

**The Palestinian
Human Rights
Monitoring Group**



The PHRMG is a Palestinian, independent, non-governmental organisation working to end human rights violations committed against Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, regardless of those responsible. The members of the Monitoring Group believe that the strength of democracy and civil society in Palestinian society will be determined by the Palestinian people, through their defense or neglect of human rights.

Ahmad Jaber House
Behind Abu-Eisheh car sale
Beit Hanina
East Jerusalem
P.O.B. 19918 Jerusalem 91198
Via Israel
Tel.: + (972) 2 583 8189
Fax:: + (972) 2 583 7197

www.phrmg.org

Executive Director

Bassem Eid

Board of Directors

Taher al-Nammari Chairman
Dr. Assad Ghannem Deputy Chairman
Dahoud al-Qunbar Treasurer
Lu'ay Okkeh General Secretary
Nadwa Sarandah Member

Monitoring Committee

Dr. Mohammad Odeh
Dr. Waleed Mustafa
Dr. Adnan Musallam

**The Palestintian
Human Rights Monitor
Vol. 9, Issue #3, June 2006**

Research written By:

Hanan Kamar

Translated By:

Nadia Harhash

Design & additional editing By:

Said M.S Awadallah

The Democratic Problems In Palestine

Contents

1. Introduction	3
2. Key Questions Posted by the research.....	3
3. Major Hypothesis.....	3
4. Methodology	4
5. Section One	
5.1 The Palestinian Social and Political Environment	4
5.2 What are the basic components required to build a democratic system?	4
6. Section Two	
5.1 Era of Reform	7
5.2 Calls for an Internal Reform	8
5.3 Calls for Reform from External Forces	8
5.4 Conclusion	9

The PHRMG Board and Staff would like to extend special thanks to the many friends who have supported our activities on behalf of the Palestinians:


(The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of our contributors)

Finnish Representative Office to the PA

The Moriah Fund

Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMPEP)

PHRMG Previous Monitor Issue was *Human Rights: Between Abbas and Hamas (Vol.9, Issue #2, April 2006)* researched by: Jeff Morency.



Introduction:

Recently, the Palestinian community was engulfed in numerous demands to create a genuine democratic reform of the Palestinian political system due to an internal urgent need. Moreover, one question prevails: is the Palestinian local political environment qualified and has all the basic components for the survival and protection of such regime?

Basic tests and the analysis of real-life situations led to the conclusion that the local Palestinian political environment is not yet qualified to embrace a democratic system and to use it as the standard. The most important reasons that led to such conclusion are the absence of the supremacy of law standard, the lack of the separation of authorities, the weakness in the structure and performance, the lack of political, social, and economical institutions, the lack of an independent civil society, and the excessive power that the executive branch possesses over both the legislative and judicial branches of government.

Usually, the problems facing a Palestinian democracy are discussed from two viewpoints; the first claims that the Palestinian local political environment is capable of adopting a democratic form of government as a way of life, basing this opinion on the Palestinian experience after the 1948 Palestinian dispossession (Nakba) which resulted in the banishment and displacement of many instilling democratic beliefs in them such as tolerance and respect of others. People adopting this opinion also rely on the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) experience in exile as a way to regulate its internal affairs where they held elections and had multiple political parties to assure that their views advocate democracy in the Palestinian infrastructure.

The second viewpoint, however, opines that although some of the previously mentioned elements are present to support a Palestinian democracy they are not sufficient and are not an indicator of a clear democratic regime because elections, for instance, maybe used as a mechanism to repeatedly re-elect the ruling elite. Even if the faces in the government change that is no indicator of a democracy because pluralism is often used as an effective way to preserve the superiority of the ruling government. Therefore, people of this opinion believe the Palestinian local

political environment is not qualified and does not have the basic components to support and nurture good governance under a democratic political regime.

Believing that the Palestinian local political environment is qualified to adopt a democratic regime may be the result of a lack of understanding of democracy, a lack of an insight of reality or ignoring reality if such an insight is present, since there is a great difference between the availability of the characteristics of a democracy and the availability of vital characteristics to achieve a real democracy. Thus, it is important to draft strict values, and to establish institutions where democratic values are applied in real life.

