The Human Rights Face

of Poverty

in the West Bank

                              RoNu 2006: Woman begging  in East Jerusalem

Whenever we lift one soul from a life of poverty,

we are defending human rights.

And whenever we fail in this mission, we are failing human rights.

Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances,

to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights,

their religious convictions and practices, and their manner and customs.

…they shall at all times, be humanely treated.

Geneva Convention IV, Article 27

Index

Summary

1. Research objective and methodology
2. Background: Poverty in context, January-June 2006

2.1              Intensification of security measures and restriction of movement

2.2              Adoption of fiscal measures

2.3              Deep crisis and massive poverty

2.4              The Quartet’ s Temporary Mechanism

3. Poverty and the human rights framework

3.1              The concept of poverty

3.2              The human rights approach to poverty

4. Poverty, basic capabilities and human rights in the oPt

4.1              Identifying basic capabilities

4.2              Human Rights in focus

5. Applicable Legal Framework

5.1              International Human Rights Law, IHRL

5.2              International Humanitarian Law, IHL

5.3              Other applicable laws and instruments

6.       Closure measures and freedom of movement in the West Bank

6.1              Internal closures: violation of human rights and cause of poverty

6.2              Horizontal fragmentation of the West Bank

6.3              The impact of external closures

6.4              The West Bank Wall

7.       The right to work

7.1              The right to work and poverty reduction

7.2              Unemployment in the oPt

7.3              The impact of internal closures

7.4              The impact of external closures

7.5              The impact of economic measures adopted by Israel and external donors

7.6              The obligation of Israel to respect, protect and fulfil

8.       The right to food

8.1              Food insecurity affects the poorest and most vulnerable

8.2              The obligations to respect, protect and fulfil

8.3              Food accessibility and the duties to respect and fulfil

8.4              Physical accessibility to food

8.5              Settlers’ violence and the duty to protect

8.6              Economic accessibility to food

8.7              Food availability in the West Bank

8.8              Physical and economic accessibility to water

8.9              The obligation to fulfil the right to food: food assistance in the oPt

9.       The Right to Health

9.1              The impact of closures

9.2              The right to health and the obligations to respect and protect

9.3              The impact of economic measures adopted by Israel and external donors

9.4              Ill health as a consequence and cause of poverty

9.5              Violation of the right to health: availability, quality and economic accessibility

10.   Other human rights

10.1           The right to education

10.2           The right to family life

10.3           The right to self-determination

11.   Poverty reduction and human rights: failures and responsibilities

11.1           Assistance and poverty reduction: the problem of targeting

11.2           Poverty reduction strategies in the oPt

Conclusions and Recommendations

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAP          Consolidated Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territories

CCPR        Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

CEDAW    Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women

CERD        Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

CESCR      Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

CRC          Convention on the Rights of the Child

EU             European Union

FAO          Food Agricultural Organisation

ICRC         International Committee of the Red Cross

IDs             Identity Documents

IDF            Israeli Defence Forces

IHL            International Humanitarian Law

IHRL         International Human Rights Law

ILO            International Labour Organisation

IUED         Institute on Development Studies of the University of Geneva

JWC          Joint Water Committee

MoA          Ministry of Agriculture

MoH          Ministry of Health

MoPIC      Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

MoSA        Ministry of Social Affairs

MSF          Médecins Sans Frontières

MTDP       Medium Term Development Plan

NGOs        Non-Governmental Organisations

OCHA       Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR    Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

oPt             Occupied Palestinian Territories

PA             Palestinian Authority

PCBS        Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

PHRMG    Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group

PPA           Participatory Poverty Assessment Project

PWA         Palestinian Water Authority

SHCP        Social Hardship Cases Programme

SSN           Social Safety Net Programme

UN            United Nations

UNDP       United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF    United Nations Children’s Fund

UNRWA   United Nations Relief and Works Agency

USD          US Dollars

WaSH        Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Programme

WBWB      West Bank Water Department

WFP          World Food Programme

WHA         World Health Assembly

WHO         World Health Organisation

Acknowledgements

This report was researched and written by a researcher of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG). The PHRMG is grateful to all friends who read early drafts of the report and provided valuable research advice and comments, to R.D. who conducted proofreading and final checks and RoNu who took the meaningful images used in this report.

A special thanks goes to the Institute of Development Studies of Geneva (IUED), for its invaluable support and cooperation and to several UN agencies, in particular, the WFP, FAO, WHO, OCHA and the UNDP for the useful information and assistance given.

The PHRMG also acknowledges with appreciation representatives of the PA Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Social Affairs, who agreed to be interviewed for this report.

The organisation also wishes to thank the Israeli, Palestinian and international non-governmental organisations and the many individuals who contributed with their expertise and suggestions to this research.

Summary

Over the past six months, the humanitarian and economic situation has seriously deteriorated in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), mainly as a result of the intensification of Israeli security measures, the withholding of tax revenues collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA) by Israel and the freeze of direct budget assistance to the PA by international donors. The adoption of the Quartet Temporary Mechanism to deliver assistance by-passing the PA, has not alleviated the suffering of the Palestinian people. In this context poverty has risen sharply, so that the majority of Palestinians are now considered to be poor.

This report addresses poverty through the lens of human rights, therefore understanding poverty as a phenomenon driven by human rights violations. It covers the period January-June 2006, focusing specifically on the West Bank.

After presenting the main features of a human rights approach to poverty, this report identifies the main human rights violations that either cause, perpetuate or, to a lesser extent, result from poverty in the oPt. It also documents those violations and analyses their impact on the poor and vulnerable groups applying the human rights legal framework. Furthermore, it reaffirms the concept of interdependence of human rights, highlighting how the enjoyment of some rights, may depend or contribute to the enjoyment of other rights and, at the same time, the violation of some may lead to the violation of others. And it evaluates the importance of mainstreaming human rights into poverty reduction strategies. Finally, it gives recommendations to several actors who bear the responsibility to reduce poverty in the oPt, acknowledging that poverty reduction is not a question of charity or welfare. Rather, it is a legal obligation.

This report gives details of the findings of research covering the period January-June 2006. Its objective consists of providing an analysis of poverty through the lens of human rights. The intent is therefore to address poverty as a phenomenon resulting from and causing itself human rights violations.

The analysis is mainly focused on the West Bank because a report on poverty in the Gaza Strip has been recently issued by a well known human rights organization. The intention is therefore not to duplicate the efforts.

This research has relied on reports that used both qualitative as well as quantitative methods in measuring/assessing poverty, evaluating that an integration of both allows for a more comprehensive understanding of a very complex issue.

The concept of poverty used in this report refers to the non-fulfillment of a person’s human rights to a range of basic capabilities – to do and be the things he or she has reasons to value[1].

The analytical human rights-based framework applied has been developed using as main sources of reference the Draft Guidelines on Human Rights and Poverty Reduction[2] and the Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Conceptual Framework[3] of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). This has had implications on the direction of the research.

In accordance with the OHCHR indications, the research began with the identification of the capabilities that Palestinians consider basic enough for their failure to count as poverty. Priority has been given to those capabilities that the OHCHR suggests are considered basic in most societies.[4] With a view to confirming whether these capabilities are basic in the Palestinian society and to identify other capabilities to be possibly added to the given list, it was fundamental to collect data on perceptions of Palestinians. Unfortunately, due to time and resource constraints, it was impossible to carry out field research. Nonetheless, to the stated purpose, the research could count on the results of the Pro-Participatory Planning Project, jointly undertaken in 2002 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This project consisted of conducting the Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA), by using a qualitative methodology. This meant consulting Palestinians on the concept and causes of poverty, as well as on the strategies to reduce it[5]. Interviews, focus groups and workshops were conducted with Palestinians from 63 localities, representing towns, camps and villages in the 16 Palestinian Districts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the report was published in 2002, both the UNDP and the MOPIC believe that the findings are still valid and the MOPIC refers to them in its studies.

In addition, this research took into account the results of the Palestinian Living Conditions Surveys Project, run by the Institute on Development Studies of the University of Geneva (IUED), in cooperation with several other partners including UN Agencies[6]. Using quantitative survey methodology, the project provides information on Palestinian public perceptions on poverty, assistance, impact and needs. The results of the IUED Poll n.10 were consulted as soon as available in order to assess Palestinians’ perception of poverty in the period December 2005-May 2006. The findings were compared with the PPA results.

Furthermore, the monitoring of recent reports as well as of media materials produced on the current crisis by several sources, confirmed that it was impacting on several sectors in particular, leading to the impoverishment or further impoverishment of Palestinians.

Going through these three methodological steps, it was possible to identify those capabilities  whose failure has resulted in poverty in the oPt, in the period covered by this research.

Once capabilities had been identified, the second step consisted in reading the capability failure in terms of rights, therefore applying the human rights legal framework to the analysis. This has led to the exposure of specific human rights violations that are causes and/or consequences of poverty, consider the poor as claim holders, identify duty holders and point out their legal obligations. Since the West Bank has the status of Occupied Land, International Humanitarian Law was also used in the legal analysis.

To document specific violations of human rights, this report relied on information from international organizations and agencies, including the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as Israeli and Palestinian governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions. In addition, it took into account information given in IUED Report n.10 and emerging from the analysis of cross tabulations of IUED Poll n. 10, using poverty both as dependent and independent variable.

To gather information or discuss the findings, interviews have also been conducted with international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies, as well as with Israeli and Palestinian governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions.

Following the outcome of the January election of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the victory of the Hamas party, the Government of Israel and external donors have adopted a variety of measures that have negatively affected the economic, humanitarian and security sectors causing a crisis situation in the oPt and resulting in the serious deterioration of human rights of Palestinians and in massive poverty. Those that have produced the most significant impact are:

-         intensification of Israeli security measures;

-         Israeli restrictions of movements of people and goods;

-         Israel’ s suspension of transfer to the PA, VAT and custom taxes;

-         freeze of direct budget assistance by external donors.

Furthermore, some additional developments are of particular importance: the banking crisis in the oPt; the increased tension between Fatah and Hamas, mainly in the Gaza Strip; and the escalation in the conflict in the Gaza Strip, following an attack by Palestinian militants on an Israeli army post at Kerem Shalom and the launch of operation “Summer Rain” by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) at the end of June. A brief overview is provided below.

2.1 Intensification of security measures and restriction of movement

Since late 2005 and through the first six months of 2006, Israel has tightened its security measures, including incursions and military operations, internal closures and restrictions on movement of people and goods in and out of  the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as within the two regions. In mid July, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) counted 536 physical obstacles in the West Bank (as compared to 402 in December 2005)[7]. In some areas, such as Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and South of Hebron, the combination of roadblocks, checkpoints and movement restrictions, has de facto isolated Palestinian communities in enclaves[8]. In addition, as of May 2006, 51% of the construction of the Wall was completed, most of which inside the West Bank. A system of permits regulating access to many routes within the West Bank, makes movement even more difficult.

Israel has also increased external closures which have caused a consistent decline in labor flows and limitations of movements of people and goods from the West Bank to Israel and between Gaza/West Bank and third countries. Trade restrictions have produced a strong negative impact on the market and Palestinian economy in general. Despite the Agreement on Movement and Access of 15 November 2005, Karni Crossing, the only existing crossing for exports and import of goods in and out of Gaza has been frequently closed in the first quarter of 2006, causing a shortage of essential food supplies, including wheat flour, fruits and dairy products and badly affecting Gaza export market[9]. Although Rafah terminal could have been an alternative to Karni for exports to third countries, in practice, movements across the terminal have been impossible, due to Israel’s prohibition to Egyptian trucks and Palestinian tracks (traveling outside the Egyptian border either to export products or only to transfer goods to Egyptian tracks) to enter or re-enter Gaza[10].

2.2 Adoption of fiscal measures

The situation in the oPt has become even more critical because of the decision of Israel not to transfer revenues to the PA despite the agreement under the Paris Protocol of 1994[11]. According to the Protocol, Israel should remit to the PA, VAT and custom taxes collected in Israel on goods destined for the Gaza Strip and West Bank, which, in 2005, amounted to approximately 13% of GDI[12]. Israel withholding of  revenues, is the primary cause of the PA liquidity crisis in 2006[13]. In May 2006, the World Bank considered that in case the financial situation did not change or, in case of intensification of fiscal strictures, the amount of the PA domestic revenues would decline to US$ 25 million and no banking system would be available to distribute this money[14]. Banks have already been applying restrictions on loans and some have refused to transfer money to the PA.

The fiscal compression has been worsened by the suspension of external donors’ assistance to the PA for almost 5 months. Direct assistance[15] was halted after the Hamas Government refused to agree on Quartet principles of non-violence, recognition of the State of Israel and the acceptance of previous agreements.

2.3 Deep crisis and massive poverty

Since the end of May 2006, noting the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation, the UN has provided a monthly assessment of the situation and changes occurred, using both humanitarian indicators and field observation.[16] In both May and June, the UN reported about fuel shortages in the West Bank, including fuel destined to hospitals and the PA Ministry of Health (MoH) vehicles. According to the findings, the MoH have experienced shortages resulting in reduced medical supplies and essential drugs, non-maintenance of medical equipment and reduced number of surgical operations. Also the social assistance sector has already felt the deleterious effect of the crisis. Starting from January, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), have not been able to guarantee cash assistance to 45.000 Palestinian families, classified as social hardship cases and have stopped the job creation projects. As a result, the poorest of the poor in the West Bank have been deprived of income. The educational sector, on the other hand, has not being strongly affected by the crisis as yet and the UN predicts that the impact of the fiscal crisis will be fully felt only at the beginning of the new school year. 

The IUED most recent survey points to the fact that this catastrophic situation has resulted in such a sharp increase in  poverty, that it is estimated that the poverty rates in the oPt currently stand at 70% and more specifically, 71% in the West Bank, 35% in East Jerusalem and 79% in the Gaza Strip. Extreme poverty rates stand at 38% in the oPt, and respectively 33% in the West Bank, 17% in Jerusalem and 54% in the Gaza Strip. Poverty rates have increased substantially in refugee camps, from 39% in July 2005 to 52% in May 2006, reaching a peak of 45% in West Bank refugee camps and 55% in Gaza refugee camps. Living conditions drastically deteriorated also in villages, where in May, 74% of the surveyed households were poor. Apparently the most affected are the poor, who have been impoverished further and are now considered as extremely poor. [17]

Very alarmingly, an increasing number of Palestinians consider they do not have the capacity to keep up financially in the coming period and this is evident for those already living in extreme poverty (28%).[18] In addition, 53% of surveyed households in the West Bank, declared they felt insecure due to the economic crisis.

The same worrying situation is given by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), who estimates that poverty rates in the oPt, in the second quarter of 2006 have reached 65.8% of households if income data is used (70.3% of the Population in the oPt); by geographic location, they stand at 54.6% in the West Bank and 887.7% in Gaza. Deep poverty rates among Palestinian households have reached 55.6%, distributed by 43.2% in the West Bank and 79.8% in Gaza. [19]

Therefore, data by PCBS and the IUED does not differ much and shows a situation of massive poverty.

Poverty has increased more sharply among PA employees who have not received their salaries for five months, rising from 37% in 2005 to 46% in 2006 (of the 46%, 10% are the poorest and 36% are the poor).[20]

Furthermore, as in fact predicted by international institutions, the non-payment of PA security personnel, has led to a rise in insecurity and higher death rates and incidents, in particular in the Gaza Strip. On the one hand, internal clashes have intensified (as of June, 85 family or factional feuding incidents were recorded by OCHA, causing the killing of 36 people, including one child, and the injuring of 193 people, including 24 children) and factionalism has increased also as a consequence of the deployment of the 3.000 “Executive Support Force” created by the PA Ministry of Interior and declared illegal by the Palestinian President. On the other hand, violence has also been directed at Israel, as has happened with the attack on an Israeli army post at Kerem Shalom, the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and the abduction and killing of a civilian which caused the launch of operation “Summer Rain” in Gaza by the IDF at the end of June. The ongoing military operation has exacerbated the hardship and living conditions of the population and created a further spiral of violence.

2.4 The Quartet’ s Temporary Mechanism

To face the serious situation, on 9 May, Members of the Quartet supported the creation of a temporary international mechanism, “limited in scope and duration, transparent and accountable” to ensure direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people, without the money passing to or through the PA government.

