The Heaven Behind the Wall

 

A story of ‘security human rights violations’

 

The 8 meters concrete barrier cutting off Abu Dis from Jerusalem. September 2004.

(taken by Fabio Forgione).

 

 

 

Researched by: Emily Shaw, Franziska Schiffner & Fabio Forgione

 

Compiled by: Fabio Forgione

 

 

 

 

 

Israeli representatives:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Palestinian representatives:

 

 

 

 

 

International ‘observers’:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I. Security reasons or land control?

 

In accordance with the position held by the Israeli Government, the protection of the Israeli population against Palestinian suicide bomber attacks carried out inside Israel stands for the official reason by which the erection of the ‘security barrier’ has been starting.

 

In truth, it would be extremely superficial to discern the ongoing construction of the barrier from the issue that has been representing the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the inception of the Israeli State in 1948: the control over the land.

 

The transformation of the ‘Green Line’, which separated the opposing forces, in a border between the newly created Israeli State and the Jordanians on the West Bank, in 1948; the occupation of the Palestinian Territories, both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the consequent establishment of Jewish settlements after the 1967 War; the division and the classification of the Occupied Palestinian Territories in three main areas with different degrees of jurisdiction after Oslo Agreements, clearly point up how the control of the land has always been a key issue of the conflict.

 

As far as the current situation is concerned, the conflict has entered in a stage in which watch-towers, patrol roads, ditches, the continuing enlargement of settlements and above all the construction of the ‘separation barrier’ can be interpreted as new attempts aimed to extend the control over the land and draw  new and wider boundaries up.

 

On this basis, the construction of the barrier began in 2002, ideally and originally following the ‘Green Line’, trespasses inside the West Bank territory remarkably, embracing some of the largest Israeli settlements and determining the so called “fingers” in the Palestinian area. In the end, the completion of the entire planned route, scheduled for the end of 2004, would leave only between forty and fifty per cent of the whole West Bank territory in Palestinian hands, with the obvious result of dividing the Palestinian land in several cantons.

 

On Israeli side, the completion of the ‘separation barrier’, besides improving security issues, will undoubtedly procure a number of significant and notorious advantages, particularly regarding the whole control on the Palestinian enclaves as well as on the movements of Palestinian people throughout the West Bank.

 

 

Eventually, although the construction of the barrier continues to be claimed as a temporary measure by the Israeli authorities, it makes particularly difficult to accept as true the Israeli government’s commitment towards the establishment of a viable, independent Palestinian State encompassing both the Gaza Strip and West Bank as demanded by the ‘Road Map’, the internationally recognised peace-process backed by United States, European Union, Russia, and United Nations.

 

 

II. Chronological developments

The idea of a barrier separating Israel from the Occupied Territories is not a new one. Physical barriers between Israeli and Palestinians were first proposed by Yitzhak Rabin in October 1994.

 

Initially, in 1994, Rabin’s government built up the Israeli-Gaza Strip barrier, a separation barrier running along the armistice line of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In early 1995, the Shahal commission was established to discuss how to implement a barrier separating Israelis and Palestinians. Prior to the Camp David 2000 Summit, Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, vowed to build a separation wall, stating that this implementation “is essential to the future Palestinian nation in order to foster its national identity and independence without being dependent on the Israeli State”[1].

 

Although the Israeli Government of present Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was hesitant to construct the barrier, it finally embraced the plan. According to the Israeli Government position, the stated purpose behind the construction of the separation wall is to prevent Palestinian suicide bombing attacks and infiltrations by Palestinians from entering Israeli cities, a problem which has mainly plagued Israel since the inception of the second Intifada Al-Aqsa, started on 28^th of September 2000.

 

Most of the separation barrier consists of a wire fence with an exclusion area on each side, often including an anti-vehicle trench. Differently, some sections consist of an up to 8 meters concrete wall, such as near Qalqiliya and Jerusalem area. In all cases there are regular observation posts, automated sensing devices and other various apparatuses. There are also gates at diverse places which are controlled by Israeli soldiers when they are not closed[2].