Key Questions Posed by the Research:

1. Are there democratic values available in the Palestinian local political environment that organize relationships between individuals and social classes, state and the community, and between all branches of government?
2. Are there mechanisms in the legislature to strengthen the executive branch's monitoring and accountability? If such mechanisms are present, are they implemented or are they kept speculative?
3. What role does the institutions of the Palestinian civil society play in Palestinian life?
4. Was the Palestinian Authority's decision to reform the system an internal urgent need or was it due to external pressures? And how did the executive authority deal with such decision?

Major Hypothesis:

Currently, there is no possibility of creating a democratic Palestinian regime due to the absence of a favorable social and political environment and the absence of major components needed for such transformation. In addition, most reformist decisions since 2002 were not self made by the Palestinian Authority, rather, they were made in response to external pressures.

Methodology:

The research utilizes the descriptive analytical method to address the problem of democracy in Palestine.

The research is divided into two parts; the first section deals with the Palestinian political and social environment and the second part deals with reform.

Section One:

The Palestinian Social and Political Environment:

The social and political environment of any society is considered a representative of its political and social inheritance which defines the parameters and nature of the regime and outlines its prevalent social and political views. Social upbringing plays a great role in molding people's behaviors, attitudes and their social culture. Furthermore, the absence of a mature value system rooted in fundamental democratic values such as tolerance, acceptance of others, non-monopoly, respect of individual rights, and other democratic views that serve as a democracy's infrastructure, presents a great obstacle in the establishment of a democratic society.

Institutions that promote the social well-being in Arab regimes, in general, and the Palestinian regime, in part, are characterized as they neither promote individual or public freedoms, nor do they promote a culture based on principles of participation and respect of others; on the contrary, it reinforces the ideas of blind loyalty and obedience, and unbounded truth through the monopoly of decision making either by the father at home, the professor at school, the manager at work, or some other pattern.

Ali Watfa describes Arab culture as "filled with violence where violence is embedded in its education, therefore, dominion is a result of the authoritarian patriarchal Arab society, which leads to a distortion of reality and consciousness, and kills the soul for criticism and rational thinking." Consequently, this type of upbringing generates an authoritarian society that has a powerful socio-political dominion that is either embraced or disassembled by society. This creates obstacles for individuals in this society in embracing change in traditional regimes because they are not qualified psychologically and

sociologically to do so due to lack of self-confidence, and lack of confidence in others and those who rule which hinder the transition into a democracy and good governance.

On the political front, political inheritance is not much different than social inheritance due to their controversial relationship; no democratic regime can exist in a society that lacks the democratic views and a non-democratic regime cannot exist in a society that is democratic. According to Abdel Ghaffar Shukur, "Unless democratic values and ideals are the basis for social relationships, it is questionable that this society may become a political democracy." Generally, the main problem with Arab societies and the Palestinian society as a part of such society is that "the patriarchal view is the fundamental principle of Arab society and its existence, and such logic is used to support the dominion of one mind and one principle in society: state and family."

The Palestinian political life and democratic experiment have suffered from personalization of the political process and its historical connection with central and charismatic political figures with complete powers applied to the process of the Palestinian decision-making. Since 1967 until 2004, Palestinian politics have been intertwined with Yasser Arafat's character. Furthermore, according to Max Feeber, "it is not possible for an authority to stand on its own on the basis of charisma, and instead of being capable to support it, the authority will combat it, which makes a democratic transformation very difficult if not impossible. Therefore, the lack of a practical political and social institution, in light of a self-personalized authority, results in the unavailability of important elements to establish a democratic system, and the formation of an independent civil society reaching good governance."

What are the basic components required to build a democratic system?

In order to answer this question, one must differentiate between democratic elements and components because the existence of some elements does not result in a democratic regime; rather, it is a result of the existence of such regime. Therefore, the democratic components are required as an outline for a democratic regime. Democratic elements are numerous, including: the existence of multiple parties, the

existence of political elections, the effectiveness of civil society, the availability of individual freedoms, the existence of a legal system based on a Constitution, among many others. The availability of these elements does not necessarily provide a fitting environment for the prosperity of a democratic system because the components are what make a political environment in any society conducive to such system. These components include supremacy of the law, separation of powers, existence of effective mechanisms for accountability, monitoring and punishment, and the guarantee of individual rights and freedoms.