On 19/20 June, in occasion of the visit to Israel of EU Commissioner for External Relations, Ferrero-Waldner, the mechanism was presented. It consists of three elements:

1. the Emergency Services Support Programme of the World Bank: the intention is to expand the programme to guarantee the coverage of essential supplies in the health sector and basic allowances to those who are providing care in hospitals and clinics; (VERIFFICARE p. 65 approx. R 2 Helth-critica SR)
2.  the Interim Emergency Relief Contribution of the European Commission: the plan is to reinforce this channel so to ensure the supply of essential utilities, such as fuel;
3. the Need Based Allowance Programme: it will be supported by the European Commission and hopefully, by other donors and will lead to the creation of a social safety net. This implies the establishment of a fund to make payments directly to bank accounts of Palestinians in greatest need. 625.000 people will benefit from social allowances under the programme.

Part one and two of the mechanism have been launched already, while  the third part will start up in September.

Commenting on the cut of funds by donor countries and agencies, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories said that “the Palestinian people have been subjected to possibly the most rigorous form of international sanctions imposed in modern times” and expressed the opinion that the limited support provided through the Temporary Mechanism, “will ameliorate the humanitarian situation but will not alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people”[21]. Sharing the same opinion, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health stated that: although a step in the right direction, the emergency plan does not fulfil the donors’ responsibility to provide health assistance in the oPt[22].

In the meantime, to respond to the impact of the fiscal crisis facing the PA and the disastrous effects on the population, the UN have revised the Consolidated Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territories (CAP), which has been increased from US$ 215 million to US$ 385 million. As pointed out in the new CAP, launched on 31^st May, “most of the new funding being sought is in the sector of temporary jobs and cash assistance to the most vulnerable, medical supplies to PA institutions and food to the growing most at-risk groups identified by UNRWA and the WFP”.[23] However, UN Agencies are still of the opinion that the new funding will alleviate the worst effects of the humanitarian crisis, but that: a lasting solution lies in a fully functioning PA and the easing of movement restrictions on Palestinians[24].

Poverty is not only deprivation of economic or material resources, but a violation of human dignity too. Indeed no social phenomenon is as comprehensive in its assault on human rights as poverty.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights[25]

3.1 The concept of poverty

Conventionally, poverty is understood in terms of lack of income (income poverty) or lack of purchasing power to secure basic needs (consumption poverty) and is considered in absolute or relative terms.

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, poverty has been mainly referred to as “relative poverty” and “subsistence poverty”. The first is based on the standards of living in a society at a given time; the second, on the cost of satisfying the minimum caloric intakes as established by the Food Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO), plus a basic allowance for non-food items, such as clothing and shelter. The World Bank considers that in crisis situations, it is important to look at the former, as an indicator of the potential humanitarian crisis.

In the oPt, the “relative poverty line” is calculated by the World Bank as spending less than USD 2.20 per person per day, while the “subsistence poverty line”, sometimes defined as “deep poverty line” or “absolute poverty line”, is calculated as spending less than USD 1.60 per person per day[26].

In addition, in 1997, the National Commission for Poverty Alleviation developed an official definition of poverty, including both the concept of relative and absolute poverty.[27].

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics base their statistics on poverty on the official definition of poverty and accordingly, have developed two poverty lines based on a budget of basic needs for an household of 2 adults and 4 children: the absolute poverty line calculated to reflect a budget for food, clothing and housing and the relative poverty line, which also includes other necessities, such as health care, education, transportation, personal care and housing supplies.[28] In 2005, the relative poverty line was calculated as standing at USD 477 per person per month, and the absolute poverty line as standing at USD 385 per person per month. The poverty lines vary depending on the household size.[29]

The IUED uses the same poverty line as used by the PCBS for an household of 2 adults and 4 children, but then modifies it according to the variation in size of the household, using a different calculation methodology. In its studies, the extremely poor (those below the absolute poverty line), are defined as “hardship cases” , while the poor (those below the relative poverty line) are defined as “below the poverty line”.[30]

In this report, those below the absolute poverty line(IUED hardship cases) are defined as “extremely poor”, while those below the relative poverty line are defined as “poor”.

It is also worth mentioning that in the occupied Palestinian territories, consumption measurements are preferred to income measurements, because consumption can be measured more precisely and fluctuates less than income.

However, while the above mentioned measurements are useful in understanding poverty in terms of economic deprivation, they neglect the many other aspects of the phenomenon.

In the past ten years the development literature has contributed enormously to broadening the understanding of poverty and affirming its multidimensional nature.

In the Human Development Reports, the UNDP, has regarded poverty as deprivation of many elements of well-being, in addition to income growth or consumption capacities, and defined it as deprivation of human development.

The Human Development report on poverty[31] defined it as “deprivation in the valuable things that a person can do or be” and coined the term “human poverty”, making a distinction between this broad deprivation and narrower income poverty, which was limited to deprivation in income or consumption.

More specifically, in the human development approach, poverty draws from three different perspectives: the income perspective, the basic needs perspective and the capability perspective. In these terms, poverty is about lack of income, but also about deprivation of material requirements for “minimally acceptable fulfillment of human needs, such as basic health services, education and food”[32]. And most important, it is about the absence of some basic capabilities, such as to live a long, healthy and creative life, to be knowledgeable, to enjoy a decent standard of living, dignity and respect; it is about lack of “real opportunity to leave a valuable and valued life”[33].

Under the capability approach in particular, economic factors are therefore still considered as important causes of deprivation of human development and poverty, although not necessarily the only and main ones; furthermore, while recognizing the economic dimension of poverty, the capability approach places importance on the inadequate command over economic resources, rather than on economic resources per se.

In the past few years, human rights experts have suggested that the “capability approach”, be the bridge between the discourses on poverty and human rights and affirmed that “poverty deprives individuals of their capabilities to enjoy human rights”.[34]

As a matter of fact, under the capability approach, poverty can be defined as absence or inadequate realization of certain basic freedoms. Given that the human rights approach supports that every human being has human rights to those freedoms, from the human rights perspective, poverty can be defined as the non-fulfillment of rights to those freedoms. Moving from the capabilities approach, the OHCHR has recently developed the human rights approach to poverty, whose main features are described below.

3.2 The human rights approach to poverty

The human rights approach to poverty is grounded in International Human Rights binding Treaties and in the United Nations Charter. As such, it introduces the important concept of rights, so that the poor are recognized as claim-holders, having entitlements that give rise to legal obligations. In particular, it emphasizes obligations deriving from International Human Rights Law (IHRL), requiring that duty holders, primarily States, be held accountable for their actions. [35]

Obligations deriving from specific human rights may be analysed by reference to the duties to respect, protect and fulfil. The first is a negative duty, requiring the duty-bearer not to breach directly or indirectly the enjoyment of human rights; the second and third are instead positive duties, requiring the duty-bearer to take measures to prevent third parties from interfering in the enjoyment of human rights and obliges the duty-bearer to adopt appropriate measures towards the full realization of human rights.

Under this approach, poverty reduction becomes an international legal obligation, and no longer a question of charity or welfare.

Main characteristics of a human rights approach to poverty are accountability, the principle of equality and non-discrimination, participation by and empowerment of the poor and the recognition of the interdependence of rights.

• Accountability: means that all duty-holders be held accountable for their conduct and that accountability mechanisms must be accessible, transparent and effective;
• Equality and non-discrimination: this principle guarantees the equal and non-discriminatory treatment of vulnerable individuals and groups and that they are not neglected. Indeed, “Sometimes poverty arises when people have no access to existing resources because of who they are, what they believe or where they live. Discrimination may cause poverty just as poverty may cause discrimination”[36].
• Participation of the poor in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of poverty reduction strategies, requires the establishment of effective decision-making mechanisms and procedures, and is consistent with the result of empowerment of the poor, achievable through the implementation of the human rights approach. Empowerment consists of the expansion of poor people’s freedom of choice and action to structure their own lives or, in other words, in the enhancement of the capabilities of the poor, “so that they can take more control of their lives”[37].
• Interdependence: the human rights approach to poverty is concerned with all categories of rights: economic social and cultural as well as political and civil rights. Although a human rights analysis may focus primarily on the first category of rights, it is fundamental to reaffirm the concept of interdependence of all human rights, meaning that the enjoyment of some rights may depend on or contribute to the enjoyment of other rights. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights recognized that: the Committee gives particular attention to the economic, social and cultural rights dimensions of anti-poverty strategies, but all rights are equally important as a means of ensuring that all people can live in freedom and dignity.[38]

Notwithstanding the above, it is important to stress that the human rights approach to poverty does not equate poverty to the non fulfillment of human rights in general, neither does it impose an obligation on duty-holders to realize all human rights immediately.

Firstly, it has already been pointed out that from a human rights perspective, poverty consists of the “non-fulfilment of a person’s human rights to a range of basic capabilities to do and be the things he or she has reasons to value”[39] .

Since basic capabilities may differ from one country to another, due to different social perceptions of what are basic capabilities in order of priority, also the set of human rights to be analysed may differ.

This implies that in any specific context, it is necessary to follow these steps:

1)      identify, through a participatory process, which are the capabilities considered to be basic (basic enough that their failure counts as poverty);

2)      identify what specific rights to those capabilities are not fulfilled.

The UN Guidelines on Poverty Reduction Strategies[40], identify a common set of capabilities that are considered basic in most societies, including: the capabilities of being adequately nourished, avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality, being adequately sheltered, having basic education, being able to ensure security of the person, having equitable access to justice, being able to appear in public without shame, being able to earn a livelihood and taking part in the life of a community.

Secondly, considering the timeframe for the realization of human rights, it has to be stressed that the human rights approach to poverty allows for progressive realization of rights and for setting priorities among different rights due to constraint of resources.

Nonetheless, International human rights law recognizes that States have core obligations, deriving from the rights to life, housing and adequate food as part of the right to a decent standard of living, health and education. Those core obligations should be considered as binding constraints and States should always guarantee the immediate fulfillment of at least the minimum essential levels of those rights.

The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights[41] has recognized that:

the right to work, an adequate standard of living, housing, food, health and education, lie at the heart of the Covenant and have a direct immediate bearing upon the eradication of poverty.[42]

Anti-poverty strategies should reflect at least these human rights core obligations and should guarantee the respect of the minimum international threshold established by them.

In addition, the UN Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty has recommended that extreme poverty be regarded: as a denial of basic human rights, and all States, either directly or in cooperation with other, must urgently take steps to eradicate extreme poverty from the face of the earth, as a “core” obligation to be carried out with immediate effect.[43]

4.1 Identifying basic capabilities

From a human rights perspective poverty is defined as the non-fulfillment of a person’s human rights to a range of basic capabilities – to do and be the things he or she has reasons to value.

Accordingly, to understand poverty in the oPt,  it is necessary to identify the capabilities that Palestinians consider basic enough for their failure to count as poverty, meaning an extreme form of deprivation. To this extent, as pointed out in the previous section, the OHCHR suggests that there are capabilities considered basic in most societies. To verify if these capabilities are in fact considered basic in the Palestinian society and also to identify other capabilities to be possibly added to the given list, it has been necessary to refer to the perceptions of the Palestinians themselves.

For this exercise, the report produced within the Palestinian Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (PPA) jointly undertaken by the UNDP and the MOPIC[44] has been very useful.

According to the PPA results, poverty in Palestine is linked to the inability of a person to provide adequate income to meet basic needs such as food, clothing, proper housing and education; it is also related to the inability to access income sources (e.g. regular jobs, properties, private income-generating projects); further, it is identified with the inability to have good health as well as the inability to have proper housing (unsatisfactory housing conditions were identified in terms of inadequate utilities or incomplete housing construction, or small size and overcrowding); poverty is also linked to the incapacity of moving freely and feeling secure, due to the continuous Israeli occupation and Israeli security measures, including closures; it is also about lack of access to water resources, health centers and roads; lack of education or training, in particular for women, who also consider that poverty is about traditions restricting women’s freedom in terms of work and the taking on of an active role outside their homes and about their right to control their possession. The perception of poverty of women from the countryside includes: lack of job opportunities, limited income to meet basic family needs, continued unavailability of food, reliance on others for managing livelihood and improper housing. In general, women interviewed, felt that poverty is linked to marginalization, inferiority and consequent exclusion. In addition, poverty is viewed as social isolation, resulting from the inability to fulfill obligations in social and religious occasions, or due to particular conditions of mental or physical illness. This is mainly pointed out by refugees, while the youth perceive poverty as mainly linked to the lack of connections and mediations in the community. Finally, children consider poverty as deprivation in terms of security, feeling of powerlessness, lack of access to education, to adequate food and health facilities (such as mental health clinics), while the elderly give prior importance to the inability to appear in public without shame and be adequately assisted (they complained about inadequate assistance and about how the community looks at them, causing a feeling of worthlessness).

This short overview of the perceptions of poverty by the Palestinians, confirms that most of the capabilities that the OHCHR suggests are basic in most societies, are in fact considered as such in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Priority is given to: the capability of being adequately nourished; the capability of being adequately sheltered; the capability  of being able to earn a livelihood; the capability of having basic education; the capability of feeling secure; the capability of appearing in public without shame; the capability  of taking part in the life of a community.

In addition, the capability of being able to move freely, the capability of having control on one’s own natural resources, such as water and land, the capability of enjoying good health in general and having access to health services (including the capability of avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality) can be added to those suggested by the OHCHR.

4.2 Human Rights in focus

The human rights approach to poverty requires that capability failures be read in terms of rights. This leads to the identification of a set of human rights and an assessment of the level of their  respect, protection and fulfillment, through the application of the human rights legal framework. This is done in order to expose specific human rights violations that are causes and/or consequences of poverty in the West Bank. 

Given the capability failures identified above, it appears that human rights whose violation is linked to poverty in the oPt are:

The monitoring of most recent reports and media documents, documenting or giving updates on the current crisis, as well as of events that occurred in the period January-June 2006, indicate that the employment, food and health sectors are the most affected and that the intensification of Israeli closure measures is still the main cause of concern. Furthermore, data of IUED Poll n.10 on Palestinian Public Perceptions clearly shows that in this specific moment Palestinians perceive poverty as being linked in particular to their incapacity to be adequately nourished, earn a livelihood and having access to health services.

In light of these considerations, the analysis that follows will focus primarily on the right to freedom of movement, the right to work, the right to food and the right to health. Shorter assessment will also cover other rights. Equality and non-discrimination is considered as a cross-cutting issue given the fundamental importance of this principle in human rights law and the human right approach to poverty and will be addressed in the analysis of each right.

5.1. International Human Rights Law, IHRL

Responsibility of Israel

In the oPt Israel is responsible for the application of IHRL because it exercises effective control in these areas.

Israel does not recognise this duty, because of two main reasons:

-         its sovereignity does not extend to those areas;

-         the Oslo Accords transferred important civil responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, including human rights responsibilities.

Nonetheless, UN human rights experts[45] and Treaty Monitoring Bodies[46] have repeatedly confirmed the view that Israel has always retained effective control on the oPt, therefore it has the primary responsibility of implementation of international human rights instruments, including the main UN human rights treaties, ratified by Israel, such as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)[47].

For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in this regard: The State’s obligations under the Covenant (CESCR) apply to all territories and populations under its effective control.[48]…The Committee reminds the State Party (Israel) that even during armed conflict, fundamental human rights must be respected and that basic economic, social and cultural rights as part of the minimum standards of human rights are guaranteed under customary international law and are also prescribed by international humanitarian law.[49] …The Committee also calls upon the State Party to give full effect to its Covenant obligations…[50]

Also the Human Rights Committee recognised: The provisions of the Covenant (CCPR),  apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories…and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law.[51]

Responsibility of the International Community

In addition to Israel, also all States of the International Community, as Members of the UN, have the responsibility to guarantee the respect and observance of human rights in the oPt, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, articles 55 and 56, which state:

Article 55

(…) the United Nations shall promote:

1. higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
2. solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
3. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Furthermore, their duty is recognised also under specific human rights provisions, such as those of CESCR.

