May - June 1997: The State of Human Rights in Palestine

 

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The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor
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The Status of the Political Opposition in Palestine


A. Introduction

The Palestinian Authority contains a number of competing and cooperating institutions, that collectively exercise authority. These include the Presidency of Yassar Arafat, the Cabinet, the Legislative Council, the PNC, and the PLO Executive Committee. Of these, the Presidency is the most influential element, and the Legislative Council is the weakest. The various institutions are built around the Fateh political faction, dominant in every national forum, and enjoying a monopoly within the security services.
The opposition comprises all those political organizations and individuals competing for influence while opposing the policies of Fateh, President Arafat, and/or the PA itself. The opposition is diverse; some figures originally from the opposition have become Ministers; some Fateh independents are seen as part of the opposition.

B. Political Opposition in Palestine

Not all opposition is in the form of political parties; despite the registration of many groups as parties. Some, such as the PPP, PFLP, and DFLP do not need to register as parties because they belong to the PLO. Hamas on the other hand, has declined to become a party, while allowing supporters to establish the Salvation party. Some individuals are part of the opposition as individuals, such as Dr. Haidar Abdul-Shafi. In at least one case, a small newly registered party encountered official harassment, despite its legality. Other small parties have registered and appeared in the elections last year.
Efforts to form a common front have not succeeded, and the opposition remains diverse. The Legislative Council is the only forum in which members of the opposition and Arafat loyalists can vigorously debate issues of the day.

C. The Repression of the Opposition

Opposition parties, organizations and activists encounter arbitrary arrests and other forms of harassment.. Some political detainees have reported being mistreated, although they rarely suffer the kind of mistreatment seen in the past, or accorded today to mostly non-political prisoners (see chapter on torture).

1. Arbitrary Arrests and Illegal Detentions

In March 1996, close to a thousand people were arrested following the suicide attacks inside Israel. A member of the General Intelligence, speaking to recently arrested prisoners in the Ramallah jail, was heard to say: "You are here because you fall into three groups. Group A are those Israel wants in prison. Group B are those the PA wants in prison. Group C are those to make up the quota to keep Israel happy. Most of you are in Group C." Another explanation for the arrest campaign was given by Colonel Mohammed Al-Masri: "The PA was scared that the opposition was exaggerating its size and role in showing itself as a political alternative while denouncing the Authority as a betrayer." But today, Al Masri continues, this is no longer the case.
Mustafa Atari, a Bir-Zeit University student was arrested during the March 1996 sweep. He was released after 318 days, in January 1997. No charges were brought against him. Nearly all of those arrested have been kept without trial or charges, and released gradually. We have no numbers on how many of those arrested last year are still being held.
Following the Beit-El (Surda) attack on 11 December, 1996, many PFLP activists were rounded up in the West Bank. In one case, the brother of a known PFLP suspect was detained and held hostage until the wanted suspect turned himself in to the authorities. Ahmed Sa'adat, a PFLP leader from Ramallah, was also arrested following the Beit-El/Surda attack. He was never charged, and was released on the same day of the National Dialogue in Nablus, February 27. One of the demands of the opposition parties in the National Dialogue was the release of imprisoned activists. The PA used the search for the perpetrators of that attack as an excuse to detain many PFLP activists. Their release was later used as a sign of 'goodwill,' as the case of Sa'adat shows.
Ghazi Hammad, from Hamas, was detained January 1-8 by the PSS. He reports being treated well, as interrogators discussed the views and politics of Hamas at the time. Later, following the suicide bombing in Tel-Aviv on March 21, many Hamas supporters and activists were held for short periods of time. The detentions, in most cases lasting only a few hours, were used to gather information about Hamas policy in general and to threaten detainees to 'behave.' The number of activists detained in this way is estimated to be in the dozens, throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
Dr. Ibrahim Maqadmeh, a Hamas leader, was released on March 11th as a sign of goodwill towards Hamas. Neither had been charged or brought to trial. Following the March attack in Tel-Aviv an arrest warrant was issued against Dr. Maqadmeh - possibly the only legal arrest warrant issued in the aftermath of the attack. Dr. Maqadmeh is today in hiding.
Following the two suicide bombings in Kfar Darom and Netzarim on April 1 (Israeli settlements in Gaza), attributed by Israel to the Islamic Jihad, up to 200 arrests were carried out among Islamic Jihad activists. In one incident that took place on April 2, fifteen students were arrested from a single high school. They were later released in stages after the intervention of a human rights organization. None were charged with anything. Attorney Husam Arafat and 29 other activists affiliated to Ahmed Jibril's PFLP - General Command were arrested in February and have remained in detention without charges. Husam Arafat went on hunger strike to protest his detention.