 

A second barrier adjacent to the first apparatus, called the “depth barrier”, and consisting of a 25m trench filled with barbed wire, surrounds communities in the Jenin and Tulkarm district, effectively fencing them in.

 

Trench filled with barbed wire in Jenin area.

 

The maps of the ‘wall route’ surprised many and sparked harsh criticism as they showed that the wall was not following the ‘Green Line’, the 1967 border between the West Bank and Israel. It in fact derogates from this line in such a way that it completely destroys the territorial contiguity of the West Bank, cutting in deeply from west and east to secure large Israeli settlement blocs, and running in twisted lines and loops of far more length than the 320 km of the Green Line[3].

 

Most of the barrier has indeed been erected in the West Bank territory and not along the ‘Green Line’, perpetrating serious human rights violations for the Palestinians living near the separation wall.  The construction of the barrier within the West Bank has been provoking a number of enclaves completely closed by the barrier and new restrictions for the Palestinians’ freedom of movement[4].

 

The first phase of the Wall’s construction, which was a 145 kilometers long wall stretching its way inside the northwestern West Bank, in the area of Tulkarm, Qalqiliya and Jenin, has begun in June 2002. Already in its first segment, the wall derogated the planned route along the “Green Line’, reaching up to 6 kilometers inside the West Bank, cutting off between the Wall and the Green Line almost 122,000 donums, de facto annexing 2% of the West Bank territory to Israel[5].

 

In October 2003, the region between the separation wall and the ‘Green Line’, named as “seam area”, was declared as a special military area for an indefinite period of time. This area includes about 9 Palestinian villages, populated by 5,200 persons, and 10 Israeli settlements, inhabited by 22,000 settlers. 

 

While all Israelis and Jews regardless of nationality get freely access to the region, Palestinians, even if they are residents of one of the dozens of villages in the region, are not allowed to enter unless they have been granted special permits from Israeli authorities. Actually, permits are frequently refused. On this regard, all Palestinians over the age of 12, residing in the so called “seam area”, are forced to attain a permanent resident permit for continuing to live in their homes[6].

 

In February 2004, in reaction to pressure from Palestinians’ concerns and human rights organizations’ protests and campaigns against the ‘Apartheid Wall’, Israel made public its alleged intention of reviewing the route of the barrier. Particularly, Israeli cabinet members said modifications would have been made reducing the number of checkpoints Palestinian people had to cross, and diminishing Palestinian hardship in some areas, such as Qalqilya, where the barrier goes very near, and in some cases encircles inhabited areas[7] .

 

The supposed modifications to the route, decided by the Israeli governments, would involve the following areas:

 

1. Baqa a-Sharqiya.

The barrier encircled the villages of Baqa a-Sharqiya, Nazlat’Issa, and Nazlat Abu Nar isolating their inhabitants, nearly 6,200, from the rest of the West Bank territory. Additionally, the barrier cut off the farmers of the villages of Qaffin, Nazlat al-Wusta, and Nazlat al-Gharbiya from their land. Last summer the Israeli authorities ordered the construction of a supplementary section of the barrier, made by eight – meter - high concrete wall. On February 2004, it has been reported that Israel has started tearing down the original fragment of the barrier.

 

2. Barta'a a-Sharqiya

The barrier erected by Israel is located about 3 km east of this village, inhabited by 3,200 persons. The barrier has completely separated Barta'a a-Sharqiya from Jenin, the biggest town in the area, where the villagers used to have all their basic services, such as schools, medical services, work places, etc. According to some media reports, Israel would intend to move the barrier on the west side of the village, running along the ‘Green Line’, but, at the time of writing, no development has been registered.

