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Intifada Loses its
Way
by Bassem Eid
The al-Aqsa Intifada has not been a success for the
Palestinians. It began as a spontaneous, unplanned action, bred
out of the Palestinian public’s frustration with the failed
peace process. The Israelis, for their part, have refused to
implement many parts of previously signed agreements, including
the release of prisoners, freezing of settlement activity, and
the opening of safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. The Palestinian Authority also proved to be a
disappointment to the general Palestinian public as widespread
corruption became apparent and Arafat ordered the political
arrest of leading opposition figures. The al-Aqsa Intifada grew
out of Palestinian discontent with this situation, perpetuated
by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and became a
popular movement to give voice to the goals and nationalistic
aspirations of the Palestinian people.
The al-Aqsa Intifada quickly degenerated into
violence, shocking Palestinians and Israelis alike. The extent
of Israeli aggression in response to the Palestinian uprising,
including the use of tanks, missiles, F-16 bombers and Apache
helicopters, is unlike any seen since the 1967 war. The armed
resistance mounted by Palestinian fighters is also a strict
departure from the previous intifada, which was characterized by
non-violent action. Politicians on both sides made strong
statements amounting to sheer incitement to violence, and
irresponsible journalism in both the Palestinian and the Israeli
media inflamed the situation. Both sides share the
responsibility for this descent into violence, and a strong
commitment will be required from both the Israelis and the
Palestinians before resolution is possible.
Arafat has come under strong pressure from the
international community to control the violence that has
characterized the al-Aqsa Intifada, and to create a more
restrained environment of non-violence in which negotiations
with the Israelis may continue. While I believe that
non-violent resistance can be extremely powerful and support
non-violent action whenever possible, it must be acknowledged
that non-violence is not an appropriate response to every
situation. The Palestinian Authority has come under severe
criticism and allegations have been made implicating police and
security services under Arafat’s control in armed attacks on
Israeli forces. The mandate of these security services is to
protect the Palestinian people and it is unreasonable to expect
them to sit idly by as the Israeli military sweeps through areas
under full Palestinian control, threatening the civilian
population and completely disregarding the sovereignty of the PA
in these areas. Terror is in the eye of the beholder, and it
takes little stretch of the imagination to regard Israeli
military actions, such as the invasion of Beit Rima on October
23rd as acts of state terror. There is no
justification for acts of terrorism that target innocent
civilians, but there is likewise no justification for the
continued occupation of Palestine. While the majority of the
Palestinian public does not condone acts of terrorism, such as
suicide bombings, in the broader context of the Israeli
occupation, they are unable to condemn these acts
unequivocally.
From the very beginning of the Intifada, Arafat faced
enormous pressure from opposition groups such as Hamas, PFLP,
Islamic Jihad, and DFLP to release political prisoners,
particularly those who were imprisoned for attacks against
Israeli targets. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000
was perceived by the Palestinian public to be an unmitigated
victory for Hezbollah, and provided a strong argument for those
favoring armed resistance to the continued Israeli occupation of
Palestine. Perhaps Arafat’s biggest mistake was to release
these opposition figures with an invitation to join his
government coalition. Since the beginning of the Intifada, he
has more or less given the opposition groups a free hand to do
as they see fit. The interests being served by these groups do
not necessarily represent the majority of the Palestinian public
and their differing agendas are partially to blame for the
current situation.
The outbreak of the Intifada was provoked by the
visit of Ariel Sharon to al-Haram al-Sharif on the 28th
of September 2000. It was not planned by the Palestinian
Authority, as some have suggested, and the leadership of the
Palestinian Authority never imagined that they would loose
control of the situation. I believe that this is now the case.
Arafat has made several crucial mistakes leaving the Palestinian
Authority in an unstable and vulnerable position. The movement
has lost its focus and has taken on the short-term objective of
opposing Israel’s excessively brutal counter-measures. Arafat
is seeking to end the Intifada by securing a full Israeli
withdrawal from area “A” and the lifting of the restrictive
closures that have devastated the Palestinian economy. These
situations were created as an Israeli response to the Intifada.
Prior to the outbreak of violence in September 2000, these
problems were not present. It is irrational to assume that a
return to the status quo that existed prior to the onset of the
Intifada would solve the problem, yet there is no longer any
talk of the nationalistic demands such as the establishment of a
viable Palestinian state, or the right of return.
While the Palestinian Authority appears to be in a
state of collapse, there is still hope for rehabilitation. The
Israeli government has to realize that without Arafat, both
sides will suffer. With Israel’s cooperation, Arafat could
regain control, but a change in policy is imperative. Israel
must respect the sovereignty of Palestinian controlled area “A”
and all military incursions must cease. The restrictive
closures that serve no practical purpose beyond the harassment
and incitement of the Palestinian people must be lifted, the
destruction of agricultural land and the demolition of houses
must cease, and the unofficial Israeli policy of political
assassinations must end. Only then will it be possible to be
negotiating towards the nationalistic aspirations of the
Palestinian people.
Thus far, the al-Aqsa Intifada seems to have merely
widened the gap between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Hatred between the two has grown, and the wary trust and guarded
optimism that characterized the Oslo-era has evaporated
entirely. Arafat no longer has the popular mandate to engage in
serious negotiations with Israel, and the current Israeli
government has shown no commitment or willingness to continue
the negotiations that were abandoned with the start of the
al-Aqsa intifada. We have heard Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s
policy requiring “seven days of absolute quiet” reiterated time
after time, but there is no Israeli commitment to this
cease-fire. Sharon has continued to order political
assassinations, fueling the fire of discontent and provoking
Palestinian response. The Israeli army persists in targeting
residential areas and PA infrastructure, particularly in Gaza.
The cease-fire Sharon speaks of seems to be entirely
unilateral, requiring complete restraint on the Palestinian side
as Israeli infractions continue unabated.
Some analysts have predicted that the terrorist
attacks in the United States on September 11th and
the subsequent war in Afghanistan will herald a new Middle East
order. This prediction has been made before. The Gulf War was
also said to be the dawning of a new Middle East, as was the
Oslo process. Change will only come to the Middle East as a
product of justice and peace. For this to happen, both the
Palestinians and the Israelis must show a willingness to
compromise, and the commitment required to settle their
differences. Unfortunately, the situation seems to be
deteriorating drastically with little hope of breaking the chain
of violence, retaliation and retribution. As of now, both sides
lack sufficient dedication to the peaceful resolution of this
conflict, and a viable solution seems to be a long way off.
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