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**Framing the West Bank Barrier:  
Examining Israeli Newspaper Perspectives on the Barrier's Construction**

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## 1. Introduction

*“It is a security fence. It is not diplomatic. It is not political. This fence has one single goal – to defend the lives of Israeli citizens.”*<sup>1</sup> Benjamin Ben-Eliezer.

*“[Israel will by erecting the barrier] start a new apartheid system which is worse than what happened in South Africa.”*<sup>2</sup> Saeb Erekat.

These two quotes about the barrier appear in the same article published in Ha’aretz in June 2002. They reveal two polar opposite perceptions of the barrier. The first quotation emphasizes the security benefits of the barrier for the Israelis, while the second concentrates on the negative humanitarian consequences of the barrier for the Palestinians.

The decision to erect a barrier, which partitions territory within the West Bank and separates the West Bank from Israel, is one of the most controversial Israeli policies in modern times. The barrier has led to a dramatic decrease in the number of suicide bomber attacks. Its construction, however, has also limited and, in some cases, completely destroyed the Palestinians' freedom of movement within the occupied territories. This has created a virtual collapse of the Palestinian economy in recent years, leading to an increase in poverty, unemployment and health problems among Palestinians. Furthermore, farmers have been separated from their farmland, many have lost the ability to go to work or to school, entire villages have been cut off from health services, and families and friends have been separated. Vast areas of Palestinian land have been confiscated and thousands of homes destroyed. In sum, there has been a dramatic deterioration of the Palestinians' humanitarian situation.

In modern democracies, citizens receive the majority of their political knowledge from the media. Therefore, it is important to examine how the Israeli media frame issues such as the barrier that affect the Palestinians' situation. Because prior research has revealed that the media have greatly influence the shaping and maintaining public opinion, this study is particularly significant. Surveys of Israeli public opinion demonstrate that opinions about the barrier were divided in early stages of its construction. This provided the Israeli media with an opportunity to influence which frames about the barrier would later dominate Israeli society. Additionally, in the early stages of the barrier's construction, the Israeli public had the greatest opportunity to influence official Israeli policies about the barrier.

How did the media depict the barrier during its first months of construction? The barrier can be described as a security issue from the Israeli point of view or as a humanitarian issue from the Palestinian point of view. It is important that both perspectives be presented in order to provide a nuanced depiction of the barrier. Because the barrier has been constructed within Palestinian territory and deeply affects the individuals living there, Israeli media have an even greater responsibility to shed light on to the negative consequences of the barrier. Ultimately, media framing of the barrier's construction has a profound impact on the level of public support for the barrier. Therefore, the question remains- *were Israeli newspaper consumers during the early stages of the barrier's construction informed about how the barrier would affect Palestinian lives?*

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<sup>1</sup> Ha’aretz, 2007-06-17, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ha’aretz, 2007-07-17, p.1.

## 2. The object of the research

This investigation focuses on how the barrier has been framed in Israeli newspapers. The aim of the study is to survey which different frames of communication were used to describe the barrier in the four and a half month period following the decision to construct it.

There are numerous ways in which the construction of the barrier could have been framed, and there are many different aspects of its construction that could have been emphasized or silenced. Two basic considerations regarding the barrier are the security aspects from the Israeli point of view and the humanitarian consequences from the Palestinian point of view. Both considerations are relevant, but are not necessarily given equivalent weight in Israeli newspapers.

The investigation will discuss how different framing of the barrier has impacted Israeli public opinion, and will explore how the issue could have been framed differently. This study is significant to the examination of Palestinian human rights. Prior research has shown that public opinion is affected by the way that media frames an issue, and currently Jewish Israeli citizens substantially lack an understanding of the Palestinian situation.

Continuous surveys of Israeli public opinion have demonstrated that there is a deep mistrust for the Arab collective. Consequently, security concerns hold priority over Palestinian humanitarian concerns on the Israeli agendas. These attitudes are demonstrated in the overwhelming Jewish Israeli support for the construction of the barrier. Strong Jewish Israeli support diminishes the likelihood that the restrictions on Palestinian movement will be lifted in the future. Ultimately, these attitudes also aggravate the peace process by providing politicians with the sufficient amount of public support for building a barrier that is not situated on the Green Line but mostly inside the West Bank.

## 3. Theory

### 3.1 Introduction to framing theory

Gamson and Modigliani define a frame as "*the central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning*".<sup>3</sup> Wolfsfeld offers a similar description of frames, "*People go through their social and political lives attempting to sift through a remarkably large amount of information. Frames –which can also be referred to as schemas- offer an organizational tool that allows people to interpret, process, and store that data.*"<sup>4</sup> The frames are definitions (often competing with one another) that attempt to answer the question of "what is going on." By examining these competing frames one can understand better the essence of a conflict.<sup>5</sup>

There are two distinct ways of using the word framing. Either way can refer to frames in communication or to frames in thought. Frames in communication usually refer to when a "speaker" consciously or unconsciously chooses specific words, images, phrases, and presentation styles when communicating an issue to others. These choices comprise the frame of the issue.<sup>6</sup> When studying frames in communication "*The question of interest [...] is not 'what are the 'true' facts?' but rather how the 'stories' are presented to readers, listeners*

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<sup>3</sup> W. A. Gamson & A. Modigliani, 'Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach', *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 95, no. 1 (July 1989), p. 143.

<sup>4</sup> G. Wolfsfeld, 'Introduction framing political conflict', in A. A. Cohen & G. Wolfsfeld (eds), *Framing the Intifada: people and media*, (Norwood, New Jersey: Alex Publishing Corporation, 1993), p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, page 24.

<sup>6</sup> J. N. Druckman, 'The implications of framing effects for citizen competence', *Political Behaviour*, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 2001), p. 227.

and viewers<sup>7</sup>.” The identifying and comparing of major themes for each story is the focus of the framing theory<sup>8</sup>.

In contrast, frames in thought usually refer to ”*an individuals understanding of a given situation*”<sup>9</sup>; which words, images and phrases come to the individual’s mind when thinking about an issue. In this case, the emphasis is on the individual’s conceptualisation. Both types of framing refer to the aspects of an issue that are being emphasized or silenced.<sup>10</sup> In this case, the study will focus on the frames in communication that are present in the written discourse within Israeli newspapers.

The frames in thought are often thought to be connected to the frames in communication by a so called “framing effect”. This framing effect is defined as the effect that the framing in communication has on the framing in thought; in other words, how the spoken discourses shape the way that people think about a specific issue. This is realized by identifying the key themes within a text and analyzing how they shape our understanding of certain events. For example, much research has shown that if a product is described as being 97 percent fat free, people perceive the product very differently than if it is described as containing three percent fat<sup>11</sup>.

There are two different ways in which frames affect an opinion about an issue. First, frames can change issue opinion by changing belief content. Different frames make people believe different things about the qualities and characteristics of the issue in question. “*If a message generates more favorable or unfavorable beliefs about the attitude object, the attitude is expected to follow.*”<sup>12</sup> Second, frames can change issue opinion by accentuating some considerations about an issue, while leaving out others. This causes the “listeners” to focus only on the mentioned considerations. Therefore, the considerations included in the frame shape the overall opinion about the issue, and dictate which of the competing considerations take priority over the others. The focus on only a limited set of considerations makes the listener attach more importance to these considerations than to others. Thus, it can change the listeners’ opinion about an issue without having changed the listeners’ beliefs about the issue. The listener may still believe in the same facts about the issue, but might have changed the opinion about which of these beliefs are most important to consider when taking a stand. Issue framing is, in this aspect, a way of communicating what an issue is or is not about. For example, if an issue is framed as an economic issue rather than as a security issue, public opinion may be influenced.<sup>13</sup>

Druckman presents an example of how the opinion about an issue can be affected by the considerations that are being highlighted: “*when government spending for the poor is framed as enhancing the chance that poor people can get ahead, individuals tend to support increased spending. However, when it is framed as resulting in increased taxes, individuals tend to oppose increased spending.*”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> A. A. Cohen, H. Adoni & H. Nossek, ‘Television News and the Intifada: A comparative study of social conflict’, in A. A. Cohen & G. Wolfsfeld (eds), *Framing the Intifada: people and media*, (Norwood, New Jersey: Alex Publishing Corporation, 1993), p. 118.

<sup>8</sup> Wolfsfeld, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 25.

<sup>9</sup> Druckman, 2001, *op. cit.* pages. 225-256.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, page 228.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, pages 228f.

<sup>12</sup> T. E. Nelson & Z. M. Oxley M, ‘Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion’, *the Journal of Politics*, vol. 61, no 4 (1999), p. 1058.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, pages 1040ff.

<sup>14</sup> Druckman, 2001, *op. cit.* pages 230f.

### 3.2 Media framing

Media frames are "*persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual.*"<sup>15</sup>

In an article called "*The Mass Media as Political Actors*," Benjamin I. Page stresses that the media can influence public opinion, and discusses framing as one of the persuasive techniques that is used as a tool to influence. According to Page, studying media frames is particularly important because the media are the key disseminators of political information. As further stressed by Nelson and Oxley, media can sometimes pursue their own policy objectives.<sup>16</sup>

One way to better understand media's role as political actors is to examine who or what determines the policy stands taken by the media. For example, editors are media actors with tremendous power over the contents in the media. Page, among others, points to the influence that editors possess. First, they hire, promote, supervise and fire journalists, and may consciously or unconsciously hire or promote journalists who share their policy preferences in order to advance their own policy views. Editors also have the power to assign and erase stories, and decide upon the story placement. They also influence the contents of the stories by accepting, altering or rejecting them. Ultimately, editors have a lot of power over which frames are found in newspapers.<sup>17</sup>

In editorials, newspapers take stands on the issue of the day. According to Page, the discourse is sometimes constructed to promote the newspaper's own position via unsigned editorials. There is some evidence that suggests that the predominant political values expressed in the news stories do in fact sometimes correspond closely to the political stands that are taken in the overt editorials.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, for example, it is more probable that an Israeli newspaper to the left of the political spectrum would highlight humanitarian considerations, while a rightist newspaper would highlight security considerations, even if the newspapers claim that their articles are neutral.

Page, Nelson, and Oxley explain that the media's influence on public opinion is not always consciously intended. Through using publications or broadcasts, they can influence the beliefs or the policy preferences of the mass or the elite audiences.<sup>19</sup> This effect is due to a wide variety of factors that influence the way that a specific news item is perceived, such as: the selection of quotes and facts, the framing of interpretations, the attribution of importance (i.e. through front page headlines) and support or opposition for a particular policy position. Communication research has demolished the idea that news is or can be "value free".<sup>20</sup> When an article is produced, there is always a wide range of decisions taken before publishing. All of these decisions tend to include conscious or unconscious values held by journalists or editors. Who the journalists choose to interview, which considerations the journalists highlight, where the editors place the articles, how much space the articles receive, which pictures are chosen, and how headlines are expressed are all factors that inevitably contain values.

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<sup>15</sup> Wolfsfeld, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 14.

<sup>16</sup> B. I. Page, 'The mass media as political actors', *Political Science and politics volume*, vol. 29, no. 3 (March 1996), p. 20.

Nelson & Oxley, 1999, *op. cit.*, pages 1040f.

<sup>17</sup> Page, 1996, *op. cit.*, pages 21f.

<sup>18</sup> Page, 1996, *op. cit.*, pages 21f.

<sup>19</sup> Page, 1996, *op. cit.*, page 20.

Nelson & Oxley, 1999, *op. cit.*, pages 1040f.

<sup>20</sup> Page, 1996, *op. cit.*, page 21.

A typical way through which the media unconsciously influence public opinion on a specific issue or policy is by simply passing on information that comes from official news sources. As a result of news gathering techniques, government officials serve as the chief sources of many kinds of political news. This tends to constrain the range of debate found in the media and can, according to Page, result in extensive overlap of the policy stands taken by media outlets and officials in power (some leaning more than others towards the left or the right).<sup>21</sup>

Wolfsfeld reinforces the point that governments usually have the power to promote frames to the media, because of the dependency on official sources for information mentioned above. However, as Wolfsfeld claims, this power partly depends on the government's ability to control conflict events and the flow of information, which may vary over time.<sup>22</sup>

Because the media often pass on official propaganda, they are responsible for choosing which information is communicated to the public. The media can choose which sources to use and can complement official sources with sources from the opposition. Although, while the media may be quoting an official source, the media remains subjective given that the official source is probably not objective. Therefore, the media will always have to search for alternative sources and quote specialists with differing views to maintain an objective view of political issues.

Nelson and Oxley state that framing can come from individual journalists, elected officials, interest groups, lobbyists, and other powerful communication agents. By creating and promoting frames and getting them on the media agenda, these agents aim at benefiting a specific political purpose.<sup>23</sup> Thus, Nelson and Oxley agree with Page that the frames can come from both actors who work within the media and from outside. Therefore, even when studying the mass media it is not necessary that the frames found in the mass media are created by the mass media itself.

An experiment performed by Nelson and Oxley reveals how articles with the same basic facts about an issue, but with quotations from different experts, give the readers differing opinions about that issue. In the experiment the participants were divided into two groups. One group read one version of an article, while the other group read another version of the same article. The story was about a hotel development in Florida where one could expect big economic gains from the development, but also negative environmental impacts. Both articles contained the same objective facts about the economic and environmental impacts of the development. However, each article contained different pictures and quotations. One of the articles contained a picture of a wetlands area that was threatened by the development and quotations that highlighted the environmental impacts. The other article contained a picture of a construction worker (representing all the new construction jobs that would be created by the development) and quotations that highlighted the economical aspects. The result was that the readers of the economic article had more favourable attitudes towards the development project than the readers of the environmental article. The study also showed that this was largely due to changes in belief importance. The individuals who had read the economic article stated that economic aspects were more important for them when taking a stand about the issue. In similar response, the individuals who had read the environmental article stated that environmental aspects were more important when taking a stand about the issue. A smaller change in belief content about what the environmental and economic impacts was also observed.<sup>24</sup> This study ultimately reveals that non objective pictures and quotations can alter readers' opinion about an issue, even if all the facts in the article are correct and

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<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, page 22.

<sup>22</sup> Wolfsfeld, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 18.

<sup>23</sup> Nelson & Oxley, 1999, *op. cit.*, pages 1041f.

<sup>24</sup> Nelson & Oxley, 1999, *op. cit.*, pages 1044ff.

objective. The considerations that the media highlight as the most relevant and important will often be the considerations that the readers find most important.

There is also a range of researchers that have focused on media's role in times of conflict. Wolfsfeld writes that "*Frames provide meaning, and the struggle over media frames is central to every political conflict where each side is attempting to promote its own world view*"<sup>25</sup>. In the case of a major crisis such as the Arab – Israeli conflict, it is especially important to focus on the ideologies articulated in the press<sup>26</sup>. Media frames about political conflict are created through interaction between the antagonists themselves. But, according to Wolfsfeld, the media usually become participants by covering some of the sites in the conflict. It is the interaction between the different actors in the conflict and outside of it which cause the changes in the frames. Regardless, actors tend to cling to certain frames even when they are exposed to new information.<sup>27</sup> "*It is extremely difficult to change existing media frames, especially about conflict. These frames take on an almost mythical quality, and after a while none of the parties raise any questions about them. Antagonists who attempt to swim against this interpretive tide usually drown.*"<sup>28</sup> Even if there is some confusion in the early stages of a conflict regarding which frames the different sides will opt for, once they are established, the antagonists are unlikely to change their minds radically<sup>29</sup>.

According to Roeh & Nir, the newspapers in a crisis situation tend to contribute to and maintain the social consensus and are therefore less objective than in a peaceful state. This is due to the use of an "us-against-them" rhetoric, with a clear preference for "us", which is a product of the culture and the context in the society in which the newspapers act.<sup>30</sup> The media's role in times of conflict is often to reinforce "*the way the participants in the conflict view themselves, their situation, and the opposition.*"<sup>31</sup> This view is shared by Wolfsfeld: "*When there is a wide level of consensus in support of a war, the news media not only reflect such consensus, they also reinforce it by constructing news stories that are consistent with public attitudes towards the other side.*"<sup>32</sup>

Thus, there is a consensus that the mass media mostly serve to reinforce the interpretations that already exist in the society in times of conflict, such as in Israel and the Palestinian territories. However, the reinforcing of existing interpretations is still an important function since frames need to be repeated. If media would present differing frames instead of just reinforcing the ones that already exist in society, there might be a larger possibility for changes in the frames in thought among Israelis, or at least for an ambiguity in the frames in thought to emerge. Even if changes in frames in thought are more uncommon in times of conflict, they would be more likely if the media didn't reinforce the existing consensus. By reinforcing the existing frames in thought, the media instead assist in maintaining the status quo.

Thus, the media have an important role in forming the understanding of a conflict, even though the importance seems to be greatest in the beginning of a conflict. This study will focus on the barrier, which forms part of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, one could argue that it is not likely that any new or surprising frames will be found in the media

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<sup>25</sup> Wolfsfeld, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 21.

<sup>26</sup> Roeh & Nir, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 176.

<sup>27</sup> Wolfsfeld, 1993, *op. cit.*, pages 16f.

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, page 17

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, page 24

<sup>30</sup> Roeh & Nir, 1993, *op. cit.*, pages 189ff.

<sup>31</sup> C. A. Collins & J. E. Clark, 'Structuring the Intifada in al-Fajr Jerusalem and the Jerusalem Post', in A. A. Cohen & G. Wolfsfeld (eds), *Framing the Intifada: people and media*, (Norwood, New Jersey: Alex Publishing Corporation, 1993), p. 192.

<sup>32</sup> G. Wolfsfeld & M. Dajani, 'Media images of the other in Israel and the Palestinian territories: Covering one another during the second Intifada'. Research Report submitted to the *Karen-Adenauer Foundation*, 2003, p 2.

and that the media's role will be strictly limited to reinforcing already existing frames. However, as shown later in this study, the Israeli public opinion about the barrier was divided during the period when the political decision to construct the barrier was taken and no specific frames were dominating in the society. Therefore, a state of frame ambiguity existed, which gave the media an opportunity to shape the frame that was later going to dominate in the Israeli public opinion.

### 3.3 Framing effect

Much research on framing has focused on the framing effect. It has focused on the extent to which the descriptions of an issue affect the attitudes towards it. However, many studies of media impact suffer from difficulties in assessing the cause and effect in the study. First, there is the problem of the direction of the causality. Do, for example, the newspapers' frames affect the opinion of their readers, or do the readers choose a certain newspaper because of their previous opinions?<sup>33</sup> In this research the problem of cause and effect arises when trying to state whether citizens have more moderate views of the Palestinian question because of the media they consume or if they choose to consume that specific media because of their political views.

Second, there is a problem with controlling other secondary variables when establishing media effect. Secondary factors that could affect both political views and media consumption habits are, for example, education, class, income, unemployment, and ethnicity.<sup>34</sup> These background factors are especially hard to control in real life case studies, such as this research.

However, these two problems can be solved by performing laboratory experiments. Several such experiments have taken place, and they have proven that the frames in communication affect the public opinion. For example Nayda Terkildsen and Frauke Schnell show that the women's movements have been framed in six different ways in various periods. With an experimental design, they test these different frames on a sample of adults. They find that while some of the frames result in more positive attitude towards gender equality among adults, other frames result in a more negative attitude.<sup>35</sup>

Another experiment by Nelson et al has shown that the tolerance of the Ku Klux Klan was affected when two different groups of research participants were exposed to different media frames about a Ku Klux Klan rally. One of the frames described the incident as a free speech issue while the other frame described it as a disruption of public order. The group of participants that was exposed to the "free speech"-frame became more tolerant of the Ku Klux Klan than the group that had been exposed to the "public order"-frame.<sup>36</sup>

Many researchers have discussed the framing effect of the mass media in particular. For example, Page discusses media's attempts to influence policy preferences and their evident effects on the public opinion. He argues that a large body of evidence indicates that what appears in the media has a substantial impact on how citizens think, what they think about, and what they regard as an "important problem". Furthermore, what media say often has an important impact on what policymakers do. But, the overall impact of media as a political actor in a complex society is determined by how persuasive power is distributed

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<sup>33</sup> See for example K. Newton, 'Mass media effects: Mobilization or media malaise', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 29, no 4 (1999), p. 583.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, pages 583f.