 

3. Qalqiliya

The town has been completely encircled by eight – foot concrete wall, isolating its 35,000 residents. The only entrance of the town is patrolled by an Israeli checkpoint remarkably restricting the freedom of movement of the Palestinian people residing in the area. According to various media reports, Israel would plan to remove a one – kilometer stretch of the wall east of the town on both sides of the main road bringing to the town.

 

4. Khirbet Jubara

The ‘separation wall’ stretches out few hundreds meters from the village, housing about 300 residents. It has cut off any communication with Tulkarm, the largest town in the area, where most of the villagers used to get all their basic services. The barrier also separates Khirbet Jubara from a-Ras: the two villages are strongly linked, sharing services, infrastructures and land. In accordance with various media reports, the Israeli Authorities would plan to move the barrier westward, closer to the ‘Green Line’[8]

 

III. International & legal pronouncements

 

1. Israeli High Court

On 29^th February 2004 Mohammed Dahla, the attorney representing the village council of Beit Surik, took the case to the Israeli High Court for the first time. The Palestinian Community’s legal representative challenged the legality of a 40km stretch of the barrier and of the orders issued for the seizure of land upon which the barrier would be built. The petitions were brought against the Government of Israel and the Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank.

 

The High Court stated: “we accept that the military commander cannot order the construction of the Separation Fence if its reasons are political. The Separation Fence cannot be motivated by a desire to “annex” territories to the state of Israel. The purpose of the Separation Fence cannot be to draw a political border”. The court also agreed that the “military commander of territory held in belligerent occupation must balance between the needs of the army on the one hand and the needs of the local inhabitants on the other”.

 

The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that a contentious section of the barrier gravely violates the rights of thousands of Palestinian residents by separating them from their farmland in “a veritable chokehold, which will severely stifle daily life”.

 

Moreover, the 34-page dossier, issued by a three judge panel, stated that a partially completed portion of the route “established for the security fence – which separates the local inhabitants from their agricultural lands – injures the local inhabitants in a severe and acute way, while violating their rights under humanitarian international law”. Again, according to the decision, constructing the fence in a way separating the Palestinian farm owner from their land “severely violates their rights of property and their freedom of movement and the difficult reality of life from which they have suffered will only become more severe”.

 

However the Israeli High Court ordered changes in just small parts of the planned course of the wall, avoiding  suggesting any alternative new route for the changes, on the basis that ”the military commander must determine an alternative which will provide a fitting, if not ideal, solution for the security considerations”.[9]

 

Nevertheless the court went on to say that it did not believe that the barrier was motivated by political reasons, as alleged by the Palestinian petitioners, but by security concerns. Interestingly the Supreme Court took the view that the deviation of the barrier from the ‘Green Line’ was not evidence that the motivation was political and not based on security; rather, it said, the opposite is the case: a barrier built only along the Green Line would by definition be one that puts political concerns against security concerns. Anyhow, the justices repeatedly admonished the Israeli military for failing to adhere to both domestic and international law requiring it to “take the needs of the local population into account”.

 

Finally, the court firmly criticized the Israeli government for failing to achieve its promises to compensate all the Palestinian farmers and land owners whose land had been confiscated.

 

In consequence of the High Court judgment and the required changes to the route, residents of settlements in the West Bank are also planning to submit petitions to the High Court, claiming that their rights will be infringed by the revised route. They say that they will be separated from their land and from larger cities, and as a result they will suffer economic and social deprivation. At the time of writing the result of these petitions is not known.

 

 

2. International Court of Justice

In December 2003, the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to make an advisory (non-binding) ruling on the "legal consequences arising" from the construction of the barrier. The hearings began in February 2004. The Palestinian Authority is not a member of the court but was allowed to make a submission by virtue of being a UN observer and a co-sponsor of the General Assembly resolution. In January 2004, the court also authorized the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to make submissions.[10]

 

The ICJ rendered the advisory opinion on 9th July 2004.

 

The Court condemned the Wall in its entirety on Occupied Palestinian Land; it did not consider legal consequences for those parts of the barrier which were built on the territory of Israel itself.

