The Human Rights Face
of Poverty
in the

RoNu
2006: Woman begging in
Whenever we lift one soul from a life of poverty,
we are defending human rights.
And whenever we fail in this mission, we are failing human rights.
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances,
to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights,
their religious convictions and practices, and their manner and customs.
…they shall at all times, be humanely treated.
2.1
Intensification of
security measures and restriction of movement
2.2
Adoption of fiscal
measures
2.3
Deep crisis and
massive poverty
2.4
The Quartet’ s
Temporary Mechanism
3.1
The concept of poverty
3.2
The human rights
approach to poverty
4.1
Identifying basic
capabilities
4.2
Human Rights in focus
5.1
International Human
Rights Law, IHRL
5.2
International
Humanitarian Law, IHL
5.3
Other applicable laws
and instruments
6.1
Internal closures:
violation of human rights and cause of poverty
6.2
Horizontal
fragmentation of the
6.3
The impact of external
closures
6.4
The
7.1
The right to work and
poverty reduction
7.2
Unemployment in the
oPt
7.3
The impact of internal
closures
7.4
The impact of external
closures
7.5
The impact of economic
measures adopted by
7.6
The obligation of
8.1
Food insecurity
affects the poorest and most vulnerable
8.2
The obligations to
respect, protect and fulfil
8.3
Food accessibility and
the duties to respect and fulfil
8.4
Physical accessibility
to food
8.5
Settlers’ violence and
the duty to protect
8.6
Economic accessibility
to food
8.7
Food availability in
the
8.8
Physical and economic
accessibility to water
8.9
The obligation to
fulfil the right to food: food assistance in the oPt
9.1
The impact of closures
9.2
The right to health
and the obligations to respect and protect
9.3
The impact of economic
measures adopted by
9.4
Ill health as a
consequence and cause of poverty
9.5
Violation of the right
to health: availability, quality and economic accessibility
10.1
The right to education
10.2
The right to family
life
10.3
The right to
self-determination
11.1
Assistance and poverty
reduction: the problem of targeting
11.2
Poverty reduction
strategies in the oPt
Abbreviations and Acronyms
CAP
Consolidated Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territories
CCPR
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
CEDAW
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CERD
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CRC
Convention on the Rights of the Child
EU
European Union
FAO
Food Agricultural Organisation
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
IDs
Identity Documents
IDF
Israeli Defence Forces
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
IHRL
International Human Rights Law
ILO
International Labour Organisation
IUED
Institute on Development Studies of the
JWC
Joint Water Committee
MoA
Ministry of Agriculture
MoH
Ministry of Health
MoPIC
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MoSA
Ministry of Social Affairs
MSF
Médecins Sans Frontičres
MTDP
Medium Term Development Plan
NGOs
Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
oPt
PA
Palestinian Authority
PCBS
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PHRMG
Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group
PPA
Participatory Poverty Assessment Project
PWA
Palestinian Water Authority
SHCP
Social Hardship Cases Programme
SSN
Social Safety Net Programme
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund
UNRWA
United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USD
WaSH
Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Programme
WBWB
West Bank Water Department
WFP
World Food Programme
WHA
World Health Assembly
Acknowledgements
This report
was researched and written by a researcher of the Palestinian Human Rights
Monitoring Group (PHRMG). The PHRMG is grateful to all friends who read early
drafts of the report and provided valuable research advice and comments, to R.D.
who conducted proofreading and final checks and RoNu who took the meaningful
images used in this report.
A special
thanks goes to the Institute of Development Studies of Geneva (IUED), for its
invaluable support and cooperation and to several UN agencies, in particular,
the WFP, FAO, WHO, OCHA and the UNDP for the useful information and assistance
given.
The PHRMG
also acknowledges with appreciation representatives of the PA Ministry of
Planning and the Ministry of Social Affairs, who agreed to be interviewed for
this report.