<sup>35</sup> N. Terkildsen & F. Schell, 'How media frames move public opinion: An analysis of the women's movement', *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 4 (December 1997), pp. 879-900.

<sup>36</sup> T. Nelson, R. Clawson R & Z. Oxley, 'Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance', *The American political science review*, vol. 91, no. 3 (September 1997), pp. 567-583.

among them (especially how concentrated or dispersed the distribution is), how important the media diversity is, and how close they are from the values and interests of ordinary citizens.<sup>37</sup>

Sometimes, more than one frame is communicated and no frame is dominating, which can lead to frame ambiguity. Frame ambiguity refers to different frames in thought co-existing within a society or even within one individual. In other words, an uncertainty exists regarding how an issue should be interpreted.<sup>38</sup>

According to Wolfsfeld, the framing effect also varies over time and circumstance. It may be greater when there is an important struggle over the world opinion, and decrease when the story is considered less newsworthy.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the media's influence probably is at its greatest when a question is new and it has not yet settled how it should be interpreted by society.

All these examples clearly demonstrate that framing has an effect on public opinion. Since it is established that the framing effect exists, it is of great importance to study frames that are communicated in real societies such as within Israel. In other words, it is likely that the way in which Israeli newspapers frame the issue of the barrier affects how the Israeli public perceived the barrier, even though the degree of influence is difficult to measure. This study does not aim to prove the Israeli newspapers' framing effect on the Israeli public opinion, but will be founded on the idea that the newspapers' framing of the barrier has an affect on public opinion about the barrier.

#### 4. Method

This research is based on an analysis of the English editions of the Israeli newspapers Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post. These two newspapers have been selected for several reasons. First, the choice was limited to newspapers that have English paper editions. Second, the newspapers have been chosen to represent both the left wing and the right wing of Israeli newspapers. Ha'aretz is a privately owned newspaper that is directed primarily to highly educated readers<sup>40</sup>. It is known to be a liberal newspaper with support for territorial concessions and the Oslo Accords, and is thusly considered to be left wing regarding the peace process. Jerusalem Post, on the other hand, is considered to be a moderate, right wing newspaper.

A reproach to this choice of newspapers is the relatively small number of readers compared to the major newspapers in Israel like Yedioth Ahronoth. However, because the choice was limited to newspapers with an English paper edition, these two newspapers will give the most balanced picture possible. Since the newspapers differ in their ideological stands, it is assumed that the frames that are identified in this research will cover the spectrum of frames in moderate Israeli newspapers, and will thus give an indication of which frames appear in other newspapers.

Only newspapers are studied in this research and not other kinds of media. It is widely known that Israelis are frequent readers of daily newspapers compared to many other nationalities. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Israelis would be more affected by what is written in the newspapers. Furthermore, studies have shown that broadsheet newspapers have a stronger connection with political mobilization than other types of media

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<sup>37</sup> Page, 1996, *op. cit.*, page 23.

<sup>38</sup> S. Blum-Kulka & T. Liebes, 'Frame ambiguities: Intifada narrativization of the experience by Israeli soldiers', in A. A. Cohen & G. Wolfsfeld (eds), *Framing the Intifada: people and media*, (Norwood, New Jersey: Alex Publishing Corporation, 1993), p. 28f.

<sup>39</sup> Wolfsfeld, 1993, *op. cit.*, pages 18ff.

<sup>40</sup> Roeh & Nir, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 178.

even if it is hard to establish whether it is the media that affects the political mobilization or vice versa.<sup>41</sup>

This research only focuses on describing how the barrier is discussed in Israeli media and not on the framing effect, concentrating on the extent to which the frames in the Israeli media affect the frames in thought of the Israeli population. As stated above, this research is based on the argument that media framing has an affect on public opinion. Even if the aim is not to prove the framing effect, it is still relevant to examine Israeli public opinion regarding the barrier. Therefore, the research also contains a smaller section about Israeli public opinion on the barrier and related issues beginning during the time when the decision to construct the barrier was made.

The period that is examined is the one surrounding the decision to build the barrier, from April 14<sup>th</sup>, 2002 to the end of August 2002. 157 articles in Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post that were published during the four and a half month long period in which the barrier turned into an important political question in Israel are analyzed. The decision to build the barrier was made on the 14<sup>th</sup> of April by the Israeli Cabinet and was approved by the government on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June. In the following months, there were many discussions about the path of the barrier. The controversial question was finally settled on the 14<sup>th</sup> of August, when the Cabinet approved the proposed placement. However, by June, infrastructure of the barrier began along the first 50 of the 110 kilometers that had been approved by that point, not including the work located in the Jerusalem area.<sup>42</sup>

This period is chosen for many reasons. First of all, the barrier, at that point, was a new phenomenon and thus more likely to be covered by the newspapers. The newspapers tend to write more about an issue when it is new or when something new has happened in relation to the issue. Second, this was the period in which the newspapers had to take a stand regarding how to frame the issue. They could opt for either creating a frame ambiguity or reinforcing the existing consensus. Third, even though the support for the separation from the Palestinians was high, there still existed several conflicting values in Israeli society regarding the issue<sup>43</sup>. This indicates that the media's possibility to influence the frames in thought about the barrier in that period - even if not radically- was probably greater than if the frames would already have been established in Israeli society. As explained in the theory section above, media's influence over public opinion is greatest when a question is new and it is not yet settled how it should be interpreted by society. Therefore, the media had the greatest possibility to influence the opinion about the barrier in this period and the influence over the public opinion about the barrier is likely to have decreased today when the frames in thought are already established. Forth, if there is a political battle to raise support from the public about a specific issue, such as the construction of the barrier, the media have an even greater responsibility to choose quotations carefully and depend on a variety of sources.

One possible reproach to the choice of studying the period surrounding the decision to erect the barrier is that the construction was still in its early stages and the repercussions for the Palestinians had not yet fully emerged. One could claim that if the humanitarian consequences had not yet started escalated, the newspapers had no responsibility to write about them. However, the humanitarian consequences were possible to predict, and this was done by a variety of organizations with great accuracy based on experiences from other places where a barrier had already been erected (ie. Gaza). On the contrary, the newspapers' responsibility to provide a comprehensive account of a construction that would have devastating impacts on Palestinian lives was very important because during this period, the

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<sup>41</sup> Newton, 1999, *op. cit.*, pages 577, 589.

<sup>42</sup> Y. Lein, *The separation barrier: position paper September 2002*, (Jerusalem: B'tselem position paper), 2002, p. 4f.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, page 30.

Israeli public had the greatest possibility of influencing official policies regarding the barrier. This was the sole period of time when the barrier plan could have been altered or hindered in order to prevent the deterioration of the Palestinian humanitarian situation. However, this could have only been possible if the average Israeli was well informed of the humanitarian consequences of the barrier.

Every article that in some way connects to the barrier and how its construction is framed during the selected period is examined. Thus, the newspapers are studied from first to final page and all articles that contain any information about the barrier are included in the analysis, even if the barrier is not the main theme of the article. All types of articles were included in the study, including opinion editorials.

There are many variables that may affect the Palestinians' freedom of movement, but this research focuses entirely on those that are concretely linked to the construction of the barrier, including the barrier itself and the checkpoints that are in direct connection to the barrier. It is important to note that articles about checkpoints are only taken into consideration in the analysis if the article connects them to the barrier. Even if an article links different aspects regarding the checkpoints to one or more of the considerations from the analysis, these are not treated in the analysis if they are not clearly connected to the barrier in the article. The article, thus, must make the reader associate the checkpoints with the barrier if it is to be treated as an article that creates a frame of the barrier. This is especially relevant because during the period examined in this research, the barrier was still in the early stages of construction and most checkpoints had not yet formed part of the actual barrier. Since this research aims to examine how the construction of the barrier in particular has been framed and not the Palestinian freedom of movement in general, the articles have to make the reader associate the content of the article to the barrier in order to be of interest for the analysis. Other factors that limit the Palestinians' freedom of movement are not treated in this research, such as the Israeli settlements and the curfews.

#### **4.1 Questions for analysis**

Some analytical questions are used to guide the investigation of the frames that appear in the newspapers. These questions are borrowed from former research and are thus academically approved of.

The questions used are the following:

- Which considerations are emphasized as being relevant regarding the construction of the barrier and which considerations are being excluded? This is the main question of the analysis and the most important question for examining how the barrier has been framed in the Israeli newspapers. For example, it can be framed both as a security issue and humanitarian issue. In the section with information about the barrier, many different considerations that could be highlighted are worked out based on general information about the consequences of the barrier. These different considerations, which are all valid considerations about the barrier, are then compared in the analysis to the considerations that appear in the Israeli newspapers. There are eight considerations focusing on the Palestinian humanitarian situation that are included in the analysis and that are worked out in section 5.2. The considerations are: freedom of movement, separation from farmland, work opportunities, the Palestinian economy, education, health service, land confiscation and house demolitions, and division of family and friends. In addition to this, the consideration of Israeli security is included in the analysis.

The analysis also studies headlines in particular, since the contemporary newspaper reader is largely a "headline consumer" and only occasionally reads entire news stories. Therefore, it is important to also examine which considerations, if any, are emphasized in the headlines. The headlines are phrased by the editors, and in contrast to a news story, they can be viewed as representing explicitly or implicitly the newspaper's position.<sup>44</sup>

- Which words are used when describing the Israeli arrangements? Using specific words versus others can influence the amount of support for a policy the article induces. Thus, the use of different names for the barrier can serve to grant (or deny) the legitimacy of its construction, and to downplay (or exaggerate) its importance. Various words can be used to describe the construction that is partly wall and partly wire fence.
  - The expression "the wall" has a dramatic connotative meaning that draws the reader's mind to other historical events such as the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Berlin Wall. Consequently, this is a word that can be used to accentuate the negative aspects of the barrier.
  - On the other hand, using the expression "the security barrier," evidently draws the reader's mind to the security aspects of the barrier. Therefore, this expression can be used when trying to increase support among Israelis for the construction of the barrier.
  - To call the barrier a "fence" is to understate its physical significance because in many parts, it consists of a six to eight meters high concrete wall. Therefore it can make the reader undermine the importance of the construction. When used together with "security" the expression both undermines the construction and frames the issue as a security issue.
  - The expression "separation" in conjunction with the word fence or barrier leads the reader's mind to the separation of Israelis and Palestinians, in other words, unilateral withdrawal. Nonetheless, this has not been a consequence of the barrier, and is thus slightly misleading.
  - Finally, the use of words such as "buffer zone" or "barrier" is more neutral because they don't include any values or claims about the construction. However, these expressions can be problematic when used to de-dramatize the construction of the barrier.

To see which words are used most often the proportion of the frequency of the different words for the barrier is measured in the analysis. It is important to also count the words in quotations because the words appear in the article and affect the reader, and because the newspaper chooses which quotations to use. The choice to include a quotation is also a choice to pass on expressions used by others with certain connotations.

- Which photos are used? Interpretations are not only constructed by words, but also by pictures. Are, for example, the photos of a nature that underscores drama? According to Roeh and Nir, photographs "from the field" underscore the drama of the event<sup>45</sup>. Furthermore, if the articles about the barrier contain pictures of Israelis, this generally makes the readers more prone to think about the benefits of the barrier for Israel. Equally, pictures of Palestinians will generally make the readers think about how the

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<sup>44</sup> Roeh & Nir, 1993, *op. cit.*, pages 178f.

<sup>45</sup> Roeh & Nir, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 183.

barrier affects the Palestinians. A picture of an angry and threatening Palestinian or an Israeli soldier pointing his gun at a Palestinian child in a checkpoint could naturally have the opposite effect. It is thus important to examine how large a proportion of the pictures in the articles about the barrier show Israelis and Palestinians, and also how they are portrayed in the pictures.

- In what order do the articles appear? Which articles are placed before the articles about the barrier? If articles about the barrier are placed just after articles about security problems such as a suicide bombing, this enhances the possibility that the reader will interpret the issue about the barrier solely as a security issue. Closely related is the question about what other news is linked to the issue. Is the issue about the barrier also linked to other issues and news in the same article, and if so which types of issues? Even if two articles contain the exact same information about the barrier, the readers could be influenced very differently depending on which other issues are linked to the barrier in the same article. These variables, the order of the articles and the linkages to other news in the same article, are mentioned by Collins and Clark in their analysis.<sup>46</sup>
- What quotations and sources are used? For example, are Israeli official sources (such as the government or the army) the main sources in the articles? Are other sources such as grass-root sources or official Palestinian sources used? Are Israelis quoted more frequently than Palestinians or the other way around? If one side of the conflict is quoted more frequently, it has a much greater chance of getting its view of the barrier across to newspaper readers. If an Israeli reader never gets to hear the voice of a Palestinian about how the barrier has affected Palestinian lives, he/she is more likely to only consider the security aspects when forming an opinion about the barrier. This analysis measures the quotations and sources used proportionally, but also analyzes them from a qualitative perspective and analyzes specific quotations and their meanings.

In this research, each quotation is counted. A new quotation is counted every time new quotation marks appear. Only quotations that are related to the barrier are counted if the article speaks about various subjects. If the article focuses entirely on the barrier, all the quotations are counted. Statements which are not surrounded by quotation marks are not treated as quotations but as sources.

In contrast, sources are counted once for every article, even if one source is used many times in the same article. Organizations and their individual members are counted as separate sources.
- How united are the frames presented in the newspapers? Is there unity to how the construction of the barrier is interpreted in the newspapers or do diverse frames exist? For example, Collins' and Clark's analysis of the first Intifada showed that different frames can exist about a subject even in the same newspaper. In their analysis of the Jerusalem Post they find that the most common interpretation was a "*security story*", but that this story was often challenged.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, this paper also takes into account how many different frames appear in the two newspapers studied, if the two newspapers differ in their frames, and if any frame can be considered dominant. The more frames that appear, the more "truths" are presented to the readers.

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<sup>46</sup> Collins & Clark, 1993, *loc. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> Collins & Clark, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 198.

Consequently, the readers will be exposed to a more nuanced depiction of the subject. If one frame is clearly dominating, however, the considerations presented in this frame will be the ones that primarily shape the readers opinion about the issue.

## 5. The barrier

### 5.1 Facts about the barrier

The process of restricting the Palestinians' freedom of movement started years before the construction of the barrier was initiated. In the year 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak approved a plan to raise a barrier between parts of the West bank and Israel. However, the implementation was slow.<sup>48</sup>

During the first half of 2002, the Intifada intensified with an increased number of attacks against Israel. As a result, the issue of constructing a barrier between the West bank and Israel re-emerged. On the 14<sup>th</sup> of April, 2002, the Israeli cabinet decided that a permanent barrier would be erected to improve the possibilities of preventing terrorism. The government approved the plan of the barrier on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June. The detailed planning of the route of the first section of the barrier was finished in early June and the construction work began later on the same month. The government approved the detailed route for the other sections of the barrier on the August 14<sup>th</sup>.<sup>49</sup>

Most parts of the barrier consist of an electronic fence in conjunction with a trace road, a patrol road, and an armoured vehicles road. The total width of the whole construction averages around sixty meters.<sup>50</sup> In other parts, the barrier consists of a concrete barrier six to eight meters high. This is the case for example in the area around the Jerusalem municipality.<sup>51</sup>

80% of the barrier's route is situated inside the West Bank and not on the Green Line. The total route of the fence is 700km, in other words twice the length of the Green Line due to its winding route. Its route is determined by the location of the Israeli settlements, and the barrier serves to separate them from the rest of the West Bank. According to Amnesty International, the route's path reflects Israel's desire to later annex the settlements.<sup>52</sup>

### 5.2 The consequences of the barrier – possible considerations

This section discusses the different consequences of the barrier for Israelis and Palestinians. It serves to outline some possible considerations that would be worth highlighting in the Israeli press. After drawing out the possible considerations about the barrier, they are compared to the considerations that are found in Israeli newspapers in chapter 7.1. The comparison makes it possible to see which considerations are highlighted in the Israeli press but also which are excluded.

The full consequences of the barrier will not be known until its construction is finished. However, there is no justification for why Israeli newspapers did not highlight the negative repercussions on Palestinian lives when the discussion of the barrier's construction began. For example, the Israeli organization, B'tselem, highlighted the coming consequences

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<sup>48</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, pp 6-7.

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, pages 6-7.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, page 8.

<sup>51</sup> B'tselem, *Separation barrier*, [http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation\\_Barrier/Index.asp](http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Index.asp), accessed 2007-07-04.

<sup>52</sup> Amnesty International, *Israel and the occupied territories: road to nowhere*, (London: Abacus Printing Co Ltd.), December 2006, p. 20.

of the barrier for the Palestinians in a 2002 report.<sup>53</sup> Human Rights Watch and B'tselem also compared the consequences at an early stage by looking at other villages where similar restrictions had previously been imposed, such as Al-Mawasi in the Gaza Strip<sup>54</sup>.

The construction of the barrier has led to a decrease in the number of violent attacks against Israel but has also increased the infringement of Palestinian human rights. More specifically, the Palestinian freedom of movement has been severely limited which has, in turn, resulted in the violation of many other rights.

### ***Freedom of Movement***

The barrier has a winding route that surrounds villages and creates enclaves of Palestinian villages that are then separated from the rest of the West Bank.<sup>55</sup> In some areas, an Eastern "depth barrier" accompanies the main barrier, which creates Palestinian enclaves.<sup>56</sup> The route, as it was planned in 2003, would have created five enclaves of Palestinian villages on the West side of the barrier, between the barrier and the Green Line, and five enclaves on the East side of the barrier due to the winding route and the depth barrier. The ten enclaves would be separated from one another and from the rest of the West Bank. One of the larger enclaves is comprised of Tulkarm and a couple of other Palestinian communities with a total of 73,900 inhabitants. Another enclave completely surrounds Qalqiliya with 38,200 inhabitants.<sup>57</sup>

In a report published in December 2006, Amnesty International describes how the barrier has limited and virtually destroyed the Palestinians' freedom of movement within the occupied territories. They are not only restricted by the barrier, but also by hundreds of military checkpoints and blockades.<sup>58</sup> In 2003, there were around 300 roadblocks and checkpoints in the West Bank. In 2005 however, there were 528 checkpoints and barriers.<sup>59</sup>

The Palestinians are only able to cross the barrier at checkpoints with special permits. According to B'tselem, it is problematic that Palestinians need to pass through checkpoints to be able to travel from some parts of the West Bank to other parts. It forces the Palestinians to travel long distances to the checkpoints where they have to wait in lines for many hours, and increases the risk of humiliation and abuse by Israeli soldiers. The checkpoints might also be closed certain hours, and during some occasions, a hermetic closure might be imposed by the IDF preventing any crossing. Hermetic closure usually occurs when the IDF believes that the threat towards Israel is increased.<sup>60</sup>

Even though the Israeli government stresses that the barrier does not prevent people from crossing since it is possible to cross with the right permits, the case of al-Mawasi in the

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<sup>53</sup> Y. Lein, 2002, *op. cit.*

<sup>54</sup> This comparison is made by B'tselem & Human Rights Watch.

B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 14

Human Rights Watch, *Israel's 'separation barrier' in the occupied West Bank: Human rights and international humanitarian law consequences – A Human Rights Watch briefing paper*, 2004, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/20/isrlpa7581.htm>, accessed 2007-07-04.

<sup>55</sup> Human Rights Watch, *World report 2003*, 'Israel, the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian authority territories', 2003, <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast5.html>, accessed 2007-07-04.

Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2005*, 'Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories', 2005, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/isrlpa9806.htm>, accessed 2007-07-04.

B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 9.

Amnesty International 2006, *op. cit.*, page 20.

<sup>56</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 9.

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, page 10.

<sup>58</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, page 2.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, page 22.

<sup>60</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, pages 13f, 21.

