precarious position prevents them from
standing up for their rights.
The Israeli
government, meanwhile, benefits as they control the flow of labor without
affecting the number of permits issued. “Since all this is being done sub
rosa, the government can exert economic pressures on the Palestinians
without being exposed to public criticism.”
The following
excerpts from an article in Al-Istiqlal newspaper illustrate the hardships
that some Palestinians have endured in order to work illegally in Israel:
Palestinian
Workers Face Hardship In the Workplace:
Dozens of
Workers Forbidden from Seeing their Families
For 8 months,
Shafiq Muhammad Mashharawi from Gaza, living in Nazareth, has been
forbidden to see his family. He is haunted by the Israeli police because
he does not have a permit to enter the Green Line. Mashharawi exemplifies
dozens of workers from the West Bank and Gaza living in Nazareth, who face
harsh measures to earn their daily bread. Mashharawi tells al-Istiqlal
newspaper: “the authorities refuse to give us permits. We have
commitments, therefore, we deal with being away from home, and we live in
Nazareth permanently because we cannot go home because of the
checkpoints.”
Day laborers:
These workers
are well known in Nazareth. They have no place to live. They dwell in the
cold of the mountains. Nazareth is the center where these workers gather,
says Nazeeh Khaled al-Ghoul from Rafah. “We gather at six in the morning
and wait for our luck. We live under difficult pressure-filled
circumstances. We wait for the cars of contractors and businessmen to pass
by, while we watch the street entrance for any police cars approaching the
area to arrest us. The minute a businessman’s car stops, every worker
heads toward it looking for work; one of us gets lucky.
A journey of
hardship:
Salim Abu
To’omeh came from Ramallah to Nazareth as a day laborer. He has a college
degree, but he failed to find a permanent job in his field of study –
accounting and business administration. The Israeli authorities refused
him a permit. He waits for a vehicle to come and pick him up…. “We must be
patient and show up every day,” says To’omeh.
Waiting in
despair:
Nazeeh Nassr
Thaher of Khan Yunis told al-Istiqlal there are 79 day laborers (50 of
them from Gaza). He pointed out that between 15-20 workers actually find
work. The rest sit around all day waiting for a vehicle to pick them up.
That vehicle might never show up. Four or five days, even a week could
pass without any cars showing up.
Examples of
suffering:
These workers
get used as often they do not earn what they deserve. Marzuq Zaghadi from
Rafah said that the Israeli employers are fully aware that they are
without permits. Therefore, they always want to hire us to pay us less and
not give us what we deserve. “Last week, 8 workers and myself worked at an
Israeli farm near Afulah for ten days, for 100 NIS each. After we finished
our work, the owner of the farm fired us, and threatened to turn us to the
police if we asked him for more money. We had no choice but to accept the
money.
E. “Black
Work” and Purchasing Permits
Since the
border around the Gaza Strip became hermetically shut, Palestinians
without steady jobs in Israel, but desperate for some source of income,
have found a new way to enter Israel for temporary work, much in the way
that undocumented workers entered Israel for daily or weekly work in the
past. Sham Israeli companies, set up for the sole purpose of collecting
fees from Palestinian workers in exchange for permits, prey on these
desperate workers, providing permits at a high fee while not actually
employing the worker. In other words, a worker pays a sham companies a fee
(during the summer of 1998, the going rate was 1,000 NIS per month) in
exchange for the company’s request that the Israeli security forces
provide the worker a permit. Other employers legitimately employ workers
for a week or so per month but force them nevertheless to pay a fee for
the permit.
"Mousa A.” of
Nusayrat refugee camp/Gaza Strip explained the scope of the phenomenon:
Of the 25,000
workers from Gaza that pass through Erez daily, only 10,000 have regular
work—the rest are “black work”—it’s like the souk [market]. They have to
find an employer to get them a permit. Most employers will either have the
worker pay up front or deduct it from his paycheck. Sometimes an employer
will have a few days of work per month for a worker and the worker has to
find work the rest of the month.
Samir F.” of
Gaza City described his experience:
I’ve got no
work in Gaza so I pay 1500 NIS for a permit for a month and a half. Then I
try to find whatever work I can, building, whatever. I find work maybe 5
to 10 days per month. Today for instance, I crossed through the checkpoint
[Erez] and waited for one and a half hours and no one came buy looking for
workers, so I came back without work today.