 

The ICJ decisions were as follows.

1. The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, is contrary to international law;
2. Israel is under an obligation to determinate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, in accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion;
3. Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem;
4. All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention;
5. The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.

The decisions were passed 14-1 by the court judges, except for the 4th decision which was passed 13-2.[11]

 

 

IV. Israeli perspective

 

As far as the Israeli position is concerned, Israel maintains that the construction of the barrier is a temporary measure with the main purpose of protecting the Israeli civilian population, in reaction to numerous suicide bombing attacks emanating from the Occupied Palestinian Territories.[12] With regard to the differing routes of the barrier and the Green Line respectively, there are two contentions relevant to the Israeli position:

 

1. Since the Government of Israel does not agree with the status of the ‘Green Line’ as the borderline between Israel and Palestine in a future two state solution, but rather argues that borders have still to be negotiated in future peace agreements, the route of the barrier consequently does not violate any Israeli obligations[13].

 

2. Even if the internationally accepted ‘Green Line’ served as the borderline between the two future Israeli and Palestinian states, the route of the barrier would not constitute a political statement about Israel’s future territorial claims, since the barrier is solely of a security nature and its route is based on security reasons, not political reasons. Furthermore, if the ‘Green Line’ were the route of the barrier, it would in fact be politically motivated[14].

 

V. Effects on Palestinian daily life

 

Palestinian communities have been experiencing massive destruction by construction of the “Apartheid Wall” so far. Agricultural land is razed; irrigation networks damaged; water resources isolated; homes and community infrastructure demolished. The access to land, markets, and the freedom to move around for employment reasons and family visits has been, additionally, heavily obstructed.

 

The Wall has created numerous Palestinian enclaves. Some of them are surrounded by it on three sides with a gate; others are surrounded by the wall, settlements and checkpoints. Already in the first phase of its construction (Jenin-Tulkarm-Qalqiliya), Palestinian sources stated that the ‘Apartheid Wall’ destroyed at least 30 km of water networks, uprooted 102,320 trees, and demolished 85 commercial buildings as well as several agricultural shelters. Approximately 65 communities are directly affected by construction of the Wall on their lands, including more than 200,000 people. 14,680 dunums (1 Dunum = 1000 m²) of land were seized for the construction of the barrier.[15]

                                                                          The huge concrete wall totally surrounding the town of Qalqiliya. July 2003.

 

 

Roughly 6000 Palestinians now live in enclaves between the barrier and the Green Line. In addition to this, about 40,000 Palestinians live in enclaves completely surrounded by the barrier. About 90 square kilometers of land are now situated between the barrier and the Green Line (not including East Jerusalem)[16]. The Wall in Bethlehem disconnects the city from Jerusalem and from the rest of the West Bank, also separating communities encompassing the area.

 

In North Jerusalem, 15,000 Jerusalem ID holders from Kufr Aqab and Qalandiya Refugee Camp are isolated from the city. Relations between the 200,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and Palestinians in the West Bank are cut off, isolating this commercial, social, religious, and historical center of Palestine and fortifying the Israeli closure and siege policy in the West Bank.

 

Landowners and farm workers whose fields are now located west of the barrier have to apply for permits, allowing them to pass through gates or checkpoints controlled by the Israeli army, in order to reach their fields. Also residents living in the villages adjacent to the barrier need to attain resident permits. Besides the limited and insufficient working hours of the gates, the process of attaining permits under the ‘permit regime’ is troublesome, and permits often have to be renewed after short time periods or are arbitrarily denied without any clarification but for unexplained ‘security reasons’[17]. In effect, the ‘permit régime’ makes land west of the barrier or in its ‘military zone’ inaccessible to its Palestinian owners, or at least lead to the deterioration of cultivated lands.[18]

 

The barrier cuts villages from the urban centers in the West Bank, making access to markets difficult. In this way problems are created for the local farmers whose land was not seized to sell the agricultural products which provide for their livelihood. Access to medical care and to schools is strongly prejudiced too.