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers that:

…in accordance with articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nation, with well-established principles of international law and with the provisions of the Covenant itself (CESCR), international cooperation for development and thus for the realisation of economic social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position to assist others in this regard.[52]

In its General Comments on specific rights[53], the Committee has gone further in clarifying that all States have the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, and its view has been supported by UN human rights experts, such as the Special Rapporteurs on the right to food and the right to health.[54] International obligations for specific rights will be commented in more detail in the next chapters.

Responsibility of the Palestinian Authority

Although recognizing that in the current situation, the PA does not exercise effective control on the oPt, nor it has adequate resources to meet the basic needs of the Palestinian population and therefore guarantee the full enjoyment of human rights, it is nevertheless important to highlight that it has the responsibility to take all necessary steps to facilitate the provision of assistance by the International Community. This means that it should put human rights before its political positions and considerations in order to avoid, as a minimum, that the human rights situation of Palestinians, in particular of those living in poverty (constituting the majority of the population), deteriorates further.

Progressive realization of human rights

As mentioned in section 3.2, the human rights approach to poverty allows for progressive realization of rights and for setting priorities among different rights due to constraint of resources.

Most of the rights that will be addressed in the following chapters are economic rights, enshrined in CESCR. Article 2 of the Covenant, requires that the full realization of the rights enunciated in the Covenant be achieved progressively, by all appropriate means.[55]

Although the wording of art. 2, seems somehow to give wide flexibility in the realization of the rights, the Committee has interpreted the word progressively, as imposing an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the goal of the full realization of the rights enshrined in the Covenant.[56]

Furthermore, the Committee clarifies that: a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights, is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education, is prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.[57]

Core obligations therefore, impose on each State to guarantee the immediate fulfillment of at least the minimum essential levels of human rights. The following chapters will point out the core obligations arising from each right covered in the analysis.

5.2 International Humanitarian Law, IHL

Responsibility of Israel

As the occupying Power, Israel is primarily responsible of the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the oPt, specifically, of Geneva Convention IV,[58] and Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907,[59] both including specific provisions applicable to occupied territories.

Although Israel rejects the applicability of Geneva Convention IV, it has been widely recognized by the ICRC, UN Organs and other Contracting Parties of the Convention as been applicable in the oPt.

Article 27 is considered to be a key provision of Geneva Convention IV.

Significantly, the ICRC Commentary, authoritative instrument of interpretation, considers that:  It is the basis of the Convention, proclaiming as it does the principles on which the whole of "Geneva Law" is founded. It proclaims the principle of respect for the human person and the inviolable character of the basic rights of individual men and women…Article 27 is the basis on which the Convention rests, the central point in relation to which all its other provisions must be considered.[60]

The first paragraph of art. 27 states:

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manner and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated.

The ICRC Commentary gives a wide interpretation to the concept of “right of respect for the person” and clarifies that: it covers all the rights of the individual, that is, the rights and qualities which are inseparable from the human being by the very fact of his existence.[61]

Article 27 is complemented by article 47, which safeguards every human being in the situation of occupation. It recognizes that:

Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor, by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.

The intent is therefore to guarantee that changes introduced, including by annexation of the occupied territory, do not lead to a deprivation of the rights and safeguards provided by the Convention.[62] According to the ICRC Commentary, this article amplifies the scope of the older article 43 of Hague Regulations, as far as the protection of civilians is concerned.

Article 43, establishes the principle that the occupying Power should guarantee safety of the people in the occupied territory, affirming that:

The authority of the legitimate power, having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the later shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

In addition, Israel is required to ensure that the basic needs of the population in the occupied territories are met. Any foreign assistance from the International Community does not relieve Israel of its responsibility. This has also been stressed by the ICRC[63] and OCHA noted in this regard: Under the Fourth Geneva Conventions, Israel, as the occupying power bears the responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian population. In recent years, international donors and the Palestinian Authority have in practical terms taken on this role. If the PA is unable to provide basic services to the Palestinian population and donors withhold assistance, the emphasis will shift back to Israel to resume its legal obligation.[64]

Specific provisions that Israel is bound to respect under IHL, will be commented in the following chapters.

Responsibility of all Contracting Parties

All High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions, are obliged to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions.[65] Therefore, they have the responsibility to ensure that Israel satisfies its obligations deriving from the Conventions.

5.3 Other applicable laws and instruments

Military Law

Since 1967, Emergency Regulations give to the Military Commander of the occupying Power, the competence to issue military orders applicable in the oPt.

Other laws

A very complex system of laws that applied in the oPt before the 1967 Israeli occupation, still remains in force, these including: Ottoman Law, British Law (introduced under the British Mandate), Jordanian Law applicable in the West Bank and Egyptian Law applicable in the Gaza Strip.

The Oslo Accords

The Oslo Accords are important in understanding water-related issues.

The above mentioned laws and instruments will be considered in the analysis carried out in the following chapters.

6.1 Internal closures: violation of human rights and cause of poverty

Human rights violations and impoverishment

Closures seriously restrict movement of Palestinians and as a consequence, limit and sometimes prevent them from going to work, accessing health and educational services, reaching their land and properties, marketing goods and separate them from their families and communities. They are one cause of a general feeling of insecurity of Palestinians in the West Bank.

According to IUED Report n. 10, the percentage of Palestinians feeling insecure as a consequence of closure measures and settlements has reached 57% in May 2006, as compared to 46% in July 2005 and the feeling of insecurity has increased in particular in the West Bank (outside refugee camps) and Jerusalem. Among those feeling insecure, the poorest are those feeling more insecure (61% of the interviewed said they felt insecure).[67]

Closures violate Palestinians’ human right to freedom of movement and as a result, many other human rights, including the right to work, the right to food as part of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health. In addition, closures are also the very first cause of poverty in the oPt.  A detailed analysis of the impact of closures on the enjoyment of these three specific rights will be presented in chapters 7-9  of these report, given that they have been identified as those  directly link to poverty in the oPt. Chapter 10 will also shed some light on the impact of closures on other rights, including the right to education, the right to family life and the right to self-determination, giving particular attention to violations suffered by the poor.

This chapter, instead, explains what closure measures are and why they constitute collective punishment. It focuses on the principle of equality and non-discrimination and on the right to freedom of movement. And it gives an assessment of the impact of closures, including the West Bank Wall, produced in recent months.

Closures as collective punishment

RoNu 2006: Kalandia Checkpoint

Since August 2005, Israel has increased closures in the West Bank.

By “closures” it is meant measures imposed on the West Bank to restrict movements of Palestinians. Closure measures include physical obstacles and a permit system that regulates movements within the West Bank.

-         Physical obstacles can be permanent, these including checkpoints, road blocks, road gates and the Wall; and temporary, such as flying checkpoints and road gates closed on a temporary basis.

According to the UN, the number of physical obstacles in the West Bank reached a peak of 536 in mid July, from 375 in August 2005.[68]

-         The permit system is not implemented through clear procedures and regulations. To travel from one area to another in the West Bank, and sometimes to continue living in their homes, Palestinians may be required to obtain permits. Restrictions and rejections may depend on the age, gender or residency of the applicants and vary from one geographical area to another. Sometimes permits are denied without explanation or on security grounds. Permits are required for the following main reasons: to cross internal checkpoints and Wall gates; to access closed areas; to live in closed areas; for West Bank residents to access the Jordan Valley; to travel to East Jerusalem.

According to Israel, their function is to protect Israeli civilians from Palestinian militant attacks, therefore, they are justified on security grounds.

Although recognizing that Israel has the right and the duty to protect Israeli civilians from violence, the imposition of tight closure measures on all Palestinians is unacceptable and constitutes a form of collective punishment.

They are acts that punish and intimidate the whole Palestinian population for offences committed by a few of its members and as such, constitute a violation of IHL, namely of article 33 of Geneva Convention IV,  that imposes on Israel, as the occupying Power, the prohibition of collective penalties stating that:

No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

Closures as discriminatory measures

Furthermore, closures are discriminatory. They are imposed on Palestinians because they are Palestinians and not on Israelis illegally living in the OPt, and as such violate the very fundamental principle of equality and non discrimination enshrined in several international human rights instruments, such as, CCPR (art.2 (1)), CESR (art. 2(2)) and CERD. Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, states that: State Parties (in this case Israel) undertake to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights (d) (i): the right to freedom of movement and residence…

Interpreting this article, the monitoring body of the Convention, considers that: Whenever a State imposes a restriction upon one of the rights listed in article 5 of the Convention…(it) must ensure that neither in purpose nor effect is the restriction incompatible with article 1 of the Convention as an integral part of international human rights standards.[69]

Article 1 of CERD, defines racial discrimination as: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

The prohibition to discriminate is also affirmed in IHL, art. 27 of Geneva Convention IV which states: Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour…all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction, based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.

Violation of the right to freedom of movement

Restrictions on the right to freedom of movement, as enshrined in art. 12  of CCPR, may be imposed only under the conditions specified in the article. Therefore, restrictions must be: …necessary to protect national security, public order, public heath or morals or the rights and freedoms of others and…consistent with the other rights recognized in the Covenant.[70]

The Human Rights Committee has added that:

…it would be a clear violation of the Covenant if the rights enshrined in article 12…were restricted by making distinctions of any kind, such as on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. …restrictions must not impair the essence of the right; the relation between right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed.

Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desires result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected…the application of restrictions…must meet the test of necessity and the requirement of proportionality…these conditions would not be met, if an individual was prevented from traveling internally without a specific permit.[71]

Despite recognizing the right and duty of Israel to protect its own citizens, therefore adopting measures adequate to respond to its security concerns, it is nevertheless important that those measures meet the test of proportionality and necessity. Looking at the impact produced by restrictions of movement on the lives of Palestinians, those measures can be said to be disproportionate and indiscriminate.

The monitoring bodies of CESCR and CCPR have frequently expressed this opinion in their Concluding Observations on Israel. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has raised its concern about these measures that: disproportionally limit or impede the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights of Palestinians in the oPt. It further stated that: The State Party (Israel) has serious security concerns which must be balanced with its efforts to comply with its obligations under international human rights law. [72]

The Human Rights Committee, said that: While acknowledging the security concerns that have led to restrictions on movement, the Committee notes with regret the continued impediments imposed on movement, which affect mostly Palestinians travelling in and between East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and which have grave consequences affecting nearly all areas of Palestinian life. The Committee considers this to raise serious issues under article 12. In regard to persons in these areas, the Committee urges Israel to respect the right to freedom of movement provided for under article 12, including the right to return to one's country.[73]

In addition, under international humanitarian law, and specifically, article 27 of Geneva Convention IV, Israel, as the occupying Power has the duty to respect Palestinians and treat them humanely at all times and take measures of control and security in regard to protected persons only if they are necessary as a result of the war.

The ICRC Commentary to this article, clarifies that:

What is essential is that the measures of constraint they (State Parties) adopt should not affect the fundamental rights of the persons concerned…those rights must be respected even when measures of constraint are justified.[74]

RoNu 2006: Palestinians stopped by the IDF, Old City.

6.2 Horizontal fragmentation of the West Bank

Impact on vertical movements

A combination of closure measures has horizontally fragmented the West Bank in three areas: north, central and south areas and created enclaves within them, such as Tulkarem, Jenin and Nablus in the North; Biddu, Beir Nabala, Hebron Old City, South of Hebron and Jericho in the South; Biddu and Bir Nabala in the center; and the Jordan Valley.

Vertical movements, from one area to the other are subject to tight restrictions and are sometimes impossible.

For example, since January Palestinians can not move from the northern to the central section on the main route around Nablus because of the closure of Shave Shomeron checkpoint. Entrance to road 505 is regulated by seven gates and when they are closed, movement from the north to the south area is impossible. Since December 2005, Palestinians living in Jenin are prohibited from passing through Tappuah/Za’atara junction, south of  Nablus, meaning they can not exit the northern section and since March 2005 males aged between 15 and 32 can not travel from Nablus to Jenin and Tulkarem, not being allowed to use two main checkpoints.

Since October 2005, Palestinians moving to the Jordan Valley from the rest of the West Bank need permits to cross the four checkpoints that regulate access to the area. Only Palestinians with the Jordan Valley address on their identity card do not need a permit. Otherwise, there are no exceptions. The situation is therefore very complicated for people not meeting this criteria, such as women born in other areas of the West Bank whose husband is resident of the Jordan Valley, or Palestinians from other areas of the West Bank who moved to the Jordan Valley. Also Palestinians who own land or property in the Jordan Valley but reside in other areas of the West Bank, still need a permit which, nonetheless, does not allow for overnight stay. OCHA has reported[75] about long delays at the four Jordan Valley checkpoints between March and April, especially at the Tayasir checkpoint; complete closures of those checkpoints between 30-31 March; and closure of Tayasir, Al-Hamra and Maale Efraim between 17-28 April, followed by restrictions for people aged 16-30.

On two occasions, between 19-25 April and on 3 May, complete closures were imposed also on Palestinians moving into/outside the Jericho enclave and was followed again by closures on the basis of restrictions by age (16-30 year old males).[76]

Since September 2000, moving from the South to the North of the West Bank takes a long time because Palestinians are not allowed to go through Jerusalem but have to take road 398 and pass through the Container checkpoints. Since 2002 passage through the checkpoint is nevertheless restricted to public transport or private cars with permits. Starting from January, vehicles and pedestrian movements from the West Bank into Jerusalem have been further restricted by military orders, limiting access of Palestinians holding West Bank IDs,  to four crossing (out of twelve previously used): Qalandiya, Gilo, Shu’fat and Ras Abu Sbeitan. These measures combined with the Wall crossing regime are preventing Palestinians from reaching their workplace, limiting access to religious sites, jeopardizing access to health service and preventing children and teachers from attending morning classes because of delays at checkpoints.[77]

Impact on horizontal movements and within governorates

Also movements within the three areas have become increasingly difficult.

For example, in the northern section a combination of checkpoints, forming an east-west closure, divides the area in two parts: the upper part composed of Tulkarem, Jenin enclaves and Tubas and the lower part which includes Nablus enclave and Qalquilya.

In the South of Hebron, farmers and herding communities living in the southern side of roads 317 and 60, are completely isolated, not being allowed  to cross those roads and the situation is expected to worsen with the completion of the concrete road barrier under construction in the northern side of the roads. 63 Palestinian households living in Hebron Old City are subjected to strict restrictions, with the City surrounded by 100 closures.

In the central area, the situation is very critical for  32.500 residents of Biddu enclave and 20.000 residents of Bir Nabala enclave: despite being a few minutes away from East Jerusalem, to get there they have to travel to Qalandiya and cross the checkpoint, which takes approximately one hour or more.[78]

More than once, PHRMG researchers have experienced long delays at Qalandiya checkpoints, where long cues and waiting periods contribute to a feeling of general anger and psychological distress of Palestinians. They have also met with old people, including women, being forced to take long detours to visit their families in East Jerusalem.

In the South of Hebron, they met with herding communities living both in Masafer Yatta and At Tuwani, who have lost their source of livelihoods, not being able to access their fields or grazing areas, neither to reach markets in Yatta and the Old Suq of Hebron. Speaking of the consequences of closures, people met described how they felt further impoverished and said they are left with nothing.

6.3 The impact of external closures

In addition to internal closures, also external closures limit Palestinians’ movement and their possibility to access their work place, health and educational centers and external markets.

Between 16 December 2005 and mid-January 2006, Israel imposed external closures on the oPt. Until 8 May, traders and workers from the West Bank could not enter Israel. This prohibition is still valid for Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

More details on the impact of these closures on human rights and on poverty are provided in chapters 7-9 of this report.

.

West Bank Closures, map by OCHA

6.4 The West Bank Wall

Security concerns and expansion plan

The construction of the West Bank Wall is justified by Israel on security grounds, since it is considered a measure that prevents Palestinians from carrying out attacks in Israel.  Nonetheless, the fact that the Wall runs for most of its route inside the West Bank and not on the Green Line, (the internationally recognized border between Israel and the West Bank), and that incorporates the majority of the Israeli West Bank settlements and settler population illegally residing in the West Bank, suggests that its objective is not only security of Israeli citizens, but also the annexation of settlements and West Bank most fertile land and water resources.

