Researched and Compiled by

 

Leonie Schultens

 

Translations by

 

Nadia Nusseibeh

 

Funded by

 

Representative Office of Finland- Ramallah

 

April 2004

The Palestinian Representatives

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Palestinian People

 

 

 

[1]

 

 

 

[2]

 

 

 

[3]

 

 

 

 

 

The Israelis

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Outside World

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The ‘Intra’fada

 

فوضى السلاح

‘The chaos of the weapons’

 

 

Since September 2000, the Middle East has been embroiled in another one of its deadly conflict spirals. This new uprising has become known as the ‘al Aqsa Intifada’, triggered in part by the visit of then head of opposition and now Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. Its roots however can be traced back to the pre-Oslo era. Although the term ‘intifada’ became notorious already in 1989, the present ‘uprising-sequel’ displays certain characteristics, which were not as prominent before the Oslo agreements.

 

Among the new phenomena is the qualitative and quantitative change in armed resistance. Whereas the first intifada saw scores of Palestinians taking to the streets, armed with stones and kitchen appliances, the present uprising is increasingly characterized by the deadly firepower of small arms. In December 2002, then Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) warned of the increased use of weapons - an evolution he wished to reverse. His short-lived government was ill-equipped to tackle the problem, and his successor, Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala’a), does not seem better placed to confront the weapons chaos. Before Oslo, Palestinians primarily desired unity and an end to the occupation. But already as the first intifada began to fade, divisions among Palestinians appeared and deepened. These rifts have remained and widened throughout the Oslo years. The failure to reach a substantive and acceptable peace agreement has given rise to strong feelings of betrayal and futility. It is to a great extent because of these internal divisions that Palestinians also turn their aggression and vent their feelings of futility against fellow Palestinians – a phenomenon this research seeks to explore. As will be explained, the main underlying cause of internal violence is the fragmented nature of Palestinian society and politics. Present-day ‘lawlessness has exposed the internal divisions of Palestinian society and government. Pitted against one another are rival security agencies, militant splinter groups and some members of powerful families in the cities’[4].

 

Due to the forces of history, Palestinians have turned into a very diverse cultural mélange, characterized by several religious convictions and political affiliations and ideologies. To give a brief historical overview helps contextualize the Palestinian experience and to place the internal violence of the al Aqsa intifada into context. Of course this diversity has to be analyzed in keeping the conflict with Israel in mind.

 

 

 

 

 

Historical overview

 

Reduced to colonial subjects by Ottoman rule and subsequently colonized by the British, the Palestinian people were denied self-government until the end of World War Two. Although national feelings and bonds existed, there was no opportunity to express them through political institutions. When most former colonies gained independence, the Palestinian people experienced their ‘al-nakba’ (catastrophe). The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 left Palestinians scattered throughout the Arab world. Geographical dispersal and refugee status impacted deeply on the Palestinian psyche, and gave rise to differing views and opinions. It was the ‘exile’ Palestinians (not those living in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank), who started forming political associations and parties, under the common umbrella of liberation and return. However, already at this infancy stage of political party formation, Palestinian viewpoints proved to be highly diverse and at times even incompatible with each other. With the rise of Nasser and pan-Arabism in Egypt, some Palestinian groups called for self-determination within the wider Arab framework, whereas others wanted a purely Palestinian independence and national sovereignty. The socialist imprint on Palestinian nationalism in the post-1948 era impaired the development of a uniquely Palestinian vision of statehood. It was the demise of Nasser and the United Arab Republic (UAR), alongside the impotence of Arab states to help Palestinians reclaim their land, which led individual Palestinian groups to take matters into their own hands. Fedayeen movements mushroomed, and each infant party of the ideological spectrum created its own fighting forces. While these groups were loyal to the overarching Palestinian goals of liberation and return, each possessed different ways, means and indeed also aims on how to bring these about. The death of Nasser and the dissolution of the UAR ushered in an era of national and sovereign consolidation for Arab states. As a result, stateless Palestinians came to identify not only with their fellow refugees, but also with the state and nation they resided in and lived among. Each new Arab state had its own agenda and plan on how to handle the ‘Palestinian problem’. The political system of their host societies influenced and shaped Palestinian thinking and organization, giving rise to any diverging ideas and trends. 

