Before Oslo, Palestinians primarily desired unity and an end to the
occupation. But as soon as the first intifada began to fade, divisions
among Palestinians emerged. Throughout the Oslo years, these rifts
continued to widen. While scores of Palestinians took to the streets,
armed with stones and kitchen appliances, during the first intifada,
the present uprising is increasingly characterized by the deadly
firepower of small arms.
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In
December 2002, then Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas
warned of the increased
use of
weapons - an evolution that he hoped to reverse. His short-lived
government was ill-equipped
to
tackle the problem, and his successor, Ahmed Qurei, proved no more
capable of confronting the
weapons
chaos in the region. The failure to reach a substantive and
acceptable peace agreement has
given
rise to strong feelings of betrayal and futility. As a result of
these internal divisions, Palestinians
also turn
their aggression and feelings of futility against fellow
Palestinians. |
 |
|
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Palestinians wait at an IDF checkpoint.
Photo: Ariel Jerozolimski [file] |
The real extent of
Palestinian infighting is often overlooked, as most people tend to
view the conflict in simpler terms: Israel versus the Palestinians.
This black and white portrayal of the Middle East conflict fails to
account for shades of gray. One can only achieve a comprehensive
understanding of Palestinian society through examining everyday
disagreements and clashes between the various political factions,
families and cities. These divisions have also led to an increasingly
violent "intrafada" during the course of the Aksa Intifada. From 2000
to 2007, 16% of Palestinian civilian deaths were caused by Palestinian
groups or individuals.
Similarly to other groups
and nations, Palestinians assemble and amass weapons due to feelings
of insecurity. By amassing weapons, Palestinians hope to alleviate and
counterbalance the insecurity they feel as a result of the occupation
and Israel's military practices. It is a paradox that small arms have
flooded the country in part to increase the nation's feeling of
security, when the impact of a highly armed Palestine will ultimately
generate greater insecurity and simultaneously erode human
development.
PALESTINIANS HAVE lived
with low level conflict for more than half a century. This has
resulted in a lowering of the threshold of violence. Acts which in
other societies are seen as brutal have become "normal" behavior. This
evolution is not unique to the Palestinians. Subject, oppressed, or
embattled peoples throughout history have commonly turned on
themselves. The occupation and war conditions under which Palestinians
currently live readily foster internal hostility and the loss of civil
liberties. Because Palestinians are accustomed to seeing weapons and
are also exposed to verbal and physical abuse of the military
occupation, verbal disagreements easily turn into fist fights and
sometimes even escalate into gang or family feuds. Growing up in a
spiral of violence means that individuals find it harder to determine
the limits of aggression.
The governing structure of
Palestinians also causes internal fighting. According to many, the
Palestinian Authority is inextricably linked to past failures and
blunders, including the failed Oslo and Camp David Accords. As
Palestinian cities are increasingly cut off from each other - a result
of Israeli closures, control of movement, and the building of the
separation wall/fence - the power of the PA to control, oversee, and
adjudicate society has diminished. The situation in many Palestinian
cities has become quasi-anarchic, as alternative power centers fill
the vacuum. Their nature varies according to each city. Sometimes it
is the strongest political faction, or those with the greatest means
of physical violence to enforce fiefdom. There has never been a
monopoly of force, a shortcoming linked to the quasi- or semi-state
nature of the PA. This problem is compounded because the means of
physical violence rest in the hands of non-democratic institutions and
groups.
ALTHOUGH THERE have always
been opponents of Yasser Arafat, the rift between his supporters and
adversaries deepened with the 2003 US insistence that he no longer
hold the key position in the Palestinian government. Palestinians thus
bowed to American pressure and restructured their institutions to
establish a new post of prime minister. The administrations of both
Abbas and Qurei reflect divisions within the governing elite. Although
the Palestinian people rallied behind Arafat after the US insisted on
his deposal, the subsequent instability of the governing nucleus
reflects the uncertainty of the larger populace regarding the
responsibilities and powers accorded to the positions of chairman and
prime minister. As Arafat's power declined, the internal regime
struggle intensified. Governmental changes have resulted in a
schizophrenic administration, part of which holds that Palestinians
need a national liberation movement under strong and authoritative
leadership - a view espoused by Arafat and his supporters. Others
advocate a move towards a mini-state requiring regular, democratic and
transparent administration, a trend originating from the new prime
minister's post. Since the governing elite is unable to clearly define
its aims and priorities, this uncertainty is passed down to the
populace, and fragments opinions.
Palestinians are at times
encouraged and even advised by outside forces to engage in internal
violence and fighting. The American government, for example,
repeatedly praised Arafat when he cracked down on his own people. As a
result, Palestinians opposed to or critical of America and its
policies are likely to turn away from the PA and join those groups who
contest US actions. The PA's weakness is in great part characterized
by this clash of international and local demands - which it tries to
meet simultaneously. Many Palestinians believe that the arrest of
members of Palestinian armed factions wanted by Israel is deplorable,
since the main priority should be to construct a unitary front against
the occupation. It is a paradox that the demand for unity should cause
splintering, and that the Palestinian government could be perceived as
"collaborating" with America and Israel.
alestinians have become refugees divided between themselves on the
West Bank and Gaza. With each additional kilometer of the Israeli
"security fence," the distinction between in- and outsiders becomes
more complex. Since travel between Palestinian cities is restricted,
controlled or even denied, each encircled enclave is left to fend for
itself. Central authority and control is thus impaired and at times
made impossible. As a result, Palestinian cities (such as Nablus) fall
into the hands of local mobsters and gang-lords.
The writer is the founder and director of the Palestinian human
rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG) based in east Jerusalem.