This
arrangement places Gazan workers who technically are legal to enter Israel
in the same weak position as illegal workers. Because of their dependence
on sham companies and part-time employers, the income of these Gaza
laborers is entirely unstable and benefits are non-existent.
F. Settlements
and Industrial Zones
Significant
numbers of Palestinian workers work for Israeli firms while remaining
geographically within the Occupied Territories. These firms, located in
two arenas: Israeli settlements and industrial zones, commonly deny
Palestinian laborers their rights, paying less than minimum wage and
neglecting social benefits such as vacation time or health insurance.
By moving
their operations to the Occupied Territories, either to an Industrial Zone
or to a settlement, Israeli manufacturing companies have succeeded in
finding a cheap and vulnerable labor force while avoiding the watch of the
Israeli authorities. Kav La’Oved (Worker’s Hotline) explains the
injustice:
Here and there
the workers enjoy the rights to which they would be entitled in Israel
itself, but for the most they are employed according to Jordanian Law (Law
2, 1965). This law, which was discriminatory in almost every area, was
updated in Jordan but has remained in force in the territories since 1967.
Workers are not entitled to any fringe benefits, such as traveling
expenses, vacation pay or work clothes. Pay for severance, sick leave or
accident leave are less than that stipulated by Israeli law.
This is so
despite Israeli Civil Administration order #967, which obligates Israeli
employers in the Jewish settlements to pay the minimum wage under Israeli
labor law and to insure against accidents.
Suhel Sharawi,
resident of Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza and a 29 year old father of four,
was fired from his job in a textile factory at the Erez Industrial Zone in
the Gaza Strip, for his involvement with the workers’ committee which had
requested full benefits for workers.
“I worked
fourteen months at a wool clothing factory in Erez. In April [1998], we
organized a strike to demand overtime payment and an improvement in the
salaries. Wages there are 50 NIS per day and the minimum wage is 101 NIS
per day. No overtime is paid. In response to the strike seven workers were
fired. All seven were members of the workers’ committee. The boss said
that my work is good but that I left work for the strike. But only the
organizers of the strike lost their jobs.”
Abuses are not
limited to the Gaza Strip. Fouad Ahmed Hajjeh from Qalqilia in the
northern West Bank related his experiences with employers at a nearby
settlement Kranei Shomron:
“I was hired
through an Arab-owned manpower business so they wouldn’t have to pay me
full benefits under Israeli law. I worked at a rope factory for three
years without minimum wage and no other rights. No health, no paid
vacation, no severance. “If you don’t like it, go home,” they told anyone
who complained. I left for another factory there where I get my rights and
a fair salary. Of the 10 or 12 factories in the settlement, this is the
only one which follows the law strictly.”
The Barkan
industrial park in the West Bank is particularly notorious for abridging
Palestinian labor rights. According to the Al-Rissalah newspaper 60
workers were fired from the Technoplast plastics factory after striking in
protest of the consistent violations.
Some of the
workers said that they work strenuous 12-hour days, every day of the week.
Anyone who misses work because of illness is sent home for a week or more
without pay. Overtime and minimum wage are not paid.
Workers also
complained of the lack of health insurance, weekends and social benefits.
The factory administration forced all workers to sign a contract with a
manpower contractor to avoid proper compensation or other rights.
In one
particularly heinous event, after Khaled Al-Sureifi was injured in a
workplace accident Technoplast fired him. Al-Sureifi was forced to pay
over 1500 NIS of his personal savings for hospital treatment.
The Civil
Administration, which is responsible for all Israeli controlled areas of
the Occupied Territories, in conjunction with the Israeli labor court
system, should put a halt to the unfair practices of Israeli employers in
the settlements and industrial zones.
G. Security
Blackmail
The closure,
an ever present fact of life for Palestinians in Oslo-Wye era, has put
permits and, for Gazans, magnetic cards, at a premium. We have already
discussed how some Israeli companies have manipulated the closure to get
Palestinian workers to pay a fee in exchange for sponsoring their permit.
