

Researched and Compiled by
Leonie Schultens
Translations by
Nadia Nusseibeh
Funded by
Representative Office of Finland- Ramallah
April 2004
The Palestinian Representatives
Saeb Erekat
Chief
Palestinian Negotiator
‘Do
we have an authority in Nablus? That’s the big question mark. Is the authority
in Jenin, Qalqilyah, Tulkarm? The authority is there in
name – but in practice?’
(Washington
Post 29.02.2004)
Ziad Abu Amr
Minister
of Information under Abu Mazen
‘Israel
bears a great deal of responsibility, but I blame the Palestinian Authority for
not doing what it should. We see almost daily violations of public order, and
the authority does nothing. There is no accountability’
(New York Times 03.03.2004)
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)
Former
Prime Minister
‘…
Many people responded to the Israeli provocations, and the Intifada deviated
from its natural course. They began, in an unprecedented manner, to use weapons
and inventions at their disposal, such as mortars, grenades and other things,
and to shoot from homes and neighborhoods… In light of this reality, and as a
result of these operations, we are talking about a military battle, not a
popular uprising expressing popular rage to which none can be opposed’
(Al-Hayat 26.11.2002)
Raji Sourani
Director
of the Palestinian Human Rights Centre
‘There’s
no way there will be a civil war [if Israel
pulls out of Gaza]. Selective
killings, maybe’
(Financial Times 18.02.2004)
Muhammad
Dahlan
Former
Chief of Security Forces
‘We
have a red line. Palestinian society will not be dragged into domestic
infighting… [In response] to the burning of a PA police station, we will burn
down all the Hamas centres. We have goons just as
they have goons’
(Al-Hayat 16.10.2002)
Zayyad Abu-Zayyad
Palestinian
Legislative Council
‘Yes,
we are in a state of anarchy…Certainly when a Palestinian policeman cannot walk
around freely wearing his uniform, this creates a vacuum in which everyone does
whatever one pleases’
(Jewish Telegraphic Agency 04.02.2004)
The Palestinian People
·
39.5% of Palestinians
perceive the performance of the PA as bad
·
49.2% of Palestinians view
the performance of the Legislative Council as bad
·
27% of Palestinians do not
trust any Palestinian personality
·
28% of Palestinians do not
trust any Palestinian political or religious faction
·
54.1% of Palestinians do
not feel the presence of the PA
·
If there were a mutual cessation
of violence, 53% of Palestinians would support a crackdown on those
continuing the violence
·
80% of Palestinians worry
that such a crackdown would lead to internal strife
·
89% of Palestinians support
internal and external calls for reform
·
39.2% of Palestinians do
not believe Abu Ala’a and his government will be able
to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire on all factions
·
73% of Palestinians believe
a continuation of violence will impede any peace negotiations
The Israelis
Colonel
(Res.) Shalom Harari
Expert
on Palestinian Affairs at the Herzliya
Interdisciplinary Centre
‘The
story repeats itself every few months: Internal unrest in the Palestinian
Authority reaches a heating point, Arafat makes a few moves to prove that he is
in control but then lets go and allows the instability to continue’
(Jewish Telegraphic Agency 04.02.2004)
Shmuel Bar
Israeli
Security veteran
‘I
wouldn’t put my money on peace. What we will see is a lot of small areas of
control and influence. Warlords with their own armed forces…It will be
fiefdoms, Afghanisation’
(Sydney Morning Herald 13.12.2003)
Yossi Beilin
Former
Israeli Minister of Justice – Cofounder of the Geneva
Initiative
‘Arafat
himself does not know anymore how much control he still possesses’
(Sueddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2001)
Zalman Shoval
Foreign
Policy Advisor to PM Sharon
‘If there’s a civil war in Gaza,
who knows whether it could be contained. It could blow over to
the other side of the fence (into Israel).
It could have implications on the West Bank
as well’
(Knight Ridder Newspapers
11.03.2004)
Ra’anan Gissin
Advisor
to PM Sharon
‘I
think there are groups and people, including Arafat, who want to instigate
anarchy in the territories in order to bring about international intervention.