Gaza Strip shows that it is not always possible to pass through the check-points. The check-point in al-Mawasi is only open limited hours with long waiting lines. In addition, the checkpoint is sometimes closed for longer periods without prior notice.<sup>61</sup>

B'tselem also stresses that the obtainment of crossing permits is a process sometimes accompanied by arbitrary harassment of Palestinians.<sup>62</sup> Residents in closed Palestinian enclaves have to apply for crossing permits to be able to enter and leave their enclaves. Residents in other parts of the West Bank are not able to enter the Palestinian enclaves without a special permit. Similarly, residents who have been separated from their farmland have to apply for special permits to be able to reach their farmlands through the agricultural gates at the barrier.<sup>63</sup>

Human Rights Watch agrees with B'tselem that the restrictions on the Palestinians' freedom of movement have become both more acute and permanent with the construction of the barrier. "*It effectively confines more than a hundred thousand men, women, and children in enclaves. It will institutionalize, and threatens to make permanent, a system in which all movement for large numbers of people is sharply curtailed except for a handful of permit holders.*"<sup>64</sup> According to Human Rights Watch, these restrictions on the freedom of movement lead to poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. They also limit the Palestinians' access to health care, education and other services.<sup>65</sup> The additional consequences that result from the restrictions on movement are discussed below.

### ***Separation from farmland***

Because the barrier is being constructed far inside the West Bank, many farmers have found themselves cut off from their agricultural land, greenhouses, olive trees and water.<sup>66</sup> Amnesty International describes how the construction of the barrier hinders or prevents the Palestinians' access to their land<sup>67</sup>. Palestinians must get a special permit to access their farmland if they are located in between the barrier and the Green Line. However, there are increased restrictions to get such permits. Many farmers are denied permits to access their land, and even those who have the permits are often denied access through the gates. The permits are usually given to parents who are too elderly to cultivate the land, but not to their children or other young family members capable of farming the lands.<sup>68</sup>

The gates do not open at the appointed times, and less than half of the gates open consistently. They are also often inconveniently located, and tractors and other vehicles are rarely permitted to go through the gates, which makes the movement of agricultural products extremely difficult.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, many residents have to travel long distances to get to their gates.<sup>70</sup>

As the route was planned in 2003, it would separate thirty-six communities with 72,200 inhabitants on the Eastern side of the barrier from their farmland that would be situated on the Western side of the barrier. This severely damages the Palestinians' standard

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<sup>61</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2004, *op. cit.*

<sup>62</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 14.

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, page 12.

<sup>64</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2004, *op. cit.*

<sup>65</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2005, *op. cit.*

<sup>66</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, pages 1f.

B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 11.

<sup>67</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, page 2.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, pages 20f.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, pages 20f.

<sup>70</sup> B'tselem, *Separation barrier*, [http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation\\_Barrier/Index.asp](http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Index.asp), accessed 2007-07-04.

of living because Palestinians in these areas rely on farming as a major source of income. The farmlands in these areas are also some of the most fertile and productive farmlands in the West Bank.<sup>71</sup>

### **Work**

The barrier's increased restrictions on the freedom of movement impede the ability of many Palestinians to travel to work.<sup>72</sup> In 2001, 25 percent of the workforce in the areas surrounding the barrier worked in agriculture. Consequently, the separation of villages from owned farmland as a result of the barrier affected the employment of many Palestinians.<sup>73</sup>

The barrier also impact individuals who do not work in agriculture. People in the enclaves have a reduced ability to work outside the enclaves and people outside the enclaves have limited ability to go to work inside them.

The Israeli organization B'tselem concentrates on the various conflicts that have arisen in the enclaves around Qalqilya and Tulkarm. B'tselem highlights that many residents in the nearby villages work for the Palestinian Authority in the district offices in the cities. The problem is also severe in villages in the Jerusalem area. Because fewer people pursue agricultural employment, many people are dependent on work opportunities in East Jerusalem.<sup>74</sup>

The checkpoints and the barrier greatly increase the amount of time it takes for many Palestinians to commute to work. Additionally, it is difficult to estimate the length of the commute because the procedures at the checkpoints are inconsistent, and sometimes checkpoints completely close. Many Palestinians have lost their jobs on the other side of the barrier due to tardiness and absence from work.<sup>75</sup>

### **Economy**

Amnesty International states that the construction of the barrier has created a virtual collapse of the Palestinian economy in recent years. There has been an increase in poverty, unemployment, and health problems among Palestinians. The humanitarian situation has deteriorated dramatically.<sup>76</sup>

The freedom of movement for people and goods is essential for every modern economy. In 2004, the World Bank stated that the Palestinians were suffering the worst economic depression in modern history. Aside from separating residents from their farmland and preventing people from commuting to work, the barrier increases transportation costs, and makes it more difficult for local villages to receive imports and to export products. Many Palestinians suffer from an inability to market products in other parts of the West Bank and a decreased supply of imports for farming (seeds, fertilizer, machines etc.).<sup>77</sup>

Shops, businesses, and factories in West Bank villages that are close to Tulkarm, East Jerusalem, and Qalqilya rely on customers in those large cities. Since the barrier was constructed, many of these businesses have been forced to close.<sup>78</sup> These various economic

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<sup>71</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2005, *op. cit.*

<sup>72</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, pages 2.

<sup>73</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 15.

<sup>74</sup> *ibid.*, page 16.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, page 22.

<sup>76</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, page 2.

<sup>77</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 15.

Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, pages 22f.

<sup>78</sup> B'tselem, *Route of the barrier around East Jerusalem*, [http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation\\_Barrier/Jerusalem.asp](http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Jerusalem.asp), accessed 2007-07-04.

implications will put further constraints on a people suffering from a tremendous economic decline.

### ***Education***

Amnesty International states that the construction of the barrier hinders or prevents many Palestinian children from getting to school for prolonged periods. This reality violates the Palestinians' right to education and undermines the future prospects of Palestinian children.<sup>79</sup>

For example, in East Jerusalem, thousands of children live in the suburbs but go to school in the centre. A similar situation exists for the students and teachers who live outside of East Jerusalem, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm that must travel to the universities and colleges in these cities on a daily basis.<sup>80</sup>

Many villages between the Green Line and the barrier are cut off from public services, and as an example, Human Rights Watch highlights the village of Umm al-Rihan in the Jenin area. The barrier cuts off Umm al-Rihan from its secondary school. In addition, the only primary school in the village is overcrowded.<sup>81</sup>

These repercussions of the barrier will ultimately decrease the education level of Palestinians in the West Bank and increase illiteracy rates throughout the territory.<sup>82</sup>

### ***Health service***

The barrier also severely limits health care access to many residents in the West Bank. The situation is most detrimental for individuals living West of the barrier. Amnesty International declares that the barrier prohibits many Palestinians from accessing medical care.<sup>83</sup> As reinforced by B'tselem, nine West Bank villages that are West of the barrier and lack proper medical service will become enclaves. Many other villages, both West and East of the barrier, have basic medical care, but rely on larger cities for more advanced medical care. The villages West of the barrier are separated from comprehensive medical care services by the barrier. Many residents on the East side of the barrier are also having increased difficulty accessing advanced medical care because the barrier isolates three major Palestinian cities, East Jerusalem, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya, from the rest of the West Bank.<sup>84</sup>

### ***Land confiscation and house demolition***

In order to construct the barrier, Israeli forces have destroyed thousands of Palestinian homes, vast areas of cultivated land, and additional important civilian infrastructure.<sup>85</sup> The destruction of agricultural land has deprived tens of thousands of impoverished Palestinians of employment and income.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, pages 2, 23.

<sup>80</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 17

B'tselem, *Route of the barrier around East Jerusalem*,

[http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation\\_Barrier/Jerusalem.asp](http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Jerusalem.asp), accessed 2007-07-04.

Human Rights Watch, 2004, *op. cit.*

<sup>81</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2004, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, page 2.

<sup>84</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 17

<sup>85</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, pages 1f.

<sup>86</sup> *ibid.*, page 26.

Palestinian land has been taken under the control of the army by seizure orders through “requisition for military needs.” The seizure orders do not necessarily indicate that the Palestinian land is permanently transferred to Israel, but it remains a threatening possibility. First, land has been taken for military needs in this way in the past and never returned to Palestinian owners. Second, the construction of the barrier appears to a long-term investment. Finally, farmland West of the barrier that is separated from its Palestinian owners may be transferred to Israel due to the Israeli declaration that land in the West Bank that has been uncultivated for three years can be taken as Israeli state land.<sup>87</sup>

The construction of the barrier has also lead to a vast number of house demolitions in Palestinian communities near the barrier. According to B'tselem, about 280 demolition orders had been issued by March 2003. The demolitions are lawfully justified because the buildings have been erected without building permits. However, the lack of building permits is a result of Israel's policy against issuing building permits to Palestinians outside already developed areas. Therefore, many Palestinians are forced to build their homes without permits to meet the needs of a growing population.<sup>88</sup>

### *Division of family and friends*

The barrier's route sometimes goes directly through villages, separating individuals in the same village from one another. In other areas, the barrier separates intimately linked neighbour villages. The barrier cuts off communities and separates families from one another<sup>89</sup>. In addition, the closures and curfews make family connections difficult to sustain<sup>90</sup>. As B'tselem writes: *"The difficulties in moving from one place to another that will result from the barrier are also expected to impair the social and family life of hundreds of thousands of residents."*<sup>91</sup>

### *Security*

The Israeli government states that security concerns primarily motivated the erection of the barrier. The purpose of the barrier is to prevent Palestinian armed groups from executing terrorist attacks in Israel.<sup>92</sup> Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2002, Palestinian terrorist organizations have waged a terrorism campaign against Israel, peaking between 2001 and 2002. Since then, terrorism has continuously decreased, although it has neither formally nor practically ended. In particular, the number of suicide attacks has decreased dramatically, despite the mounting motivation to carry out such attacks.<sup>93</sup>

The decreasing number of terrorist attacks against Israel may be an indication that the barrier performs a security function.<sup>94</sup> This point is reinforced in a 2007 report that is

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<sup>87</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 18.

Human Rights Watch, 2004, *op. cit.*

<sup>88</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 24

<sup>89</sup> Amnesty International, 2006, *op. cit.*, page 20.

<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, page 23.

<sup>91</sup> B'tselem, 2003, *op. cit.*, page 17.

<sup>92</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2005, *op. cit.*

<sup>93</sup> Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), *Anti-Israeli terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends*, March 2007, pp. 6, 9.

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Anti-Israeli+Terrorism+2006.htm>, accessed 2007-07-14.

<sup>94</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2005, *op. cit.*

presented on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' homepage. It states that the "security fence" has proved its effectiveness in reducing the number of terrorist attacks against Israel<sup>95</sup>.

The barrier, the "buffer zones," and even the parts of the barrier that have not yet been completed serve as obstacles that prevent terrorists from entering Israel to carry out suicide bombing attacks. In 2006, no terrorists crossed the barrier, and consequently most suicide attacks were carried out in the Jerusalem area. The statistics clearly demonstrate that since the first section of the barrier was completed in 2003, the number of mass murder terrorist attacks carried out in Israel has dropped dramatically.<sup>96</sup>

Ultimately, there are various relevant considerations regarding the barrier. However, to get a comprehensive account of the barrier controversy, it is vital that not one sole consideration is highlighted while the majority of the others are obscured. Thus, highlighting that the barrier has been constructed to increase Israeli security is legitimate as long as considerations about the effects on Palestinian life are taken into account.

## 6. Israeli public opinion

In order to understand the frames used by Israeli newspapers to describe the construction of the barrier, it is important to understand how the society in which the newspapers act perceives the barrier. By examining the public opinion about the barrier in Israeli society, it is possible to see how it corresponds to the frames presented in Israeli newspapers. If the frames in newspapers correspond to Israeli public opinion, this *may* indicate that the frames in the newspapers have affected the public opinion regarding the barrier. However, disunity would reveal that newspapers have minimal influence on Israeli public opinion.

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies is based at the Tel Aviv University and has continuously produced basic research on matters related to Israel's national security. In 2006, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), which incorporated the Jaffee Center, was founded. Based on statistics from these sources, a summary can be sketched of Israeli public opinion regarding the Palestinians in general, and the barrier, more specifically, beginning in 2002.

In 2002, during the second Intifada, the barrier's construction commenced. Israeli public opinion was shifting to the right, and Israelis were increasingly concerned with both their personal security and the national security. 92% of the respondents expressed fear that they or one of their family members would fall victim to a terrorist attack.<sup>97</sup> Most Israelis believed that the Palestinians bore all or some of the responsibility for the continuation of the conflict.<sup>98</sup>

Opinions about separation from the Palestinians were divided: some Jews supported distancing from the Palestinians via separation, and others through removing Arabs from the territories. 29% supported separation but not transfer, and 19% supported separation *and* transfer.<sup>99</sup> The Jaffee Center survey reveals several conflicting values in Israeli society regarding Israeli security and Palestinian threats. Thus, it was critical that governmental policy decisions attract the support of wavering individuals in Israel.<sup>100</sup> The question about Israeli/Palestinian separation revealed Israeli opinion regarding the presence of Palestinians in

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<sup>95</sup> ICC, 2007, *op. cit.*, page 11.

<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*, pages 20f.

<sup>97</sup> A. Asher, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002*, (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University), 2002, p. 9f.

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.*, pages 17,22.

<sup>99</sup> *ibid.*, pages 9f, 28f.

<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*, page 30.

general. Thus, the opinion about separation indicates that the opinions about what measure to take towards the Palestinians were varied. This is an important factor to take into consideration in our analysis. As previously stated, it is difficult to change the frames about a conflict once they have already been established.<sup>101</sup> The barrier is only a part of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it is probably that the frames about the conflict were already deeply rooted in Israeli society. Therefore, even if the frames about the barrier were not yet established in Israeli society when the construction started, they were not likely to fluctuate dramatically from other opinions connected to the Palestinians.

However, it still indicates that the media's ability to influence the public opinion about the barrier in that period - even if not radically- was probably greater than if the frames specifically about the barrier had already been established in Israeli society. In the midst of a political battle, in order to gain support from the public about a specific issue such as the construction of the barrier, media have an even greater responsibility to quote conscientiously and to use alternative sources of information.

The 2003 survey demonstrates that the Israelis' sense of security increased from the previous year, but was primarily due to international events. For example, the percentage of people who feared that they or a family member might fall victim to a terrorist attack dropped by nine percent from 2002.<sup>102</sup>

As in 2002, the majority of Israelis blamed Palestinians for the ongoing conflict.<sup>103</sup> Even though the Israeli public perceived the Arabs in a less negative way than the year before, 37% still thought that Arabs wanted to destroy much of the Jewish population of Israel, and 23% thought that they wanted to conquer the state of Israel.<sup>104</sup>

The Quartet roadmap, an international initiative aimed at ending violence and working toward a peace settlement, led to increasing international pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. According to the Jaffee Center, this pressure created increasing domestic pressure in support of a withdrawal from the Palestinian territories and for a separating barrier between Israel and the Palestinian areas.<sup>105</sup>

The development of public opinion until 2007 reveals that despite the sharp decline in the number of terrorist attacks, mainly due to the construction of the barrier, 69% of the Israeli population still fear that they or a family member might fall victim to a terrorist attack. In 2007, 60% of Israelis reported that they felt no change in their concern for terrorism, and 36% felt increased concern.<sup>106</sup> There was a growing conviction among the Israeli public that any concessions to the Palestinians would only lead to increased terror and hostility<sup>107</sup>.

The Israelis continued to prioritize security concerns above other issues<sup>108</sup>. The construction of the barrier enjoyed overwhelming support among the Jewish population throughout the examined period. The INSS states that it is difficult to find any question about which there is so wide a consensus.<sup>109</sup> In 2004, 80% supported the construction of the barrier, and by 2005, support increased by another two percent. In 2006 and 2007, the number of people who supported the barrier dropped only slightly.<sup>110</sup> The INSS attributes this high level

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<sup>101</sup> Wolfsfeld, 1993, *op. cit.*, page 24.

<sup>102</sup> Asher, 2002, *op. cit.*, pages 11, 19f.

<sup>103</sup> *ibid.*, page 13.

<sup>104</sup> *ibid.*, page 23.

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*, page 11.

<sup>106</sup> B. M. Yehuda & S. Dafna, *The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007*, (Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies incorporating the Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University), 2007, p. 49.

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*, page 53.

<sup>108</sup> *ibid.*, pages 10, 70.

<sup>109</sup> *ibid.*, pages 10, 62.

<sup>110</sup> *ibid.*, pages 19f.

of support to Israelis' security preoccupations, and to a realization among Israelis that a solution to the conflict the separation of Israelis from Palestinians.<sup>111</sup> The survey also asked its respondents if they would support Israel if the state declared the barrier as its permanent border if there was no possibility of political progress with the Palestinians or if there was a resurgence of terrorism in the territories. In 2005 and 2006, a clear majority was in favour. However, in 2007, the population was evenly split on the issue.<sup>112</sup> According to INSS, this change in public opinion was due to a loss of support among the Israeli public for the concept of unilateralism. The concept of unilateralism in Israeli politics stated that because there was no Palestinian partner, Israel must undertake policies on its own to change the reality on the ground.<sup>113</sup> The loss of support for unilateralism originates in the failures to prevent Qassam rocket attacks, kidnappings of Israeli soldiers, and the second Lebanon war.<sup>114</sup> Despite the general loss of support for the concept of unilateralism, the INSS states that it is significant that half of the Jewish population still did not reject the possibility of turning the barrier into a permanent border. This support is still overwhelming among the Israeli public.<sup>115</sup>

The majority of surveyed Israelis were in favour of the barrier's current location, in which the majority of the large Jewish settlements are on the Israeli side of the barrier. However, most agreed with the exclusion of the smaller, isolated settlements from the state of Israel.<sup>116</sup>

Ultimately, the INSS study revealed that Israeli basic opinion about questions relating to national security remains relatively stable over time. Two deeply rooted basic opinions presented in the survey are a deep mistrust for the Arab collective and the need for separation between the two populations. These basic opinions manifest themselves in the overwhelming support among the Israeli public for the construction of the barrier, which is, above all, perceived as a security issue.<sup>117</sup>

## 7. Analysis

### 7.1 Considerations highlighted

During the 4.5 month long period (April 14<sup>th</sup>, 2002 to August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002) surrounding the decision to build the barrier, its development was widely covered in the Israeli newspapers Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post. In total, 157 articles that discussed various aspects of the barrier and/or its construction were published.

As cited in the chapter 6, a survey of Israeli public opinion during this period shows that even though 48% supported separation from the Palestinians, there were conflicting perspectives in Israeli society regarding the barrier. Many Israelis had undecided views about the barrier. Therefore, it is probable that Israeli newspaper consumers' general opinion would have been influenced by the frames about the barrier represented in Israeli newspapers. The newspapers' affects on Israeli public opinion during the period surrounding the decision to erect the barrier is critical because the Israeli public had the strongest opportunity to affect Israeli policies regarding the barrier during this time.

There are numerous ways in which the construction of the barrier could have been framed, and many different aspects of its construction that could have been emphasized or

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<sup>111</sup> *ibid.*, pages 62f.

<sup>112</sup> *ibid.*, pages 19f.

<sup>113</sup> *ibid.*, pages 59f.

<sup>114</sup> *ibid.*, pages 19f.

<sup>115</sup> *ibid.*, page 62.

<sup>116</sup> *ibid.*, page 63.

<sup>117</sup> *ibid.*, pages 10, 62f, 87f.

obscured. However, the security consideration and the humanitarian consideration are most likely to serve as bases for the frames about the barrier. The newspapers could focus either on the Israeli security benefits of the barrier or on the humanitarian consequences for the Palestinians (i.e. the limited freedom of movement, the separation from farmland, the land confiscations and house demolitions, the loss of work possibilities, the economic consequences, the effects on the Palestinians' ability to access education and health facilities, and the division of families and friends). This report does not aim to prioritize these considerations, but is founded in the belief that these considerations should be represented in order to give the comprehensive account of the barrier controversy. Because the media shape and maintain public opinion, it is important to study how the Israeli media frames issues, such as the barrier, that affect the Palestinian lives.

As mentioned above, during the initial period of the barrier's construction, several frames in thought co-existed in Israeli society. Surveys clearly demonstrate that support for the barrier among Israel's Jewish population rapidly increased. Therefore, it is important to examine if the Israeli newspapers presented differing frames of the barrier or just reinforced the security frame. Even if changes in frames in thought are more rare in times of conflict, changes are more likely if the newspapers provide a variety of frames for their readers.