Private Israeli employers are not, unfortunately, the only ones to have
exploited the desperation prevalent among Palestinians. The Israeli
General Security Service (GSS), has, since the closure was imposed in the
wake of the Oslo accords, engaged in a practice we call “security
blackmail.” As reported in Al-Rissalah, “many workers complained about the
blackmail they have been offered by Israeli intelligence officers, who
would give them work permits and magnetic identification card in return
for collaboration. Other workers mentioned that their valid permits have
been confiscated and if they want them back, they need to cooperate with
the GSS.”
Nizzar
Mabhouh, a foreman with an Israeli development company from the Jabalya
refugee camp in Gaza, was the victim of this treatment and shared his
experience with the PHRMG:
“I’ve worked
in Israel sixteen years in all, always with a permit. To get a permit, the
company requests it and if there are no security problems, you get the
permit. The company requests the permit from the Erez administration which
is affiliated with the GSS. The latter can pressure the workers who need
permits and magnetic cards. Four and a half years ago I went to Erez and
was told that my magnetic card had been revoked for security reasons. I
was sent to see a guy in a uniform—clearly Shabak—and I asked him why. I
said to him that if there’s a problem why doesn’t he arrest me and finish
the matter. I have never had any security problems and I’ve worked in
Israel for so many years. “We can’t take a risk with anyone,” he said.
“Some lunatic told us about you. If you are ready to work with us, I can
settle this problem.” I said to him “You just called my informer a lunatic
and now you want me to be just like him.” He said he didn’t mean it and
that I should work with him to get my name cleared. I obviously refused
his offer. I got a lawyer who did nothing but cost me 1800 NIS.”
Nizzar was
prohibited from reaching his job in Israel for three and a half years
until he was re-issued a permit in the mid-1997.
Jamil, a
married father of two from Qalqilia, was interviewed by the PHRMG at the
Qalqilia branch of the Palestine General Federation of Trade Unions
(PGFTU). He related his story, “I had a permit but six months ago it was
taken. I went to the border crossing to request another. I was told by the
official there ‘If I help you, you’ll help me.’ I refused. He told me to
think about it and come back. I still can’t get a permit.”
Wasim, a
married 28 year old father of one from Kfar Jayous was also a victim of
security blackmail.
“I had a job
working in a clothing factory which started in January 1993. In March
there was a closure. When some workers were allowed back into Israel I
didn’t get renewed. I went to Kadumim to see and the GSS there told me
“Your name is on the computer. If you help me, I’ll help you and you’ll
get a permit.” I told him no. He said to me, “there are two pages in the
computer, black and white. Ask the computer which one you are on.” “You
ask it” I told him. He said to me “Don’t talk back to a wiser person than
you. Go back to the window and ask for your magnetic card. If they give it
to you, you are a lucky person. If you don’t get it come back and I’ll
help you.” Of course I didn’t get my card or permit and I am still waiting
for 5 years. I have a lawyer and the PA Labor ministry sent a letter on my
behalf. I have never been to prison or been arrested in my entire life.”
This cynical
and malicious GSS practice preys on Palestinian desperation and
constitutes a violation of the workers’ right to work as well as a form of
blackmail intended to force innocent workers to collaborate with Israel.
H. Trade
Unions
Palestinian
workers have long suffered from insufficient representation by trade
unions. While one can point to improvements since the peace process began,
the status quo is still less than ideal. A number of factors can be
pointed to in order to explain the insufficiency of trade union support,
including the historically political nature of PTU’s, the lack of
democratic processes within the trade unions, the illegal prohibition on
PTU’s operating in Israel, and relations between the Histadrut and
Palestinian workers and trade unions.
PTU’s are
organized under an umbrella confederation, the PGFTU. A proper trade union
is a democratic organization of workers from a common occupation who bind
together to increase their power in the workplace. Prior to the Oslo
Accords and the institution of the PNA, PTU’s were primarily political
bodies, operating as tools of political parties instead of functioning to
improve the lot of workers. Under this framework, if a worker had a
problem related to work or otherwise, he consulted the union dominated by
his party of affiliation, not the union ostensibly for his trade. As an
example, if a taxi driver was laid off, he might turn to the farm workers’
union instead of the taxi drivers’ union if the farm workers’ were
dominated by a party to which worker felt affiliated.
The political
orientation of trade unions can be explained in part by the Israeli
occupation, resistance to which was seen by unionists as a goal above and
excluding all others, including even protection of workers’ rights.