When everything is in disarray, he hopes to go to the Europeans and ask them to
bail him out’
(Associated Press 11.02.2004)
Lt.
Gen. Moshe Yaalon
Chief
of Staff
‘[Palestinian
society] is rife with internal power struggles, maybe
we can even call it anarchy’
(Associated Press 02.03.2004)
The Outside World
Kenneth
Roth
Executive
Director of Human Rights Watch
‘The
Palestinian Authority wants to be treated as an equal with other governments.
President Arafat must ensure that the PA has a functioning judicial system
which operates to protect the human rights of all Palestinians’
(Humanist, Jan-Feb 2003)
James
Zogby
Arab
American Institute
‘If
a year from now, Palestinians are freer, economically prospering and seeing
that a viable independent state is in their grasp, then groups that espouse
violence will lose support that they currently have. These groups prey off of
despair and anger’
(Washington
Post 04.06.2003)
Javier
Solana
EU
Foreign Policy Chief
‘The
alternative to the Palestinian Authority is Palestinian Anarchy’
(Jewish World Review 04.02.2002)
John
Dugard
Special
Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights
‘Both
Palestinians and Israelis have been responsible for inflicting a reign of
terror on innocent civilians’
(Commission on Human Rights Report, 08.09.2003)
Hosni Mubarak
Egyptian
President
‘What
will come after Arafat? … There are six, seven or eight leaders who will arise
and compete amongst themselves for the trust of the Palestinian people. This
will be done by means of actions against Israel.
Then there will be anarchy’
(Al-Safir, 07.12.2001)
Terje Roed-Larsen
UN
Special Envoy
‘We
have to do everything that can hinder chaos and anarchy in Gaza
after (Israeli) withdrawal. It might be that the situation may necessitate an
international presence’
(Palestine
Chronicle, 19.03.2004)
Contents
The ‘Intra’fada: ‘The chaos
of the weapons’ p.
7
Historical Overview p.
8
Weapons among Palestinians p.
10
Case Examples of Internal Palestinian Violence p. 11
I. Societal Characteristics particular to
Palestine p.
12
II. Chaotic Bureaucracy and Misguided Laws p. 15
III. The stigma of collaboration: a common pretext for
aggression? p. 18
IV. ‘Honor’ and domestic abuse: violence against women
p. 21
V. Gunfire: ‘The chaos of the weapons’ p. 23
VI. Silencing the press and free speech p.
26
VII. A Crystal Ball Glimpse at the Future p.
29
Appendix 1: Internal Violence from January to October
2003 p. 31
Appendix 2: Gunfire Incidents in the OPT (2000-2003) p. 32
Bibliography p.
33
The ‘Intra’fada
فوضى
السلاح
‘The chaos of the weapons’
Since September 2000, the Middle
East has been embroiled in another one of its deadly conflict
spirals. This new uprising has become known as the ‘al Aqsa Intifada’,
triggered in part by the visit of then head of opposition and now Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. Its roots however can be traced back
to the pre-Oslo era. Although the term ‘intifada’
became notorious already in 1989, the present ‘uprising-sequel’ displays
certain characteristics, which were not as prominent before the Oslo
agreements.
Among the new phenomena is the
qualitative and quantitative change in armed resistance. Whereas the first intifada saw scores of Palestinians taking to the streets,
armed with stones and kitchen appliances, the present uprising is increasingly
characterized by the deadly firepower of small arms. In December 2002, then
Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) warned of the
increased use of weapons - an evolution he wished to reverse. His short-lived
government was ill-equipped to tackle the problem, and his successor, Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala’a), does not seem
better placed to confront the weapons chaos. Before Oslo,
Palestinians primarily desired unity and an end to the occupation. But already
as the first intifada began to fade, divisions among
Palestinians appeared and deepened. These rifts have remained and widened
throughout the Oslo years. The
failure to reach a substantive and acceptable peace agreement has given rise to
strong feelings of betrayal and futility. It is to a great extent because of
these internal divisions that Palestinians also turn their aggression and vent
their feelings of futility against fellow Palestinians – a phenomenon this
research seeks to explore. As will be explained, the main underlying cause of
internal violence is the fragmented nature of Palestinian society and politics.