The analysis of the articles published in Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post between the April 14<sup>th</sup>, 2002 and August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002 revealed that a large majority of the articles, 73.9%, highlighted the Israeli security consideration (refer to table 7.1.1). The first and the second columns of the table demonstrate the frequency and percentage of the ten different considerations highlighted in Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post. The third column demonstrates the total frequency and percentage of the considerations highlighted. The first number in every box reflects the number of articles that highlight a specific consideration. The number in brackets is the total number of articles that were analyzed during the entire period, in Ha'aretz, the Jerusalem Post, or in total. Finally, the last figure in every box is the percentage of times a consideration was highlighted out of all the times any consideration was highlighted. Because one article can highlight more than one consideration, the sum of the percentages is not 100%.

**Table 7.1.1 Considerations highlighted for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| <b>Considerations Highlighted</b>                    | <b>Ha'aretz (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Freedom of movement for the Palestinians</b>      | 3 articles (84), 3,6%                      | 3 articles (73), 4,1%                            | 6 articles (157), 3,8%                |
| <b>Separation from farmland</b>                      | 2 articles (84), 2,4%                      | 4 articles (73), 5,5%                            | 6 articles (157), 3,8%                |
| <b>Work possibilities for the Palestinians</b>       | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 3 articles (73), 4,1%                            | 3 articles (157), 1,9%                |
| <b>The Palestinian economy</b>                       | 2 articles (84), 2,4%                      | 1 article (73), 1,4%                             | 3 articles (157), 1,9%                |
| <b>Education for the Palestinians</b>                | 1 article (84), 1,2%                       | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 1 article (157), 0,6 %                |
| <b>Health service for the Palestinians</b>           | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 0 articles (157), 0%                  |
| <b>Land confiscation and house demolition</b>        | 5 articles (84), 6,0%                      | 6 articles (73), 8,2%                            | 11 articles (157), 7,0%               |
| <b>Division of family and friends</b>                | 2 articles (84), 2,4%                      | 1 article (73), 1,4%                             | 3 articles (157), 1,9%                |
| <b>Israeli security</b>                              | 55 articles (84), 65,5%                    | 61 articles (73), 83,6%                          | 116 articles (157), 73,9%             |
| <b>No specific consideration highlighted / Other</b> | 38 articles (84), 45,2%                    | 21 articles (73), 28,8%                          | 59 articles (157), 37,6%              |

The trend of highlighting the security consideration is especially evident in the Jerusalem Post, in which as many as 83.6% of the articles about the barrier highlighted Israel's security. In addition, 65.5% of the examined articles in Ha'aretz highlighted the security consideration. Thus, the security frame was more pervasive in the Jerusalem Post than in Ha'aretz, although it was the dominating consideration in both newspapers. This result was expected due to the Jerusalem Post's more right-wing agenda.

There are numerous examples of articles published in Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post which only highlight the security considerations of the barrier and do not mention any humanitarian considerations. An article published in Ha'aretz in July 2002 about the barrier's construction serves as a quintessential example. The only consideration of the barrier that is mentioned is its ability to prevent terrorist attacks by hindering Palestinians from the West Bank from entering illegally into Israel. Despite the length of the article, it does not mention the implications of the barrier for the Palestinians.<sup>118</sup>

Even though the security consideration strongly dominated in the articles in both newspapers during the examined period, several of the Palestinian humanitarian considerations received limited attention. In total, 20.9% of the articles in one way or another highlighted the consequences of the barrier for the Palestinians (refer to table 7.1.1). Of these considerations, the land confiscation and house demolition points received the most attention, (mentioned in 7% of the articles about the barrier). The Palestinian freedom of movement

<sup>118</sup> Ha'aretz, 2002-07-31, p. 4.

consideration and the separation from farmland consideration were noted in 3.8% of the articles. The loss of work opportunities for the Palestinians, the Palestinian economy, and the division of family and friends-considerations were acknowledged in only 1.9% of the articles. The health consideration was not mentioned in one single article during the examined period. Thus, the general trend reflects that most of the humanitarian considerations were only seldom mentioned in the Israeli newspapers examined in this report, offering Israeli newspaper consumers a very partial account of the barrier controversy.

One clear example of an article that highlights the humanitarian consequences of the barrier and its effects on the Palestinians' freedom of movement in particular is located in a June edition of the Jerusalem Post. The article states that: "*Since the formal termination of Operation Defensive Shield, the Israel Defence Forces have, quietly and systematically, divided the West Bank into eight almost hermetically-sealed enclaves. [...] Movement of Palestinians between one and another requires a permit from Israeli authorities. Without mobility, no normal economic and social life is possible, nor can any central control be effected.*"<sup>119</sup> However, it is rare to locate articles that solely focus on the detrimental repercussions of the barrier's construction on Palestinian lives.

The same article can also highlight more than one consideration. However, the security frame primarily dominated the articles. If the humanitarian considerations were mentioned, they were usually highlighted as secondary to the security consideration. When the humanitarian considerations are mentioned, they are often mentioned together with the security consideration. The security consideration however is mostly mentioned alone, which therefore gives more weight to the security consideration. In a June 2002 Jerusalem Post article, the barrier is described as "*first and foremost an effective security mechanism*". The article discusses how the barrier will improve Israeli security. But, at the end of the article, the mayor of an Arab village is briefly quoted about the possibility that some Arab owned land might have to be expropriated in order for the barrier to be constructed. Thus, the dominating consideration is security, and the land confiscation consideration is only mentioned as secondary.<sup>120</sup> It is particularly noteworthy that the issue of land confiscation was given so little weight in the articles because, as previously stated, vast areas of cultivated land and thousands of Palestinian homes have been destroyed by the Israeli forces for the purpose of constructing the barrier. Furthermore, Palestinian land has been taken under the control of the army by seizure orders, which has had a devastating effect on the lives of the many Palestinians who depend on agriculture as their primary/only source of income.

The analysis of the articles in Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post also demonstrates that even when facts about the consequences of the barrier on Palestinians were mentioned in the articles, they were often not accentuated. For example, in a May publication of Ha'aretz, an article mainly highlights the Israeli security benefits of the barrier, but also mentions that in the cases when there are Arab villages close to one another on both sides of the green line, house demolitions might be necessary in order to construct the barrier. Therefore, the author of the article suggests that the barrier be built further east. However, the article does not discuss the humanitarian implications of building the barrier inside the West Bank, such as the creation of enclaves and the severe limitations on Palestinian freedom of movement. The enclaves that are isolated from the rest of the West Bank are created because of the barrier's winding route that sometimes surrounds entire villages. This, among other things, has contributed to limiting and virtually destroying the Palestinians' freedom of movement within the occupied territories. According to Human Rights Watch, restrictions on the freedom of movement lead to poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. They also limit the Palestinians' access to health care, education, and other services.

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<sup>119</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-06-14, p. A9.

<sup>120</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-06-11, p. 3.

The Jerusalem Post highlighted the humanitarian considerations more frequently than Ha'aretz during the examined period. However, as previously mentioned, the Jerusalem Post also highlighted the security consideration more often than Ha'aretz. In addition, more Ha'aretz articles either failed to highlight any specific consideration or highlighted non-related considerations (45.2% as compared to 28.8% in the Jerusalem Post). 37.6% of the total articles failed to highlight any specific consideration or highlighted non-related considerations. See table 7.1.1. When no specific consideration is highlighted in an article, no consideration is given more weight than another. These articles, in conjunction with the articles that highlight non-related considerations, do not influence whether the reader perceives the barrier's construction as a security or humanitarian issue (or both). Therefore, these articles are irrelevant to this research. Regardless, the fact that a majority of articles focused on the security aspects of the barrier controversy indicates that Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post did not make a substantial attempt at exposing the humanitarian aspects of the issue during the initial stage of the barrier's construction.

Table 7.1.2 charts the considerations highlighted in the headlines. The numbers on the left hand side of each box represent the number of articles that highlighted a specific consideration. The numbers in brackets represent the total number of headlines analyzed throughout the period. The numbers on the right hand side reflect the percentage that any specific consideration was highlighted in the headlines out of the number of times any considerations were highlighted in the headlines.

**Table 7.1.2. Considerations highlighted in headlines for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| <b>Considerations Highlighted</b>                    | <b>Ha'aretz (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Freedom of movement for the Palestinians</b>      | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 1 article (73), 1,4%                             | 1 article (157), <b>0,6%</b>          |
| <b>Separation from farmland</b>                      | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 0 articles (157), <b>0%</b>           |
| <b>Work possibilities for the Palestinians</b>       | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 0 articles (157), <b>0%</b>           |
| <b>The Palestinian economy</b>                       | 1 article (84), 1,2%                       | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 1 article (157), <b>0,6%</b>          |
| <b>Education for the Palestinians</b>                | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 0 articles (157), <b>0%</b>           |
| <b>Health service for the Palestinians</b>           | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 0 articles (157), <b>0%</b>           |
| <b>Land confiscation and house demolition</b>        | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 1 article (73), 1,4%                             | 1 article (157), <b>0,6%</b>          |
| <b>Division of family and friends</b>                | 0 articles (84), 0%                        | 0 articles (73), 0%                              | 0 articles (157), <b>0%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli security</b>                              | 17 articles (84), 20,2%                    | 26 articles (73), 35,6%                          | 43 articles (157), <b>27,4%</b>       |
| <b>No specific consideration highlighted / Other</b> | 66 articles (84), 78,6%                    | 45 articles (73), 61,6%                          | 111 articles (157), <b>70,7%</b>      |

As shown in the table above, the majority (70.7%) of the headlines did not highlight any specific consideration or highlight another non-related consideration. However, 27.4% of the headlines highlighted the Israeli security consideration. Only 1.8% of the headlines highlighted humanitarian considerations. The security consideration was emphasized over 15 times more frequently than all of the humanitarian considerations in the headlines. Five out of the eight humanitarian considerations were not highlighted at all in the headlines, and none of the humanitarian considerations were mentioned in more than 0.6% of the headlines. The Jerusalem Post highlighted the security consideration in 35.6% of the headlines, while Ha'aretz highlighted the security consideration in 20.2% of article headlines.

The headlines further accentuate the security frame of the barrier controversy found in the analyzed articles from Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post. For example, a headline of a June Ha'aretz publication reads as follows: "*Police chief: we need fence to help secure Jerusalem.*"<sup>121</sup> The typical headline that highlights the security consideration contains either a quotation regarding the security aspect of the barrier, or utilizes the expression "security fence/barrier."

The findings of this research show that when discussing the barrier, Israeli newspaper staff has chosen to highlight the security consideration in headlines in a clearer way than the humanitarian considerations. Headlines are phrased by editors, and therefore represent explicitly or implicitly the newspapers' own positions. Newspaper staffs' decision to stress

<sup>121</sup> Ha'aretz, 2007-06-20, p. 2.

Israeli security concerns in headlines is especially relevant because the contemporary newspaper reader is largely a "headline consumer" and only occasionally reads entire news stories. Thus, the phrasing of headlines may have an important influence on Israeli frames in thought about the barrier controversy. However, the fact that most headlines did not highlight any specific consideration is likely to decrease their influence in shaping Israeli public opinion about the barrier, even if a certain influence in favor of the security frame-in-thought is still probable.

Ultimately, most humanitarian considerations were only mentioned occasionally in the newspapers –except for the health service consideration, which failed to be mentioned at all. This reality in conjunction with the newspapers' strong emphasis on the security consideration in articles, the highlighting of humanitarian considerations only as secondary to security considerations, the lack of focus on the humanitarian considerations even when basic facts about the barrier's effects on Palestinians were mentioned, and the more obvious accentuation of the security consideration in headlines, suggests that only the security frame is present in the articles analyzed in this research. The security consideration was highlighted over ten times more often than the most common humanitarian consideration, the land confiscation and house demolition consideration. Therefore, it can be determined that the security frame solely dominated both newspapers during the period in which the decision to construct the barrier was debated.

Gamson and Modigliani define a frame as: "*the central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning.*"<sup>122</sup> The newspapers' framing of the barrier is an example of frames in communication. The primary object of this report is how the barrier controversy is conveyed to newspaper readers. The results of the research reveal that the articles in Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post focused on the security considerations when discussing the barrier. While other aspects of the barrier are mentioned, they are not presented as part of the *central* storyline of the controversy.

As stated in the theory section of the report, the readers tend to focus only on the mentioned considerations. Furthermore, the accentuation of certain considerations versus others can alter the reader's opinion about the importance of various aspects of an issue. Because a security frame dominated Israeli newspaper articles, reader opinions were most likely shifted toward support for the barrier's construction.

The securitization theory provides some interesting angles on the media's role in determining which threats exist in a given society. "*In securitization theory, "security" is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process: the social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and from what) through "securitizing speech-acts" through which threats become represented and recognized. Issues become "securitized", treated as security issues, through these speech-acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such.*"<sup>123</sup> The emergence of threats depends on the capacity of different actors, such as the media, to make socially effective claims about them. Which claims are likely to be effective and the objects to which they refer are usually deeply embedded in a given society.<sup>124</sup> According to Williams "...what makes a particular speech-act a specifically "security" act – a "securitization"- is its casting of the issue as one of an "existential threat", which calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics."<sup>125</sup> In security discourse, an issue labeled as a *security* issue is described as

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<sup>122</sup> Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, *op. cit.*, page 143.

<sup>123</sup> M. C. Williams, 'Words, images and enemies: Securitization and international politics', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47, no. 4, (December 2003), p. 513.

<sup>124</sup> *ibid.*, pages 513f.

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, page 514.

having supreme priority. Thus, there is a need and a right and to address the concern through extraordinary measures. Security issues are viewed as being "beyond normal politics," non-negotiable and beyond public debate. Therefore, when Israeli media frame the barrier as a security issue by only focusing on the threat of Palestinian terrorism, they are "securitizing" the issue. The media make the barrier issue such a security priority that it becomes unchallengeable. This hinders any substantial debate about the most controversial aspects of the barrier, such as the humanitarian consequences for the Palestinians.

A quote by Israel Police Inspector Gen. Shlomo Aharonishsky in a June edition of the *Jerusalem Post* serves as a key example of a "speech-act" used to "securitize" the barrier issue. He states that the construction of a "security fence" is absolutely "essential" for the capital to reduce terrorist attacks by bombers from Palestinian areas. The use of words such as "essential", "urgent", "vital" etc. when speaking about the barrier makes the reader perceive it as an indispensable security necessity. Even when these phrasings in newspapers are in quotes or sources, they have the same effect on newspaper readers. It is important to remember that the newspaper staff actively choose which quotes and sources to integrate in articles. Therefore, they have a responsibility to provide their readers with a nuanced and neutral account of the barrier controversy.

In the period surrounding the decision to construct the barrier, surveys of Israeli public opinion (referred to in Chapter 6) demonstrate that Israelis worried more than ever about both their personal security and national security. 92% of the respondents feared that they or one of their family members would fall victim to a terrorist attack. Israeli newspapers easily promoted the security frame because the fear was already present in Israeli society and security questions were already prioritize in the Israeli personal and public agenda. This could serve to explain why the newspapers were more likely to successfully contribute to establishing and maintaining the dominating security frame-in-thought in Israeli society. The "negative aspects" about the barrier were downplayed in the newspapers in comparison to the barrier's security benefits for Israel. Therefore, the framing effect generated by the newspapers' framing of the barrier should have provided a more positive view of the barrier among the Israeli public than if a variety of frames would have been provided that included the barrier's effects on the Palestinians' humanitarian situation. Thus, there is reason to believe that the newspapers maintain the security frame by failing to provide readers with a variety of frames that challenge the consensus. This may be a possible explanation for the overwhelming support for the barrier among Israel's Jewish population.

It is interesting to examine how the considerations that are highlighted in the two newspapers varied over time during the examined period. The following section will analyze the findings on a monthly basis to reveal if any change occurred over time in how the barrier was framed. The tables 10.1-10.5 in the appendix present the considerations that were highlighted in the two newspapers each month between April and August 2002.

In the second half of April, following the decision to build the barrier, 91.7% of the articles about the barrier in *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* highlighted the security consideration, and no article mentioned any humanitarian consideration or explained how the barrier would affect Palestinian lives (See table 10.1). In *Ha'aretz*, each of the four articles about the barrier highlighted the security consideration. In the *Jerusalem Post*, 87.5% of the articles stressed the security aspect of the barrier. In both cases, the articles that did not highlight security did not highlight any specific consideration or highlighted other considerations that were not humanitarian. Thus, in the close aftermath of the decision to build the barrier, the Israeli newspaper reader was not informed about the consequences of the barrier for Palestinians.

This trend only slightly altered in May (refer to table 10.2). 86.4% of the articles highlighted the security consideration, and only two articles out of 22 highlighted any

humanitarian consideration (educational consideration, and land confiscation and house demolition consideration). None of the other six humanitarian considerations represented in the analysis were mentioned in Ha'aretz or the Jerusalem Post. It is less likely that any humanitarian consequence of the barrier be mentioned close to the decision to build it because the barrier's construction had barely begun and the barrier's impact on Palestinian lives had not come into effect. However, it would have been possible for newspapers to predict the consequences of building a barrier on the West Bank due to the construction of past barriers built, such as in Gaza. These predictions were made with great accuracy by various human rights organizations, and would have offered readers a more nuanced account of the West Bank barrier.

In June, more articles that highlighted the humanitarian considerations about the barrier started to appear, even though several humanitarian considerations still failed to be mentioned. In total, 24.5% of the articles stressed one or more humanitarian consideration, as compared to 9% in the previous month. However, the dominating consideration was still the security, which was highlighted in 62.2% of the articles (50% in Ha'aretz and 80% in the Jerusalem Post). The second largest category was, as in previous months, the lack of any specific consideration/other consideration (40.5% of the articles). While Ha'aretz had a much larger percentage of articles that highlights either no specific consideration or a non-humanitarian consideration, the Jerusalem Post more frequently highlighted both security and humanitarian considerations (See table 10.3).

In July, the dominating consideration was still Israeli security. As shown in table 10.4, 77.3% of the articles highlighted the security consideration, 66.7% in Ha'aretz and 84.6% in the Jerusalem Post. The majority of the humanitarian considerations were not mentioned at all in the two newspapers. In Ha'aretz, only three of the eight humanitarian considerations were mentioned, and in the Jerusalem Post, only two were mentioned. Five of the humanitarian considerations were not mentioned in either newspaper. Regardless, for the first time, the percentage of articles that highlighted the humanitarian consequences (31.8%) was larger than the percentage of articles that did not highlight any specific consideration/other (22.7%). In the articles that discussed the humanitarian consequences of the barrier, they were conveyed primarily as secondary subjects. For example, several articles discussed the controversy over the barrier's route around Rachel's Tomb outside of Jerusalem. The main focus in the articles was on Israeli security and the importance of incorporating the tomb into Israel's future borders. The humanitarian considerations were only briefly mentioned.

In August, the security consideration again dominated, (refer to the table 10.5), and was highlighted in 88.5% of the articles about the barrier. The security consideration was highlighted in 93.3% of the Jerusalem Post articles (the highest percentage thus far), and in 81.8% of the Ha'aretz articles. The humanitarian considerations were highlighted in 23% of the articles, and many particular humanitarian considerations failed to be mentioned at all. 11.5% of articles highlighted no specific/other considerations. The percentage, as in earlier months, was higher in Ha'aretz than in the Jerusalem Post. Thus, the number of articles that highlighted the humanitarian considerations was higher than the number of articles that highlighted other or no specific considerations. Despite this, the security consideration was highlighted almost four times more often than the combined humanitarian considerations.