The
organisation also wishes to thank the Israeli, Palestinian and international
non-governmental organisations and the many individuals who contributed with
their expertise and suggestions to this research.
Summary
Over the past six months, the humanitarian and economic situation has seriously deteriorated in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), mainly as a result of the intensification of Israeli security measures, the withholding of tax revenues collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA) by Israel and the freeze of direct budget assistance to the PA by international donors. The adoption of the Quartet Temporary Mechanism to deliver assistance by-passing the PA, has not alleviated the suffering of the Palestinian people. In this context poverty has risen sharply, so that the majority of Palestinians are now considered to be poor.
This report addresses poverty through the lens of human rights, therefore understanding poverty as a phenomenon driven by human rights violations. It covers the period January-June 2006, focusing specifically on the West Bank.
After presenting the main features of a human rights approach to poverty, this report identifies the main human rights violations that either cause, perpetuate or, to a lesser extent, result from poverty in the oPt. It also documents those violations and analyses their impact on the poor and vulnerable groups applying the human rights legal framework. Furthermore, it reaffirms the concept of interdependence of human rights, highlighting how the enjoyment of some rights, may depend or contribute to the enjoyment of other rights and, at the same time, the violation of some may lead to the violation of others. And it evaluates the importance of mainstreaming human rights into poverty reduction strategies. Finally, it gives recommendations to several actors who bear the responsibility to reduce poverty in the oPt, acknowledging that poverty reduction is not a question of charity or welfare. Rather, it is a legal obligation.
1. Research objective and methodology
This report gives details of the findings of research covering the period January-June 2006. Its objective consists of providing an analysis of poverty through the lens of human rights. The intent is therefore to address poverty as a phenomenon resulting from and causing itself human rights violations.
The analysis is mainly focused on the West Bank because a report on poverty in the Gaza Strip has been recently issued by a well known human rights organization. The intention is therefore not to duplicate the efforts.
This research has relied on reports that used both qualitative as well as quantitative methods in measuring/assessing poverty, evaluating that an integration of both allows for a more comprehensive understanding of a very complex issue.
The concept of poverty used in this report refers to the non-fulfillment of a person’s human rights to a range of basic capabilities – to do and be the things he or she has reasons to value[1].
The analytical human rights-based framework applied has been developed using as main sources of reference the Draft Guidelines on Human Rights and Poverty Reduction[2] and the Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Conceptual Framework[3] of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). This has had implications on the direction of the research.
In accordance with the OHCHR indications, the research began with the identification of the capabilities that Palestinians consider basic enough for their failure to count as poverty. Priority has been given to those capabilities that the OHCHR suggests are considered basic in most societies.[4] With a view to confirming whether these capabilities are basic in the Palestinian society and to identify other capabilities to be possibly added to the given list, it was fundamental to collect data on perceptions of Palestinians. Unfortunately, due to time and resource constraints, it was impossible to carry out field research. Nonetheless, to the stated purpose, the research could count on the results of the Pro-Participatory Planning Project, jointly undertaken in 2002 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This project consisted of conducting the Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA), by using a qualitative methodology. This meant consulting Palestinians on the concept and causes of poverty, as well as on the strategies to reduce it[5]. Interviews, focus groups and workshops were conducted with Palestinians from 63 localities, representing towns, camps and villages in the 16 Palestinian Districts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the report was published in 2002, both the UNDP and the MOPIC believe that the findings are still valid and the MOPIC refers to them in its studies.
In addition, this research took into account the results of the Palestinian Living Conditions Surveys Project, run by the Institute on Development Studies of the University of Geneva (IUED), in cooperation with several other partners including UN Agencies[6]. Using quantitative survey methodology, the project provides information on Palestinian public perceptions on poverty, assistance, impact and needs. The results of the IUED Poll n.10 were consulted as soon as available in order to assess Palestinians’ perception of poverty in the period December 2005-May 2006. The findings were compared with the PPA results.