Present-day ‘lawlessness has exposed the internal divisions of Palestinian
society and government. Pitted against one another are rival security agencies,
militant splinter groups and some members of powerful families in the cities’.
Due to the forces of history,
Palestinians have turned into a very diverse cultural mélange, characterized by
several religious convictions and political affiliations and ideologies. To
give a brief historical overview helps contextualize the Palestinian experience
and to place the internal violence of the al Aqsa intifada
into context. Of course this diversity has to be analyzed in keeping the
conflict with Israel
in mind.
Historical overview
Reduced to colonial subjects by
Ottoman rule and subsequently colonized by the British, the Palestinian people
were denied self-government until the end of World War Two. Although national feelings
and bonds existed, there was no opportunity to express them through political
institutions. When most former colonies gained independence, the Palestinian
people experienced their ‘al-nakba’ (catastrophe).
The creation of the state of Israel
in 1948 left Palestinians scattered throughout the Arab world. Geographical
dispersal and refugee status impacted deeply on the Palestinian psyche, and
gave rise to differing views and opinions. It was the ‘exile’ Palestinians (not
those living in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank), who
started forming political associations and parties, under the common umbrella
of liberation and return. However, already at this infancy stage of political
party formation, Palestinian viewpoints proved to be highly diverse and at times
even incompatible with each other. With the rise of Nasser
and pan-Arabism in Egypt,
some Palestinian groups called for self-determination within the wider Arab
framework, whereas others wanted a purely Palestinian independence and national
sovereignty. The socialist imprint on Palestinian nationalism in the post-1948
era impaired the development of a uniquely Palestinian vision of statehood. It
was the demise of Nasser and the United Arab Republic (UAR), alongside the
impotence of Arab states to help Palestinians reclaim their land, which led
individual Palestinian groups to take matters into their own hands. Fedayeen movements mushroomed, and each infant party of the
ideological spectrum created its own fighting forces. While these groups were
loyal to the overarching Palestinian goals of liberation and return, each
possessed different ways, means and indeed also aims on how to bring these
about. The death of Nasser and the dissolution of the
UAR ushered in an era of national and sovereign consolidation for Arab states.
As a result, stateless Palestinians came to identify not only with their fellow
refugees, but also with the state and nation they resided in and lived among.
Each new Arab state had its own agenda and plan on how to handle the ‘Palestinian
problem’. The political system of their host societies influenced and shaped
Palestinian thinking and organization, giving rise to any diverging ideas and
trends.
Just as Palestinian political
organizations, in their diverse flora and fauna, were born, violence hit the
region once more. After the 1967 war, the West Bank and
Gaza
(until then under Jordanian and Egyptian control respectively) became part of
the new ‘Greater Israel’. Another reorientation was forced on the Palestinians.
Since then, the different groups have largely remained the same, although the
region has been anything but quiet and despite incremental and sporadic steps
towards Palestinian statehood and sovereignty. Refugee Palestinians reside in
neighboring Arab countries, often refusing to assimilate for hope of eventual
return. Part of the nation has fled the Middle East, and
resettled in Europe or America.
These diasporas reflect views of both home and host
societies, and are usually unable to express a common policy aside from the
aims of liberation and return. In the lands of Palestine itself, Palestinians
fell into two categories: those residing in the state of Israel – for political
purposes now called ‘Israeli-Arabs’ – and those living in the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank, who found themselves under a new form of domination, dubbed the
‘occupation’. Each of these geographical groups differs in aspirations, life
experience and political opinion. And within each, political divisions range
from one extreme of the ideological and political spectrum to the next.