In sum, the number of articles that highlighted the humanitarian considerations and the implications of the barrier for the Palestinians increased only slightly in the last two months examined. The lowest percentage of articles that highlighted Israeli security was 62.2% (in June). The highest percentage of articles that highlighted the humanitarian considerations was 31.8% (in July). Land confiscation and house demolition consideration was the most frequently discussed humanitarian consideration (13.6% in July). In conclusion, the humanitarian considerations were highlighted too late (peaking in July), because the barrier's

construction had begun in June. By July, it was too late to change the plan of the barrier. It should have been the newspapers' responsibility to highlight humanitarian considerations of the barrier as well as the security consideration before the decision to construct the barrier was finalized. The impacts of the barrier on Palestinians were possible to predict and should have been presented throughout the decision process to construct the barrier. In contrast, as our research has revealed, in April 2002 no article discussed the humanitarian considerations of the barrier.

The general trend throughout the examined period was the consistent domination of the Israeli security consideration over the humanitarian considerations in Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post articles. Because Israeli newspapers always framed the barrier as a security issue they maintained the dominating frame in thought, the security frame, and also helped create it. As mentioned above, several frames in thought co-existed in the Israeli public opinion surrounding the decision to erect the barrier. When the decision to construct the barrier was made, the newspapers could have presented a variety of frames about the barrier, including the humanitarian considerations. This alternative action may have caused the Israeli public opinion to maintain several frames in thought about the barrier. Once the security frame had been established in Israeli newspapers, they reinforced this frame even when the humanitarian consequences of the barrier for the Palestinians were evident.

## **7.2 Words used to describe the barrier**

To investigate which frame dominates Israeli newspaper articles, one must also analyze what words are used to describe the issue because different words have different connotations. Some words will inevitably draw the reader's attention to security considerations, even if such considerations are not explicitly highlighted in the article. Other words will make the reader associate the barrier with walls and other separation measures in history, such as the Berlin wall or the South African Bantustans during the apartheid. These words will attract the reader's mind to the more negative connotations of separation. In addition, some words will understate the barrier and will directly serve to undermine the humanitarian considerations.

The words that are chosen to describe the barrier affects the reader's frames in thought by both changing the belief content and by making the reader attach more importance to one specific consideration. The word "fence," during the examined period, was a word that could alter the belief content of the reader because it made the reader believe that the barrier would only consist of a fence, when it in fact would also include a wider security area of around 60 meters with electronic defence systems, a trace road, a patrol road, an armoured vehicles road, and a six to eight meter concrete wall in parts. In the same way, the word "wall" could also be misleading, since only parts of the barrier would be constructed as a wall. The word "wall" can also have negative connotations for the reader and be associated with historical events such as the apartheid in South Africa and the Berlin wall. "Barrier" is a more neutral, value free word that does not disseminate specific beliefs about the barrier.

During the examined period, the most obvious way for newspapers to draw a reader's mind to a specific consideration during the examined period was by adding the word "security" in front of the word used to describe the barrier, such as "the security barrier" or "the security fence". This inevitably caused the reader to think about the barrier as a security issue. To add the word "separation" to a word used to denote the the barrier would also cause the reader to think about the barrier's existence or non-existence as a issue regarding separation from the Palestinians. In this way, one could attract support for the construction of the barrier from Israelis who supported a separation from the Palestinians via withdrawal from the West Bank. The reader would connect the question of the barrier with the question of

unilateral withdrawal and would perceive it as a political question of whether to create a political border between Israelis and Palestinians. The expression “separation” with a word connoting the barrier is also misleading because according to the Israeli government, the construction of the barrier was unrelated to the question of unilateral withdrawal. In addition, an evacuation of West Bank settlements and a unilateral withdrawal has not followed the barrier’s construction. Therefore, the question of constructing the barrier was not a question of unilateral withdrawal. The expression “separation” and a word connoting the barrier would make the reader attach importance to the political considerations of the barrier and give the reader misleading ideas about the controversy.

Table 7.2.1 shows the results of the examination of the words used by the newspapers between April and August 2002. The first number in every box shows the number of times the word was used. The number in brackets represents the total number of times that the barrier was mentioned using any word. Finally, the last figure in every box represents the percentage of times a word was used out of the number of times any word was used for the barrier.

**Table 7.2.1 Words for the barrier for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| <b>Words</b>              | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage*</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency</b> | <b>Total frequency</b>   |
|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Barrier</b>            | 32 (561), 5,7%                            | 28 (553), 5,1%                  | 60 (1114), <b>5,4%</b>   |
| <b>Wall</b>               | 23 (561), 4,1%                            | 18 (553), 3,3%                  | 41 (1114), <b>3,7%</b>   |
| <b>Fence</b>              | 385 (561), 68,6%                          | 363 (553), 65,6%                | 748 (1114), <b>67,1%</b> |
| <b>Security barrier</b>   | 3 (561), 0,5%                             | 3 (553), 0,5%                   | 6 (1114), <b>0,5%</b>    |
| <b>Security fence</b>     | 43 (561), 7,7%                            | 117 (553), 21,2%                | 160 (1114), <b>14,4%</b> |
| <b>Separation barrier</b> | 0 (561), 0%                               | 2 (553), 0,4%                   | 2 (1114), <b>0,2%</b>    |
| <b>Separation fence</b>   | 50 (561), 8,9%                            | 5 (553), 0,9%                   | 55 (1114), <b>4,9%</b>   |
| <b>Buffer zone</b>        | 10 (561), 1,8%                            | 9 (553), 1,6%                   | 19 (1114), <b>1,7%</b>   |
| <b>Other</b>              | 15 (561), 2,7%                            | 8 (553), 1,4%                   | 23 (1114), <b>2,1%</b>   |

\*Percentage of the total amount of times the barrier is mentioned using any word

The table clearly shows that the most common word used in both Ha'aretz and Jerusalem Post for the barrier is "fence". "Fence" was used in 68.6% of all cases in Ha'aretz and in 65.6% of the cases in the Jerusalem Post (averaging 67.1%). The second most common expression for the barrier was "security fence," still including the word fence. This expression was used in only 14.4% of the cases. Other words for the barrier have considerably lower figures such as "wall" (3.7% of the cases) and "barrier" ( 5.4% of the cases).

Because "fence" is the word most used in the newspapers when discussing the barrier, readers might receive a misleading account of the barrier. In April 2002, the barrier was only in a planning stage, and few civilians had a clear understanding of the extensive repercussions of the barrier. Therefore, the choice of words denoting the barrier might have had an effect on belief contents of Israelis. When the word "fence" was repeatedly used, it is likely to have caused Israelis to think of the barrier as only a fence. However, the fact that the barrier would also consist of a 60 meters wide security area means that the Palestinians would be more negatively affected by the construction than by the construction of a fence. The security area has required the destruction of thousands of homes and the confiscation and/or destruction of tens of thousands of dunams of land on the West Bank in order to make space for the construction. These are consequences of the construction of the barrier that are undermined when using the word "fence" to denote the barrier.

The vast use of the word "fence" in the beginning of the examined period may be explained by the fact that media were not aware of the various aspects of the barrier controversy. However, as is shown in appendix 10.6-10.10, the usage of the word "fence" has increased rather than decreased over time, thus deeming this explanation improbable. In April, the word was used in 42.3% of the cases while in June, July, and August, the word was used in over 60.0% of the cases.

For example, on May 21<sup>st</sup>, 2002, an article in the Jerusalem Post discusses the decision to construct the barrier using the word “fence” to denote the barrier. *“It’s been decided to construct a continuous 364-km long fence, including around Jerusalem. The decision is accompanied by a timetable for implementation in the shortest possible time.”*<sup>126</sup>

Newspaper articles discuss different routes, timetables, contractors, and other issues related to the decision to construct the barrier, but fail to specify details about the construction work. In a Ha’aretz article on June 16<sup>th</sup> draws attention to the fact that the construction work on the barrier will start that day and states that: *“The fence will run from the Salem checkpoint in the north to Kfar Kassem in the south. Another stretch for the fence is planned for the Jerusalem area.”*<sup>127</sup>

Because this article was written the same day that the construction work began, details about the barrier’s construction were available to media staff. However, the article uses only the word fence to denote the barrier throughout the whole article. In addition, the construction of a concrete wall in the Jerusalem area was known from a very early stage of the barrier’s planning. However, the word “fence” still incorrectly used to describe this part of the barrier.

As previously mentioned, the expression “security fence” is the second most common expression used to denote the barrier (14.4% of the cases). The word “security” included in the expression to denote the barrier gives the impression that the barrier issue is innately connected to security considerations. The inclusion of the word “security” in the name for the barrier implies that security considerations are the most important considerations, and that these are connected to the issue by necessity. This expression also includes the word “fence” and thus serves to understate the physical presence of the barrier. Therefore, the second most common expression used to denote the barrier highlights the security considerations as the most important considerations to bear in mind and undermines the barrier’s physical construction.

The usage of the expression “security fence” is also often linked to the articles that highlight security considerations more explicitly. An example of this can be taken from a debate article in Jerusalem Post on the June 19<sup>th</sup>:

*“But I was relieved to hear that the Defense Ministry last week had finally started building the long-awaited 110km security fence designed to separate Palestinian villages and cities in the West Bank – and their suicidal bombers – from Netanya, Hadera, Kfar Saba, Petah Tikva, and all the other Israeli localities straddling the Green Line which have known such fear and terror during the past two years.”*<sup>128</sup>

Another quotation from the Jerusalem Post serves as an example of how words and expressions are often transferred between the newspapers’ sources:

*“The suicide car bomber attack on the packed bus near the Megiddo junction early yesterday further underlines the urgency for constructing a security fence along the Green Line, Dany Atar, head of the Gilboa concil, declared yesterday.”*<sup>129</sup>

In this example, the journalist has chosen the same word for the barrier as Dany Atar, the source, used in his statement. However, even words that appear in quotations or in references to other sources are important because they still affect the reader the same way that words chosen by the journalist himself. It is also important to note that it is a choice to utilize the same word as a source. The newspapers should have been analyzing the words of their sources more cautiously. In some cases, newspaper staff should have chosen more neutral words than their sources, so as to avoid passing on biased views of the barrier to readers.

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<sup>126</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-05-21, page 2

<sup>127</sup> Ha’aretz, 2002-06-16, page 2

<sup>128</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-06-19, page 8

<sup>129</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-06-06, page 2

More neutral expressions, such as simply “barrier” or “buffer zone”, are used considerably less frequently. However, the media’s role is to be an objective monitoring power in society, and therefore should not frequently choose to use non-objective descriptive words. However, only words that are non-objective in the sense that they bear with them positive connotations about the barrier are used at the expense of more objective words. Words with negative connotations about the barrier are not used to the same extent as words with positive connotations. This is shown by the fact that the word “wall,” which is a word with negative connotations (and the word that Palestinians most often use to describe the barrier), is only used in 3.7% of the cases. The word “wall” most commonly appears with the word “fence,” as in the example below: *“One of the reasons why Siniora [Hanna Siniora, editor of the Palestinian paper The Jerusalem times] and his colleagues in the Palestinian leadership do not accept the Israeli ideas for separation is that they all draft lines where the fences and walls will be situated, but there is no list of settlements that should be dismantled.”*<sup>130</sup> As the example demonstrates, it is more likely that nuanced words are used to denote the barrier when alternative sources are used.

Ultimately, the words denoting the barrier raised support for the barrier’s construction among the Israeli public because the physical characteristics of the barrier were undermined by the word “fence.” The usage of “fence” makes the barrier’s construction less dramatic. “Security fence” also undermines the barrier’s physical presence *and* links it to security considerations. The survey of Israeli public opinion, (refer to Chapter Six), stated that during this time, Israelis worried about their personal security, and 92% expressed fear of that they or one of their family members would fall victim to a terrorist attack. In this climate of fear, the linkage of the barrier to security considerations would inevitably make the public more in favour of the construction. Because this consideration was already prioritized in Israeli society, the newspapers did not need to provide additional arguments about the importance of the security consideration in the barrier controversy.

The usage of “fence” in Ha’aretz and the Jerusalem Post is similar. Both of the newspapers use this word most frequently, and both newspapers use it about a third of the times they mention the barrier. However, the most important difference in the word choice results is that Jerusalem Post uses the word “security fence” considerably more than Ha’aretz. “Security fence” is chosen 21.2% of the times that the Jerusalem Post writes about the barrier, while it is used 7.7% of the times that Ha’aretz writes about the barrier. This might indicate that the Jerusalem Post had a somewhat stronger security frame than Ha’aretz. However, Ha’aretz uses the expression “separation fence” more frequently than the Jerusalem Post. This is probably due to the fact that, especially in the beginning of the examined period, Ha’aretz mentions the barrier issue in articles that primarily focus on unilateral withdrawal. During Spring 2002, before construction work on the barrier started, the question of unilateral separation and withdrawal from the West Bank was more important in Ha’aretz than questions about the barrier. Therefore, news about the barrier was often included in longer articles about political plans of unilateral separation that were circulating in the Labour Party during this period. Thus the barrier was seen as part of a broader strategy of unilateral withdrawal and separation. However, a consequence is that the political plans to build the barrier were perceived by the reader as a question of unilateral separation from the Palestinians. Thus, the question was seen as a political question and political considerations about whether or not it was the correct time and place to create a border between Palestinians and Israelis would be the primarily considerations brought to mind. The usage of “separation fence” highlighted the political considerations about the barrier and provided a deceiving account of the barrier issue. A more responsible way to write about the barrier would have

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<sup>130</sup> Ha’aretz, 2002-06-11, s.4

been to distinguish it from the question of separation from the Palestinians, because the barrier could very well be built without leading to separation from the Palestinians. Politicians made the distinction during the examined period and no withdrawal from the West Bank has taken place since 2002. Therefore, it is worth noting that the word “fence,” second most commonly used in Ha’aretz, provides a deceiving account of the barrier.

In sum, it can be concluded that the most commonly used words for the barrier in the two examined newspapers have attached positive connotations to the barrier, highlighted security considerations, and in the majority of cases, undermined the physical construction of the barrier. In fact, all the expressions that include the word “fence” combined comprise 86.4% of the total cases.

### **7.3 Photos and illustrations**

This section analyzes the photos and other kinds of illustrations that appeared in the 157 articles discussing the barrier between April 14<sup>th</sup> and August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002. Examining the visuals connected to the articles is important because pictures also affect the readers’ minds. In general, it can be assumed that pictures of Israelis will draw the readers’ minds to the Israeli situation and how the barrier will affect Israelis, while pictures of Palestinians will draw the readers’ minds to the Palestinian situation and how the barrier will affect the Palestinians. Some exceptions might of course exist. For example, a picture of an angry and threatening Palestinian or an Israeli soldier pointing his gun at a Palestinian child at a checkpoint could naturally have the opposite effect

Some pictures might accentuate the drama of an event, and help increase support for or resistance of a political question. For example, pictures that capture the urgency of the Israeli security threat by showing the devastating results of the latest terror attack, will increase support for the construction of the barrier. In contrast, pictures taken around the barrier’s construction sites depicting bulldozers destroying Palestinian cultivated land will diminish the support for the barrier’s construction.

The results of the examination of the photos and illustrations are shown in table 7.3.1. The numbers to the left in each box represent the absolute number of times photos or illustrations with different themes were published. The numbers in brackets are the total number of photos and illustrations that appeared in the 157 articles studied. Finally, the numbers to the right represent the percentage of photos and illustration with various themes out of all photos and illustrations in the 157 articles.

#### **Table 7.3.1 Photos and illustrations in articles that mentions the barrier for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| Motive   | Ha'aretz frequency and percentage* | Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage | Total frequency and percentage |
|--|------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| <b>Palestinian civilian</b>  | 1 (31), 3,2%                       | 0 (31), 0,0%                            | 1 (62), <b>1,6%</b>            |
| <b>Israeli civilian</b>  | 4 (31), 12,9%                      | 9 (31), 29,0%                           | 13 (62), <b>21,0%</b>          |
| <b>Angry/Threatening Palestinian</b>                                   | 1 (31), 3,2%                       | 0 (31), 0,0%                            | 1 (62), <b>1,6%</b>            |
| <b>Israeli soldier</b>   | 2 (31), 6,5%                       | 3 (31), 9,7%                            | 5 (62), <b>8,1%</b>            |
| <b>The barrier / physical obstacles closely related to the barrier</b> | 8 (31), 25,8%                      | 7 (31), 22,6%                           | 15 (62), <b>24,2%</b>          |
| <b>Israeli politician / expert</b>                                     | 7 (31), 22,6%                      | 6 (31), 19,4%                           | 13 (62), <b>21,0%</b>          |
| <b>Palestinian politician / expert</b>                                 | 3 (31), 9,7%                       | 0 (31), 0%                              | 3 (62), <b>4,8%</b>            |
| <b>Destruction after terror attack</b>                                 | 1 (31), 3,2%                       | 0 (31), 0%                              | 1 (62), <b>1,6%</b>            |
| <b>Construction work on the barrier</b>                                | 1 (31), 3,2%                       | 1 (31), 3,2%                            | 2 (62), <b>3,2%</b>            |
| <b>Other</b>   | 3 (31), 9,7%                       | 5 (31), 16,1%                           | 8 (62), <b>12,9%</b>           |
| <b>Palestinians in total</b>   | 5 (31), <b>16,1%</b>               | 0 (31), <b>0,0%</b>                     | 5 (62), <b>8,1%</b>            |
| <b>Israelis in total</b>   | 13 (31), <b>41,9%</b>              | 18 (31), <b>58,1%</b>                   | 31 (62), <b>50,0%</b>          |

\* Percentage of photos or illustrations picturing the different motives out of all photos and illustrations in articles about the barrier.

The table shows that, in total, 50% of the pictures portray Israelis, while only 8.1% of the pictures portray Palestinians. In addition, 21.0% of the pictures portray Israeli civilians while only 1.6% of the pictures portray Palestinian civilians. The same tendencies are evident in photographs of politicians and experts. 21.0% of the examined photographs portrayed Israeli politicians or experts, while only 4.8% portrayed Palestinian politicians or experts. These figures reveal that the newspapers have given priority to pictures that portray Israelis over those that portray Palestinians. The gap between the number of Israelis portrayed and the number of Palestinians portrayed is present in each newspaper (See 7.3.1). This suggests that the visuals reinforced the text of the articles by drawing the readers' attention primarily to the how the barrier would affect Israelis. Because the text of the articles mainly highlighted how the barrier was built to create increase security for Israelis, it is likely that the pictures of Israelis that accompanied these texts also helped to underscore that the main Israeli security consideration. As mentioned above, visuals of Israelis can in some exceptional cases draw the reader's attention to the negative repercussions of the wall on Palestinian lives. For example, a photograph of a soldier that abuses Palestinian civilians was mentioned. However, Israeli civilians, Israeli politicians, or Israeli experts comprise 84.0% of the pictures that portrayed Israelis. Thus, it is not likely that the majority of the pictures would have had an opposite effect than the expected. The visuals served to reinforce the highlighted security consideration of the barrier for Israelis. Also, in most of the photographs portraying Palestinians, negative connotations were attached to the image. Only one examined picture portrayed an angry and threatening Palestinian. A cartoon illustration in Ha'aretz on June 11<sup>th</sup>, 2002 showed an exaggeratedly big and angry Palestinian man, wearing a t-shirt with the word "opposition" written on it, easily jumping over the barrier.<sup>131</sup> However, because only one such picture was found, it is not likely that this image would have greatly affected readers.

<sup>131</sup> See Ha'aretz, 2002-06-11, page 4

Depictions of the barrier or other physical obstacles compose the biggest share of images connected to the examined articles. This category of images is depicted in 24.2% of the pictures. Pictures of the barrier can be considered pictures from the field and thus pictures that underscore the drama of the barrier's construction. As stated above, pictures of the barrier can increase opposition to its construction. Pictures of the construction work itself can also increase resistance to the barrier's construction. The combination of the categories reveal that 27.4% of the images are pictures from the field that might diminish support for the barrier. However, there is also a considerable share of visuals, 21.0%, depict Israeli politicians or Israeli experts and are most typically pictures from an office environment or portrait pictures. Such pictures can be assumed to have the opposite effect than pictures from the field because they serve to understate the drama of controversy. In addition, many of the pictures of Israeli civilians also downplayed the controversy. Therefore, no clear conclusion can be drawn as to whether the newspaper primarily attempted to accentuate or diminish the controversy's drama.