2. Mistreatment of Political Detainees

Political detainees are often treated better than other kinds of prisoners. There is a general recognition that mistreating them is a negative strategy that increases opposition and bitter feelings towards the PA.
Since the beginning of the year, treatment is also better during interrogation. Only a small number of reports of mistreatment or torture come from political detainees. In some prisons political detainees they are allowed to leave the prison during the day.

3. Closure of Political Events

In the past, the PA has arbitrarily canceled events; this includes a human rights conference organized by Raji Sourani in 1995, and a DFLP festival that was scheduled for June 1996. During the first part of 1997, the PHRMG has not come across a case of a political event being closed by the PA.

4. Harassment of Small Parties

The Al-Ahd party, founded before the elections in 1996, has complained of harassment. This includes the arrest of the party's leader , Abdullah Issa during the elections, and the confiscation of his passport from April 1996 to February 1997.

5. Closure of Political Newspapers

Al-Risala newspaper, appearing weekly, represents the views of the Salvation party. Despite printing often severe criticism, the newspaper has not been closed. On the other hand, it is less extreme than the previous Hamas affiliated newspaper, Al-Watan, that was closed in March 1996.

D. Analysis

1. Military Operations and Political Repression

There is a strong connection between military operations against Israeli conducted by opposition groups, and subsequent arrest campaigns. In the case of the Beit-El/Surda attack, many PFLP activists remained imprisoned as political prisoners months after the perpetrators were tried and convicted. Assuming that the figure of 200 Islamic Jihad activists arrested after the Gaza bombings is precise, then it too is an example of political arrests riding on the wave of 'anti-terror' activity.
By contrast, the March 1997 bombing in Tel-Aviv resulted in arrests by the PA of three 'Sourif Cell' suspects, and an intimidation campaign that in comparison to the past was mild. It is possible that opposition activity not related to military attacks on Israeli targets would be tolerated more than in the past. This is either because Israel would not be exerting as much pressure on the PA to 'fight terror' in the absence of bombings, or because the PA is genuinely interested in allowing the opposition to operate. Some observers have remarked that the PA uses 'Israeli pressure' to justify the arrest of opposition figures not connected to any illegal activities.

2. How Many Political Detainees?

According to statistics supplied by the Mandela Institute for June 1996 and May 1997, the number of internees held in PA detention facilities and prisons is fairly stable. In June 1996 1290 were held, and in May 1997 the figure was 1095 - a drop of less than 10%. At a workshop on prisons and rehabilitation held on April 28, Ramallah Prison Director Ahmed Al-Arraj put the number of prisoners at 846, 619 of which have not been tried. Human rights organizations do not receive official information from all detention facilities on the number of prisoners and their type - political or criminal.
Assuming that the proportion of political to criminal detainees is stable, the data above would show that the number of political prisoners is decreasing, but not by much. The data masks fluctuations in the number of prisoners, as a result of releases (leading up to the National Dialogue in February), or mass arrests (most recently of Islamic Jihad supporters).

3. Political Activity in the PA

Why is the level of repression dropping? Many of our sources, from Dr. Ghassan Al-Khatib from the JMCC to known figures in the PFLP and Hamas agree that the level of political activity by the various organizations is low. This is a consequence of three factors: the continuing confusion and debate within the organizations as a result of their failure to change or derail the Oslo peace process, and the success of President Arafat in weakening the opposition through direct repression and political tactics. A third factor comes only from Hamas: they are 'keeping a low profile,' avoiding overt political activity 'so as not to put the PA in a defensive position,' and concentrating on civil society work characteristic of that movement. During January, Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar said that Hamas would become a political party, but this initiative failed because the membership did not support it.
In any case, it stands as a fact that popular support for the opposition has been dropping consistently since 1993 - from a high of 34% to a current low of around 20%. This drop continues to exist even when support for President Arafat and the PA take a dip. The largest increase is in those who have no trust in any political leader, standing at 25.9 %.
The Legislative Council is rarely mentioned, as its activities are quite free, and we have not found any serious violations connected to its functioning. However, the PA has been accused of ignoring the Legislative Council and suppressing media coverage of its activities.

E. Conclusions

As a human rights organization, the PHRMG does not have political positions vis-a-vis the various political factions. But as an organization with a commitment to democracy and civil society, we support the existence of a political system that has responsible actors capable of responding to popular will, representing a wide spectrum of opinion, and carrying out political initiatives within a pluralistic and tolerant environment.
We support the existence of law abiding political parties and organizations, and welcome their active participation in the affairs of society. The tendency of the PA to arrest hundreds of political activists from the opposition following armed attacks on Israeli targets, together with the more selective imprisonment of political opposition activists in between, has created a climate of mistrust. The PA must live up to its undertakings to protect the rule of law; all prisoners in detention must be either charged or released. Those charged must be allowed to defend themselves in court in a fair trial.

ngs to protect the rule of law; all prisoners in detention must be either charged or released. Those charged must be allowed to defend themselves in court in a fair trial.

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