During the first intifada, Palestinians tried to bring some coordination and
unity into their different experiences and voices. For the first time, people
of diverse backgrounds and convictions came together with the aim to end the
occupation and establish an independent political entity. This implicit
alliance was understood by all political factions to serve as a stepping stone
to statehood, with the real bargaining on what form the future state should
take, and which social, political or legal systems should be adopted, left for
the future. Out of the intifada was born the
Oslo
process. And as the peace-talks progressed, the divisions reappeared. Already
in the final stages of the intifada, chasms in the
superficial and imposed Palestinian unity began to increase. As it turned out,
the Oslo peace process was
still-born, and the failure to solve the conflict merely compounded many
problems. It was during the Oslo
years that large amounts of weapons found their way into Palestinian cities,
although part of the peace talks involved a Palestinian agreement to limit and
control arms. The exact reverse was true, as the highly publicized scandal over
the ‘Karin A’ illustrated only too well. With peace out of sight, no central
control of violence, and worsening economic and living conditions, the goals of
unity and an end to occupation seemed to evaporate. Partly as a result of
subsequent Israeli actions to curtail Palestinian movement, the post-Oslo era
only enhanced the divisions between different Palestinian factions.
It is with this historical
blueprint of division, imposed or superficial unity and an upsurge in the
availability of deadly force in mind, that the al-Aqsa Intifada has to be
approached. Divisions abound throughout Palestinian history,
the second uprising exhibits a more militant character, and involves much
greater levels of violence. Israel’s almost complete re-occupation of
Palestinian cities and villages only exacerbates the situation, providing
extremists with a welcome excuse for their aggression and continued arms
smuggling and import.
The real extent of Palestinian
infighting is often overlooked, as most people tend to view the conflict in
simpler terms: Israel
versus the Palestinians. This black and white image of the Middle
East conflict does not take into account the grey shades within
each society. For a correct perspective on the Palestinians, it does not
suffice to be aware of opinions of the Islamic opposition and of the
pseudo-official voice of the Palestinian Authority (PA). It is only by
examining everyday disagreements and clashes between the various political
factions, families and cities that a complete picture of Palestinian society is
painted. These divisions have during the course of the al Aqsa Intifada also
led to an increasingly violent ‘Intrafada’. In the 10
year period from 1993 to 2003, 16% of Palestinian civilian deaths were caused
by Palestinian groups or individuals.
It is the purpose of this research to shed light on this under-reported
internal violence by providing case examples and analysis.
Weapons among Palestinians
Much like other groups and
nations, Palestinians assemble and amass weapons out of a feeling of
insecurity. By amassing weapons, Palestinians hope to alleviate and counterbalance
the insecurity they feel as a result of the occupation and Israel’s
military practices. ‘Unfortunately, this frenzied armament is accompanied by
the absence of the rule of law, as well as the inability of the central
authority to control and regulate the use and carrying of weapons’.
With Israelis and Palestinians locked in conflict, for Palestinians, weapons
possession has become socially legitimized, since it is implicitly linked to
resistance and self-defense. Weapons are kept for many reasons, including the
defense of land and honor, the preservation of family status, the defense
against settlers, and the settling of conflicts arising from business interests
or the like. Since few defined laws, public security or accountability exist,
Palestinians own weapons because they feel they have to take matters into their
own hands. It is paradox that small arms have flooded the country in part to
increase the nation’s feeling of security, when the effect of a Palestine
armed to its teeth will ultimately generate greater insecurity and
simultaneously erode human development.
The issue of weapons collection
was recently raised again in Palestinian discussions on a ceasefire (hudna). The sensitive nature of such an initiative was
clearly expressed by public figures: ‘The road map refers to the need to
dismantle the infrastructure of the military factions and to collect their
weapons. But [officials in] the office of the [PA] Prime Minister said they
told the Americans and the Israelis that we cannot and do not want to
fulfill this condition’.