Because of this perspective, however, Palestinian workers’ rights have
traditionally not been championed by the organizations which hold
themselves up as defenders of those rights. Another explanation for the
failure of unions to protect workers rights during the occupation which
cannot be overlooked has been the Israeli suppression of trade union
leaders. As leaders of the resistance to the occupation, the trade unions
were targets of the Israeli army, the leaders suffering arrests and
deportations. This too made functioning on behalf of workers problematic.
There has been
an undeniable shift in the focus of trade unions following the
establishment of the PNA. With the beginnings of a national entity and
the, at least partial, end to the occupation, the PGFTU and its
constituent unions began to focus more on the rights of workers and less
on political activism on behalf of a party. Criticisms of the PGFTU as a
tool of the PNA have, however, persisted throughout the Occupied
Territories. The PHRMG encountered reports that PGFTU leaders are closely
allied with the PNA and its security forces, appointed for their
connections and not for their interest in workers. The PHRMG was unable to
confirm these reports. Yet the PGFTU’s failure to hold democratic
elections, as any legitimate trade union organization must, despite the
passage of several target dates has provided fuel to the fire of
speculation. Muhammad Aruri, head of the PGFTU legal department maintained
that the separation of the executive committee between the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip made movement toward elections difficult. Nevertheless the
PGFTU is committed, according to Aruri, to making the transition to a
democratic body. The PHRMG calls on the PGFTU to act independently from
the PNA and to carry out elections in the near future because an
independent democratic trade union movement is an essential element in the
vindication of the rights of Palestinian workers.
The PHMRG
witnessed the vibrant activity at the Qalqilia branch of the PGFTU, where
some hundred or so workers passed through for assistance, education,
training and support on their sole weekly day of rest. The PHRMG commends
the work of such PGFTU branches that are making the transition into
participatory and effective organs run by and for their members.
The
effectiveness of the PGFTU is, however, necessarily and unconscionably
hindered by the laws of the state of Israel and the relationship with the
Histadrut, the Israeli trade union federation. Israeli law prohibits the
PGFTU from organizing or engaging in collective bargaining in Israel.
This violates
the principle of freedom to join effective labor unions, which is
documented in numerous human rights mandates, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Hence the PGFTU’s representation of
individual workers is limited to providing private Israeli lawyers. In
addition the PGFTU can and does cooperate with the Histadrut to improve
the workplace rights of Palestinians. Palestinian workers cannot join the
Histadrut. They are, however, covered by collective agreements signed by
the Israeli union federation. In exchange for this bargaining
representation, as well as for legal assistance, the Histadrut takes 0.7%
from the paycheck of every legal Palestinian worker. 10% of that total is
kept as a commission by the Employment Service of the Israeli Department
of Labor.
In the wake of
the signing of the Oslo accords, the Histadrut and the PGFTU signed an
agreement of cooperation on March 5, 1995. One element of the agreement
bound the Histadrut to remit 50% of the money it received from Palestinian
workers through the Employment Service to the PGFTU. For three and a half
years, claiming financial hardship, the Histadrut failed to live up to its
promise, paying only a fraction of the total, which amounts to millions of
shekels. In August 1998, the Histadrut and the PGFTU agreed that the PGFTU
would finally receive one half of the money from the workers’ salaries in
the form of a 0.9 per cent fee paid directly from the Israeli Employment
Service. Funds from four months have been paid since that time. The funds
that the Histadrut owes the PGFTU for the time period from March 1995
through August 1998 have not yet been paid. The PHRMG calls for the
transfer of funds which rightfully belong in the hands of the PGFTU to be
used for the amelioration of the condition of Palestinian workers.
I. National
Insurance Discrimination
As described
in Section II, since 1970, the State of Israel has systematically
discriminated against Palestinian workers through its national insurance
policies:
Despite the
fact that the rates deducted by the N.I.I. [National Insurance Institute]
from the wages of Palestinians and Israelis are the same, the benefits are
not. Workers from the territories are entitled only to compensation for
work accidents and employer bankruptcy. Their wives my claim a maternity
allocation only if they give birth in a hospital within the Green Line.
Palestinian workers are denied all the other benefits to which Israeli
workers are entitled: old age pensions, disability payments, unemployment
benefits, low-income supplements, child benefits, nursing care, etc.