In order to be able to analyze the ability for such a system to emerge and prosper in Palestine, it is necessary to measure the availability of these components in the Palestinian political environment. Thus, after conducting a close analysis under strict scrutiny, one notes that the needed components are missing in the Palestinian political environment for several reasons, the ones most prevalent are:

First: The lack of supremacy of the law.

This principle contains the idea of submission to the law, and that such law is the source for all formal decisions concerning citizens' rights, freedoms, and property. Also, these laws must be issued by a legitimate source, and they must reflect the will of the people, while representing justice, moral values, and democracy. Based on these ideas and their availability, such principles help transform the political system from its personalized status that it suffers from, to an institutionalized status. The lack of a constitution is the major obstacle that prevents achieving this principle. In the Palestinian case, the best example for the lack of supremacy of the law is due to the lack of a constitution until now, although there were many attempts to draft one. In addition, disobedience of the law, weakness in the system, and the refusal to execute judicial and executive orders all contribute to the deterioration of this principle.

Second: Separation of Powers.

The most fundamental objective of the separation of powers in democratic regimes is to reduce the powers given to a specific branch of the government and to prevent abuse. It is noteworthy that two types of separation are needed to achieve a democracy: A horizontal

separation between the three branches of government, and a vertical separation between the administrative and political authorities with the goal to defend the executive authority from any interference and pressures exerted by the legislative authority.

As for the Palestinian situation, it is difficult to claim there is a real separation of powers because the executive branch also has influence over the judicial and legislative branches of government. For example, the president's issuance of an executive order granting the Supreme Court the interim government position which was declared in Article 81 Section 1 of the Judicial law for the year 2002, violates the judicial ideals and its independence, and reflects the empowerment of the executive branch over the other branches of government.

The main reason why authorities are intertwined and influenced by one another is due to the executive branch's procrastination until 2002 in approving the Palestinian Basic Law which resulted in the absence of a constitutional background that would set the limit of the relationship between the three branches of government. Many attempts to draft a constitution fell on deaf ears in 2003 because others attempted to create a parliamentary regime whose goal was to kill the idea of a democratic regime while replacing it with an authoritarian one that would send the idea of a constitution back to square one.

Third: Authority interaction in an appropriate, systematic, and orderly manner.

Elections are considered one of the most important ways for an authority to interact in an appropriate, systematic, and orderly manner, and they are the foundation for a legitimate regime and its laws. Elections, however, are not necessarily indicative of a legitimate interaction of authorities. In the Palestinian situation, the absence of presidential elections from 1996 until 2005, the period of Yasser Arafat's presidency, reveals the Palestinians' disregard for this principle. One question must be asked at this point: If the presidential and legislative council's terms are restricted to the transitional phase that officially ended in May 1999, why were elections not held thereafter, especially if it was possible to amend the Basic Law to set the presidential term for four years with only one chance to be re-elected?

This reality leads one to say that the Palestinian Authority could have made such decision long ago, but it did not want to. In other words, there was an intentional disregard for such decision. In spite of all this, the Palestinian elections set for January 25th, 2006, might help establish a foundation for transferring the Palestinian regime from the personalized regime that it suffers from to the rational, legal authority that Feeber discussed, which is the best form of government because it is based on the idea that one is loyal to the institution and not to individuals.

Fourth: Monitoring and Accountability

At this time, the Palestinian situation lacks the mechanism necessary for the monitoring and accountability of the executive branch; although such mechanism exists in the rule books, it is not applied in real life. This mechanism loses its influence, also, due to the authority's indifferent behavior towards it. Issuing orders in the name of the Palestinian authority which includes many ministers, members of the PLO and negotiation groups, amongst the president, caused the deterioration of the monitoring and accountability principle.

Furthermore, other practices negatively influenced the accomplishment of this principle. According to the legal researcher Isam Abdeen, "the private committee's report about corruption that was issued in June 1997 was full of alterations and amendments which led to the Palestinian Legislative Council's contribution in invalidating the report because how else can one explain the cabinet's approval of a government that is made up of ministers who were accused of corruption?"