Only one photo from the field served to underscore the urgency of the Israeli security situation. This is a photo depicting the devastation after a terror attack in Petah Tikva with a caption below the photo stating: "*Mad normality: A smashed window after this week's terror attack in Petah Tikva.*"<sup>132</sup>

In addition, Ha'aretz tends to have smaller differences between the shares of depicted Palestinians and depicted Israelis. In total 41.9% of Ha'aretz pictures portray Israelis and 16.1% portray Palestinians. Even though there is a considerable difference between the two figures, the gap between the corresponding figures from the Jerusalem Post is larger. Out of the Jerusalem Posts total pictures, 58.1% portray Israelis and not one single picture portrays Palestinians. This severe result reveals the Jerusalem Post's lack of desire to depict the Palestinians and their point of view. This gap reinforces the earlier interpretation that the Jerusalem Post has a more dominating security frame than Ha'aretz and therefore also focuses more on the Israeli situation and less on the Palestinian situation.

In sum, the analysis of the photos and illustrations shows that many more photographs portraying Israelis were published in the two newspapers than photos portraying Palestinians. As previously mentioned, this gap causes the reader to think only from an Israeli point of view and attaches the most importance to a consideration that affects Israelis, Israeli security.

When looking at whether the newspapers have been trying to underscore or downplay the drama of the barrier's construction or the Israeli security situation, the result is more ambiguous. Only one examined picture underscored the drama of the Israeli security situation and no picture served to downplay the severity of it. In regards to the barrier's construction, there was a considerable amount of pictures that underscored the drama and downplayed its severity. It can therefore be concluded that neither newspaper downplay or underscore the drama of the barrier's construction via published images.

## 7.4 Quotations and sources

In the theory section of this paper, there is an explanation of how different quotations in articles about the same issue containing the same facts about the issue could cause the reader to attach varying importance to different considerations. Even if all the facts presented in the article were identical, quotations from sources that argued for different considerations would cause the readers to think differently about the facts. This points to the importance of analyzing quotations and sources when studying media frames. Media can act as political actors by promoting certain policies in a subtle way, partly through the selection of quotes and sources. The interview of someone and the inclusion of a quotation in an article are either

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<sup>132</sup> Ha'aretz, 2002-05-31, page B2

conscious or unconscious decisions made by journalists, which are influenced by the values held by the journalists. Therefore, it is important that media actors are aware of the impacts of their decisions, and make objective and conscious choices.

First, this section will focus on whether only Israeli sources are used or if they are also supplemented by Palestinian sources in articles about the barrier. If only Israelis are used as sources, it is less likely that the articles will express both Israeli and Palestinian points of view. Therefore, if the Israeli reader never gets to hear the voice of a Palestinian about how the barrier has affected Palestinian lives, he is more likely to consider only the security aspects or other implications of the barrier for the Israelis. Second, this section will examine what kind of Israeli sources are used and quoted. The greater the range of views held by the sources, the greater likelihood that the articles will give a nuanced and objective frame of the issue.

Political actors serve as primary sources in articles. The most problematic kind of political actors in this context are government officials or other political officials. Political actors, such as government officials, are always trying to promote specific frames about issues for political purposes by getting their frame on the media agenda. Because official sources often serve as primary sources for political news, this constitutes a problem. Therefore, an unconscious way in which the media might express frames created by powerful individuals in society is by passing on what comes from official news sources. This tends to constrain the range of debate found in the media.

The fact that the media often pass on official propaganda means that they have an important responsibility to communicate alternative information to the public. The media can choose which sources to use and can complement official sources with sources from the opposition. Hence, even if the media are only quoting an official source, they are not objective due to the subjectivity of the official source. It is especially relevant to study the usage of Israeli official sources because most Israeli officials support the barrier. Therefore, the media will always have to search for alternative sources and quote specialists with differing views to maintain an objective view of political issues.

Table 7.4.1 reveals an examination of sources used between April 14<sup>th</sup> and August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002. The figures to the left in each box show the number of times a type of source was used. Each source was counted only once in the same article. The figures in brackets represent the total number of sources used. Finally, the figures on the right show the percentage of the number of times a type of source was used in relation to the total number of sources used.

**Table 7.4.1. Sources used in articles about the barrier for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| Type of source                           | Ha'aretz frequency and percentage | Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage | Total frequency and percentage |
|--|-----------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| <b>Israeli official</b>                  | 72 (111), 64,9%                   | 71 (109), 65,1%                         | 143 (220), <b>65,0%</b>        |
| <b>Palestinian official</b>              | 2 (111), 1,8%                     | 4 (109), 3,7%                           | 6 (220), <b>2,7%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli expert</b>                    | 7 (111), 6,3%                     | 10 (109), 9,2%                          | 17 (220), <b>7,7%</b>          |
| <b>Palestinian expert</b>                | 0 (111), 0,0%                     | 0 (109), 0,0%                           | 0 (220), <b>0,0%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli civilian</b>                  | 7 (111), 6,3%                     | 2 (109), 1,8%                           | 9 (220), <b>4,1%</b>           |
| <b>Palestinian civilian</b>              | 4 (111), 3,6%                     | 3 (109), 2,8%                           | 7 (220), <b>3,2%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli organization/movement</b>     | 9 (111), 8,1%                     | 8 (109), 7,3%                           | 17 (220), <b>7,7%</b>          |
| <b>Palestinian organization/movement</b> | 0 (111), 0,0%                     | 1 (109), 0,9%                           | 1 (220), <b>0,5%</b>           |
| <b>Palestinian terrorist leader</b>      | 0 (111), 0,0%                     | 2 (109), 1,8%                           | 2 (220), <b>0,9%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli soldier</b>                   | 5 (111), 4,5%                     | 2 (109), 1,8%                           | 7 (220), <b>3,2%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli newspaper/journalist</b>      | 1 (111), 0,9%                     | 1 (109), 0,9%                           | 2 (220), <b>0,9%</b>           |
| <b>Palestinian newspaper/journalist</b>  | 1 (111), 0,9%                     | 0 (109), 0,0%                           | 1 (220), <b>0,5%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli Arab</b>                      | 0 (111), 0,0%                     | 4 (109), 3,7%                           | 4 (220), <b>1,8%</b>           |
| <b>Foreign source</b>                    | 0 (111), 0,0%                     | 0 (109), 0,0%                           | 0 (220), <b>0,0%</b>           |
| <b>Other</b>                             | 3 (111), 2,7%                     | 1 (109), 0,9%                           | 4 (220), <b>1,8%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli sources in total</b>          | 101 (111), <b>91,0%</b>           | 98 (109), <b>89,9%</b>                  | 199 (220), <b>90,5%</b>        |
| <b>Palestinian sources in total</b>      | 7 (111), <b>6,3%</b>              | 10 (109), <b>9,2%</b>                   | 17 (220), <b>7,7%</b>          |

The figures at the bottom of the table reveal that 90.5% of the sources that are referred to in the examined articles are Israeli, while only 7.7% of the sources are Palestinian. In each subcategory, Israelis are more frequently used as sources. For example, 65.0% of the sources are Israeli officials and only 2.7% are Palestinian officials. In addition, all experts that are used as sources are Israeli and none are Palestinian. The difference is less evident when looking at civilian sources. Israeli civilians constitute 56% and Palestinian civilians comprise 44% of all civilians used as sources. The difference between how frequently Israeli and Palestinian sources are used could be an explanation of why the security considerations are more highlighted in the articles than other relevant considerations. Because the newspapers often pass on what politicians, professors, security experts, and similar sources have expressed concerning the barrier's construction, it may often be the case that the newspapers articles highlight the same considerations as their sources.

A typical news article in both the newspapers during this period contains only one source, often an Israeli official. The most typical source would be the Defense Minister at the time, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, the previous Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Amos Yaron, or other "government officials" and "military sources." Two examples from the Jerusalem Post illustrate the use and consequences of these sources:

*“He [Director General of the Ministry of Defense Amos Yaron] stressed that the fence and obstacles to be erected are aimed at protecting residents along the Green Line and are not to be seen as a border.”<sup>133</sup>*

This article has the General Director of the Ministry of Defense as its only source throughout the entire article and only highlights protection and security as the results of the barrier’s construction. No other effects of the barrier are mentioned, most probably because the article only uses Yaron as source. *“He [Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer] also said that a 60 to 90 km security fence along the Green Line from Jenin to Kalkilya being planned must be extended in the future to create full security separation.”<sup>134</sup>* The Defense Minister is the only source in this article, in which only security considerations are emphasized when discussing when and where the barrier is to be constructed. In general, articles that only use Israeli sources also only highlight security considerations.

When the articles use several sources, most are usually Israeli officials. Sometimes the sources can have different opinions about whether or not the barrier should be built, but their opinions are based solely on security considerations. An article from the Jerusalem Post in June serves as an example. This article describes how the work on the barrier’s construction is progressing, and only highlights the security consideration:

*“While cautioning that the plan is not a ‘full-proof or magic solution’, Olmert and Police officials said it could help reduce the entry of terrorists into the city from Ramallah in the North and Bethlehem in the South. [...] Internal Security Minister Uzi Landau said this week that a fence would be useless without an uncompromising war on the terror emanating from the Palestinian Authority.”<sup>135</sup>* Even though the sources are not convinced that the barrier will solve all security problems, they are still only considering the security aspect of the barrier in expressing their opinions about the issue. Therefore, in using primarily Israeli officials as sources, the newspapers fail to communicate to the reader that other kinds of considerations exist.

To primarily interview and use Israeli sources are choices made by journalists that greatly affect the outcome of articles. When articles only refer to powerful sources in Israeli society, the media are transmitting the security frame held by these sources. Even if all of the facts in the articles are true, the use of only these sources will provide a biased account of the barrier because only the security considerations are highlighted. This then causes the reader to attach more importance to the security considerations. Ultimately, Israeli media need to take measures against this overwhelming imbalance and try to integrate more Palestinian sources and sources of neutral character into articles.

Table 7.4.2 outlines analysis of the quotations made in the articles published about the barrier between April 14<sup>th</sup> and August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002. The numbers to the left in each box show the number of times the different types of quotations appeared in the articles. A new quotation is counted every time new citation marks appear. The numbers in brackets show the total number of quotations used in all the articles. Finally, the numbers to the right demonstrate the percentage of times that the different types of quotations appeared in relation to the total number of quotations.

**Table 7.4.2. Distribution of quotations in articles about the barrier for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

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<sup>133</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-05-15, page 2

<sup>134</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-04-30, page 3

<sup>135</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-06-21, page A3

| Quoted source                            | Ha'aretz frequency and percentage | Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage | Total frequency and percentage |
|--|-----------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| <b>Israeli official</b>                  | 72 (161), 44,7%                   | 74 (190), 38,9%                         | 146 (351), <b>41,6%</b>        |
| <b>Palestinian official</b>              | 5 (161), 3,1%                     | 8 (190), 4,2%                           | 13 (351), <b>3,7%</b>          |
| <b>Israeli expert</b>                    | 14 (161), 8,7%                    | 21 (190), 11,1%                         | 35 (351), <b>10,0%</b>         |
| <b>Palestinian expert</b>                | 0 (161), 0,0%                     | 0 (190), 0,0%                           | 0 (351), <b>0,0%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli civilian</b>                  | 14 (161), 8,7%                    | 19 (190), 10,0%                         | 33 (351), <b>9,4%</b>          |
| <b>Palestinian civilian</b>              | 15 (161), 9,3%                    | 10 (190), 5,3%                          | 25 (351), <b>7,1%</b>          |
| <b>Israeli soldier</b>                   | 5 (161), 3,1%                     | 2 (190), 1,1%                           | 7 (351), <b>2,0%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli organization/movement</b>     | 13 (161), 8,1%                    | 24 (190), 12,6%                         | 37 (351), <b>10,5%</b>         |
| <b>Palestinian organization/movement</b> | 0 (161), 0,0%                     | 4 (190), 2,1%                           | 4 (351), <b>1,1%</b>           |
| <b>Palestinian newspaper/journalist</b>  | 2 (161), 1,2%                     | 0 (190), 0,0%                           | 2 (351), <b>0,6%</b>           |
| <b>Palestinian terrorist leader</b>      | 0 (161), 0,0%                     | 3 (190), 1,6%                           | 3 (351), <b>0,9%</b>           |
| <b>Israeli Arab</b>                      | 0 (161), 0,0%                     | 7 (190), 3,7%                           | 7 (351), <b>2,0%</b>           |
| <b>Foreigner</b>                         | 7 (161), 4,3%                     | 1 (190), 0,5%                           | 8 (351), <b>2,3%</b>           |
| <b>Other</b>                             | 14 (161), 8,7%                    | 17 (190), 8,9%                          | 31 (351), <b>8,8%</b>          |
| <b>Israelis in total</b>                 | 118 (161), <b>73,3%</b>           | 147 (190), <b>77,4%</b>                 | 265 (351), <b>75,5%</b>        |
| <b>Palestinians in total</b>             | 22 (161), <b>13,7%</b>            | 25 (190), <b>13,2%</b>                  | 47 (351), <b>13,4%</b>         |

75.5% of all the quotations that appear in the articles come from Israeli sources, while only 13.4% come from a Palestinian source. Similar trends exist within each subcategory. For example, 41.6% of the quotations come from Israeli officials and only 3.7% come from Palestinian officials. In addition, in the examined articles, all quoted experts are Israeli, and none are Palestinian. Exact quotations can often be dramatic, emotional, and contain strong expressions about the situation. This is reflected by several examples below:

*“As long as there is no fence along the Green Line, getting from Nablus to Netanya is a piece of cake.”<sup>136</sup>*

The statement above is made by a ‘senior security source’ with reference to a terrorist attack that took place in Netanya the previous day. Below is another example of MK Amnon Rubinstein expressing his opinion about the barrier:

*“Every day that goes by without a fence brings us a sea of tears.”<sup>137</sup>*

The Israeli quotations most often highlight security considerations. 75.5% of the quotations in the examined articles are made by Israelis. Using one-sided quotations, newspapers provided a partial account of the barrier issue.

The Palestinian share of quotations is larger than the frequency of Palestinian sources in general. However, the general trend is similar. Israeli quotations constitute a great majority of all the quotations in the newspapers and Palestinians are quoted to a much lesser extent. The fact that the Palestinian share is bigger when looking at quotations is likely a result of the fact that many articles that have been quoting Palestinians are of a different nature. Israelis are quoted in smaller news articles to large cover stories or reportages. However, often when Palestinians are quoted, the articles are bigger reportages that contain many quotations from the same individuals. Therefore, one single article with Palestinian quotations can increase the share of Palestinian quotations considerably. An example of this is an article in Ha'aretz on

<sup>136</sup> Ha'aretz, 2002-05-20, page 2

<sup>137</sup> Ha'aretz, 2002-06-11, page 2

June 11<sup>th</sup>, 2002. The article is a reportage that covers more than half a page in Ha'aretz that day and focuses specifically on the Palestinians' view of the plans for building the barrier. Among others Hanna Siniora, editor of the Jerusalem Times is quoted:

*“They are all Israeli programs that punish the Palestinians and limit their movement and therefore such separation will intensify the distress of Palestinians in the territories and will not provide Israel with security and certainly will not provide it with peace”, says Siniora.*”<sup>138</sup>

In addition to Hanna Siniora, two civilian Palestinians are quoted. Because this article is lengthy, the three Palestinians are quoted several times. An interesting, but not unexpected, note is that this kind of reportage (one that quotes and uses Palestinians as sources) also highlights other considerations than security. The article above highlights restricted freedom of movement for the Palestinians, division of family and friends, and the Palestinian economy. This clearly shows a connection between source choices and highlighted considerations in an article. The reportage above illustrates that Palestinian civilians are quoted, while usually Israeli officials are quoted. This discrepancy gives more weight and credibility to the Israeli sources because selected Palestinian civilians are not spokespersons for any recognized parties and are not seen as possessing expert knowledge. Due to the deep distrust for the Arab collective in the examined period (as demonstrated in chapter 6) Israeli newspaper consumers were probably even less affected by the stories told by Palestinian civilians.

The Palestinians are not quoted in many articles. However, they are frequently quoted several times in the same article. Therefore, articles that contain the Palestinian perspective are still rare, although there are some examples of in depth-articles using Palestinian sources and quotations.

Since the newspapers are Israeli and not Palestinian, it might not seem surprising or unusual that mainly Israeli sources are used and quoted. Nevertheless, the construction of the barrier is an event that has greatly affected the lives of another people has been taking place on another people's territory. Consequently, the barrier's construction cannot be perceived as a domestic event. It is extremely important to seek out alternative sources from the other side and outside neutral sources. Neutral sources are parties uninvolved (directly) with the conflict, such as the different departments of the UN that are working in the area and possess reliable and updated information. However, this kind of source was never used in Ha'aretz or the Jerusalem Post during the examined period. Even in times of armed conflict, the media should not act as a party to the conflict. In these times, more than ever, Israel needs the media to be an objective force to monitor the actions of the state. One way for the media to accomplish this is by seeking alternative sources of information, such as outside sources or sources from the other side of the conflict.

Tables 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 also provide an outline of the kinds of Israeli sources that were used and what statements were quoted during the examined period. The Israeli officials category has the highest figure in both of the tables. Israeli officials constitute 65.0% of the sources used during the examined period, and 41.6% of the quotations come from Israeli officials. As already noted and revealed in the above examples from official sources strongly promoted a security frame of the barrier during Spring and Summer 2002. This is further shown in the quotation below of Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, published in Ha'aretz on June 17<sup>th</sup> 2002.

*“It is a security fence”, Ben-Eliezer said. ‘It is not diplomatic. It is not political. This fence has one single goal – to defend the lives of Israeli citizens. Every day that passes*

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<sup>138</sup> Ha'aretz, 2002-06-11, page 4

*without the fence being erected as quickly as possible is likely to cost us more lives', he added.*"<sup>139</sup>

Also on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002, a similar statement is quoted in the Jerusalem Post:

*"Every day that passes in which this fence is not being built at maximum speed is likely to cost us more victims', Ben-Eliezer said. [...] This is the worst and most inhuman side of all terrorism. It obliges us to establish a barrier wall which is the only thing that can minimize the infiltration of these male and female suicide bombers', said Ben-Eliezer."*<sup>140</sup>

In these quotations, building the barrier is described as an inevitable, urgent matter due to security concerns. These statements can be considered to be securitization speech-acts, when a powerful actor in society describes something as a security question by talking about existential threats and an urgent need for extraordinary measures to address the threat. When the media are publishing these statements, they help the securitization actors securitize the question. In addition, the media failed to supplement these quotations with arguments from alternative sources about other possible actions to reduce terrorism. For example, terror experts often recommend addressing the root causes of terrorism.

Another example conveys how newspapers have transmitted the understatement of their sources about important considerations from the Palestinian perspective:

*"Yaron [Defense Ministry director general Amos Yaron] said the Defense Ministry will use land expropriation orders to take the land needed for the fence, but landowners will be invited to discuss compensation for the land. But he added nobody should think about getting rich from land – and the ministry won't waste time on unnecessary disputes with the owners."*<sup>141</sup>

This article does not further discuss the expropriation of land, and thus fails to communicate who the landowners are and how the barrier will impact them.

The fact that mainly Israeli officials are quoted and used as sources means that their frames are transferred and that the considerations they hold as most important are highlighted. Officials are most frequently used as sources most likely because they possess the most information and news about the plans for the barrier's construction. Because government officials are political actors that promote frames for political purposes, it is critical that the media supplement these sources.