 

On all sections of the barrier, ways are prolonged for the residents to reach any destination, since passage is only possible through the few gates in the barrier, which are not all operated all the time, some not at all[19]. Ways of a few hundred meters have changed into a many kilometers.

 

Separation barrier’s negative environmental effects are exceptionally clear, especially in those sections in which it runs as concrete wall. It destroys landscapes – tens of thousands of trees have already been uprooted for its construction, and fields paved for the strip of roads adjacent to the fence.

 

The psychological effects on the people are immeasurable: the ‘apartheid wall’ annihilates not only their livelihoods but their whole way of life. Always at direct sight, it is the most vivid expression of injustice and hopelessness for the Palestinians residing in the West Bank territory.

 

Furthermore, the Israeli government is showing nothing but indifference to the grave human rights violations connected to the construction of its ‘separation barrier’ and causing awful troubles to the huge number of Palestinians subjected to it.

 

It is self evident that the Israeli population has the right to live in peace and security but the Palestinian population is, at the same time and at the same level, absolutely entitled to get a decorous and respectable life.

 

VI. Relation between the wall, settlements, and water resources

The route of the already constructed barrier shows that there are additional objectives besides the physical separation between Israeli population centers in Israel and Palestinian population centers in the West Bank:

 

1.      The ‘inclusion’ on the Israeli side of the barrier of as many Israeli settlements as possible, (at the same time ‘exclusion’ of as many Palestinian residential areas as possible – ‘more land, fewer people’).

2.      Remaining or establishing Israeli control over vital water resources in the area.

 

 

The Jenin and Tulkarm areas are the “corn belt” of the West Bank. In addition, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya are important for providing the West Bank with water. The underlying water problem is of high significance in connection with the route of the barrier. The West Bank supplies the area with three main groundwater basins: the Western Aquifer, the Northeastern Aquifer, and the Eastern Aquifer.

 

The Tulkarm and Qalqiliya areas are particularly rich in wells water from the Western Aquifer, the water of which is of exceptionally high quality. This area is therefore of vital interest and importance to Israel, as well as to the Palestinians. In the eastern part of the West Bank, the Jordan valley supplies Israel with the Eastern Aquifer water. Thus many Israeli settlements, provided with large agricultural infrastructure are just located in the above mentioned valley. Palestinians have no access to the Eastern Aquifer groundwater.[20]

 

Fifty wells are stated to have been affected in the first phase of construction of the Wallr (either isolated west of the barrier or in the ‘military zone’), in addition to more than 200 cisterns. 25 wells and cisterns have been destroyed during the construction of the barrier, so far. The importance of the wells arrives from the location of main wells and springs in the West Bank[21]  before-mentioned restriction on water usage in the West Bank: the 67 wells in Tulkarm and 75 wells in Qalqiliya represent the West Bank’s sole access to the Western Aquifer.[22]

 

The barrier derogates from the Green Line south and north of Tulkarm. North of Tulkarm, opposite the Baqa al-Gharbiya village west of the Green Line, it ran east of the three Palestinian villages Nazlat ‘Isa, Baqa Ash-Sharqiya, and Nazlat An-Nar, leaving them on the ‘Israeli side’, despite the ‘separation’ idea of the fence. The apparent reason for this route was to secure Israel’s control over the wells of this area[23]. At the same time a secondary barrier was constructed west of the villages, in order to cut off access of the residents to Israel proper. This left the area completely fenced-in, causing severe humanitarian hardship to the residents.

 

Due to immense protest by human rights groups, this section of the barrier was changed, in order to ease the residents’ difficulties in reaching their fields and schools. However, residents complain that the new barrier route still cuts them off from wells and restricts their access to water on their side of the fence.

 

The route of the barrier suggests Israel’s determination to keep control over wells in the area, usually in combination with construction of the barrier around settlements. The control over water can be gained by the settlers in autonomous actions[24].