 

Just as Palestinian political organizations, in their diverse flora and fauna, were born, violence hit the region once more. After the 1967 war, the West Bank and Gaza (until then under Jordanian and Egyptian control respectively) became part of the new ‘Greater Israel’. Another reorientation was forced on the Palestinians. Since then, the different groups have largely remained the same, although the region has been anything but quiet and despite incremental and sporadic steps towards Palestinian statehood and sovereignty. Refugee Palestinians reside in neighboring Arab countries, often refusing to assimilate for hope of eventual return. Part of the nation has fled the Middle East, and resettled in Europe or America. These diasporas reflect views of both home and host societies, and are usually unable to express a common policy aside from the aims of liberation and return. In the lands of Palestine itself, Palestinians fell into two categories: those residing in the state of Israel – for political purposes now called ‘Israeli-Arabs’ – and those living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, who found themselves under a new form of domination, dubbed the ‘occupation’. Each of these geographical groups differs in aspirations, life experience and political opinion. And within each, political divisions range from one extreme of the ideological and political spectrum to the next.

 

During the first intifada, Palestinians tried to bring some coordination and unity into their different experiences and voices. For the first time, people of diverse backgrounds and convictions came together with the aim to end the occupation and establish an independent political entity. This implicit alliance was understood by all political factions to serve as a stepping stone to statehood, with the real bargaining on what form the future state should take, and which social, political or legal systems should be adopted, left for the future. Out of the intifada was born the Oslo process. And as the peace-talks progressed, the divisions reappeared. Already in the final stages of the intifada, chasms in the superficial and imposed Palestinian unity began to increase. As it turned out, the Oslo peace process was still-born, and the failure to solve the conflict merely compounded many problems. It was during the Oslo years that large amounts of weapons found their way into Palestinian cities, although part of the peace talks involved a Palestinian agreement to limit and control arms. The exact reverse was true, as the highly publicized scandal over the ‘Karin A’ illustrated only too well. With peace out of sight, no central control of violence, and worsening economic and living conditions, the goals of unity and an end to occupation seemed to evaporate. Partly as a result of subsequent Israeli actions to curtail Palestinian movement, the post-Oslo era only enhanced the divisions between different Palestinian factions.

 

It is with this historical blueprint of division, imposed or superficial unity and an upsurge in the availability of deadly force in mind, that the al-Aqsa Intifada has to be approached. Divisions abound throughout Palestinian history, the second uprising exhibits a more militant character, and involves much greater levels of violence. Israel’s almost complete re-occupation of Palestinian cities and villages only exacerbates the situation, providing extremists with a welcome excuse for their aggression and continued arms smuggling and import.

 

The real extent of Palestinian infighting is often overlooked, as most people tend to view the conflict in simpler terms: Israel versus the Palestinians. This black and white image of the Middle East conflict does not take into account the grey shades within each society. For a correct perspective on the Palestinians, it does not suffice to be aware of opinions of the Islamic opposition and of the pseudo-official voice of the Palestinian Authority (PA). It is only by examining everyday disagreements and clashes between the various political factions, families and cities that a complete picture of Palestinian society is painted. These divisions have during the course of the al Aqsa Intifada also led to an increasingly violent ‘Intrafada’. In the 10 year period from 1993 to 2003, 16% of Palestinian civilian deaths were caused by Palestinian groups or individuals[5]. It is the purpose of this research to shed light on this under-reported internal violence by providing case examples and analysis.

 

 

Weapons among Palestinians

 

Much like other groups and nations, Palestinians assemble and amass weapons out of a feeling of insecurity. By amassing weapons, Palestinians hope to alleviate and counterbalance the insecurity they feel as a result of the occupation and Israel’s military practices. ‘Unfortunately, this frenzied armament is accompanied by the absence of the rule of law, as well as the inability of the central authority to control and regulate the use and carrying of weapons’[6]. With Israelis and Palestinians locked in conflict, for Palestinians, weapons possession has become socially legitimized, since it is implicitly linked to resistance and self-defense. Weapons are kept for many reasons, including the defense of land and honor, the preservation of family status, the defense against settlers, and the settling of conflicts arising from business interests or the like. Since few defined laws, public security or accountability exist, Palestinians own weapons because they feel they have to take matters into their own hands. It is paradox that small arms have flooded the country in part to increase the nation’s feeling of security, when the effect of a Palestine armed to its teeth will ultimately generate greater insecurity and simultaneously erode human development.