As of May 2006, 51% of the West Bank Wall was completed, extending for 362 kilometers, while another 13% was under construction and 36% was marked as planned.[81] Once completed, according to the new revised route approved on 30 April 2006, the Wall will be 703 km long, more than twice the length of the Green Line (315 km), and will run for 70% of its route inside the West Bank.[82]

As a consequence, 69 West Bank Israeli settlements, where 76% of the West Bank settler population leave (approximately 182.500 settlers), will be located between the Green Line and the Wall. The Wall will incorporate two of the biggest settlements: the Ari’el  and the Ma’ale Adumin settlement groups, respectively in the North and near Jerusalem, meaning the incorporation of approximately 7% of the West Bank land. The section of the Wall that surrounds Ari’el, goes deep into the West Bank, separates seven Palestinian villages in the north of the settlement from Salfit, main city in the area, affecting approximately 25.000 Palestinians residing there[83]. In East Jerusalem, the Israeli settler population living between the Green Line and the Wall will be 183.280 people.[84]

The impact produced by the Wall on forced displacement of Palestinians has already been enormous: IUED Poll n.10 indicates that 5% of West Bank population has been forced to move, estimating that 4% of the extremely poor and more than 4% of the poor have been displaced.[85]

Israeli Settlements in the West Bank are illegal under international humanitarian law, specifically, under Geneva Convention IV, art. 49 affirming:

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population in the territory it occupies.

Also extensive destruction and appropriation of property is prohibited under art. 53 of Geneva Convention IV, and State Parties (in this case, Israel) who do not respect their duty under this provision, commit a grave breach of the Convention, as stated in art. 147:

Grave breaches…shall be those involving the following acts: extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

Furthermore, annexation of occupied land is prohibited under art. 47:

Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any annexation by the latter (Occupying Power) of the whole or part of the occupied territory.

The ICRC Commentary states in this regard: …occupation as a result of war, while representing actual possession to all appearances, cannot imply any right whatsoever to dispose of territory. As long as hostilities continue the Occupying Power cannot therefore annex the occupied territory, even if it occupies the whole of the territory concerned.[86]

The Wall, running deep into the West Bank, is the cause of violation of human rights of Palestinians, severely affecting every aspect of their life. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion considered that:

The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime  gravely  infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot  be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order.  The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.[87]

The impact of a tight permit regime

Passage from one side of the Wall to the other is regulated through gates. As of July 2006, the UN report that the Wall gates are 73 and only 38 are accessible to Palestinians with valid permits. [89]

The crossing of gates affect villages that are completely surrounded by the Wall, such as Khirbet Jbarah area, Beit Iksa and Qalandiya village, and villages surrounded by the Wall on three sides, while closed by other physical obstacles on the fourth side. This is the case of twenty-eight villages in the areas of Qalqiliya, Biddya and Biddu.

The Wall creates closed areas, otherwise called seam zone, meaning areas located between the Green Line and the Wall that isolate Palestinian communities in enclaves and separate them from their property located on the west side of the Wall.[90] To live there or to cross the Wall gates, Palestinians need to obtain a permit. Also medical staff and international humanitarian organizations need permits. Instead, the permit regime does not apply to Israeli citizens, Israeli permanent residents and those who have a right to immigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of return.[91]

Since December 2005[92], new procedures apply to the permit regime regulating the passage through Wall gates to access closed areas located on the west side of the Wall. Accordingly, applicants are classified either as having “permanent interests” or as having  “temporary interests”. Only farmers, merchants, business owners, employees of an international organization and of the Palestinian Authority, teachers, medical staff and students can fall in the first category, therefore are eligible to obtain one year permits. Farmers can also obtain longer permits, of two years. Instead, land tenants and labourers fall in the category of those with “temporary interests”, therefore, can not obtain long term permits.

Since February 2005, an increasing number of applications for permits to cross Wall gates, have been rejected, either on security grounds or more frequently, for land-related reasons: in their applications, Palestinians have to prove land ownership or to have a direct relationship with the owner of the land. Another reason for rejections is “no land west of the Barrier”, which is very vague and not clear. OCHA reports that no further explanation is generally given and Palestinians lack the resources, such as access to maps, to prove the contrary. [93]

The number of permits rejected has increased after the election of Hamas government, mainly because of Israel’s refusal of any cooperation with the Palestinian Authority: while travel permits were previously issued by a PA Agency working in cooperation with Israeli authorities, since January, Palestinians are requested to deal directly with Israeli authorities.

Erratic operation of gates makes access even more difficult: sometimes gates remain closed or sometimes they open with delays, so that due to time constraints farmers can not cultivate and maintain their land regularly. An additional problem consists in the wrong number of gate reported on permits, with the consequent difficulty of access.

Strict closures and erratic functioning of gates, have caused an increase in poverty in villages and lead to further impoverishment of farmers, land owners and small traders. Specific data is given in the evaluation of the impact of closures on the right to food, in chapter 8.

The tight permit regime is affecting Palestinians living on the West Bank side (east side) of the Wall, who find it increasingly difficult to go to school, work, access markets, health centers and visit their families on the other side of the Wall.

This is true, for example for approximately 230.000 Palestinians holding East Jerusalem ID cards who found themselves on the east side of the Wall and need to pass trough Wall gates to go to Jerusalem.[94]

West Bank Wall, map by OCHA.

7.1 The right to work and poverty reduction

The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights deals more comprehensively than any other human rights instrument with the right to work, which is enshrined in its article 6, stating that: The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work … (State Parties) take steps…to achieve the full realization of this right and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.

The right to work is essential for the realization of other human rights, such as the right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to food. It is also important for the survival of the individual and a constitutive element of his/her human dignity. Ultimately, it is also instrumental in eradicating poverty.

To this extent, the UN General Assembly has recognised that:

Improving human development and fostering productive workforce- in short, improving the employability of the working poor –will enable the poor to participate in and benefit from economic growth…improving the employability of the working poor is one element of a rights-based approach to reducing poverty through unemployment. A second is to eliminate discriminatory practices against the employment of certain groups.[96]

7.2 Unemployment in the oPt

Unemployment[97] rates and the number of unemployed in the oPt have increased dramatically since the start of the Second Intifada in 2000.

Unemployment rates in the West Bank peaked at 31.2% in the first quarter of 2003, decreased in the next two years, fluctuating between 21 and 25%, further declined to 20% in the second quarter of 2005 and grew to 21.8% in the last quarter of 2005[98]. Otherwise, looking at the number of unemployed, estimations are of 95.300 (37.900 unemployed and 57.400 stopped looking for a job) unemployed in the West Bank in the third quarter of 2000 and 170.200 (123.900 unemployed and 46.300 stopped looking for a job) in the fourth quarter of 2005[99].

Unemployment rates are currently estimated to have reached 25.3%. Using a relaxed definition of unemployment, therefore, including Palestinian workers who are not actively looking for a job, they further raise to 31%.[100] According to IUED statistics, in May 2006, unemployment rates reached 38%.[101] In May, the World Bank projected that unemployment could almost double by the end of the year, reaching 40%.[102]

Despite differences in measurement, it is clear that unemployment rates in the oPt are very high. Unemployment is higher among the poor and the poorest sectors of the Population (60% and 28% respectively) and job loss is the first cause of income decline for the extremely poor.[103]

In recent years, increases in unemployment and unemployment rates have resulted from several factors, such as the intense Palestinian population growth, a declined in employment in Israel and lack of domestic job creation in the oPt. Nonetheless, Israeli closure policies, defined by the World Bank as a “drag anchor on Palestinian economic recovery”[104], still remain the main cause.

Already in 2003, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its concluding observations on Israel, stated that:

The Committee notes with grave concern the severe consequences of closure on the Palestinian population…Workers from the occupied territories are prevented from reaching their workplace, depriving them of income and livelihood and the enjoyment of their rights under the Covenant.[105]

7.3 The impact of internal closures

Unfair deprivation of employment

Recently, the ILO calculated the effective workforce affected by internal closures in the last quarter of 2005. According to its data, in the West Bank, 569.600 workers have been affected, the highest number being in Hebron, Jerusalem and Nablus, followed by Ramallah and Jenin. Observing trends in the period November 2004-December 2005, the ILO concluded that increase of closure measures always resulted in rise in unemployment.[106] Closures, as documented by OCHA, have sharply increased in the first six months of 2006, further reducing employment and employment opportunities for Palestinians.

The Poll n.10, shows that 55% of the respondents consider that the inability to obtain permits to move in the West Bank is the cause of their difficulty to go to work. This answer was given by more than half of the poor (55% for extremely poor and poor). 74% also said that their difficulty to go to work was caused by their inability to move in the West Bank because of physical obstacles. This answer was given by 73% of the extremely poor and by 78% of the poor. [107]

The right to work implies the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment.[108] There is no doubt that internal closures adopted by Israel, unfairly deprive Palestinians, mainly the poor, of employment and as such, constitute a violation of their right to work as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.

Discrimination of Palestinian workers

Israel also violate the prohibition of discrimination of workers, set for in IHRL, IHL and specific ILO Conventions. Closures, movement restrictions and the permits regime applied by Israel impact on the right to work and specifically, on one of its essential elements, accessibility, which requires that the labour market be open to everyone. The very first dimension of accessibility is non-discrimination. Commenting on it the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights clarified that: Under its article 2, paragraph 2, and article 3, the Covenant prohibits any discrimination in access and maintenance of employment… which has the intention or effect of impairing or nullifying exercise of the right to work on a basis of equality. [109]

Reflecting on the permit system that regulates movements within the West Bank and on requirements that Palestinians have to meet and restrictions on permit issuance, the ILO considers that: The complexity and inconsistency of the regime for issuing permits underlines the arbitrary and discriminatory way in which rights which are so fundamental to the exercise of employment and occupation are granted or refused, without reference to any perceptible rule basis and without any legal recourse or appeal. …In terms of ILO’ s standards and rights there is abundant evidence of discrimination among the population in respect of access to employment and occupation (…). Such discrimination is contrary to the Discrimination Convention[110] and the ILO Declaration of the fundamental Principles and the Rights at Work.[111]

The ILO Discrimination Convention, requires that State Parties (in this case Israel), should declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof.[112]

As occupying Power, Israel should also respect article 27 of the Geneva Convention IV. The ICRC Commentary specifies that the prohibition established in this article is not only a negative duty: the occupying Power should assume an active role in enacting the prohibition.

Israel, clearly does not satisfy this obligation.

Excessive use of force

Very often, to give enforcement to closure measures, the IDF use lethal force. According to OCHA[113], in the past six months, the physical protection of civilians has deteriorated: between  December 2005 and June 2006, 45 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank, including 4 children, and  747 were injured. The highest number of casualties happened in May, when 21 civilians were killed during IDF military operations, including search and arrest campaigns in the northern and central West Bank, and 223 people were injured, mainly in Ramallah Governorate.

Observing the correlation between fatalities and Palestinian unemployment in the period last quarter of 2004-first quarter of 2006, the ILO is of the opinion that: a higher degree of conflict, reflected in a higher casualty toll, leads to a lower level of economic activity, which, in turn translates into a higher degree of unemployment.[114]

7.4 The impact of external closures

RoNu 2006: Submission of work permit requests, Employment Office in West Jerusalem.

In addition to internal closures, also external closures, that regulate the flow of Palestinian workers into Israel, have contributed to job and income losses.

Because of increased external restrictions, since the start of the Intifada, in 2000, 85.000 Palestinians lost their job in Israel or Israeli settlements. The number of Palestinians working in Israel dropped consistently in 2005, falling to 60.000 by the fourth quarter of the year, from 67.000 recorded in the second quarter.[115] This trend has continued in 2006: the World Bank estimates that in 2005 approximately 44.800 Palestinians worked in Israel every day, while, since the January election, the number has dropped to an average of 25-30.000 workers per day.[116] Since 11 March, Israeli authorities have imposed a closure for Palestinian workers and traders entering Israel from the West Bank. Nonetheless, the closure was partially lifted on 7 May and access to Israel was again possible. This is not the case of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

IUED Poll n.10 highlights that 64% of the respondents identified the inability to obtain permits to go to East Jerusalem or Israel from the West Bank as the cause of their difficulty to go to work. This answer was given by a high percentage of the poor: 74% of extremely poor and 62% of the poor. Furthermore, 62% said their problems in accessing their work in Israel or East Jerusalem was caused by physical obstacles. 68% of the extremely poor and 58% of the poor gave this answer. [117]

Israel is clearly not meeting its responsibilities under the “Bertini Commitment”, in which Israel agreed to increase the number of work permits of Palestinian workers in Israel.[118] 

It is important to mention that with the intensification of external restrictions and loss of jobs in Israel, Palestinians have turned to local employment, mainly in the agricultural sector, which, however,  has also been severely affected by Israeli security measures.

7.5 The impact of economic measures adopted by Israel and external donors

Impact on most vulnerable groups and the poor

In the first six months of 2006, the sharp increase in unemployment has also been largely caused by the fiscal crisis as discussed in chapter 2.

Most vulnerable to unemployment are the youth, PA employees, Social hardship Cases and refugees.

-         The youth: youth unemployment, already very acute in 2005[119], has worsened in 2006. According to the UN, approximately 40% of youth age 15-19 and 39% aged 20-24 are currently unemployed.[120]

-         PA employees: approximately 160.000 PA employees, supporting 942.000 dependants, meaning one in four Palestinians, have not been receiving their salaries for 4 months. At the end of June, approximately 9% of over due salaries were paid to 120.918 families.[121]

-         Social hardship cases: the beneficiaries of the emergency job creation programme run by the MoSA.

-         Refugees: the number of applications to UNRWA job creation programme in the West Bank has increased from 2.000 in December 2005 to 4.000 in April 2006 and is considered to have increased by eight times in the course of the past two years.[122]

Particular attention should also be given to women. The ILO points out that female employment rates in the oPt have historically been low, but that they have furthered declined with the current crises.[123] According to the IUED Report n.10, this explains the high percentage of housewifes excluded from the labour force: 43% in the West Bank, 47% in Jerusalem and 43% in Gaza.[124] It is important to note that  highest unemployment rates in the oPt are for women with high education level (33% in Q4/2005) and that one third of PA employees are women who are suffering the consequences of the current crises: they are believed to be among the first who will not be able to continue to work, despite not being paid, because of difficulties they are apparently already experiencing in affording childcare.

IUED recent data on poverty and income evolution, reveals that in the period December 2005-May 2006, a high percentage of Palestinians indicated that their income decreased (44% or respondents, 40% in the west Bank and 58% in Gaza). The most affected are the poor: 55% of the extremely poor and 39% of the poor have perceived a decline in their income, primarily as a consequence of job loss or working hour loss (61% of the extremely poor and 41% of the poor indicated this as the main reason of their income deterioration).[125]This is common to both refugees and non-refugees and this situation has resulted in an increased percentage of underemployment among the two groups reaching 36% and 24% respectively.[126]

Furthermore, the IUED survey observes that: job loss is a reality for everyone, in each level of poverty but the poorest are still the one to be hit the hardest. Accordingly, 42% of the poor interviewed, said that at least one member of their households lost his/her job (29% extremely poor and 13% poor). As a consequence, the poor are those who feel the most economically insecure and consider it very probable that they will loose their job (43% of respondents in 2006 as compared to 49% in 2005), and 54% of the extremely poor indicate employment assistance as their main priority for the community. In 2006, employment assistance was received by 15% of extremely poor surveyed households and by 12% of poor households. [127]

Violation of human rights: multiple responsibility

Looking at the impact produced by economic measures adopted by Israel and international donors in recent months, it can be said that the right to work of Palestinians have been violated. Specifically:

-         International Donors: the impact produced on unemployment by the suspension of direct assistance to the PA can be said to be a violation of the right to work of Palestinians. External donors are failing to comply with their commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full realisation of the right to work, in coherence with the spirit of Arts. 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and specific provisions of  CESCR[129].  At the moment of writing, there is not enough information to assess whether the Temporary Mechanism is able to adequately address the gap created due to the suspension of direct assistance.

-         Israel: by withholding the transfer of VAT and taxes collected on goods directed to the oPt, Israel does not respect its obligation to give full implementation of the right to work in the West Bank and Gaza.