 

Examples for the inclusion of Israeli settlements can be seen in the already existing parts of the barrier in the Tulkarm area. Small sections of the fence run parallel to the Green Line on Palestinian lands, but most of it is winding its way through occupied Palestinian land, for example south of Tulkarm to ‘include’ on the western side of the fence the Israeli settlements of Sal’it and Zufin, and far north of Tulkarm the settlements of Rekhan, Tal Menashe, Hinnanit, and Shaqed. Linking the settlements to Israel does not refer to the built-up area solely; it includes the ‘municipal boundaries’ of the settlements and areas under jurisdiction of ‘regional councils’, which often render the settlement area much larger and provide for future settlement expansion.[25]

 

Regarding the planned fence in the southern West Bank, the rather spectacular case of the ‘cave dwellers’ in Susiya village in the southern Hebron Hills received much media coverage. The Israeli government tries to expel the Susiya residents from their living places, presumably in order to annex parts of the southern West Bank by constructing the barrier all around the large settlements of the area. The State argues that the cave dwellers’ buildings were erected without building permits. At the same time illegal settlement outposts flourish not far from the village, some of which were erected on private Palestinian land.[26]

 

Following the Israeli High Court demand to revise the route of the barrier, the Israeli settler population is concerned that as a result of re-routing the fence, settlements could find themselves east of the barrier, i.e. on the Palestinian side.

 

In response, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has repeatedly confirmed that “the large settlement blocs of Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim and Gush Etzion will be on the Israeli side of the separation fence”, giving the precise reason for the interruption in the Jerusalem part of the barrier east of Ma’ale Adumim: the settlement is intended to be enlarged, and only the future complete bloc is supposed to be surrounded by the fence[27].

 

Besides the blatant violation of international obligations[28] and provisions under the Road Map to freeze all settlement activities, this strategy contrasts both the security purpose of the barrier in that it leaves a break in the fence, and the temporary nature of the ‘separation wall’ in that it is apparently planned to be built in the future without any given time limit. Instead the Israeli Prime Minister does not even try to conceal the political character of the ‘anti-terrorist fence’ in its intention to annex large settlement blocs to Israel’s territory.[29]

 

The doubts as to the temporariness of the barrier relate to the ‘facts on the ground’ which the barrier creates in the West Bank. The result is the impossibility of the establishment of an independent, viable Palestinian State with contiguous territory in the West Bank. Instead, the Palestinians would have to content for creation of their State with the heavily overpopulated and impoverished Gaza Strip as the tiny remains of original Palestine. This of course is not the Two-State solution as envisioned by the ‘Road Map Quartet’.[30]

 

The Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories are internationally regarded as illegal according to Article 49 of the ‘Geneva Civilians Convention’[31], to which Israel is a signatory and therefore bound by it. East-Jerusalem is internationally equally regarded to be occupied territory, and Israel’s annexation of East-Jerusalem and its subsequent declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 1980 have not been recognized by other states except the United States of America[32].

Consequently, the route of the fence in the West Bank surrounding the settlements and thereby connecting them to the territory of Israel proper is to be regarded as illegal. Israel is under the obligation to evacuate the settlements instead of consolidating them.

 

 

VII. Case studies throughout the West Bank

 

 

1. Abu Dis. Jerusalem area

 

The neighborhood of Abu Dis is located on the eastern outskirt of Jerusalem, roughly three kilometers from Jerusalem’s Old City. It currently records a population of about 11, 670 inhabitants.

 

The construction of the barrier in Abu Dis commenced in May 2003 and originally was formed by concrete blocks which residents could still manage to squeeze through or climb with ladders. The time required to reach Jerusalem stepped on dramatically at this stage, from ten minutes to more than one hour.

     

The appalling wall erected in Abu Dis, Jerusalem. September 2004 (taken by Fabio Forgione).