 

The issue of weapons collection was recently raised again in Palestinian discussions on a ceasefire (hudna). The sensitive nature of such an initiative was clearly expressed by public figures: ‘The road map refers to the need to dismantle the infrastructure of the military factions and to collect their weapons. But [officials in] the office of the [PA] Prime Minister said they told the Americans and the Israelis that we cannot and do not want to fulfill this condition’[7]. The emphasis in this statement should be on the word ‘cannot’ – the PA is simply unable to carry out any weapons collection. With its declining authority, control and legitimacy, such an attempt would amount to digging its own grave. It is for this reason, and for fear of a Palestinian civil war, that the authorities ‘do not want’ to initiate a weapons collection. Even if Arafat ordered the cessation of violence and the handing-in of weapons by armed groups, it is unclear if his call would be followed. It is more likely that the local command of the Intifada in cities like Nablus or in the Gaza Strip would oppose any such order. The ambiguity of Arafat and the PA regarding weapons and their collection should be seen as a tactic of self-preservation. If the order were resisted, the fragile links holding the PA together could break, and Arafat’s legitimacy to govern and represent the Palestinian people would be severely undermined.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case Examples of Internal Palestinian Violence

 

 

The underlying cause of intra-Palestinian violence is intimately, if not solely, linked to the endemic conflict with Israel and the lack of unity of the Palestinian people. Naturally, Palestinian unity is impaired by Israeli practices. It is unclear which of the two needs to be addressed first in order to improve the situation. Without Israeli occupation, Palestinians may find it easier to organize coherently and to unite. On the other hand, if Palestinians were united, they could counter the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza more effectively. At present however, this question is impossible to answer. One of the two – Palestinian splintering and Israeli occupation – has to be taken out of the equation to be able to observe the impact this would have on internal Palestinian violence.

 

 

 

I’m a Palestinian, says every resistance group

(Source: Omayya, Al Hayat Al Jadida, 06.01.2004)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I. Societal Characteristics particular to Palestine

 

 

There are several social characteristics and trends particular to the Palestinian people. As such, Palestinians have lived with low level conflict for more than half a century. This has resulted in a lowering of the threshold of violence. Acts, which in other societies are seen as brutal, have become ‘normal’ behavior (as the case examples below will illustrate). This evolution is not unique to the Palestinians: ‘Subject, oppressed, or embattled peoples throughout history have commonly turned on themselves. The occupation and war conditions under which Palestinians currently live readily foster internal hostility and the loss of civil liberties’[8]. Since Palestinians are used to seeing weapons, and are also exposed to verbal and physical abuse at the hands of the military occupation, verbal disagreements can easily turn into fistfights, and sometimes even escalate into gang or family feuds. Growing up in a spiral of violence means individuals will find it harder to determine the limits of aggression. ‘[The] psychological strain under which Palestinians live leads to the spread of crime, since a simple problem can easily turn into a killing’[9].

 

The lack of economic viability also affects internal infighting among Palestinians. In one recent inter-Palestinian clash, the allocation of foreign funds was the source of contention. On 19^th February 2004, the Jenin branch of the al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades opened fire on two PA members visiting a hospital in Jenin. According to Ha’aretz, the shooting was part of a power struggle between Fatah factions over the control of international aid for development projects[10]. This incident also raises questions of how international funds are used, or abused. The deteriorating economic situation in the Palestinian Areas has led to an increase in crime, and - as a result – a decrease in personal security. According to Palestinian security official Sabri Tmazi, there has been a 60% rise in crime since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada: ‘That is in burglaries and other property crimes. Violent crime and murders have stayed almost at the same level, so it’s clearly an economic issue’[11].

 

The governing structure of Palestinians also causes internal infighting. In the minds of many, the Palestinian Authority is inextricably linked to past failures and blunders, including the failed Oslo and Camp David accords. As Palestinian cities are increasingly cut off from each other – a result of Israeli closure, controls of movement, and the building of the wall / fence - the power of the PA to control, oversee and adjudicate society has diminished. The situation in many Palestinian cities has become quasi-anarchic, as alternative power centers fill the vacuum. Their nature varies according to each city – sometimes it is the strongest political faction (e.g. Hamas in Gaza), or those with the greatest means of physical violence to enforce fiefdom laws (e.g. warlords / gangs in Nablus). There has never been a monopoly of force – a shortcoming linked to the quasi- or semi-statal (and consequently also legal) nature of the PA. This problem is compounded since the means of physical violence rest in the hands of non-democratic institutions and groups.