The category of Israeli officials largely dominates. None of the other categories of sources show nearly as high figures in the two tables. The two types of sources that are used most often and most frequently quoted after Israeli officials are Israeli organizations and Israeli experts. All kinds of organizations, movements, and associations are included in the Israeli organizations category. The kinds of considerations that are highlighted by these sources mainly depends on the kind of organization or movement. During the examined period, the groups that were used as sources were different kind of interest groups or lobby groups. Danny Atar, head of the Gilboa Regional Council and Chairman of the Forum of Heads of Green Line Communities, was most frequently quoted in the Israeli organizations category. This is an organization that was raising money and lobbying for the construction of the barrier for security reasons during the examined period. Atar's quotations about the barrier are positive and often contain security arguments that help to highlight the security consideration as is demonstrated by the example below:

*"This government simply holds no accountability for human life, and they act as if they have all the time in the world', said Atar. He believes that every day that there is no*

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<sup>139</sup> Ha'aretz, 2002-06-17, page 1

<sup>140</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-06-17, page 1

<sup>141</sup> Ha'aretz, 2002-06-11, page 2

*barrier between Israeli cities and Palestinian towns the lives of tens of innocent Israelis are at risk.*<sup>142</sup>

It is noteworthy that so few Palestinian and international organizations were used as sources or asked to make statements about the barrier, because a wide variety of such organizations actively monitor the barrier's construction. Therefore, an abundance of alternative sources were available to the newspapers. It is especially problematic that the newspapers chose to devote so much space in articles to lobby groups in favour of the barrier. The newspapers should have instead made an effort to use more neutral sources to make claims about the barrier.

In contrast, the Israeli experts that are used as sources do not always highlight a specific frame. For example, different experts on security fences were quoted on how effective these kinds of measures are in preventing terrorism. The sources are not highlighting the security consideration, but the fact that the newspapers have chosen to perform these kinds of interviews and publish them in an article about the barrier is inherently a way of highlighting the security considerations.

Ultimately, the usage of sources and quotations points to the presence of a security frame in the media. Mainly Israelis are quoted and especially Israeli officials. These officials strongly promote a security frame when discussing the barrier. Consequently, the security frame is transferred to the newspapers and then on to readers. On the rare occasion that Palestinians are quoted, considerations such as freedom of movement and land confiscation are mentioned. However, Israeli official sources strongly dominate so it is likely that readers only attach importance to the security consideration. This variable of analysis reveals a dominating security frame in Israeli newspapers, a trend revealed by other variables in the research.

Finally, the two tables show no dramatic differences between the newspapers. The figures for all the different categories of sources are similar for both newspapers. Ha'aretz's share of quoted Israelis is a bit smaller and the share of quoted Palestinians quoted is a bit larger than in the Jerusalem Post. However, there is not a significant difference in each newspaper's reliance on official sources. Thus, because these two newspapers with differing political views use similar sources, it can be assumed that these are the types of sources used by other Israeli newspapers.

## **7.5 Issues linked to the barrier**

In order to get a comprehensive account of how Israeli newspapers framed the issue of the barrier in the period surrounding the decision to erect it, April 14<sup>th</sup> to August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, it is not sufficient to examine how the barrier itself was described. The newspaper consumers are equally influenced by other issues linked to the barrier issue. Depending on what related issues the newspaper consumers are considering when reading about the barrier, it is perceived in a more positive or negative way. Therefore, the media has a responsibility not only to describe the barrier in a nuanced way, but also to link the barrier controversy to a wide variety of other issues and not only to Israeli national security.

First, the other themes linked to the barrier issue in other articles on the same page must be examined. For example, if articles about the barrier are placed just after articles about security problems (i.e. a suicide bombing), the readers are more likely to interpret the controversy solely as a security issue. The readers would likely think about terrorism when reading about the barrier, which in turn, would make them see the barrier as an indispensable security measure to prevent terrorist attacks. For example, a barrier article's placement after a

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<sup>142</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2002-06-25, page 3

peace process article could have an opposite effect on the reader. The reader may perceive the Palestinians more humanely and as possible peace partners.

In addition, other issues linked to the barrier in the same article must be examined. Even if two articles contain the exact same information about the barrier, readers may be influenced by other issues linked to the barrier in the same article. For example, if an article discussing the barrier also discusses terrorism or the weak Palestinian Authority, readers may ultimately perceive the barrier as a security issue. But, if an article about the barrier also addresses Palestinians lives, such as the new rules and procedures for checkpoint crossings, it is more likely that the reader consider humanitarian aspects of the barrier issue.

Terrorism is most frequently the subject of articles placed before articles about the barrier. This is demonstrated in table 7.5.1, which presents the subjects of articles placed before articles about the barrier. The numbers to the left in each box are the absolute number of times that the different subjects appear in the articles placed before the barrier articles. The numbers in brackets are the total number of related themes that appear before the barrier articles. Finally, the numbers to the right represent the percentage of each related subject that appears before the barrier articles out of all the related subjects that appear before the barrier articles. Articles that are placed before articles about the barrier but that are not related to the issue are not included in the calculations.

**Table 7.5.1 Themes of articles that appear before articles about the barrier for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| <b>Subject of articles</b> | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage*</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|----------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Terrorism</b>           | 17 (29), 58,6%                            | 39 (42), 92,9%                                 | 56 (71), <b>78,9%</b>                 |
| <b>Peace process</b>       | 2 (29), 6,9%                              | 2 (42), 4,8%                                   | 4 (71), <b>5,6%</b>                   |
| <b>Weak PA</b>             | 4 (29), 13,8%                             | 0 (42), 0,0%                                   | 4 (71), <b>5,6%</b>                   |
| <b>Other</b>               | 6 (29), 20,7%                             | 1 (42), 2,4%                                   | 7 (71), <b>9,9%</b>                   |

\* Percentage points are based upon the total amount of articles that appeared before articles about the barrier and that were related to the issue. Articles that appeared before articles about the barrier but that was not related to the issue are not included in the calculations. In addition to this, out of the total 157 articles about the barrier, many were on top of page on the left side and did thus not have any preceding articles that could be included in this analysis.

Terrorism is the subject of 78.9% of the related articles placed before the barrier articles during the examined period. This is a very high percentage, considering that none of the other themes identified in this research appeared in more than 10% of the articles placed before the articles about the barrier. A typical example is found in July publication of the Jerusalem Post. The article about the barrier, which examines how Israel should combat terrorism and includes an argument in favor of the barrier's construction, is placed beneath two articles about the victims of a terrorist attack in Emmanuel.<sup>143</sup> The decision of the newspaper to place the articles in this order affects the readers' view of the barrier as primarily a security issue. The article in itself frames the barrier as a security issue, and thus creates a frame-in-thought which is favorable towards the barrier's construction. By placing such an article beneath articles about terrorism, the reader is likely to already be thinking about terrorism when reading about the barrier. This article placement generates an even more favorable opinion towards construction that might hinder terrorist attacks inside Israel.

<sup>143</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2007-07-19, p. A4.

Any possible criticism about the barrier from a humanitarian point of view is much less likely, because the reader does not have these considerations in his or her mind when reading about the barrier.

The most common subject that is linked to the barrier in the same article is also terrorism. News about terrorist attacks is mentioned in 37.3% of the articles that also mention the barrier. Table 7.5.2 outlines the other subjects mentioned in the same articles that mention the barrier. The numbers to the left in each box are the absolute number of times other subjects are mentioned in the same articles that discuss the barrier. The numbers in brackets are the total number of other subjects that are mentioned in the same articles that discuss the barrier. Finally, the numbers to the right represent the percentage of the other subjects that appear in the same articles that mention the barrier out of the total number of other subjects mentioned in the same articles that mention the barrier.

**Table 7.5.2. Other themes mentioned in the same article as articles about the barrier for the entire period 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| <b>Subjects</b>              | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Terrorism</b>             | 15 (47), 31,9%                           | 13 (28), 46,4%                                 | 28 (75), <b>37,3%</b>                 |
| <b>Military operations</b>   | 6 (47), 12,8%                            | 0 (28), 0,0%                                   | 6 (75), <b>8,0%</b>                   |
| <b>Peace process</b>         | 4 (47), 8,5%                             | 7 (28), 25,0%                                  | 11 (75), <b>14,7%</b>                 |
| <b>Weak PA</b>               | 1 (47), 2,1%                             | 2 (28), 7,1%                                   | 3 (75), <b>4,0%</b>                   |
| <b>Unilateral separation</b> | 5 (47), 10,6%                            | 2 (28), 7,1%                                   | 7 (75), <b>9,3%</b>                   |
| <b>Domestic politics</b>     | 7 (47), 14,9%                            | 1 (28), 3,6%                                   | 8 (75), <b>10,7%</b>                  |
| <b>Other</b>                 | 9 (47), 19,1%                            | 3 (28), 10,7%                                  | 12 (75), <b>16,0%</b>                 |

The fact that terrorism appears more frequently than any other subject in the same articles that discuss the barrier likely cause readers to perceive the barrier as a security issue and as a necessary terrorist prevention measure. A typical example is an article in a May publication of Ha'aretz that discusses a suicide bombing in Megiddo junction the previous day. An Israeli police officer is used as a source, and he discusses the importance of placing a separation fence along the seam line.<sup>144</sup> In this case, it is obvious that the reader will strongly connect the issue of the barrier to Israeli security because the barrier's linkage to the terrorist attack. As explained in chapter 6, the vast majority of Israelis in this period were afraid of falling victim to a terrorist attack, which makes it more likely that they would support any measure that might increase national security.

The Jerusalem Post linked many more articles about terrorism to the issue of the barrier than Ha'aretz, 92.9% compared to 58.6%. Ha'aretz linked the issue of the barrier to a wider variety of issues, even though most of them also underlined, while more subtly, the security aspect of the barrier. The fact that a right-wing newspaper such as the Jerusalem Post

<sup>144</sup> Jerusalem Post, 2007-05-09, p. 3.

stresses the Israeli security more than a left-wing newspaper such as Ha'aretz is expected, and furthermore follows the general trend of the results found in this research.

A closely related issue that is mentioned in 8.0% of the articles about the barrier is Israeli military operations in the West Bank. This category also underlines the security aspects of the barrier by causing readers to think of the Palestinian threat in general when reading about the barrier. It could also cause the readers to perceive the barrier more as a security question than as a political question.

The second most common category is "other", in articles that are placed before barrier articles (9.9%) and in barrier articles that also mention other subjects (16.0%). The category contains a wide variety of themes that in some way relate to the barrier, but either do not specifically contribute to highlighting the security or the humanitarian aspects of the barrier, or are mentioned so rarely that they are not likely to have influenced the frames-in-thought about the barrier among the Israeli public. The fact that that terrorism is the only subject that is more common in both cases than the "other" category indicates that the security frame is the only present frame in Israeli newspapers when examining how the barrier is linked to other related issues.

5.6% of the articles that appear before the articles about the barrier discuss the problems regarding the Palestinian Authority. Problems in the P.A. are discussed in the same article as the barrier in 4.0% of the cases. The fact that the PA is described as being weak, could cause readers to think that there is no partner with whom to negotiate, thus increasing support for a unilateralist measure such as the barrier's construction. It could also make the readers think that the P.A. itself is not capable of preventing terrorism, thus making the barrier seem necessary to hindering suicide attacks inside of Israel. Therefore, even if the articles describe the barrier in neutral terms, the readers would still be more likely to only see the security-aspects of the barrier.

The peace process is the subject of 5.6% of the articles that appear before the articles discussing the barrier. In 14.7% of the cases, the peace process is mentioned in articles also discussing the barrier. The fact that the barrier is linked to the peace process could be seen as counterbalancing the security frame of the barrier because it stresses the importance of communication and peace talks with a Palestinian partner. Linking the peace process to articles about the barrier reminds the readers of alternative or complementary measures to the the barrier's construction. However, this percentage is not high enough to have any real impact on the frames-in-thought of the newspapers' readers because of how much the barrier is linked to security issues or a weak P.A. that is not a possible negotiating partner. Themes linked to security issues and the theme of a weak P.A. constitute 49.3% of the themes mentioned in the same articles as the barrier and comprise 84.5% of the themes mentioned in the articles before the barrier articles. In contrast, themes about the Palestinians' standard of living or economy are never linked to articles about the barrier.

The issue of unilateral separation is mentioned in 9.3% of the articles that discuss the barrier. The debate in this period was a result of the internal elections in the Labour party and alternative peace plans. It was not determined whether or not the barrier should form part of a unilateral withdrawal strategy, and different politicians attempted to attract support for their alternative strategies. Some supported the barrier only as a security question and not as a political question of unilateral withdrawal. Others thought of the issue as part of a peace plan of unilateral withdrawal. However, no political voices that were against the construction of the barrier were participating in the debate. Therefore, the general frame-in-thought about the barrier is likely to have been influenced in a positive way by the linking of these articles to the issue of the barrier. Even the readers on the left of the political spectrum, who supported withdrawal from the West Bank in order to create a political border between Israelis and the Palestinians, would receive a positive image of the barrier. However, this was a deceiving

account because the government did not support unilateral withdrawal, and it was not the outcome of the barrier's construction. However, this percentage is also too low to have any impact on Israeli public opinion in and of itself.

Domestic politics are mentioned in 10.7% of the articles about the barrier. By linking the barrier issue to domestic politics, the barrier could be perceived by readers as being only an "Israeli problem." Thus, the readers could be influenced to consider only the consequences and benefits of the barrier for Israel. Readers would be less likely to factor in reactions from the international community and the consequences of the barrier for the Palestinians.

In sum, the results of the analysis of the issues linked to the barrier serve to reinforce the general security frame about the barrier found in this research. When the readers read articles about the barrier in the newspaper, they have often just read about issues that underline the necessity of a barrier to increase Israeli security. Because the themes linked to the issue of the barrier do not shed light on the Palestinians' situation but instead focus on Israeli security, the readers are already inclined to think of the barrier in security terms before reaching the actual articles discussing the barrier. In the articles about the barrier, the readers are likely to find information about other news and issues that further underline the security aspect of the barrier. This makes it less probable that they would question the barrier's construction from a humanitarian point of view because, as explained in the theory chapter, the readers tend to focus only on the mentioned considerations that they have stored in their short term memory. The fact that the barrier is being linked by the newspapers to security issues makes it probable that the readers would perceive the barrier primarily as a security issue. Thus, this variable of analysis also demonstrates that a security frame dominated Israeli newspapers during the examined period.

## **8. Conclusions**

During the Spring and Summer of 2002, a number of decisions were made by the Israeli government that led to the construction of the barrier in June that same year. During this period, the question of building a barrier between the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Israelis started to receive more attention in Israeli society and in Israeli media. This research has therefore examined how the media framed the issue of the barrier's construction in this initial period. From April 14<sup>th</sup> to August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, 157 articles were published about the barrier, which have been the objects of analysis in this research.

The results of the analysis are very clear, and the same trends have been apparent in all the analyzed components of this research. Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post have both communicated a security frame to their readers through all the different examined variables. Even if humanitarian considerations appeared in the articles, the security frame clearly dominated.

The main variable in this research is the question of which considerations newspapers highlighted in discussing the barrier. 73.9% of the articles highlighted Israeli security considerations, and more specifically, the majority highlighted that the barrier would prevent terrorists from entering into Israel. Many of these articles did not mention any implication of the barrier for the Palestinians. In total, the different humanitarian considerations were highlighted in only 20.9% of the articles. However, the humanitarian considerations were not usually the primary consideration in the articles, but were often secondary to the security consideration. The humanitarian consideration that received the most attention was Palestinian land confiscation and house demolitions, which was highlighted in 7% of the cases. When comparing finding, to the fact that the Israeli security was highlighted in 73.9% of the articles, it becomes clear that Israeli security overwhelmingly dominated newspaper

articles about the barrier. The study of headlines also shows that the Israeli security consideration was the most frequently highlighted consideration.

The newspapers' accentuation of the Israeli security consideration could have had impacted the reader in two different ways. First, it could have affected the readers' belief content. The articles mainly portrayed Palestinians as terrorists and seldom discussed the barrier's negative impacts on innocent civilian Palestinians. This might have encouraged the reader to believe that Palestinians were mostly terrorists and that the barrier would not have many severe negative consequences for civilian Palestinians. If readers do not get any information about negative consequences of the barrier, it is not surprising that they do not believe that such consequences exist. Second, the highlighting of Israeli security considerations can cause readers to attach more importance to the Israeli security considerations than to any other consideration. The fact that the newspapers evidently prioritized one consideration over the others might have led readers to think that the security consideration was the most important to bear in mind when forming an opinion about the barrier. The results of the first period ultimately reveal that during the examined period, the media chose to communicate the barrier as solely a security question to readers.

The second variable that was examined was the words the media chose to use to denote the barrier. The most common word for the barrier was "fence" in both of the newspapers (67.1% of the cases where the barrier was mentioned with any word). This expression could have affected Israelis' ideas about the physical presence of the barrier. "Fence" might have made readers think that the barrier was only going to consist of a fence, when it is also partly a concrete wall and partly a fence with a wider security area, averaging 60 meters wide. In the initial state of the barrier's construction, few Israelis knew how the barrier would be constructed. Therefore, the choice of words used to denote the barrier in newspapers might have had an effect on Israelis' belief contents. When the word fence was repeated, it is likely to have made Israelis think of the barrier as only a fence. In portraying the barrier as only a fence, newspapers undermined the severity of the negative repercussions on Palestinian lives.

The second most common expression for the barrier was "security fence." This expression also changes Israelis' belief content by calling the barrier a fence. In addition, the expression also leads the readers' minds to security considerations. By including the word security in the very name for the barrier, one can give an impression that the barrier is inevitably related to security and that this is the most important consideration to bear in mind when taking a stand about the issue.

More neutral expressions and words for the barrier with negative connotations were seldom used. Therefore, it can be concluded that the words chosen by the media to denote the barrier could have increased support for the barrier's construction. The words the media chose to use are the same words used by the political actors that were promoting the barrier during this time. By using the same non-objective words as the politicians, the media helped politicians frame the barrier as a security question neglecting the discussion of severe repercussions on Palestinian lives.

The third variable of the analysis is the examination of photographs and illustrations that were published with the articles. 50.0% of the images depicted Israelis, while only 8.1% depicted Palestinians. This discrepancy shows that the newspapers gave priority to images that portray Israelis. Neither the pictures of Israelis, nor the pictures of Palestinians, portrayed the individuals in the pictures in a negative way. Thus, the pictures of Israelis drew the readers' minds to barrier's impacts on Israelis, and the images of Palestinians drew the readers' minds to the barrier's impacts on Palestinians. Therefore, a majority of the visuals that depicted individuals reinforced the text of the articles by portraying Israelis. The pictures of Israelis made it more likely that the reader would attach more importance to considerations

affecting Israelis. Because the text of the articles mostly highlighted the security benefits for Israelis, it is likely that the pictures helped further accentuate this consideration.

The fourth variable that was examined is the sources the newspaper used and the kind of quotations that were included in the articles. 90.5% of the sources that are referred to in the articles are Israeli, while only 7.7% are Palestinian. A clear majority of the quotations also came from Israelis, even if the numbers were not as extreme as for the sources in general. 75.5% of the quotations were from Israelis, while only 13.4% were from Palestinians. The analysis also showed that the newspapers often choose to quote statements that were dramatic and emotional when discussing Israeli security. The result is problematic because the media often transmit the frames held by their sources to the articles. If one type of source is primarily used, only the frame held by that source will be communicated by the newspapers to their readers. Because Israeli readers rarely heard the voice of a Palestinian about how the barrier affected Palestinian lives, but were flooded with arguments about Israeli security from Israeli sources, readers received an extremely biased view of the barrier. The overwhelming majority of Israeli sources could be explained by the result in the analysis of the first variable, the focus on security considerations in articles above any other consideration.

A second result of the fourth variable is that the single group of sources used most frequently was Israeli officials. Israeli officials constitute 65.0% of the sources and 41.6% of the quotations used. No other category of sources had nearly as high of figures. The use of state officials as sources is problematic because they promote a frame for political purposes. During the examined period, it has been shown that Israeli state officials were strongly promoting a security frame of the barrier. The officials described the construction of the barrier as an urgent security matter with no other possible alternatives. If the barrier was not constructed as soon as possible, many more Israelis would fall victims to terrorism every day. By publishing these statements made by Israeli official sources, and by rarely balancing them with statements from other sources, the media helped Israeli officials transmit their frame to the public. The media's role is to monitor the actions of the state and to give an objective view of political issues. This is impossible if the articles are entirely based on statements made by state officials.