What about the Palestinian civil society's role in light of this personalized authority?

Civil society can be defined as "the sum of all free organizations that voluntarily help fulfill its citizens' goals by adhering to democratic values, not necessarily striving to become a part of authority." Based on this definition, it is necessary to understand that political parties who compete for power should not be considered a part of civil society. Furthermore, civil society is controversially correlated with democracy; therefore, civil society cannot prosper without a democratic political environment and thus, this system can only be accomplished by the people

and not by an executive order or an external donor party's pressures.

The importance of a civil society in a democratic life-style is perceived through the accomplishment of two duties: First, improving the relationship between individuals and society that they are obligated to respect, such as creed, race, ethnicity, etc. while embracing the one to help accomplish their goals through democratic means; therefore, civil society's role is an education-based one. Second, serving as a protective shield to protect society from the executive authority's intrusions; thus, it is necessary to mention that the government does not produce society, rather, due to the vast difference in society's goals, individuals resort to creating a government which helps transform it from its normal status to an orderly one, providing it with the right to use force to maintain law and order. For this reason, society has an important role to exercise democracy and to train individuals to do so.

Palestinian civil society, however, differs. Some researchers, such as Ziad Abu Omar, consider its existence a reality as was mentioned in his book "Civil Society and the Democratic Transformation in Palestine," while others, such as Dr. AlJarbawi consider it completely absent where in his discussion of Abu Omar's book he opined that, "the components are a necessity for the existence of a civil society, and without them society cannot prosper even if some societal elements existed. Without the necessary components, the elements are nothing more than a hollow skeleton."

This study adapts the second viewpoint, previously mentioned, which opines that Palestinian life lacks an influential civil society due to many reasons, namely:

First: The absence of a powerful judicial and legislative authority. According to Dr. George Jockman, "the parliament and the judicial authority are two essential elements for a democratic nation because not only are they important for a democracy but they are essential for its preservation." In the Palestinian case, the executive authority controls both the legislative and judicial authorities which led to the absence of the most important requirement for the existence and maintenance of a democratic society.

Second: The majority of society's organizations were created by direct orders of the PLO or the Palestinian Authority; therefore, political issues were the priority in these organizations rather than social ones.

Third: Cultural relations and ideals are still the strongest and most controlling factor in social relations; meaning, the required social institution has not been established which means that at the present time, the possibility of establishing a democratic political regime in Palestine is very slim.

Section Two:

Era of Reform:

There were multiple calls for an internal reform to remedy the corruption widespread in the Palestinian Authority's institutions. It, however, fell on deaf ears, whether from the Palestinian Authority or society, which led to an overall corruption of the Palestinian Authority.

The 1996-1997 Public Monitoring Association's report, a monitoring mechanism to monitor ministries and public institutions, unraveled corruption widespread in institutions and security devices and shed light on the absence of monitoring mechanisms. The report's findings raised red flags and suggested a reform in the Palestinian Authority's institutions.

The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) formed a special committee, after reviewing the report, to monitor the situation. In reality, however, the PLC and the President worked on weakening the committee, which is indicative of the ineffectiveness, dependence, and impartiality of the PLC and the executive authority's control over it.

To clarify, it is important to discuss the decisions made by the PLC. On the 27th and 28th of May, 1997, the PLC issued order # 169/11/2; Article 2 ordered "the creation of a joint committee between the monitoring, budget and financial committees in order to discuss the monitoring report, taking into consideration the PLC, after three weeks from its issuance."

On the 28th thru the 31st of July, 1997, order # 195/16/2 followed, whose Article 1 "asked President Arafat to reconstruct his cabinet to include those who are qualified and have great

credentials, in a period not exceeding the month of September." Article 3, however, contradicted the aforementioned article, where it stated that the report should be "referred to the President, including proposals and documents by members and ministers, to examine them and to take all necessary actions to evaluate them."

The PLC's issuance of Article 3 is a compromise to give up its power and influence over the judicial authority, and to give up its weapons while referring the entire file to the judiciary so criminal lawsuits can be brought against responsible parties for spending public funds and causing corruption. Such action taken by the PLC reflects the negative role the Palestinian Parliament plays in dealing with the executive authority.