 

Afterwards, the work has been fast advancing over the past five months and a massive concrete-structure, higher then 8 meters, is now nearly utterly surrounding the neighborhood, blocking any direct way of communication to and from Jerusalem. Actually, about the 80 per cent of the total planned project has been accomplished, so far. No gate has been opened till now all along the concrete complex.

 

The ‘apartheid wall’ also separates approximately 35 families whose relatives are located in the other side of the Wall, Jerusalem side. Furthermore, ten of these families hold West Bank ID, even though their home is on the west side of the barrier. At the time of the writing it is still unclear if they will be granted Jerusalem ID, or will have to relocate east side the barrier, in the West Bank.

 

As easily comprehensible, the erection of the barrier has caused serious economic troubles to Abu Dis residents. Jerusalem inhabitants used to visit and shop in the village, where prices were normally cheaper than in downtown Jerusalem. On this regard, local shops were strongly depending, up to 60 per cent of their monthly income, on clients and customers arriving from Jerusalem.

 

The construction of the barrier has also irreversibly depreciated the land in Abu Dis by 60 per cent of its original value. Actually, before the Wall was erected, renting house to students had become an important source of income, determining a dramatic increasing of the land’s price.

 

Nowadays, most of the shops are perpetually closed down, and the unemployment has consequently reached its highest pick since the establishment of the village. Finally, in accordance with the local authority, the 90 per cent of the land (800 donums), confiscated for the construction of the wall, resulted to be agricultural land, thus an important income source.[33]

 

The 8 meters high concrete Wall separating Abu Dis from Jerusalem (taken by Fabio Forgione). June 2004.

 

According to several media reports, the wall erected in Abu Dis would have a symbolic significance as well.  Palestinian Prime Minister, Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala) lives in the suburb, and the building set aside for the future Palestinian parliament is situated right there. Furthermore, in previous peace negotiations, Abu Dis was also proposed as the centre of a possible negotiated capital for an independent Palestinian State[34].

 

Throughout the last two years, Abu Dis has been hosting a lot of demonstrations against the ‘apartheid wall’. The last protest, on 27^th of August, was ‘headed’ by Arun Ghandi, the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, along with 2000-3000 demonstrators.

 

“The Israeli’s ‘security barrier’ which I have been seeing reminds me of the Bantustans which the apartheid regime in South Africa tried to create”, Arun Ghandi shouted during the rally[35].

 

 

2.  Barta’a Sharqiya Enclave. Jenin area.

 

The community of Barta’a Sharqiya Enclave includes the villages of Barta’a Sharqiya (3,404 inhabitants), Dhaher al Malih (205 residents), Um Rihan (353 residents), Khirbet Sheikh Saed (206 people), Khirbet Abdulah Younis (133 inhabitants), Khirbet Munther Al Gharbiya (n.a.).

 

It has been completely enclosed, with the only entries to West Bank represented by two gates located at: Barta’a and Shaked.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Map supplied by UNRWA. August 2004

 

 

All the inhabitants of the enclave, over the age of 16, are required to obtain a permit to reside in the enclave as well as to travel outside in the rest of the West Bank territory.

 

Barta’a Sharqiya has been separated by Barta’a Gharbiya, located on the Israeli side of the ‘Green Line, since 1948 occupation. The two villages used to have strong social, economic, familiar links with about 40 per cent of Palestinian people living on the eastern side of the village in the West Bank hold Israeli Identity Card but prevented to get the other side of the ‘Green Line’ because of the barrier.

 

Due to the construction of a new settle road nearby the enclave, residents of Khirbet Munther Al Gharbiya, situated in the southern part of the enclave, are obligated to use a tunnel to have access to the rest of the enclave. Inhabitants of Dhaher al Malih village are unable to enter Barta’a because they are not permitted to travel on the settler road. They thus live in an enclave within an enclave!

 

Furthermore, women originally from Dhaher al Malih village who have married into families living in communities on the other side of the barrier are unable