The emphasis in this statement should be on the word ‘cannot’ – the PA is
simply unable to carry out any weapons collection. With its declining
authority, control and legitimacy, such an attempt would amount to digging its
own grave. It is for this reason, and for fear of a Palestinian civil war, that
the authorities ‘do not want’ to initiate a weapons collection. Even if Arafat
ordered the cessation of violence and the handing-in of weapons by armed
groups, it is unclear if his call would be followed. It is more likely that the
local command of the Intifada in cities like Nablus
or in the Gaza Strip would oppose any such order. The ambiguity of Arafat and
the PA regarding weapons and their collection should be seen as a tactic of
self-preservation. If the order were resisted, the fragile links holding the PA
together could break, and Arafat’s legitimacy to govern and represent the
Palestinian people would be severely undermined.
Case Examples of Internal Palestinian Violence
The underlying cause of
intra-Palestinian violence is intimately, if not solely, linked to the endemic
conflict with Israel
and the lack of unity of the Palestinian people. Naturally, Palestinian unity is
impaired by Israeli practices. It is unclear which of the two needs to be
addressed first in order to improve the situation. Without Israeli occupation,
Palestinians may find it easier to organize coherently and to unite. On the
other hand, if Palestinians were united, they could counter the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
more effectively. At present however, this question is impossible to answer.
One of the two – Palestinian splintering and Israeli occupation – has to be
taken out of the equation to be able to observe the impact this would have on
internal Palestinian violence.
I’m a Palestinian, says every resistance group
(Source:
Omayya, Al Hayat Al Jadida, 06.01.2004)
I. Societal Characteristics particular to Palestine
There are several social
characteristics and trends particular to the Palestinian people. As such,
Palestinians have lived with low level conflict for more than half a century.
This has resulted in a lowering of the threshold of violence. Acts, which in
other societies are seen as brutal, have become ‘normal’ behavior (as the case
examples below will illustrate). This evolution is not unique to the
Palestinians: ‘Subject, oppressed, or embattled peoples throughout history have
commonly turned on themselves. The occupation and war
conditions under which Palestinians currently live readily foster internal
hostility and the loss of civil liberties’.
Since Palestinians are used to seeing weapons, and are also exposed to verbal
and physical abuse at the hands of the military occupation, verbal
disagreements can easily turn into fistfights, and sometimes even escalate into
gang or family feuds. Growing up in a spiral of violence means individuals will
find it harder to determine the limits of aggression. ‘[The] psychological
strain under which Palestinians live leads to the spread of crime, since a
simple problem can easily turn into a killing’.
The lack of economic viability
also affects internal infighting among Palestinians. In one recent
inter-Palestinian clash, the allocation of foreign funds was the source of
contention. On 19th
February 2004, the Jenin branch of the al
Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades opened fire on two PA members visiting a hospital in Jenin. According to Ha’aretz, the
shooting was part of a power struggle between Fatah
factions over the control of international aid for development projects.
This incident also raises questions of how international funds are used, or
abused. The deteriorating economic situation in the Palestinian Areas has led
to an increase in crime, and - as a result – a decrease in personal security.
According to Palestinian security official Sabri Tmazi, there has been a 60% rise in crime since the start
of the al-Aqsa Intifada: ‘That is in burglaries and other property crimes.
Violent crime and murders have stayed almost at the same level, so it’s clearly
an economic issue’.
The governing structure of
Palestinians also causes internal infighting. In the minds of many, the
Palestinian Authority is inextricably linked to past failures and blunders,
including the failed Oslo and Camp
David accords. As Palestinian cities are increasingly cut off from
each other – a result of Israeli closure, controls of movement, and the
building of the wall / fence - the power of the PA to control, oversee and
adjudicate society has diminished. The situation in many Palestinian cities has
become quasi-anarchic, as alternative power centers fill the vacuum. Their
nature varies according to each city – sometimes it is the strongest political
faction (e.g. Hamas in Gaza), or
those with the greatest means of physical violence to enforce fiefdom laws
(e.g. warlords / gangs in Nablus).
There has never been a monopoly of force – a shortcoming linked to the quasi-
or semi-statal (and consequently also legal) nature
of the PA. This problem is compounded since the means of physical violence rest
in the hands of non-democratic institutions and groups.