-         Palestinian Authority: it should as a minimum avoid taking measures resulting in the restriction and limitation of the enjoyment of the right to work. Therefore, it is the PA’s responsibility to consider the effects produced by its political decisions and positions on the right to work of all Palestinians and consequently modify them with a view to facilitating the enjoyment of such right.

7.6 The obligation of Israel to respect, protect and fulfil

Facts on the ground, as presented above, lead to the conclusion that Israel is not meeting it obligation under CESCR. Specifically, it does  not meet its core obligation to ensure at least, a minimum essential level of the right to work, as impose by IHRL.  In the context of the right to work, the core obligation can be spelled as the obligation:

-         to ensure the right of access to decent work for all persons;

-         to avoid any measure that result in discrimination;

-         to adopt and implement an employment policy with a view to stimulating economic growth and development and overcoming unemployment and underemployment.

In fact, Israel’s policies are obstructing Palestinian’s access to work, causing discrimination, unemployment and recession.

This is also a violation of International humanitarian Law.

In terms of art. 52 of Geneva Convention IV, as occupying Power, Israel is prohibited from taking measures either creating unemployment or restricting the opportunities offered to workers in the occupied territory.[131]

8.1 Food insecurity affects the poorest and most vulnerable

The definition of the right to food used in this report, which is the one given by the UN expert on the theme, includes elements of the definition of food security[133], considered to be the corollary of the right to food. The UN Special Rapporteur considers that:

Understanding food security is vital to understanding the right to food, as it gives us an understanding of the minimum standards that are considered necessary[134].

The overview presented below, clearly points to the fact that in the oPt, the right to food is largely violated.

Since January 2006 food security in the oPt has deteriorated sharply. While at the end of 2005, food-insecure people in the oPt were estimated to be 37%, the World Food Programme (WFP) and FAO are now projecting that 51% of the oPt population should be considered as food-insecure. This means a total of 1.547.229 Palestinians, 909.715 in the West Bank and 637.515 in Gaza[135]. In the West Bank, food insecurity is likely to increase more rapidly in the North, in Tubas, Nablus, Tulkarem and Jenin.

The 14% increase is mainly the result of the deterioration in food accessibility but also, although less significantly, of food availability.

In general, since the outbreak of the second Intifada, closure policies have been the main cause of food insecurity. Starting from December 2005, Israeli security measures including internal closures and restrictions on movement of goods and people, have been intensified, impeding physical and economic access to food and water.  In addition, after the January election, the suspension of Israel tax revenues and external donors’ direct budget support to the PA has exacerbated an already difficult situation: in April OCHA warned that limited PA funding was expected to triple the deteriorating food security trend by the end of the year.

The UN considers that the emerging food insecure are the groups most affected by the fiscal-economic crisis: social hardship cases; low income PA employees (e.g., municipal cleaners, guards, security personnel); small shop owners and employees; and small farmers and agricultural laborers[136]. Furthermore, the WFP and FAO[137] have observed that the current food crises mostly affects people with heightened nutritional needs and poor income sources: the elderly, poorly educated people, lactating and pregnant women and households with many children. Lactating and pregnant women and children have been considered as the most vulnerable, because of problems in iron deficiency, lack of vitamin A and iodine deficiency.

A nutritional assessment conducted in 2004 by CARE/John Hopkins University noticed that 22% of children between 12 and 59 months suffer from vitamin-A deficiency and 53.9% are borderline deficient[139].

Measuring chronic malnutrition[140], the WFP reports that in the past six years, stunting levels in children under five have been increasing. According to a review of nutrition situation in the West Bank and Gaza, conducted by WHO, PA Ministry of Health and UNICEF[141], stunting is strongly related to poverty. Therefore, children living in poor households are the most vulnerable. According to the study, refugee children and children living in rural areas are more stunted, because of the high levels of poverty.

Because of the current limited access to food, the nutritional situation of children is expected to worsen. In general, in 2004 and 2005 the nutritional status of Palestinians has remained stable and chronic malnutrition  was estimated to be stable at the level of 9.4%. This figure is now expected to increase, in particular for the poorest.

8.2 The obligations to respect, protect and fulfil

Responsibility of Israel

In the oPt, Israel is primarily responsible for the application of CESCR, the human right treaty dealing with the right to food more comprehensively than any other international instrument under international human rights law. Article 11 of CESCR, states that:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate  standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing (…) and recognise the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger (…)

The right to food, enshrined in CESCR as part of the right to a decent standard of living, imposes three types of obligations on Israel: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.

Israel should also ensure specific protection to children, in accordance with article 24 (c) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, affirming that:

State Parties shall take appropriate measures to combat disease and malnutrition, including through the provision of nutritious foods and drinking water.

In any case, Israel, has the immediate core obligation arising from the right to food, to guarantee the minimum essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe.

In addition, as occupying Power, Israel is primarily responsible for the application of IHL.

Specifically, as far as the right to food is concerned, under Geneva Convention IV, Israel has the main responsibilities as follows: to provide food and water supplies to the Palestinian population (art. 55); to allow access for impartial humanitarian organisations (arts. 23 and 59). Furthermore, Israel should respect the following prohibitions: prohibition of collective punishment (art.33); annexation of occupied land (art.47); destruction of property belonging to individuals or collectively to private persons or to the State, unless it is rendered absolutely necessary for military operations (art. 53). Israel is also bound to respect the following specific provisions of the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907: prohibition of confiscation of private property (art. 46); prohibition of requisitions except for military needs (art. 52).

Responsibility of the International Community and  Intergovernmental Organisations

As explained in this report, the International Community and intergovernmental organisations bear some responsibilities for the application of international human rights law in the oPt, deriving from the UN Charter and specific human rights provisions. To this extent, as far as the right to food is concerned, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food clarifies that:

The three obligations placed on States by virtue of the existence of the right to food (to respect, protect and fulfil) also apply to intergovernmental organisations, particularly the United Nations.[142]

Furthermore, all States of the International Community, who are Parties to the Geneva Conventions, are obliged to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions.[143] Therefore, they have the responsibility to ensure that Israel satisfies its obligations under IHL.

Responsibility of the Palestinian Authority

The Special Rapporteur on the right to food has confirmed the view that since September 2000, Israel, as occupying Power exercises effective control in most of the oPt and that the PA does not have human rights obligations in this regard.[144]

8.3 Food accessibility and the duties to respect and fulfil

Food accessibility is one of the main components of the right to food. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights considers that: The right to adequate food is realised when every man, women and child, alone or in the community with others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.

In the oPt, Israel has the obligation not to interfere with food accessibility, as part of its obligation to respect the right to food. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, affirms that: The obligation to respect the right to food means that the occupying Power must not disrupt or destroy the Palestinians’ existing access to food. It is an immediate (not progressive) obligation and requires the occupying Power to avoid negatively affecting existing availability and physical and economic access to adequate food and water.[145]

In addition, Israel should take measures aimed at strengthening Palestinians’ access and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food security. This follows from its obligation to fulfil (facilitate) the right to food.

Nonetheless, already in 2003, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, reported that security measures adopted by Israel in the oPt impeded physical and economic access to food and water and concluded that those measures were disproportionate and jeopardized food and water security of the great majority of Palestinians. In recent reports, the WFP and FAO reiterated that food insecurity largely results from the adverse effects of Israeli closure policies[146].

8.4 Physical accessibility to food

As documented in chapter 6, since September 2005, there has been an intensification of Israeli security measures in the oPt that have lead to isolation of Palestinians from sources of livelihoods with strong repercussions on food accessibility.

Israel justifies the adoption of such measures on the ground of security. Although recognizing security needs of Israel, facts on the ground largely demonstrate that those measures are disproportionate, discriminatory, constitute collective punishment and deprive Palestinians of their right to food. Therefore, by adopting closure measures, Israel falls short of its obligation under IHRL, to respect the right to food requiring that it ensure that every Palestinian in the oPt has permanent access at all times to sufficient and adequate food and avoid taking measures resulting in the deprivation of such access.

In addition, Israel does not satisfy its obligation to fulfil the right to food, requiring the adoption of measures that facilitate Palestinians’ access and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood.

It also violates humanitarian law, specifically the prohibition to collectively punish protected persons and not to take reprisals against them[148].

Impact of restrictions on movement on physical accessibility to food

Because of permanent and temporary obstacles, as well as the increasing difficulty in obtaining permits to move from one area to another, movement within the West Bank, has deteriorated. The situation is even more complicated for people living in enclaves which are severed from the central and southern West Bank and the Jordan Valley. Residents of the northern West Bank can not access trade routes from the North to Nablus, the Jordan Valley or the South. As a result, traders face problems in accessing local markets.

Covering short distances sometimes takes a long time and requires traveling on poor quality roads. This is true for example for traders traveling from Hebron and Bethlehem to the North: journeys that would take half an hour now take several hours.[149]

Travel time and costs for West Bank Palestinians moving into Jerusalem have also increased, both as a consequence of the Wall crossing regime and of recent Israeli Military Orders, limiting West Bank Palestinian traffic into Jerusalem to four crossing and closing the remaining eight. Because of these restrictions and unpredictable flying checkpoints in East Jerusalem, markets in East Jerusalem are cut off from the rest of the West Bank.  Also the Jordan Valley has been isolated from the rest of the West Bank: since October 2005 to move from the Jordan Valley to other areas of the West Bank and vice-versa, Palestinians are requested to hold permits to pass through four checkpoints. This apply also to farmers to access their land. Nevertheless, permits, which are already difficult to obtain, do not allow for overnight stay, preventing them from tending their fields regularly. As a consequence of the permit regime as well as of delays and closures at checkpoints, farmers have already sustained substantial losses of perishable agricultural products, mainly vegetable and fruit.

Accessibility to land is very problematic also for Palestinians living in the enclave of South Hebron, south of Road 317. Because of a combination of movement restrictions and physical obstacle, including the one metre high road barrier under construction, blocking access across the road, farmers find it very difficult to access  approximately 80.000 dunums of agricultural land, positioned on the other side of Road 317 and shepherds can hardly access grazing areas.[150] In general, in this area, roads are used by Israeli settlers.

As a consequence of closure policies, poverty among rural communities in the oPt has increased dramatically and the WFP and FAO consider small farmers and agricultural laborers among the most vulnerable for food insecurity.

According to the IUED, in the West Bank and in Jerusalem, a high percentage of the extremely poor and of the poor live in villages, (47% and 59% of the extremely poor and 42% and 50% of the poor) and Palestinians working in agricultural petty trade sector, are the most at risk of poverty: 50% of them are extremely poor and 42% are poor.[151]

Very significantly, 79% of the extremely poor and 71% of the poor, said that in the period December 2005-May 2006, they had problems in cultivating their land because of physical obstacles, and 48% of the extremely poor and 61% of the poor also considered that this was due to their inability to obtain permits to move in the rest of the West Bank.[152]

Farmers have impoverished so much that can hardly afford to pay for public transports to travel to their land. According to the IUED, 48% of the extremely poor and 44% of the poor expressed this concern.[153]

Impact of the West Bank Wall

The construction of the West Bank Wall, and consequent expropriation of agricultural land, destruction of livelihood assets, the razing of trees, appropriation of water resources and tightening of the permit regime, is negatively impacting on physical accessibility to food and constitutes a violation of the right to food.

As occupying Power, Israel violates those provisions of IHL (listed here above) prohibiting those acts.

According to PCBS latest survey on economic conditions of Palestinian households, 83% of surveyed households in the West Bank said they had difficulty in accessing food as a consequence of the Security Wall[154].

IUED Report n.10 highlights the many problems caused by the Wall on peasantry: 13% of farmers interviewed said it caused difficulties for land cultivation; 11% said it was difficult to market their produce; 14% said their orchards, citrus and olive groves were destroyed; 7% denounced the demolition of their wells and 16% the confiscation of their land.[155]In addition, 20% of the respondents said they are separated from their land by the wall. Crosstabulation of the level of poverty and effect of the Wall in terms of separation from land, shows that this indication was given by 21.7% of the extremely poor and 19.9% of the poor.[156]

The Wall largely cuts into the West Bank and creates areas of land that lie between the Wall and the Green Line, also called “closed areas”. To enter and also to live inside these areas, Palestinians are required to obtain permits which, nevertheless, are increasingly rejected because of land-related issues. Palestinians tenant farmers, labourers, spouses of land owners and second degree owners, can not prove land ownership or to have a direct relationship to the owner of the land. Land owners, living east of the Wall, who in the past relied  on extended family members and labourers in their agricultural activities are badly affected by the tightening of the permit regime.

Farmers have also reported being given permits with wrong gate numbers, jeopardizing their passage through the right gate, or being given permits to cross gates located far from their land, therefore forcing them to cover long distances and waste considerable time[157]. Furthermore, erratic operation of the Wall gates prevent farmers from accessing their land regularly. Although agricultural gates should be opened three times a day, for 20-60 minutes, very often, because of security reasons, they remain closed for several days. Sometimes, tractors or other vehicles can not pass through the gates, so that farmers can only walk or use donkeys, which results in their inability to transport their agricultural produce. Consequently, to face the uncertainty, many farmers have changed the types of crops they cultivate, from high-maintenance, lucrative crops to crops less lucrative and requiring less maintenance, such as wheat.

Palestinians owing land in the closed areas, also face the additional problem of  dispossession, which deprives them of their means of subsistence. These areas are classified as Area C, therefore are under  Israeli civil control (see Box 1).

Much of Palestinian land in closed areas has already been expropriated,  declared “State Land”[159] and area of construction of Israeli settlements. According to recent projections, once the Wall is completed, 76.5% of the West Bank settler population will live in these areas[160].  In some areas, despite the recognition of the land as “State Land”, Palestinians still cultivate their land, but are concerned about the possible enforcement of the State Land declaration which would deny them permits to access their properties, since they are not recognized as owners. Furthermore, land owners of unregistered land not yet declared State land,  fear the confiscation.

RoNu 2006: Wall separating the village from cultivated land, Abu Dis.

OCHA regularly reports[161] on land confiscation and raizing of trees, which has continued in 2006 both for building the Wall and for expanding settlements, checkpoints, road barriers, fences and buffer zones.

In the period August 2005-January 2006, 7.884 dunums of land have been requisitioned throughout the West Bank[162], while between April and June 2006, 1.150 dunums have been destroyed or requisitioned, and 1.015 have been reclaimed[163].

Furthermore, according to the PA Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), between September 2000 and April 2005, 79.270 dunums of fruit trees, greenhouses and fruit and vegetables in open field were confiscated and/or destroyed.[164]

IUED cross tabulation on cause of income decreased and level of poverty, points to the fact that a 77% of the total poor (30.8% of extremely poor and 40.2% of the poor) indicated damage of land for cultivation as the main cause of their income decrease.[165]

Movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Physical accessibility to food has been endangered also by an increasing division between Gaza and the West Bank. In December 2004, the World Bank stressed that:

An unfettered flow of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank is needed to link the two territorial elements of the Palestinian economy and lay the basis for a viable statehood. A functioning link would create a larger effective internal market, help trigger price and income convergence between Gaza and the West Bank and provide a pathway from the economy of the West Bank to a future seaport in Gaza[168].

The Agreement on Movement and Access reached in November 2005 by Israel and the PA, promoted by the Quartet, gave hope of a future peaceful economic development and improvement of the movement of people and goods across borders.

Nonetheless, reports on the implementation of the agreement[169], reveal that most of the principles and provisions have not been implemented. Since January, all crossings have been closed for many days, because of security reasons, including Erez, closed to Palestinian workers and traders since 12 march and Karni, the main crossing for import and exports from Gaza. In addition, despite Israel’s initial agreement to introduce truck convoys between the West Bank and Gaza by 15 January 2006, the deadline has expired without the commitment being met and discussions on the matter have not been resumed[170]. Cargoes transiting between the West Bank and Gaza are still subject to back-to-back procedures and delays which render Palestinian imports non-competitive, compared to the Israeli’s. In addition, because of closures, producers from Gaza are not able to export their produce to the West Bank. In April 2006, the World Bank pointed out that because of the closures, the Gazan market was flooded with produce destined for Israel and third country markets, which could have been sold in the West Bank market, if a means for transportation existed, such as the use of truck convoys[171]. In general, exported agricultural produce from Gaza has continued to decrease in the first six months of 2006[172]. The WFP estimates that: the risks inherent to importing goods into oPt directly are enormous given the uncertainty of closure policies, primarily linked to security concerns.[173]

As a result, food prices have increased consistently in the first six months of 2006 worsening the economic accessibility of Palestinians to food, as documented in section 8.6.