In January
1994, Kav La’Oved commenced a lawsuit on behalf of three Palestinian
workers demanding the reimbursement of deductions from their payments into
the national insurance fund for which no benefits were received. In 1995,
the plaintiffs moved to certify the suit as a class action, which would
have had the effect of allowing all workers who had had national insurance
funds deducted to get full benefits. As part of the potential settlement
or verdict it was hoped that Israel would be forced to create or help to
create a social insurance system for Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza. Despite the potential benefit to Palestinian workers en masse, the
motion for class action status was opposed by the PGFTU, as an improper
attempt by an Israeli organization to represent Palestinian workers as a
community. Lawyers for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, understood the
opposition of the PGFTU as politically motivated, based on a preference
that the potentially significant sums of money would be directed toward
the PNA instead of toward the workers directly. As we shall see in the
following section, entrusting workers’ benefits to the PNA, is a
questionable proposition. The PGFTU’s stance indicates that the union
still may be more concerned with national political interests than with
the interests of Palestinian workers. As a practical matter, the
opposition of the PGFTU to the class action motion, at times vociferous,
played a part in Kav La’Oved’s decision to refrain from filing an appeal
of the trial court’s rejection of the motion. The lawsuit was upheld in
February 1999 by the Supreme Court and will be going to trial in the near
future.
The Paris
Protocol, enshrined in the Cairo Agreement between Israel and the PNA,
defined the scope and character of the economic relationship between
Israel and PNA during the period of the Oslo Accords.
The provision
on labor issues, Article VII, attempts to address the problem of the
National Insurance iscrepancy. In subsection 3, Israel pledges to
“transfer to
the PNA, on a monthly basis, the equalization deductions as defined by
Israeli legislation, if imposed and to the extent levied by Israel. The
sums so transferred will be used for social benefits and health services,
decided upon by the PNA, for Palestinians employed in Israel and for their
families. The equalization deductions to be so transferred will be those
collected after the date of the signing of the Agreement from wages of
Palestinians employed in Israel and from their employers.”
Unlike the
remedy sought in Kav La'Oved's lawsuit, the funds transferred would cover
only post-Cairo Agreement deductions, excluding the preceding thirty years
of national insurance money deducted from Palestinian paychecks. An
Israeli law passed specifically to validate the Cairo Agreement
"retroactively declares that all the National Insurance deductions [now
called equalization deductions] collected from the Palestinian workers'
wages in the past…'shall be considered to have been legally paid and
received.'"
This fiction
could, and should, be reversed by the Israeli court which will hear the
Kav La'Oved lawsuit. Indeed, the Paris Protocol provides "The above
arrangements concerning equalization deductions…may be reviewed or changed
by Israel if an authorized court in Israel will determine that the
deductions…must be paid to individuals, or used for individual social
benefits or insurance in Israel, or that it is otherwise unlawful."
In any case no
funds have been transferred under this provision from Israel to the PNA.
Palestinian Labor Ministry officials complain of Israeli stonewalling.
However Israeli authorities contend that the equalization deductions are
being set aside in a bank account, held up by inaction by the PNA on the
establishment of a social welfare fund as required by the Paris Protocol.
PNA Labor
officials gave no explanation for when such a system would be set up or
what measures had been taken to that end. In the meantime, Palestinian
workers continue to be denied the benefits for which they pay.
J. PNA Misuse
of Worker Pensions
Allegations of
corruption among PNA officials, even ministers, are ubiquitous. The
Palestinian government’s accountability on many financial matters is
suspect.
Unfortunately
Palestinian workers have not escaped the plague of PNA corruption. Instead
of protecting the futures of Palestinian workers, PNA president Yasser
Arafat and his financial advisor Khaled Islam have manipulated worker
pension funds for non-worker related activities. The scheme to redirect
Palestinian worker pensions to bank accounts under Arafat’s control was
described in articles published in major journals of the European press,
Der Spiegel and Le Parisien. We reproduce the article from Der Spiegel,
and a copy of a letter from Arafat evidencing the transfer of funds
described in the article. During the course of his research, the author
interviewed Freih Abu Meddein, Justice Minister, Khaled Islam and Arie
Gilon, the administrator of the Pension Fund, none of whom denied the
content of the story, nor complained after publication.
|