Although there have always been
opponents of Arafat, the rift between his supporters and adversaries deepened
with the US’
insistence in 2003 that he no longer hold the key position in the Palestinian
government. Palestinians thus bowed to American pressure and thus restructured
their institutions to establish a new post of Prime Minister. The
administrations of both Abbas and Qurei
reflect divisions within the governing elite. Although the Palestinian people
rallied behind Arafat after the US
insisted on his deposal, the subsequent instability of the governing nucleus
reflects the uncertainty of the larger populace regarding the responsibilities
and powers accorded to the positions of Chairman and Prime Minister. As
Arafat’s power continues to decline, the internal regime struggle is likely to
intensify. Governmental changes have resulted in a schizophren
administration, part of which holds that Palestinians need a national
liberation movement under strong and authoritative leadership – a view espoused
by Arafat and his supporters. Others advocate a move towards a mini-state
requiring regular, democratic and transparent administration, a trend
originating from the new Prime Minister’s post. Since the governing elite is unable to clearly define its aims and priorities, this
uncertainty is passed down to the populace, and divides opinions.
Palestinians are at times
encouraged and even advised by outside forces to engage in internal violence
and infighting The American government, for example, has repeatedly praised
Arafat when he has cracked down on his own people. As a result, Palestinians
opposed to or critical of America
and its policies are likely to turn away from the PA and join those groups who
contest US actions. The PA’s weakness is in great part characterized by this
clash of international and local demands – which it tries to meet
simultaneously. Many Palestinians believe that the arrest of members of
Palestinian armed factions, who are wanted by Israel,
is deplorable, since the main priority should be to put up a unitary front
against the occupation. It is paradox that the demand for unity should cause
splintering, and that the Palestinian government could be perceived as
‘collaborating’ with America
and Israel.
A further problem relates to the
distinction between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. As mentioned above, Palestinians
are divided into external refugees, those in the West bank and Gaza,
and those who have been incorporated into Israel.
With each additional kilometer of the Israeli ‘security fence’, the distinction
between in- and outsiders becomes more complex. Since travel between
Palestinian cities is restricted, controlled or even denied, each encircled
enclave is left to fend for itself. Central authority and control is thus
impaired and at times made impossible. As a result, Palestinian cities (such as
Nablus), fall into the hands of
local mobsters and gang-lords.
Nablus
is the prime example of internal violence, chaos and anarchy. Mayor Ghassan Shaka’a recently resigned
because of fear for his own safety. His brother was killed by one of the rival
gangs operating in the city. In his resignation letter, Shaka’a
told Arafat that ‘Nablus is going through a state of chaos and accelerated
deterioration, resulting in confusion and the interruption of the daily lives
of citizens… but now that chaos has become the normal attitude; the lack of
security and order, the daily practice; and the law of jungle, a point of view’.
The governor of the city, Mahmoud Aloul,
blames crime on PA weakness, which allows other groups to hijack the struggle
for national liberation and to pursue their own goals.
Nablus
is torn between different militant gangs, who each try to gain control over
affairs. Most of the perpetrators and victims are young extremists, who battle
for vengeance, influence and control over smuggling and extortion. Their gang
fights often harm innocent bystanders, like Shu’eib Shakhshir, who was killed because he was caught between a
battle of Fatah loyalists and gunmen of a local
warlord. According to his brother, ‘there is no security now, there are just
gangs’.
Internal violence can also be
traced to Palestinian religious heterogeneity. There have always been
predominantly Christian cities or villages, but the violence of the second intifada has resulted in increased Christian migration, as
cities are taken over by Islamic groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This
religious recomposition of cities like Bethlehem
has at times resulted in violence against Christian women, who do not cover
themselves in Islamic fashion. The belief of Islamic extremists that Westerners
sympathize more with Christian suffering has furthermore led some militants to
initiate shooting from Christian areas like Beit Jala, in order to force an Israeli reprisal. In this way,
they manage to frighten Palestinian Christians into leaving or changing their
lifestyle. These tactics deepen the rift between Palestinians of different
religions and with increased Christian flight, amount to a shrewd population
transfer initiated by Palestinians against Palestinians.
The internal divisions among
Palestinians