8.5 Settlers’ violence and the duty to protect

Several Israeli, Palestinian and International organizations and institutions have documented Israeli settlers’ violence towards Palestinians and their property, therefore have reported about destruction of crops and water wells, pollution of water, killing of animals, beating of farmers, which have jeopardize Palestinians’ food accessibility and availability as well as their personal security. This situation has not changed in recent months.

The Special Rapporteur on the right to food  has reminded to Israel of its obligation to protect the right to food, stating that: The obligation to protect the right to food means that the responsible State must protect the civilian population in occupied areas from third parties attempting to restrict, deny or destroy people’s existing access to food and water. [174]

Therefore, Israel, is required to take measures aimed at prohibiting Israeli settlers from depriving Palestinians of their access to adequate food. However, Israel has failed to take action against settlers, who still commit violent acts against Palestinians, reassured of their almost complete impunity.

8.6 Economic accessibility to food

Impact of closure policies and recent Israeli and external financial measures

PCBS reports that already in the 4^th Quarter of 2005, 60.4% surveyed households declared a consistent reduction in their income as a consequence of the second Intifada[176]. Of them, 49.9% households in the West Bank said to have lost more than 50% of their usual income.

Those working in the agricultural sector are among the most vulnerable. The inability of farmers to access agricultural land, markets and farm inputs, due to restrictions, closures and the Wall, as documented in this chapter, has in fact reduced their incomes.

Since January 2006, in addition to closures, both the suspension of Israeli tax revenues to the PA and the cut of external direct assistance have further decreased families’ income, and deteriorated economic accessibility to food. The poorest households have been hit the hardest.  Among PA employees who have not received their salary for 5 months, the most affected are the low level income employees, with no savings to rely on, who are identified by the WFP and FAO as emerging food insecure.

Furthermore, since February, the MoSA has halted cash assistance to the beneficiaries of the Social Hardship Cases Programme (SHCP), which is to say 47.934 households, while reporting to have received 116 new applications. Economic accessibility to food of the poorest has worsened considerably while their reliance on food delivery by the WFP has increased.

In addition to reduced income, also a significant increase in prices of basic food commodities and an alarming increase in the price of sugar and wheat flour have reduced households’ purchasing power. While food costs in the oPt stabilized in 2005, and inflation in the West Bank was reported to be unchanged in the first two months of 2006[177], already at the end of April, the WFP observed a noticeable price increase throughout the oPt, although more significant for Gaza than the West Bank (for example, flour prices increased by approximately 32% in Gaza, compared to 7% in the West Bank). [178]

There are three main causes of the increase in prices of basic foods: increased price of basic food commodities in the international market; increased cost of transportation of food commodities from Israel to the oPt; closure of Karni crossing in the Gaza Strip.

To this extent, it is worth noting that the majority of basic food commodities in oPt markets are imported from international markets and transshipped or resold into oPt Therefore, recent price increases in external markets, for example in the case of sugar or wheat, are likely to have been transmitted to importers in Israel and the oPt and to consumers in oPt local markets, further reducing the purchasing power of already vulnerable households[179].

Food import in the oPt is also heavily dependent on Israel. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000, external closures adopted by Israel have caused a reduction of Palestinian trade with Israel. Still, according to the World Bank, in 2004 and the first half of 2005, growth of both Palestinian import and export from/to Israel had fully recovered. On the contrary, in the second half of 2005 imports and exports declined. This trend has continued through the first six months of 2006, the main cause being increased closures. External closures have also resulted in increased transaction costs and reduced competitiveness in the local markets and have led to price increases.

Unemployment, is an additional cause of the reduced purchasing power of Palestinians, as well as a challenge to their economic accessibility to food.

In general, as a consequence of the liquidity crisis, the level of cash in the local economy has reached very low levels and a critical economic recession is advancing, impacting on the market and agricultural sector.

The sharp decline in economic access to food is badly hitting small traders, such as small shop owners and employees. They are unable to cope with decreased purchasing power and increased demand for credit. As a consequence, they have been refusing to offer credit, curtailing one of the main coping strategies of vulnerable households. As a matter of fact, in the period December 2005-May 2006, 71% of the extremely poor and 53% of the poor used credit to sustain the hardship.[180]

Generally, as a result of both fiscal measures and Israeli closure, poor Palestinian households, including the chronically poor and the new poor, meaning Palestinians who lost their sources of income after the second Intifada,[181] are no longer able to cope with the hardship and increasingly rely on negative coping strategies, such as reducing expenditures and not paying bills.  This is more evident in poorest households: in May 2006, the UN reported that 85% of households in deep poverty reduced expenditures, comparing to 55% of households above the poverty line,[182] and the IUED estimates that 71% of the poorest households and 55% of poor households can not pay bills.[183]

They also use extreme coping strategies, such as reducing the quality and quantity of food consumed which reduces caloric intake and also the nutritional value of food.

The WFP estimates that throughout 2005 in the West Bank 38% of Palestinians of which 49% in non refugee camps and 27% in refugee camps, reduced food intake. According to PCBS survey on economic conditions of Palestinian households[184], conducted in the last Quarter of 2005, 86% of surveyed households decreased expenditures for food and 73% reduced the quantity and quality of food. Statistics point to a 91% of households in the West Bank reducing the quality of food and 82.9% the quantity of food. In the same study, food was indicated as the first households’ priority.

Most up to date data by the IUED, shows that between December 2005 and May 2006, 55% of the respondents had reduced their level of food and more precisely, 50% in the West Bank, 29% in Jerusalem and 73% in Gaza. While in the West Bank the percentage of those who reduced food consumption is higher in refugee camps, in Gaza it is higher outside refugee camps. The percentage is very high among the extremely poor (76%) and the poor (53%). [185]

It is interesting to note that in 2006 food is still considered as the most important households’ need and food assistance is considered as a priority by extremely poor and poor Palestinian households in the West Bank and by both refugees and non-refugees.[186] By looking at the area of residence, it appears that those indicating food as their first need, live predominantly in villages, which are in fact the areas where the right to food is largely violated, as demonstrated in this report.

Fiscal measures and the responsibility of Israel

By withholding tax revenues, Israel fails to respect its responsibility under IHRL to guarantee the enjoyment of the right to food.

In addition, as occupying power, it fails to meet its duties under IHL, specifically, article 55 of Geneva Convention IV, requiring that it provide food and water supplies to the Palestinian population.

Fiscal measures and the responsibility of the International Community

At the World Food Conference  of 1974, States adopted a declaration, reaffirming that: every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties.[187] On that occasion, for the first time, Governments recognized their common responsibility: to work together for higher food production and a more equitable and efficient distribution of food between counties and within countries.[188]

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers that:

In the Spirit of article 56 of the Charter of the United Nation, the specific provisions contained in articles 11, 2.1 and 23 of the Covenant (CESCR), the Rome Declaration of the World Food Summit, State parties should recognize the essential role of international cooperation and comply with their commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization of the right to adequate food. In implementing this commitment, States parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary aid when required.[189]

The suspension of direct assistance to the PA, has impacted very negatively on the right to food and in particular on its constituent element of economic accessibility.

At the moment of writing there is not enough information to assess whether the Need Based Allowance Programme created under the International Temporary Mechanism will mitigate the effects produced by such suspension. However, all international donors should support this programme targeting those who have suffered a significant loss of income due to the financial crisis, as part of their human rights obligations clearly identified in the Comment on the right to food reported above.

Fiscal measures and the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority has the responsibility to take all necessary steps to facilitate the provision of assistance by the International Community, this meaning that it should put human rights of Palestinians before its political positions and considerations.

6.7 Food Availability in the West Bank

RoNu 2006: Truck transporting goods, Container Checkpoint.

Impact of Israeli closure policies and recent fiscal measures

Other than accessibility, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights considers that the core content of the rights to food also implies the availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals.

Specifically, the monitoring body observes that:

Availability refers to the possibilities either for feeding oneself directly from productive land or other natural resources, or for well functioning distribution, processing and market systems that can move food from the site of production to where it is needed in accordance with demand. [190]

In order to assess food availability in the oPt and specifically in the West Bank, it is necessary to focus on the agricultural sector, which has become increasingly important for the Palestinian economy in the past six years.

Unfortunately, as documented in the analysis of food and water accessibility, since January the construction of the West Bank Wall, combined with the intensification of security measures, has limited the ability of Palestinians to access and cultivate their lands and water resources, has lead to the requisition of the most fertile agricultural land, the razing of trees, the destruction of infrastructures and the isolation of agricultural communities. Ultimately, this means a substantial loss of agricultural produce and market outlets and an increasing dependence on humanitarian assistance, mainly from the WFP and UNRWA.

Security measures and the construction of the West Bank Wall have also fragmented Palestinian economic space into small, inefficient enclaves, resulting in contraction and inefficiency of markets[191]. As a consequence of the West Bank fragmentation into three separated areas, farmers are unable to market their produce and lose perishable products, trade flows have been curtailed, transaction costs have increased and local markets are likely to close.

The WFP considers that:

The Israeli Defense Force controls all movement of people and goods within the occupied territory, between Gaza and the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Israel through dense networks of military checkpoints, physical barriers and roadblocks that essentially truncate any “natural” trade flow of goods, people and transport linkages…marketing and distribution systems have incurred higher costs due to the security and closure considerations (…).[192]

Availability of food has been furthered eroded by the current liquidity crisis: reduced purchasing power and low level of cash in the local economy have already disrupted agricultural production cycles and increased the vulnerability of horticultural producers and smaller traders who may have to abandon their activity in the coming months.

8.8 Physical and economic accessibility to water

The obligation of Israel to respect, protect and fulfil the right to food is extended to water.

As a matter of fact, the right to food includes access to drinking water and irrigation water necessary for agriculture.

Unfortunately, as it happens for food, water security in the oPt is jeopardized by Israeli closure measures, including the West Bank Wall: restrictions on water supplies, destruction of water infrastructures and confiscation of water resources has dramatically reduced both accessibility and availability.

The Palestinian Hydrology Group estimates that approximately 50% of Palestinians are under the “water poverty line”,[193] and that the average consumption of water in the West Bank is of 450 cubic meters per year. Given that the threshold of drinking water shortage has been defined as 1.000 cubic meters per year per person, below 500 cubic meters the situation is considered critical[194].

PCBS considers that once completed, the Wall will lead to the confiscation of 12 million cubic meters of Western Basin, and estimates that 95% of water resources in the oPt will be appropriated. The Palestinian Hydrology Group considers that  as of May 2006, the construction of the Wall has lead to the requisition of already 45 wells, pumping 5.6 million cubic meters of water.

Since January 2006, after the election of Hamas, Palestinians accessibility to water has worsened, as a result of the refusal of Israeli authorities to hold Joint Water Committee meetings with PA authorities. Lack of cooperation and also the cut of external donors’ direct assistance to the PA, has resulted in the suspension of projects on water and sanitation infrastructures. Not having financial resources, the Palestinian Water Authority as well as Municipalities are not able to guarantee the functioning of the water monitoring system, therefore an adequate quality of water, nor can they afford to operate their own wells, which means that water supplies are limited and intermittent. Between May and June, for example, Benized area, in Ramallah district, was left without water supplies for 23 days[195].

An increased number of communities are not connected to water networks and rely on tanked water. The Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Programme (WaSH) of the Palestinian Hydrology Group estimates that in 2005, 200 Palestinian communities were not connected to water networks. According to PCBS data, the number is slightly lower, although still high: 184 localities in the oPt are not connected to a water network, of which 183 in the West Bank.

As a matter of fact, an IUED recent survey reveals that water network is considered as the most important infrastructure needed by Palestinian households (45% of surveyed households).[196]

WaSH also considers that most of the water networks currently available are old and in faulty conditions, this causing large loss of water through the network[197]. The Palestinian Water Authority estimates that water loss amounts to 45% of supplied water.

In addition, because of closures, West Bank fragmentation and also the ongoing  economic crisis, the price of tanked water per cubic meter has increased from 11.09 NIS in 2005 to 14.03 NIS in April 2006[198]. According to the Palestinian Hydrology Group, 47% of Palestinians are unable to pay water supplies.[199]

Poor households are the most vulnerable in this situation, since they can not afford to buy tanked water.

Most affected areas in the West Bank, are those near the Security Wall, namely, Bethlehem, Jenin, Qalquilia and Tulkarem governorates; and areas where movements restrictions have been intensified, such as the Jordan Valley Enclave. In these areas Palestinian communities can not access adequate quantities of water and the delivery of tankered water is delayed at  checkpoints or Wall gates. For example, OCHA reports that between 24 April and 14 May, the delivery of water to 19 Palestinian communities was delayed by IDF checkpoints and that in one occasion a water tanker was denied access.[200]

In addition, in the South of the West Bank, the poor hydrological season has further deteriorated water accessibility to water of residents. Farmers and the poor, who can not afford adequate supplies of clean water for family and animal consumption, are those mainly affected.

8.9 The obligation to fulfil the right to food: food assistance in the oPt

Under international humanitarian law, Israel has the primary responsibility to provide food and water supplies to the Palestinian population and humanitarian assistance.

To this extent, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, considers that:

As the occupying Power Israel bears a treaty obligation to facilitate and ensure the access to food of the civilian Palestinian population and to facilitate humanitarian access for impartial organizations providing emergency assistance.[204]

The ICRC Commentary, clarifies that the occupying Power has the obligation to ensure, to the fullest extent of the means available to it, the food of the occupied population and that when the occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the occupying Power has to accept relief supplies destined for the population  and must facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.[205]

This obligation, under IHRL, is spelled out as duty to fulfil the right to food, in the sense of providing food assistance.

Despite its obligations under IHRL and IHL, Israel does not provide humanitarian assistance and sometimes restricts humanitarian access.

Main providers of food aid in the oPt, are instead UNRWA and the WFP, in cooperation with the ICRC. Assistance is also given by the PA and NGOs.

Food is considered by refugees and non refugees (46% and 12% respectively), as the most important assistance item received.[206]

Starting from August 2006, the WFP will increase its non-refugee beneficiaries from 480.000 (70% based in the West Bank and 30% in Gaza) to 600.000 to assist the most vulnerable groups due to the significant increase in food insecurity. Beneficiaries include Social Hardship Cases, new poor and vulnerable groups living in social welfare institutions, such as orphans, the disabled and the elderly.

At the same time, UNRWA is aiming at increasing refugee beneficiaries from 210.000 households in the oPt, to 240.500, assisting the most affected by the fiscal crisis and  intensification of movement restrictions, in order to respond to the problem of economic accessibility to food and inadequate nutrition.

Since January 2006, international agencies, NGOs and Islamic charitable organizations, (Zakat Committees) have reported restrictions or refusal of access through checkpoints. Between January and April, humanitarian organizations filed 289 access reports. Humanitarian access further deteriorated in May, when 150 access incidents were reported, of which 147 by UNRWA, complaining about obstruction of delivery of aid or movement of staff members by the IDF or Border Police, both at checkpoints and at Wall barriers. Ninety-nine of the incidents occurred in the East Jerusalem area. Due to improvements in access at Jerusalem checkpoints, the number dropped to 50 in June, which is, nevertheless, still very high.

The last resolution adopted by the WHO World Health Assembly (WHA)[207], on health conditions in the oPt, clearly points out that in the current situation, the two main concerns in the health sector are:

-         health conditions and humanitarian crises resulting from the Israeli occupation and restrictions;

-         health crisis caused by the decision of Israel to stop transferring VAT and custom taxes to the PA, and of external donors to cut their direct support.

9.1 The impact of closures

With regard to closure policies, WHA expressed its concern for the consequences of the construction of the Wall on the accessibility and quality of medical services received by the Palestinian population and also for restrictions imposed on ambulances and medical personnel, having serious implications on pregnant women and patients in general.