On the 6th thru 8th of January, 1998, order # 235/26/2 was issued, Article 1 stated "the entire file is to be referred to the President to take necessary action" and most importantly, Article 3 declared "the termination of the debate and controversy over the report in the Legislative Council."

It is prevalent that the PLC terminated this file without accomplishing any of its missions which is indicative of most of its members' dishonesty, and lack of qualification. It is also indicative of the executive authority's power over other authorities demonstrating the lack of a real separation of powers, an essential component for the existence of a democratic regime. It is important to note that the 1997 Monitoring Association's report was the association's first and last report until the present time, which is a direct contradiction of the Palestinian basic law which insists on an annual PLC report about the performance of the ministries and public institutions.

The second internal call for reform in the Palestinian Authority's institutions was introduced by Michelle Richard's report which was prepared by Dr. Khalil Al Shakaki and Dr. Yazeed Sayegh in 1999 (named after the former French Prime Minister) where it revealed a structural defect in the Palestinian Authority's ministries and institutions, where it diagnosed the defect and offered necessary recommendations to alleviate it. The report urged the Palestinian Authority to adopt a formal constitution, to establish a system to monitor the executive authority, to guarantee

the independence of the judiciary and to strengthen the Palestinian public institutions.

The report also focused on what it considered essential steps to form an effective state that is democratic through a formal constitution, an independent judicial system, and police force under civilian control.

In addition, the report clarified that the major challenge that faces the development of public institutions is not technical, systematic or financial, rather, it is political. It further alerted that the most dangerous result upon the Palestinian Authority through the defects of its institutions will most likely be political.

Nevertheless, the administration has not made any real response to these demands because there is no political will to make structural reforms.

However, the authority that had been warned twice through “the Monitoring Authority’s report” and through “Richard’s report” did not pay attention to these warnings until the defects were brought to light through the Israeli incursions in the Palestinian-controlled areas in April of 2002, and after the prolongation of the Aqsa Intifada which erupted in September 2000. The Palestinian Authority’s total disability in defending itself socially and economically, and the lack of a plan to execute in emergency situations were revealed by the incursions.

As a result of this incursion that destroyed the Palestinian lands and the Palestinian Authority’s infrastructure, calls for reform increased internally and externally.

Calls for an Internal Reform:

On May 15th, 2002, President Yasser Arafat’s speech directed at the PLC was considered the first official call for a comprehensive reform. One day after the speech, on May 16th, 2002, the PLC issued a statement reform to identify defects and to outline a plan for reform.

What matters, however, is this was the Legislative Council’s response to the excessive demands of the executive authority, or to be precise, to President Arafat’s demands, and it was not an initiative taken by the Legislative Council. The order issued by the Council stated that “the Palestinian Legislative Council listened

to President Arafat’s speech given in Ramallah and Gaza on the 15th and 16th of May, 2005 and to what it contained from explicit calls for a strong administrative and financial reform.”

Some of the most important suggestions made by the Palestinian Legislative Council were the establishment of a real separation of powers, the creation of a reliable monitoring and accountability system, the insistence of the executive authority’s ratification of the basic law, and the implementation of legitimate elections, etc.

Following this reform statement, a committee of ministers for reform was formed (the 100 day plan) on the 12th of June, 2002, and a wider national committee was formed which contained twenty five members, including ministers and PLC members, and members from both the public and private sectors, lead by Yaser Abed Rabbu. Afterwards, a reform document was issued by civil society organizations in the summer of 2002.

Furthermore, two main points should be noted about the internal reform procedures: first, the initiative for reform was taken by the executive authority (Yaser Arafat) and not a joint decision by the legislative and executive authorities; it also did not contain any input from civil organizations. Second, those reform procedures would not have seen the light if it weren’t for the Israeli incursions.

Calls for Reform from External Forces:

President George Bush’s statement in June 2002 is considered the first official call from an outside force for a Palestinian reform. President Bush considered reform as a way to progress towards the peace process. In July 2002, the quartet committee’s (United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations) efforts followed which held workshops to reform the Palestinian Authority’s institutions on both the external and internal levels.