 

Although there have always been opponents of Arafat, the rift between his supporters and adversaries deepened with the US’ insistence in 2003 that he no longer hold the key position in the Palestinian government. Palestinians thus bowed to American pressure and thus restructured their institutions to establish a new post of Prime Minister. The administrations of both Abbas and Qurei reflect divisions within the governing elite. Although the Palestinian people rallied behind Arafat after the US insisted on his deposal, the subsequent instability of the governing nucleus reflects the uncertainty of the larger populace regarding the responsibilities and powers accorded to the positions of Chairman and Prime Minister. As Arafat’s power continues to decline, the internal regime struggle is likely to intensify. Governmental changes have resulted in a schizophren administration, part of which holds that Palestinians need a national liberation movement under strong and authoritative leadership – a view espoused by Arafat and his supporters. Others advocate a move towards a mini-state requiring regular, democratic and transparent administration, a trend originating from the new Prime Minister’s post. Since the governing elite is unable to clearly define its aims and priorities, this uncertainty is passed down to the populace, and divides opinions.

 

Palestinians are at times encouraged and even advised by outside forces to engage in internal violence and infighting The American government, for example, has repeatedly praised Arafat when he has cracked down on his own people. As a result, Palestinians opposed to or critical of America and its policies are likely to turn away from the PA and join those groups who contest US actions. The PA’s weakness is in great part characterized by this clash of international and local demands – which it tries to meet simultaneously. Many Palestinians believe that the arrest of members of Palestinian armed factions, who are wanted by Israel, is deplorable, since the main priority should be to put up a unitary front against the occupation. It is paradox that the demand for unity should cause splintering, and that the Palestinian government could be perceived as ‘collaborating’ with America and Israel.

 

A further problem relates to the distinction between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. As mentioned above, Palestinians are divided into external refugees, those in the West bank and Gaza, and those who have been incorporated into Israel. With each additional kilometer of the Israeli ‘security fence’, the distinction between in- and outsiders becomes more complex. Since travel between Palestinian cities is restricted, controlled or even denied, each encircled enclave is left to fend for itself. Central authority and control is thus impaired and at times made impossible. As a result, Palestinian cities (such as Nablus), fall into the hands of local mobsters and gang-lords. 

 

Nablus is the prime example of internal violence, chaos and anarchy. Mayor Ghassan Shaka’a recently resigned because of fear for his own safety. His brother was killed by one of the rival gangs operating in the city. In his resignation letter, Shaka’a told Arafat that ‘Nablus is going through a state of chaos and accelerated deterioration, resulting in confusion and the interruption of the daily lives of citizens… but now that chaos has become the normal attitude; the lack of security and order, the daily practice; and the law of jungle, a point of view’[12]. The governor of the city, Mahmoud Aloul, blames crime on PA weakness, which allows other groups to hijack the struggle for national liberation and to pursue their own goals[13]. Nablus is torn between different militant gangs, who each try to gain control over affairs. Most of the perpetrators and victims are young extremists, who battle for vengeance, influence and control over smuggling and extortion. Their gang fights often harm innocent bystanders, like Shu’eib Shakhshir, who was killed because he was caught between a battle of Fatah loyalists and gunmen of a local warlord. According to his brother, ‘there is no security now, there are just gangs’[14].

 

Internal violence can also be traced to Palestinian religious heterogeneity. There have always been predominantly Christian cities or villages, but the violence of the second intifada has resulted in increased Christian migration, as cities are taken over by Islamic groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This religious recomposition of cities like Bethlehem has at times resulted in violence against Christian women, who do not cover themselves in Islamic fashion. The belief of Islamic extremists that Westerners sympathize more with Christian suffering has furthermore led some militants to initiate shooting from Christian areas like Beit Jala, in order to force an Israeli reprisal. In this way, they manage to frighten Palestinian Christians into leaving or changing their lifestyle. These tactics deepen the rift between Palestinians of different religions and with increased Christian flight, amount to a shrewd population transfer initiated by Palestinians against Palestinians.

 

The internal divisions among Palestinians