Since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, several NGOs[209], the PA Ministry of Health and WHO have thoroughly documented the effects of such restrictions and closures on the health system and, more specifically, on the right to health.

They have criticised movement restrictions and delays, which have resulted in women giving birth at checkpoints, have caused medical complications and sometimes have caused the death of patients traveling in ambulances; the West Bank fragmentation, constituting an obstacle to the development of an adequate medical system and preventing patients from reaching health clinics; and the traumatic stress suffered by Palestinians, including children, living in fear and in a feeling of constant insecurity, dramatically affecting their psychological well being.

This situation has further deteriorated since January because of an intensification of internal closures and restriction as documented in this report.

In May, OCHA reported on ambulance incidents in the West Bank, establishing that forty-four ambulances of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society were denied access and eight were delayed at checkpoints, mainly at entrances to Jerusalem, at Al Ram and Hizma checkpoints. It also documented an incident where the IDF opened direct fire on an ambulance transporting a woman in labour to a hospital in Nablus.[210] WHO also reported that movement restrictions from the central to the northern section of the West Bank affected patients and health staff and that closures in the Jordan Valley prevented them from accessing the area. Closures were extended also to NGOs delivering health assistance, such as the Palestinian Medical Relief Society.[211]

Since February, as a result of recent restrictions on access to Jerusalem from the West Bank, Palestinians who do not hold a Jerusalem ID card, require a permit to access six of the hospitals providing them primary and secondary medical care. Because of the difficulty in obtaining permits, the patient caseloads for these hospitals has dropped significantly as compared to previous months. In Augusta Victoria hospital, the number of patients dropped by 30%.[212]

The Wall is also affecting Palestinian patients and medical staff capacity to reach health clinics. According to a recent survey by PCBS,[213] 34.5% of surveyed households in East Jerusalem said they had difficulties in reaching health centers as a consequence of the Wall, the majority of which (88.3%) is located on the east side of the wall.

Furthermore, IUED Report n.10 points out that among the Palestinians who could not access health services, 32% said this was due to closure measures, including checkpoints, the West Bank Wall and other physical obstacles. [214]

In addition to internal closures, also external closures produce the effect of restricting the full enjoyment of the right to health by Palestinians. As a matter of facts, basic health services, such as oncology services, services in the field of cardiology and chest surgery and transplants, are not available in the oPt. Movement outside of the oPt is nevertheless limited and sometimes impossible. [215]

RoNu 2006: Ambulance at Container Checkpoint.

9.2 The right to health and the obligation to respect and protect

The right to health is enshrined in  numerous human rights instruments. Among them, CESCR, which provides the most comprehensive article on this right.

Interpreting this article, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, defined the right to health as an inclusive right and said that: it extends not only to timely and appropriate health care, but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food and nutrition…[216]

Therefore, the enjoyment of the right to health, strongly depends on enjoyment of the right to food.

As already specified for other human rights, the right to health imposes the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. In the oPt, Israel has to comply with these obligations and immediately, with the core obligations arising from the right to health, including:

-         to ensure non-discriminatory access to health facilities, goods and services and their equitable distribution;

-         to ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe and to an adequate supply of safe and drinking water;

-         and  to provide essential drugs.

More specifically, under the obligation to respect the right to health, Israel should refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all persons to health services, abstain from enforcing discriminatory practices and from limiting access to health services as a punitive measure. In addition, under the obligation to protect the right to health, Israel should take measures that ensure equal access to health care and health services provided by third parties.

There is ample evidence that Israel  does not satisfy these obligations and violates the right to health. In particular, Israel prevents the full realization of one of the essential constitutive elements of the right to health: accessibility.

Specifically, two dimensions of accessibility are jeopardized by Israeli closure policies: non-discrimination and physical accessibility.

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, considers that non-discrimination requires that: …health facilities, goods and services must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population…without discrimination.[217]

Physical accessibility requires that Israel guarantees that: health facilities, goods and services must be within physical safe reach for all section of the population, especially vulnerable or marginalized groups.[218]

The obligation not to discriminate imposed by the right to health as enshrined in CESCR (art. 2 (2)) , is immediate and not progressive, which means that Israel should immediately guarantee the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment.

Instead, as has emerged from the analysis presented in this chapter, Israeli closure policies in the West Bank are discriminatory and an obstacle to Palestinians’ access to health services and facilities, run by the MoH, UNRWA or the private sector.

In addition to CESCR, Israel ratified other important human rights instruments protecting the right to health such as the Convention on the Elimination of any Form of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Convention on the Elimination of any Form of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 

Art.5 of CERD, prohibits discrimination in all its forms and specifically guarantees the right of everyone to public health, medical care, social security and social services.

Art. 12 of CEDAW requires State Parties to take measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure access to health care services.

Israel is consequently responsible for the application of those specific provisions in the oPt and by implementing tight security measures, discriminatory in nature, it falls short of its obligations.

Finally, it is important to stress that the obligation to refrain from limiting access to health services as a punitive measure, as part of its obligation to respect, is established also in international humanitarian law: under Geneva Convention IV, Israel, as the occupying Power, has the obligation to respect the prohibition of collective penalties, as enshrined in art.33.

9.3 The impact of economic measures adopted by Israel and external donors

Between January and June 2006, the freeze of direct assistance to the PA by external donors as well as the decision of Israel to withhold VAT and tax revenues have led to a rapid deterioration in the health sector.

External donors direct support amounted to approximately 50% of the PA MoH budget. The second most important channel for funding was payment of revenues from Israel. Not receiving funds, the MoH has been confronted with a crisis.

The public health system can not be replaced by the UN, NGOs and the private sector. Already in May OCHA warned that these actors do not have the capacity to duplicate or replace the role or the PA and its service delivery and also Pierre Krahenbuhl, director of ICRC operations, said that: Neither the ICRC nor any other humanitarian organization can replace the authorities in their role as provider of public services.[219] NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) expressed the same opinion, saying that: humanitarian aid actors do not have the competence, the means or the responsibility to act as a substitute for the Palestinian Authority.[220]

The MoH is responsible for 62% of primary health clinics and for important curative and rehabilitative programs in the oPt. For example, according to WHO data, 72.4% of surgical operations are performed in MoH hospitals and 47% of maternity beds and 61% of general hospital beds are located there. [221] The MoH provides also important preventive and promotive services, such as immunization of children, supplementation programs (providing vitamin A and D supplements to children and iron supplements to pregnant women) and antenatal and postnatal services. [222]

Already in May the UN considered that the lack of fuel and other operating supplies prevented the MoH  from continuing its normal operations. According to WHO[223], in Jenin and Salfit, the MoH was not able to provide services to the villages, not having fuel for MoH vehicles. For the same reason, vaccination for newborn was stopped in 74 village health rooms in the Hebron district. In June, diagnostic services were stopped in eight MoH hospitals and surgical services in seven, while out-patient services in five hospitals.

The UN also reported that equipment was lacking maintenance and warned about drug and consumable shortages in hospitals both in the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard, the MoH confirmed: hospitals are suffering from acute shortages of medicines necessary for the treatment of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, high blood pressure and diabetes. There is also a severe shortage of medicines for kidney patients, as well as of kidney dialysis solutions and disinfectants for dialysis equipment. There is, in addition, an acute shortage of surgical material such as thread, anaesthetics and medical gauzes. Hospitals are also suffering from frequent shortages of food supplies necessary for their patients.[224]

In June, the UN Monitor reported that 27% of drugs from the essential drug list were out of stock, as compared to 19% in December 2005.  According to the IUED most recent survey analyzing dissatisfaction for health services[225], the poor are mainly dissatisfied due to unavailability of prescribed drugs (52% of the extremely poor and 29.5% of the poor).[226]

Furthermore, since February, at leat 50% of MoH employees, meaning approximately 6.000 people, have not received their salaries and in June, WHO  recorded that staff work attendance dropped by between 10% and 20% in three hospitals in the West Bank (in Nablus, Jerico and Beit Jala) and the MoH predicts that in the coming months, nurses may significantly reduce their attendance in community clinics in the north.

Those most vulnerable in the crisis are people who were already considered vulnerable, such as patients affected by chronic diseases needing long term treatments, such as cancer patients; complicated pregnancy cases; children; and the poor.

9.4 Ill health as a consequence and cause of poverty

In the West Bank, the poor living outside refugee camps, are main users of MoH services[227], as they can not afford to attend private health centers. Therefore if the public health system can not provide them services, they are left without any assistance.

The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, recognizes that:

…for those living in poverty, the full enjoyment of the right to health is a remote goal.[228]

This is true for the poor living in the oPt, whose situation has furthered worsened as a result of the crisis. The poor can not even pay for transportation to reach the clinics. For example, in June the number of patients receiving mental health treatment in MoH clinics was 2.131, still very high, although lower than in April and May, mainly because patients can not afford transportation costs to reach the clinics.

In April-June 2006, patients have increasingly relied on PA and UNRWA services, not being able to pay for private services. WHO specifies that in June, two thirds of women gave birth in MoH hospitals, where they do not pay for the service, as it is covered by governmental insurance, and only one third delivered in NGOs or private facilities.[229]

However, as documented in this chapter, the public sector is already facing difficulties in guaranteeing normal health and social services.

The number of applications for assistance by the MoSA has increased considerably in June (116 new applications were received compared to an average of 20-30 of previous months), although, due to lack of funds, since February the MoSA has not been able to provide health insurance to 47.938 beneficiaries, nor to provide equipment to people with special needs, including wheel chairs.[230]

Apparently, an increasing number of people can no longer afford any more prescription medicines, the demand for basic medicines and substitutes for expensive medicines has increased and pharmacies are offering credit to customers.[231]

Therefore, in the current situation, poverty is an additional cause of ill-health in the oPt. In the medium and long term, ill-health could lead to further impoverishment, because it could erode the capabilities that poor people need to escape from poverty. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health considers that:

Ill health causes poverty by destroying livelihoods, reducing worker productivity, lowering educational achievement and limiting opportunities. Because poverty may lead to diminished access to medical care, increased exposure to environmental risks, the worst forms of child labor and malnutrition, ill health is also often a consequence of poverty. In other words ill health is both a cause and a consequence of poverty: sick people are more likely to become poor and the poor are more vulnerable to disease and disability.[232]

IUED Poll n.10, seems to confirm this position, indicating that 69.7% of the extremely poor and 21.2% of the poor said that ill-health is the main causes (second) of their further impoverishment, in terms of income decrease.[233]

9.5 Violation of the right to health: availability, quality and economic accessibility

Responsibility of external donors

Commenting on the crisis, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health  recognized that, by halting their direct support, international donors have breached their international responsibility to provide health assistance in the oPt.[235]

To this extent, it is important to emphasize once more, as recognized by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights[236], that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, is an obligation of all States, in accordance with specific provisions of  CESCR[237], as well as with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the spirit of these international instruments, as well as the Alma-Ata Declaration on primary health care, States are committed to take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization of the right to health. In compliance with their international obligations, States have the responsibility to respect the right to health, to prevent third parties from violating this right and to facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services and provide aid and humanitarian assistance.[238]

The Special Rapporteur stressed that donors halted their assistance without giving any advance warning to the PA, who was consequently not able to put in place alternative funding mechanisms, jeopardizing the capacity of the MoH to ensure health services and leading to an acute crisis of the health system.

The International Temporary Mechanism[239] developed by the European Commission is intended to provide support to health services, covering running costs and providing essential medical supplies to health care centers and hospitals, delivering 1.5 million litres of fuel to ensure the continued supply of energy, in particular for hospitals, and paying allowances to about 11.500 Palestinian health workers. However, at the moment of writing there is not enough information available to assess whether the Mechanism will be a satisfactory  response to the crisis.

Responsibility of Israel

By withholding VAT and tax revenues, Israel has contributed and continues to contribute to the collapse of the health system in the oPt and violates the right to health.

In particular, Israel does not comply with its obligation to fulfil the right to health, which includes: the obligation to facilitate, in the sense of taking positive measures to enable and assist individuals and communities in the enjoyment of the right to health; the obligation to provide assistance; the obligation to promote the right to health, by creating, maintaining and restoring the health of the population.

The impact on availability and quality

The crisis faced by the public health sector seriously endangers the enjoyment of the right to health and specifically, one of its essential elements, availability , which requires that functioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and services be available. These include the underlying determinants of health, such as safe and potable drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities (hospitals and clinics), as well as essential drugs and trained medical and professional personnel receiving domestically competitive salaries.[241]

As also stated by WHO: the crisis is seriously affecting the ability of the Palestinian ministry of Health to deliver critical health care services and maintain public health programmes.[242]

The crisis is also already affecting another essential element of the right to health: quality, requiring that health facilities, goods and services be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality.[243] Therefore, quality means availability of skilled medical personnel, unexpired drugs and hospital equipement, safe and potable water and adequate sanitation.

Israel as well as external donors are equally responsible of these violations.

The impact on economic accessibility

Facts presented above demonstrate that the current crisis is seriously reducing the economic accessibility of Palestinians to the right to health, which requires that health facilities, good and services must be affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Economic accessibility is based on the principle of equity, which, according to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights:

…demands that poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer households.[244]

Since the MoH and the MoSA, as presented in this chapter, are no longer in a position to ensure social and health services, the poor, who are already disproportionately burdened with health expenses, find it increasingly difficult to access health services and therefore, are not able to fully enjoy their right to physical and mental health. This situation is very likely to deteriorate further in the coming months.

Violation of IHL

Geneva Convention IV

Article 55

To the fullest extent to the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring…medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

Article 56

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory…Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.

Under international humanitarian law, Israel has the primary responsibility to ensure that the basic needs, including health needs of the Palestinian population are met. 

In particular, as clarified by the ICRC Commentary, Israel as occupying Power, is under an obligation to utilize all the means at its disposal to guarantee medical supplies and any article necessary to support life.[245] 

In addition, if hospitals and medical services are without necessary supplies and unable to meet the needs of the population, the occupying power must ensure that hospital and medical services can work properly.[246]

Nevertheless, the Commentary clarifies that if the national authorities are able to care for the health of the occupied population, then the Occupying Power must merely avoid hampering the work of the organizations responsible for the task.[247]

There is no doubt that in the current crisis situation, it is Israel’s responsibility to provide health assistance and guarantee that health needs of the Palestinian population are met. However, in general, Israel should at least, as a minimum, avoid implementing security and economic policies that seriously violate the Palestinians’ right to health by jeopardising the activity of  the MoH, UNRWA and other service providers.

10.1 The right to education

According to a PCBS recent survey[248] on the impact of the Wall on Palestinians in Jerusalem, referring to the period 15^th May-10^th June, 75.2% of surveyed households[249] with primary or secondary school students said they used alternative routes to reach schools and 69.4% of them sometimes could not attend schools. The number increases for students in higher education: 80% and 71.1% respectively. In general, 94.7% of households identified the time spent to cross checkpoints, as an obstacle to their capacity to move. Both students and teachers who live on the east side of the Wall, experience long delays in crossing checkpoints and the Wall to access schools in East Jerusalem and very often miss the morning classes. In addition, since the beginning of 2005, school staff has to obtain permits to go to East Jerusalem. According to OCHA[250], out of 259 applications submitted, only 147 permits were issued, valid only for three months and from 5am to 7pm. Every three months, school staff have to apply again.

In general, the UN report that closure measures negatively impact on access to school of children, students and teachers throughout the West Bank leading to a limited access to quality of Education For All.[251]  

An additional obstacle to access to education is settlers’ violence. In particular, children living in the South of Hebron area, such as children of At-Twani village, have been prevented from using the shorter road and forced to walk for kilometers to reach their school, and threatened by settlers living in the area. This has been documented by NGOs such as the Christian Peace Maker Teams or Operation Dove, whose representatives met with PHRMG researcher and confirmed they still need to walk children to school to prevent they are attacked by settlers.[252]

Furthermore, because of the economic crisis, an increasing number of families can not afford school fees. According to the Ministry of Education and Higher education, in the academic year 2005-2006, the number of students who could not pay school fees has almost doubled if compared with the previous year, rising from a total of 29.700 students to 56.000 students.