The primary use of Israelis, and especially Israeli officials, as sources are choices made by journalists that greatly affect the outcomes of articles. Media has mainly used powerful actors in Israeli society as sources and has therefore transferred the security frame held by these actors. Because few other sources have been used, articles have conveyed a biased account of the barrier that only highlighted security considerations even though many other relevant considerations exist. Consequently, readers almost always attach more importance to security considerations than to other considerations. The Israeli media must use alternative sources of information in order to provide a comprehensive and impartial account of the barrier controversy. First, newspapers must use more varied Israeli sources so that official sources are supplemented by other type of sources, such as civil organizations or civil experts. Second, the Palestinian and international barrier sources must be used more frequently in articles, particularly in articles discussing the barrier.

The fifth variable was examination of other issues or themes that have been linked to the barrier. Other issues can be linked to the barrier in two different ways in newspapers. First, they can be perceptually linked to the barrier by being placed immediately before articles about the barrier. Second, they can be directly linked to the barrier by being discussed in the same article as the barrier. The most common subject of the articles that were placed before the barrier articles was terrorism. 78.9% of the articles about the barrier followed articles about terrorism. Readers often read articles about the barrier after having read about problems with terrorism. As a result, readers had security considerations in mind already when reading about the barrier. Readers would most likely attach more importance to security

considerations, and less to the humanitarian situation for the Palestinians, after reading about devastating terrorist attacks. Terrorism was also the most frequently linked theme in articles that also discussed the barrier. Terrorism was mentioned in 37.3% of the cases where other themes were mentioned in the same articles that discussed the barrier. Even if this figure is lower, terrorism was still more common than any other subjects in the articles. This enhances the possibility that readers would interpret the barrier issue as solely an issue of terrorism prevention.

In conclusion, during the examined period, Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post primarily communicated the security consideration in articles that discussed the construction of the barrier. Even if other considerations were highlighted, none were used nearly as frequently as the security consideration. The security frame was the only real frame according to the definitions of the word frame used in this research. For example, a frame is described as "*the central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning.*"<sup>145</sup> Even if humanitarian considerations were mentioned, they were mentioned much more rarely, and often as secondary to the security consideration. Thus, the average Israeli newspaper consumer is likely to have perceived the barrier *foremost* as a security issue.

Chapter six in this research describes the Israeli public opinion during the time of the decision to construct the barrier. Public opinion polls reveal that Israeli society was filled with fear and insecurity. 92% of the respondents expressed fear that they or one of their family members would fall victim to a terrorist attack. In this climate, the security frame of the barrier could easily be accepted by Israelis. Thus, it was an easy frame for the media to promote and reinforce. It is impossible to assume that the frame would not have dominated Israeli society without the media's involvement. However, the media have undeniably helped promote a security frame throughout the examined period.

Israeli opinion about separation from the Palestinians was not clear in 2002. 48% of the Israeli population supported some kind of separation from the Palestinians. However, separation does not necessarily mean building a barrier, and building a barrier does not necessarily mean separation. But, the question about separation can give an indication about Israeli opinion regarding how to handle the Palestinians in general. Because the barrier issue first started to be discussed in 2002, there is no information about Israeli opinion about the barrier that year. Furthermore, it is not likely that public opinion about the barrier existed before public debate about the issue started that year. Thus, the ideas about separation reveal that opinions were divided about the need for measures taken towards the Palestinians. The fact that the barrier was a new question, on which Israelis had not yet taken a stand indicates that the media had greater power over shaping public opinion about the barrier than in usual times of conflict. By 2004, the barrier already gained massive support in Israeli society, 80% of Israelis supported its construction. It is not possible to exclude the possibility that media played a part in this by promoting a security frame in a society filled with fear. Following 2004, the opinion polls showed strong support for the barrier.

Because frames in thought are difficult to change in times of conflict, once they are settled in a society, the security frame of the barrier that now dominates Israeli society will most likely persist. Essentially, if the media today attempted to promote a different frame of the barrier, it would not necessarily make any difference. The critical time for the media to develop and promote a frame of the barrier to Israelis was during the Spring and Summer of 2002, when the question was given more weight in Israeli public debate for the first time. The media lost the opportunity to promote an objective and nuanced frame of the barrier, unbiased by Israeli security considerations and inclusive of humanitarian consequences for the

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<sup>145</sup> W. A. Gamson & A. Modigliani, 'Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach', *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 95, no. 1 (July 1989), p. 143.

Palestinians. Most typically, articles discussing the barrier neglected any mention of Palestinian life and instead focused solely on Israeli security.

Finally, can these conclusions be generalized for all Israeli newspapers at the examined time, or do they only concern Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post? Because Ha'aretz and the Jerusalem Post represent two different political positions among Israeli newspapers, and because there is a range of newspapers that fall between these two, there is a possibility that most other moderate Israeli newspapers would present frames of the barrier that lie somewhere between the frames in these two newspapers. In some cases, the Jerusalem Post showed a stronger and more dominating security frame than Ha'aretz. However, for all of the variables in the analysis, the security frame was the most common frame in Ha'aretz as well. Therefore, both newspapers communicated a clear security frame to their readers, even if it was slightly less dominating in Ha'aretz. Because the results were so similar for both newspapers that are politically divided, it is likely that similar results would be found in other Israeli newspapers.

The media need to take measures against the discrepancies and biases discovered in this research. Ultimately, the media have helped create and reinforce a security frame that was promoted by Israeli officials for political purposes. Even in times of armed conflict, the media should not act as a party of the conflict, but rather make an objective stand. In these times, more than ever, a nation needs the media to serve as an objective force that monitors the actions of the state.

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## 10 Appendix

### 10.1 Considerations highlighted from 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 30<sup>th</sup> of April 2002

| <b>Considerations Highlighted</b>                    | <b>Ha'aretz (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Freedom of movement for the Palestinians</b>      | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>Separation from farmland</b>                      | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>Work possibilities for the Palestinians</b>       | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>The Palestinian economy</b>                       | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>Education for the Palestinians</b>                | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>Health service for the Palestinians</b>           | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>Land confiscation and house demolition</b>        | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>Division of family and friends</b>                | 0 articles (4), 0%                         | 0 articles (8), 0%                               | 0 articles (12), 0%                   |
| <b>Israeli security</b>                              | 4 articles (4), 100%                       | 7 articles (8), 87,5%                            | 11 articles (12), 91,7%               |
| <b>No specific consideration highlighted / Other</b> | 2 articles (4), 50%                        | 3 articles (8), 37,5%                            | 5 articles (12), 41,7%                |

## 10.2 Considerations highlighted from the 1<sup>st</sup> of May to the 31<sup>st</sup> of May 2002

| <b>Considerations Highlighted</b>                    | <b>Ha'aretz (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Freedom of movement for the Palestinians</b>      | 0 articles (16), 0%                        | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 0 articles (22), 0%                   |
| <b>Separation from farmland</b>                      | 0 articles (16), 0%                        | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 0 articles (22), 0%                   |
| <b>Work possibilities for the Palestinians</b>       | 0 articles (16), 0%                        | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 0 articles (22), 0%                   |
| <b>The Palestinian economy</b>                       | 0 articles (16), 0%                        | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 0 articles (22), 0%                   |
| <b>Education for the Palestinians</b>                | 1 article (16), 6,3%                       | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 1 article (22), 4,5%                  |
| <b>Health service for the Palestinians</b>           | 0 articles (16), 0%                        | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 0 articles (22), 0%                   |
| <b>Land confiscation and house demolition</b>        | 1 article (16), 6,3%                       | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 1 article (22), 4,5%                  |
| <b>Division of family and friends</b>                | 0 articles (16), 0%                        | 0 articles (6), 0%                               | 0 articles (22), 0%                   |
| <b>Israeli security</b>                              | 14 articles (16), 87,5%                    | 5 articles (6), 83,3%                            | 19 articles (22), 86,4%               |
| <b>No specific consideration highlighted / Other</b> | 5 articles (16), 31,3%                     | 1 article (6), 16,7%                             | 6 articles (22), 27,3%                |

### 10.3 Considerations highlighted from the 1<sup>st</sup> of June to the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2002

| <b>Considerations Highlighted</b>                    | <b>Ha'aretz (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Freedom of movement for the Palestinians</b>      | 1 article (44), 2,3%                       | 2 articles (30), 6,7%                            | 3 articles (74), 4,1%                 |
| <b>Separation from farmland</b>                      | 0 article (44), 0%                         | 2 articles (30), 6,7%                            | 2 articles (74), 2,7%                 |
| <b>Work possibilities for the Palestinians</b>       | 0 article (44), 0%                         | 2 articles (30), 6,7%                            | 2 articles (74), 2,7%                 |
| <b>The Palestinian economy</b>                       | 2 articles (44), 4,5%                      | 1 article (30), 3,3%                             | 3 articles (74), 4,1%                 |
| <b>Education for the Palestinians</b>                | 0 article (44), 0%                         | 0 article (30), 0%                               | 0 articles (74), 0%                   |
| <b>Health service for the Palestinians</b>           | 0 article (44), 0%                         | 0 article (30), 0%                               | 0 articles (74), 0%                   |
| <b>Land confiscation and house demolition</b>        | 1 article (44), 2,3%                       | 4 articles (30), 13,3%                           | 5 articles (74), 6,8%                 |
| <b>Division of family and friends</b>                | 2 articles (44), 4,5%                      | 1 article (30), 3,3%                             | 3 articles (74), 4,1%                 |
| <b>Israeli security</b>                              | 22 articles (44), 50%                      | 24 articles (30), 80%                            | 46 articles (74), 62,2%               |
| <b>No specific consideration highlighted / Other</b> | 25 articles (44), 56,8%                    | 5 articles (30), 16,7%                           | 30 articles (74), 40,5%               |

#### 10.4 Considerations highlighted from 1<sup>st</sup> of July to 31<sup>st</sup> of July 2002

| <b>Considerations Highlighted</b>                    | <b>Ha'aretz (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Freedom of movement for the Palestinians</b>      | 2 articles (9),<br>22,2%                   | 0 articles (13),<br>0%                           | 2 articles (22),<br>9,1%              |
| <b>Separation from farmland</b>                      | 1 article (9),<br>11,1%                    | 1 article (13),<br>7,7%                          | 2 articles (22),<br>9,1%              |
| <b>Work possibilities for the Palestinians</b>       | 0 articles (9),<br>0%                      | 0 articles (13),<br>0%                           | 0 articles (22),<br>0%                |
| <b>The Palestinian economy</b>                       | 0 articles (9),<br>0%                      | 0 articles (13),<br>0%                           | 0 articles (22),<br>0%                |
| <b>Education for the Palestinians</b>                | 0 articles (9),<br>0%                      | 0 articles (13),<br>0%                           | 0 articles (22),<br>0%                |
| <b>Health service for the Palestinians</b>           | 0 articles (9),<br>0%                      | 0 articles (13),<br>0%                           | 0 articles (22),<br>0%                |
| <b>Land confiscation and house demolition</b>        | 2 articles (9),<br>22,2%                   | 1 article (13),<br>7,7%                          | 3 articles (22),<br>13,6%             |
| <b>Division of family and friends</b>                | 0 articles (9),<br>0%                      | 0 articles (13),<br>0%                           | 0 articles (22),<br>0%                |
| <b>Israeli security</b>                              | 6 articles (9),<br>66,7%                   | 11 articles (13),<br>84,6%                       | 17 articles (22),<br>77,3%            |
| <b>No specific consideration highlighted / Other</b> | 3 articles (9),<br>33.3%                   | 2 articles (13),<br>15,4%                        | 5 articles (22),<br>22,7%             |

### 10.5 Considerations highlighted from 1st of August to 31st of August 2002

| <b>Considerations Highlighted</b>                    | <b>Ha'aretz (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post (frequency and percentage)</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Freedom of movement for the Palestinians</b>      | 0 articles (11), 0%                        | 1 article (15), 6,7%                             | 1 article (26), 3,8%                  |
| <b>Separation from farmland</b>                      | 1 article (11), 9,1%                       | 1 article (15), 6,7%                             | 2 articles (26), 7,7%                 |
| <b>Work possibilities for the Palestinians</b>       | 0 articles (11), 0%                        | 1 article (15), 6,7%                             | 1 article (26), 3,8%                  |
| <b>The Palestinian economy</b>                       | 0 articles (11), 0%                        | 0 articles (15), 0%                              | 0 articles (26), 0%                   |
| <b>Education for the Palestinians</b>                | 0 articles (11), 0%                        | 0 articles (15), 0%                              | 0 articles (26), 0%                   |
| <b>Health service for the Palestinians</b>           | 0 articles (11), 0%                        | 0 articles (15), 0%                              | 0 articles (26), 0%                   |
| <b>Land confiscation and house demolition</b>        | 1 article (11), 9,1%                       | 1 article (15), 6,7%                             | 2 articles (26), 7,7%                 |
| <b>Division of family and friends</b>                | 0 articles (11), 0%                        | 0 articles (15), 0%                              | 0 articles (26), 0%                   |
| <b>Israeli security</b>                              | 9 articles (11), 81,8%                     | 14 articles (15), 93,3%                          | 23 articles (26), 88,5%               |
| <b>No specific consideration highlighted / Other</b> | 2 articles (11), 18,2%                     | 1 article (15), 6,7%                             | 3 articles (26), 11,5%                |

### 10.6 Words for the barrier from 14<sup>th</sup> of April to 30<sup>th</sup> of April 2002

| <b>Words</b>              | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage*</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|---------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Barrier</b>            | 4 (20), 20%                               | 4 (32), 12,5%                                  | 8 (52), 15,4%                         |
| <b>Wall</b>               | 0 (20), 0%                                | 1 (32), 3,1%                                   | 1 (52), 1,9%                          |
| <b>Fence</b>              | 9 (20), 45%                               | 13 (32), 40,6%                                 | 22 (52), 42,3%                        |
| <b>Security barrier</b>   | 0 (20), 0%                                | 2 (32), 6,3%                                   | 2 (52), 3,8%                          |
| <b>Security fence</b>     | 0 (20), 0%                                | 4 (32), 12,5%                                  | 4 (52), 7,7%                          |
| <b>Separation barrier</b> | 0 (20), 0%                                | 0 (32), 0%                                     | 0 (52), 0%                            |
| <b>Separation fence</b>   | 1 (20), 5%                                | 0 (32), 0%                                     | 1 (52), 1,9%                          |
| <b>Buffer zone</b>        | 5 (20), 25%                               | 2 (32), 6,3%                                   | 7 (52), 13,5%                         |
| <b>Other</b>              | 1 (20), 5%                                | 6 (32), 18,8%                                  | 7 (52), 13,5%                         |

\*Percentage of the total amount of times the barrier is mentioned using any word

### 10.7 Words for the barrier from 1<sup>st</sup> of May to 31<sup>st</sup> of May 2002

| <b>Words</b>              | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage*</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|---------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Barrier</b>            | 13 (90), 14,4%                            | 2 (30), 6,7%                                   | 15 (120), 12,5%                       |
| <b>Wall</b>               | 7 (90), 7,8%                              | 0 (30), 0%                                     | 7 (120), 5,8%                         |
| <b>Fence</b>              | 48 (90), 53,3%                            | 17 (30), 56,7%                                 | 65 (120), 54,2%                       |
| <b>Security barrier</b>   | 1 (90), 1,1%                              | 0 (30), 0%                                     | 1 (120), 0,8%                         |
| <b>Security fence</b>     | 11 (90), 12,2%                            | 8 (30), 26,7%                                  | 19 (120), 15,8%                       |
| <b>Separation barrier</b> | 0 (90), 0%                                | 0 (30), 0%                                     | 0 (120), 0%                           |
| <b>Separation fence</b>   | 5 (90), 5,6%                              | 0 (30), 0%                                     | 5 (120), 4,2%                         |
| <b>Buffer zone</b>        | 3 (90), 3,3%                              | 3 (30), 10%                                    | 6 (120), 5%                           |
| <b>Other</b>              | 2 (90), 2,2%                              | 0 (30), 0%                                     | 2 (120), 1,7%                         |

\*Percentage of the total amount of times the barrier is mentioned using any word

### 10.8 Words for the barrier from 1<sup>st</sup> of June to 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2002

| <b>Words</b>              | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage*</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|---------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Barrier</b>            | 5 (309), 1,6%                             | 10 (298), 3,4%                                 | 15 (607), 2,5%                        |
| <b>Wall</b>               | 13 (309), 4,2%                            | 5 (298), 1,7%                                  | 18 (607), 3,0%                        |
| <b>Fence</b>              | 232 (309), 75,1%                          | 211 (298), 70,8%                               | 443 (607), 73,0%                      |
| <b>Security barrier</b>   | 1 (309), 0,3%                             | 0 (298), 0%                                    | 1 (607), 0,2%                         |
| <b>Security fence</b>     | 26 (309), 8,4%                            | 65 (298), 21,8%                                | 91 (607), 15,0%                       |
| <b>Separation barrier</b> | 0 (309), 0%                               | 1 (298), 0,3%                                  | 1 (607), 0,2%                         |
| <b>Separation fence</b>   | 25 (309), 8,1%                            | 3 (298), 1,0%                                  | 28 (607), 4,6%                        |
| <b>Buffer zone</b>        | 1 (309), 0,3%                             | 3 (298), 1,0%                                  | 4 (607), 0,7%                         |
| <b>Other</b>              | 6 (309), 1,9%                             | 0 (298), 0%                                    | 6 (607), 1,0%                         |

\*Percentage of the total amount of times the barrier is mentioned using any word

### 10.9 Words for the barrier from 1<sup>st</sup> of July to 31<sup>st</sup> of July 2002

| <b>Words</b>              | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage*</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|---------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Barrier</b>            | 7 (55), 12,7%                             | 4 (70), 5,7%                                   | 11 (125), 8,8%                        |
| <b>Wall</b>               | 0 (55), 0%                                | 5 (70), 7,1%                                   | 5 (125), 4%                           |
| <b>Fence</b>              | 31 (55), 56,4%                            | 45 (70), 64,3%                                 | 76 (125), 60,8%                       |
| <b>Security barrier</b>   | 0 (55), 0%                                | 0 (70), 0%                                     | 0 (125), 0%                           |
| <b>Security fence</b>     | 1 (55), 1,8%                              | 15 (70), 21,4%                                 | 16 (125), 12,8%                       |
| <b>Separation barrier</b> | 0 (55), 0%                                | 0 (70), 0%                                     | 0 (125), 0%                           |
| <b>Separation fence</b>   | 11 (55), 20%                              | 1 (70), 1,4%                                   | 12 (125), 9,6%                        |
| <b>Buffer zone</b>        | 1 (55), 1,8%                              | 0 (70), 0%                                     | 1 (125), 0,8%                         |
| <b>Other</b>              | 4 (55), 7,3%                              | 0 (70), 0%                                     | 4 (125), 3,2%                         |

\*Percentage of the total amount of times the barrier is mentioned using any word

**10.10 Words for the barrier from 1<sup>st</sup> of August to 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2002**

| <b>Words</b>              | <b>Ha'aretz frequency and percentage*</b> | <b>Jerusalem Post frequency and percentage</b> | <b>Total frequency and percentage</b> |
|---------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Barrier</b>            | 3 (80), 3,8%                              | 8 (123), 6,5%                                  | 11 (203), 5,4%                        |
| <b>Wall</b>               | 3 (80), 3,8%                              | 7 (123), 5,7%                                  | 10 (203), 4,9%                        |
| <b>Fence</b>              | 60 (80), 75,0%                            | 77 (123), 62,6%                                | 137 (203), 67,5%                      |
| <b>Security barrier</b>   | 1 (80), 1,3%                              | 1 (123), 0,8%                                  | 2 (203), 1,0%                         |
| <b>Security fence</b>     | 5 (80), 6,3%                              | 25 (123), 20,3%                                | 30 (203), 14,8%                       |
| <b>Separation barrier</b> | 0 (80), 0,0%                              | 1 (123), 0,8%                                  | 1 (203), 0,5%                         |
| <b>Separation fence</b>   | 8 (80), 10,0%                             | 1 (123), 0,8%                                  | 9 (203), 4,4%                         |
| <b>Buffer zone</b>        | 0 (80), 0,0%                              | 1 (123), 0,8%                                  | 1 (203), 0,5%                         |
| <b>Other</b>              | 0 (80), 0,0%                              | 2 (123), 1,6%                                  | 2 (203), 1,0%                         |

\*Percentage of the total amount of times the barrier is mentioned using any word