This was followed by the “Road Map” in October 2002, with its three phases, which required the efforts of both sides, especially the Palestinian side. This plan stresses the importance of the progression of the reform process in the Palestinian Authority’s institutions as a condition to proceed from one level to the next.

Through this plan, one notes that it stresses the need for reform of the Palestinian Authority's institutions. The first phase contained a number of objectives which include building Palestinian institutions, drafting a Palestinian constitution, conducting free and honest elections, achieving a real separation of powers, and forming an independent electoral committee reviewed by the Legislative Council. The second phase, however, was set to begin after the Palestinian elections, and among the goals set for this phase: a new prime minister position with authority. Finally, the third phase finally stressed the importance of reform and the maintenance of it.

Based on that, the President became interested in reform because he could not proceed in the peace process without achieving an internal reform imposed upon him by outside forces. Therefore, one can understand the cause of many political developments and their decisions. For example, the president ratified both the Palestinian basic law on the 7th of July, 2002, and the Judicial Authority law that same year. The Prime Minister position was initiated in the meeting of the Legislative Council that was held on the 29th of April, 2003, and hence, the Prime Minister position was formed even though its "authority" is still a controversial topic. The authority's resources were unified under the Financial Ministry. Some security devices such as the police, the protective forces, and the civil defense became a part of the Ministry of the Interior. A central electoral committee was formed to prepare for the elections. Finally, the Palestinian Legislative Council ratified the Palestinian elections law on the 18th of June, 2005, amending the 1996 law, and other procedures that were taken during that period of time.

Although the Palestinian decision-makers followed all the aforementioned procedures for reform, the system did not succeed in facing the political obstacles it encountered. Based on the Palestinian Bureau for Political Researches and surveys' 2003/2004 report entitled "The Democratic Apparatus in Palestine," the indicator reached 430 points out of a possible 1000, compared to 1996/1997's indicator that reached 563 points. That period witnessed a genuine launch in the political system, holding elections that three-fourths of the eligible voters participated in.

There are three main reasons that caused the deterioration of the Palestinian democratic situation, they are: first, a great gap exists within the legislative and the political systems, therefore, it is necessary to improve mechanisms to enhance the position of the Legislative Council and its monitoring role. The general monitoring committee needs to be encouraged to provide the Council with an annual report reviewing the performance of the public organizations and ministries. Second, the Palestinian traditional society imposes certain ideals upon its people, therefore, it is important to emphasize an active social security system, to provide an illiteracy-elimination program, to encourage civil society organizations to conduct annual elections to elect their leaders, to activate the civil service law, and to monitor the implementation of anti-discrimination laws against women. Third, Palestine lacks strong and effective organizations, therefore, it is necessary to abide by the basic law, especially laws that insure a true separation of powers, enhance monitoring of the executive authority, and assure judicial independence and the active implementation of court orders.

Conclusion:

Democracy is an outlet and not an independent goal that reflects the political, social, and economical status that are based on democratic beliefs such as tolerance, respect of others, truth suppression and decision-making. This can only be accomplished through a real separation of powers, supremacy of the law, and providing the legislative authority with the necessary mechanisms to monitor the executive authority and to provide an equal opportunity for all citizens to compete for power.

The Palestinian experience in moving towards a democracy is characterized with a. the existence of a national authority and military occupation, simultaneously, which disparages the authority, b. the Palestinian Authority's reliance on donations which results in outside interferences with the Palestinian Authority from the donor countries, c. central authority's lack of authority where parts of the country suffers from the lack of law and order.

The Palestinian political and social environment is considered unqualified and lacks the basic components to establish a democratic regime and that is due to several factors; most important is the authoritarian society and the

Palestinian patriarchal society which teaches generations to be authoritarian. Also, marginalizing the respect of order in political life and supremacy of the law ideals creates a lack of separation of powers between the three authorities and causes the executive authority to dominate the other authorities and their duties. Therefore, the Palestinian Authority lacks an effective and honest legislative authority which contributes to its ill-qualification for establishing a democracy.

the acceptance of others, tolerance, respect of others, among other democratic beliefs.

Although there were many calls for reform of the Palestinian institutions, like the one posed by the Monitoring Authority's 1997 report, and the one called for by Richard's in 1999, these calls fell on deaf ears which is an indicator of the government's unwillingness to rid itself of corruption, leading the way to good governance.

Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority ignored those who warned it that corruption had spread throughout its institutions, threatened its existence, and exposed its defects. It is noteworthy that the Palestinian Authority's attitude towards reform changed only with the intervention of outside forces. Therefore, a few questions should be asked: Why did the Palestinian Authority ignore internal calls for reform? Is it because these calls were proposals rather than compulsory like the ones imposed by outside forces? And does the Authoritarian social and political upbringing play a role in such behavior, meaning, is the authority figure unable to make decisions unless they were orders given by a more powerful source?

In order for the Palestinian political and social system to rid itself of corruption and to progress towards democracy, it has to, first and foremost, work on instilling democratic values in all its social institutions and using it as a basis for all relationships. Dr. Al-Zoubeidi believes that "a democratic political culture cannot prosper unless it receives the blessings of the ruling party who usually adopts it out of necessity, especially when other alternatives are more costly, and therefore, this culture gradually spreads among society."

Finally, it is necessary to establish a political process allowing the creation of a strong, more independent society. This political process should not be controlled by forces to enable it to accomplish its duties, to allow its members to practice their democratic rights, and to build a genuine democratic culture based on

References:

1. The carpets, Osama Swytaat, Nayef 2004: Fattah involvement (the ruling party) and the Fattah cadres working at the practical ministries and their consolidation to the reform, (incidents of workshop). Beir Zeit: Institute of Ibrahim Abu Loghed for international studies.
2. Dr. Abu-Amr, Ziad 1995: The civil society and the democratic conversion in Palestine. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
3. Aalbdyry, Moussa and others 1995: The Palestinian democracy, banknotes. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
4. Dr. Aljrbaawy, Ali 1999: The legal structure and the democratic conversion in Palestine. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
5. Al-Rais, Nasser 2005: The Palestinian judiciary, values of the honesty and versification of the accountability and the transparence. Ramallah: The coalition for the sake of the honesty and the accountability, AMAN.
6. Dr. Al-Zubeidi, Bassem 2003: The political education of the Palestinian. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
7. Dr. Al-Shikakee , Khalil and others 2004: Democratic measures in Palestine, general report 2003-2004. Ramallah: The Palestinian center for political and Christian research.
8. Al'aze'r, Mohammed Khaled 1996: The political regime and the democratic conversion in Palestine. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
9. Bishara, A'Azme 1996: The questioning and the Questionability, Series of democratic principles. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
10. Bishara, A'Azme 1996: The pluralism and the tolerance, Series of democratic principles. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
11. Bishara, A'Azme 1996: Operation of the legislation, Series of democratic principles. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
12. Bishara, A'Azme 1995: Supremacy of the law, Series of democratic principles. Ramallah: Places Palestinian organizations to study democracy.
13. Shukr, Abd-AlGfaar. Dr.Morrow, Mohammed 2003: The role of the society in building democracy. Syrian: Dar Al-Feker in Damascus.
14. Dr. Awwad, Talib 2004: The electoral composition and the elections in Palestine. Beir Zeit: Journalism Institute at Beir Zeit.

We have recently established PHRMG as a 501 c (3) tax exempt organization in the United States. We are establishing a US board to support the mission and activities of PHRMG. Donations to PHRMG in the US may now be tax deductible under US tax laws. We welcome your continued support and make payments to PHRMG (EIN 83-0397275)

EIN documentation can be found on the following web link:

[http://www.phrmg.org/Tax Exemption Approval Letter.pdf](http://www.phrmg.org/Tax%20Exemption%20Approval%20Letter.pdf)

c/o DAVID B. GARDNER
6300 Wilshire Blvd. # 1010, Los Angeles, CA 90048

www.phrmg.org
Tel. (323) 653-4514
Fax. (323) 651-5938

The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG) is a Palestinian, independent, non-governmental organization working to end human rights violations committed against Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, regardless of those responsible. The members of the Monitoring Group believe that the strength of democracy and civil society in Palestinian society will be determined by the Palestinian people, through their defense or neglect of human rights.

P.O. Box 19918
East Jerusalem 91198
www.phrmg.org
tel. 972-2-583-8189
fax. 972-2-583-7197