According to the IUED most recent survey, regular attendance of school is the first most important need for children in the oPt, mentioned as a priority need by 49% of the respondents in the West Bank, 36% in Jerusalem and 53% in the Gaza Strip.

Very significantly, this was indicated as the most important need by 57% of the extremely poor and 48% of the poor.

Unfortunately one third of the surveyed households also said they are not able to meet the needs of children. Among them, the rates of poor households who raised this concern have increased consistently since April 2005: from 22% to 34% in the current situation. Among the obstacles preventing regular school attendance are security reasons, such as the fear of exposure to violence by Israeli soldiers (53%) and exposure to violence caused by the lack of internal Palestinian security (47%); as well as the deteriorated households’ economic situation (51%).

The IUED study also compares households who pointed to economic difficulty, to households with children drop-outs of school and comes to the interesting conclusion that a significant percentage of households with drop-outs (27%) indicated financial limitations as main obstacle to childrens’ education. Households also mentioned that children (under 18 years of age) entered the labor market to relieve the economic hardship of their households. This is confirmed by cross tabulations of drop-outs and level of poverty: since there isn’t a statistically significant relationship, it is very likely that children who left school to work, contributed to reduce the poverty level of their households. [253]

Nonetheless, while in the short term leaving school for work may look like an effective strategy to alleviate poverty, in the long term, school drop-outs mean a missed opportunity for poor children to develop those capabilities they need to escape poverty.

The right to education is enshrined in article 13 of CESCR, stating that:

The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education.

Education is an important means by which vulnerable and marginalized groups can escape poverty. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers that:

Education is an indispensable right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities.

By imposing discriminatory and disproportionate measures affecting Palestinian children, students and professionals working in this field, Israel falls short of its obligation to respect the right to education, which imposes the duty not to interfere in the enjoyment of the right by limiting access to education. Israel also falls short of its obligation to protect the right to education, by preventing that third parties (Israeli settlers) equally limit the enjoyment of the right. It also fails to fulfil the right to education, requiring at least that it facilitates the enjoyment of this right.

10.2 The right to family life

According to PCBS, in the last quarter of 2005, only 57% of households living in areas affected by the Wall, were able to visit their relatives.[254] In a recent survey conducted in Jerusalem, 21.4% of interviewed households, declared that at least one member was separated from relatives as a consequence of the Wall, and 84.6% declared they had difficulties in visiting family and relatives.[255]

The UN point out that one in four West Bank Palestinians are separated from their relatives by the Wall,[256]and the IUED observes that: for both Jerusalemites and West Bankers, separation from relatives has remained the main problem resulting from the Wall’s construction[257].

This data confirms that the Wall is already producing a strong impact on Palestinian social structure, dividing families and breaking social relations that constitute a fundamental element of Palestinians’ life, also in terms of socio-economic support.

Receiving support from the extended family and friends is one of the coping strategies mostly used by the poor to deal with the hardship. Although receiving economic support from the family is a strategy almost exhausted, due to the current deep economic crisis, social support and cohesion are still very important.

By breaking families and communities, the Wall is likely to jeopardize social cohesion, which is regarded as a factor that have contributed to the alleviation of poverty and prevented the fragmentation of the Palestinian social fabric. It will also endanger Palestinians’ capability  of taking part in the life of a community, considered as basic by them.

The right to family life is enshrined in art. 10 CESCR, stating that:

State Parties to the present Covenant, recognize that…the widest possible protection should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group of unit of society.

By building the Wall inside the West Bank, Israel fails to respect, protect and fulfil this fundamental right and is therefore primarily responsible for its violation.

10.3 The right to self-determination

Closures, including the West Bank Wall,  jeopardize the right of Palestinians to self-determination and their capability of having control on their own resources, and threatens the viability of a Palestinian State. Article 1 of both CESCR and CCPR enshrine this right by virtue of which all peoples have the right to freely determine their political status, freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development…and freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources…In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

It is the opinion of the Human Rights Committee that this article imposes obligation not only on States in relation to their own population, but on all States parties to the Covenant, who should facilitate the realization of  and the respect for the right to self-determination.[258]

11.1 Assistance and poverty reduction: the problem of targeting

Several sources, including the MoP, the MoSA, PCBS, the IUED and UN agencies recognise the important role of assistance in reducing the incidence and severity of poverty in the oPt, but they also confirm that a significant percentage of the poor do not receive assistance, the main cause being inefficient targeting.

According to PCBS consumption data for 2005, when emergency assistance to households is subtracted, the percentage of households below the poverty line increases from 29.5% to 34.2%; at the same time, they reveal that emergency assistance reduces deep poverty from 23.5% to 18.1% of households.[259]

The IUED most recent survey suggests that in May 2006 more than half of the Palestinians were in need of assistance and that assistance was perceived as being more important than six months before. 76% of the extremely poor households said they needed a lot of assistance and that food assistance, followed by employment and health assistance were the most important. The same opinion was expressed by residents of villages in the West Bank, who are in fact among those who have been impoverished the most in the period December 2005-May 2006. However, the IUED study also observes that households living in extreme poverty have received more than half of the assistance delivered (53%), while poor households only 28%, registering a decrease of 13% compared to 2005; the study concludes that the targeting of the poor “has challenged the international and local aid”.[260]

The problem of targeting has been pointed out also by the MoSA, one of the main providers of assistance in the oPt, running the Social Hardship Cases Programme (SHC)  and the new Social Safety Net Programme (SSN). The MoSA estimates that only 55% of beneficiaries of the SHC are poor (using the consumption national poverty line, the one used by both PCBS and the IUED), which also means that a significant proportion of the resources are directed to the non-poor. A recent assessment conducted by the MoSA, considers that the SHC programme has rather targeted vulnerable groups who, nevertheless, may not be at risk of poverty. These considerations have lead to the adoption of a new formula to identify beneficiaries of the SSN programme which is planned to be fully operational in 2007 and which will replace the SHC programme. The new formula would combine the vulnerable group criteria with the “needy households” criteria. Therefore, households who have a low predicted level of consumption will be also targeted. Only 60% of existing beneficiaries of SHC, would be eligible to receive assistance under the new programme. Therefore, resources, if at all available, will be distributed more efficiently.[261]

Other assistance providers, including the WFP, UNRWA, NGOs use other criteria to identify their beneficiaries.

For example, the WFP identifies its beneficiaries on the basis of a combination of four factors: income diversification, geographic location, presence of the separation barrier and prevalence of malnutrition.[262] Accordingly, the two most vulnerable groups for food insecurity targeted by the WFP, are chronic poor and new poor (those who have become poor since September 2000). A survey conducted by the WFP in 2004 already recommended to redefine targeting criteria for beneficiaries being classified as “new poor”.[263] The WFP is currently planning this revision, to better identify its beneficiaries.

It is worth mentioning that the Quartet Temporary Mechanism intends to create a social safety net, therefore, a cash assistance programme to directly assist “Palestinians in greatest need”. At the moment of writing no additional information is available on selection criteria to identify the beneficiaries.

This short overview, points to the need of more efficient targeting and also of coordination among different institutions and organisations. Otherwise, the risk is to create social inequity.

To conclude, it should be also stressed that while emergency assistance is necessary to alleviate poverty and suffering, it is nevertheless fundamental to recognise and tackle root causes of the humanitarian crisis. This means acknowledging that massive poverty in the oPt is mainly caused by human right violations which requires serious action by all actors involved, these being Israel, the PA as well as the International Community and Intergovernmental Organisations, such as the UN and the EU.

Otherwise, the humanitarian crises will deteriorate further while Palestinians will be increasingly dependent on emergency assistance.

11.2 Poverty reduction strategies in the oPt

Poverty reduction strategies on hold

In recent years, poverty reduction in the oPt, has been the main objective of the UNDP Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP), which has developed specific projects, also in cooperation with the PA Ministry of Planning (MoP) and the Palestinian National Commission for Poverty Eradication. Two such projects are the Participatory Poverty Assessment Project, already mentioned in this report, and the Palestinian Pro-poor Participatory Planning (PPP) project. The intent is to incorporate the perspective of the poor into national and district poverty eradication strategies, by strengthening their participation, as well as that of main stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of those strategies. As a result, a Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) has been developed, which, nevertheless, is on hold in this moment, due to resources constraints, resulting from the fiscal measures adopted by International donors as well as by Israel.

To face the crisis, and massive poverty, the MoP has drafted a new emergency plan, recognising the need “to adjust its work on the MTDP to represent a series of action areas falling firmly within the paradigm of development relief”[265], and calling for support in some areas, including the provision of salaries to PA employees; the provision of basic services in the health and education sectors ad access to water; social assistance; job creation; and emergency humanitarian assistance.

The MoP recognises that the situation of occupation precludes solid development in the oPt and that the PA does not have effective control on the territories, nor on Palestinian natural resources. As a consequence, PA projects (including those on poverty reduction) strongly depend on foreign aid and Israeli revenues. Without external and Israeli funds, the MoP will not be able to give implementation to any poverty reduction plan.[266]

The added value of a human rights approach to poverty reduction

In the oPt, the human rights dimensions of poverty eradication policies have never received attention. Although the above mentioned projects have encouraged the informed and active participation of the poor and worked on their empowerment, as requested by the human rights approach to poverty reduction, they have failed in mainstreaming the other key-constitutive elements of this approach in anti-poverty strategies. This is regrettable, as a human rights approach to poverty is probably the only approach, although very difficult and challenging, that could make anti-poverty strategies in the oPt effective. For sure, a human rights approach to poverty requires concerted action by all stakeholders involved, namely, Israel, the PA and the International Community, including other UN agencies.

This would imply, granting rights to the poor and imposing legal obligations on duty-holders, such as Israel, the International Community, as well as the PA, as highlighted in this report; it would also mean that duty-holders be held accountable for their conduct in relation to IHRL and IHL; and that anti-poverty strategies reflect the minimum threshold established by non-derogable core obligations arising from human rights, such as the right to work, food and health, as pointed out in this report. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is of the opinion that: it is particularly incumbent on all those in a position to assist, to provide international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical to enable developing countries to fulfil their core obligation. In short, core obligations give rise to national responsibilities for all States and international responsibilities for developed States, as well as others that are in a position to assist.[267]

To summarise, all parties concerned, should work together to design a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy based on:

-         IHRL and IHL norms and standards;

-         accessible mechanisms of accountability;

-         informed and active participation of the poor;

-         the well-being of especially vulnerable groups;

-         the identification of immediate, intermediate and long term targets;

-         effective monitoring methods (indicators and benchmarks).[268]

They should also set priorities and work primarily for the eradication of extreme poverty. The UN Secretary General stated that: poverty can be reduced only if we reach out to the poorest of the poor…only through partnership with them, and by taking steps to tackle inequity, we can eradicate poverty in all its dimensions.[269]

Conclusions and Recommendations

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has repeatedly affirmed that: poverty is the greatest human rights challenge of our time.[270]

While the first UN Decade for the eradication of poverty is coming to an end[271], poverty remains a major human rights challenge in the occupied Palestinian territories.

This report has documented that human rights violations, including the right to freedom of movement, the right to work, the right to food and the right to health have led to the impoverishment or caused further impoverishment of Palestinians, demonstrating that discrimination fuels Palestinians’ deprivation of their basic capabilities and of their human rights. In particular, it highlighted the impact produced by these violations on the poor and vulnerable groups, considered as claim-holders, while pointing out responsibilities of Israel, the International Community and the PA under IHRL and IHL.

Despite the fact that international law requires that any individual or group victim of a human rights violation have access to effective remedies and receive adequate reparation, effective accountability mechanisms are not available as yet to Palestinians and violators (Israel, international donors and the PA) remain unaccountable for their conduct in relation to IHRL and IHL.

The poor, therefore the majority of the Palestinian people, are the victims of this situation and lack of the means and capabilities necessary to escape from poverty, fundamental for their enjoyment of human rights and essential for the respect of their human dignity.

Israel, the International Community, the PA and also International Organisations, should immediately address the multiple violations linked to poverty and work together to develop a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy, reflecting the minimum threshold established by non-derogable obligations arising from human rights, in particular, the right to work, the right to food and the right to health. 

The PHRMG believes that all parties should respect their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, and specifically, the following recommendations should be considered:

Israel

-         immediately lift closure measures which constitute collective punishment to Palestinians, are discriminatory in nature, unnecessary and disproportionate, resulting in the serious violation of Palestinian’s human rights, and causing or perpetuating poverty, as documented in this report;

-         take all measures necessary to restore and ensure public order and safety, while respecting Palestinians and their rights, as required by IHL and IHRL;

-         dismantle the Wall running into the West Bank and put an end to its construction, cause of additional and unjustified restrictions on the Palestinians’ freedom of movement, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, annexation of the West Bank and of multiple human rights violations and further impoverishment of Palestinians;

-         end extensive destruction and appropriation of Palestinian property and annexation of the occupied territories;

-         ensure prompt and adequate compensations and reparation for all Palestinians whose property has been destroyed or confiscated giving priority to the extremely poor;

-         end the permit regime, which is discriminatory and cause of human rights violations and poverty;

-         immediately satisfy, as a minimum, its core rights obligations, arising among others, from the right to work, food and health, recognising that these rights have a direct immediate bearing upon the eradication of poverty in the oPt;

-         refrain from unfairly depriving Palestinians of employment, limiting their access to decent work and discriminating against them, acknowledging that the right to work is instrumental in eradicating poverty;

-         refrain from depriving Palestinians of their physical access to  food and water, by adopting disproportionate closure measures, including the Wall, resulting in the expropriation of most fertile land, razing of trees, appropriation and control of water resources, destruction of wells and restrictions of movements of people and goods, including agricultural produce;

-         review in cooperation with the PA, the operation of the Joint Water Authority and other Institutions in the field of water management and control, with a view to ensure fair sharing of water resources in the oPt, in accordance with international law;

-         take economic and fiscal measures necessary to guarantee Palestinians’ economic accessibility to food and water, in particular of those living in extreme poverty;

-         halt the construction and enlargement of settlements in the West Bank, illegal under IHL, and disengage from the existing ones;

-         protect Palestinian farmers from Israeli settlers’ violence and to prosecute criminal acts committed by them, in order to fight impunity and ensure accountability;

-         facilitate humanitarian access for humanitarian organisations providing assistance to the Palestinians in the oPt, in particular the extremely poor and most vulnerable groups;

-         ensure equal access to health services to all Palestinians, in particular the poor and most vulnerable groups, without discrimination;

-         take economic measures necessary to ensure that functioning public heath facilities, goods and services be available and of good quality and be affordable for all, including the poor and vulnerable groups;

-         cooperate with UN human rights experts and UN treaty monitoring bodies, by monitoring the violations of human rights in the oPt and reporting about the compliance with UN human rights instruments;

-         guarantee that mechanisms of accountability be available and accessible to all, including the poor and, to this extent, take immediate action in order to ensure that international mechanisms, such as the system of individual petitions to UN human rights international treaty bodies, are accessible.

The International Community and specifically international donors

-         as High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions, ensure that Israel’s obligations as occupying Power, are met, specifically the obligations pointed out in this report;

-         guarantee the respect and observance of human rights in the oPt, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and human rights law;

-         take immediate action to guarantee the full enjoyment of human rights in the oPt, in accordance with international law.

Intergovernmental Organisations

-         mainstream human rights in the peace process in the Middle East, acknowledging that peace is not possible without the full enjoyment of human rights;

-         the OHCHR: guide and coordinate all parties involved, in the development of an effective anti-poverty strategy for the oPt, in accordance with the OHCHR guidelines.

The Palestinian Authority

-         immediately take all necessary steps to facilitate the provision of assistance to the Palestinians and ensure direct support to the PA, therefore meeting the requests of the Quartet, in order to avoid that the human rights situation of Palestinians, in particular those living in poverty, deteriorates further.

All parties concerned: Israel, the PA, international donors, IGOs (specifically the UN and EU), humanitarian and human rights NGOs

-         using the human rights framework to poverty reduction, work together to design a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy reflecting the minimum threshold established by non-derogable core obligations arising from human rights, such as the right to work, food and health, as pointed out in this report;

-         identify, under the guidance and coordination of the OHCHR and the UNDP, immediate, intermediate and long term targets of poverty reduction as well as benchmarks and indicators.