Furthermore, the monitoring of recent reports as
well as of media materials produced on the current crisis by several sources,
confirmed that it was impacting on several sectors in particular, leading to the
impoverishment or further impoverishment of Palestinians.
Going through these three methodological steps, it was possible to identify those capabilities whose failure has resulted in poverty in the oPt, in the period covered by this research.
Once capabilities had been identified, the second step consisted in reading the capability failure in terms of rights, therefore applying the human rights legal framework to the analysis. This has led to the exposure of specific human rights violations that are causes and/or consequences of poverty, consider the poor as claim holders, identify duty holders and point out their legal obligations. Since the West Bank has the status of Occupied Land, International Humanitarian Law was also used in the legal analysis.
To document specific violations of human rights, this report relied on information from international organizations and agencies, including the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as Israeli and Palestinian governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions. In addition, it took into account information given in IUED Report n.10 and emerging from the analysis of cross tabulations of IUED Poll n. 10, using poverty both as dependent and independent variable.
To gather information or discuss the findings, interviews have also been conducted with international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies, as well as with Israeli and Palestinian governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions.
2. Background: Poverty in context, January-June 2006
Following the outcome of the January election of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the victory of the Hamas party, the Government of Israel and external donors have adopted a variety of measures that have negatively affected the economic, humanitarian and security sectors causing a crisis situation in the oPt and resulting in the serious deterioration of human rights of Palestinians and in massive poverty. Those that have produced the most significant impact are:
- intensification of Israeli security measures;
- Israeli restrictions of movements of people and goods;
- Israel’ s suspension of transfer to the PA, VAT and custom taxes;
- freeze of direct budget assistance by external donors.
Furthermore, some additional developments are of particular importance: the banking crisis in the oPt; the increased tension between Fatah and Hamas, mainly in the Gaza Strip; and the escalation in the conflict in the Gaza Strip, following an attack by Palestinian militants on an Israeli army post at Kerem Shalom and the launch of operation “Summer Rain” by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) at the end of June. A brief overview is provided below.
Since late 2005 and through the first six months of 2006, Israel has tightened its security measures, including incursions and military operations, internal closures and restrictions on movement of people and goods in and out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as within the two regions. In mid July, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) counted 536 physical obstacles in the West Bank (as compared to 402 in December 2005)[7]. In some areas, such as Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and South of Hebron, the combination of roadblocks, checkpoints and movement restrictions, has de facto isolated Palestinian communities in enclaves[8]. In addition, as of May 2006, 51% of the construction of the Wall was completed, most of which inside the West Bank. A system of permits regulating access to many routes within the West Bank, makes movement even more difficult.
Israel has also increased external closures which have caused a consistent decline in labor flows and limitations of movements of people and goods from the West Bank to Israel and between Gaza/West Bank and third countries. Trade restrictions have produced a strong negative impact on the market and Palestinian economy in general. Despite the Agreement on Movement and Access of 15 November 2005, Karni Crossing, the only existing crossing for exports and import of goods in and out of Gaza has been frequently closed in the first quarter of 2006, causing a shortage of essential food supplies, including wheat flour, fruits and dairy products and badly affecting Gaza export market[9]. Although Rafah terminal could have been an alternative to Karni for exports to third countries, in practice, movements across the terminal have been impossible, due to Israel’s prohibition to Egyptian trucks and Palestinian tracks (traveling outside the Egyptian border either to export products or only to transfer goods to Egyptian tracks) to enter or re-enter Gaza[10].
2.2 Adoption of
fiscal measures
The situation in the oPt has become even more critical because of the decision of Israel not to transfer revenues to the PA despite the agreement under the Paris Protocol of 1994[11]. According to the Protocol, Israel should remit to the PA, VAT and custom taxes collected in Israel on goods destined for the Gaza Strip and West Bank, which, in 2005, amounted to approximately 13% of GDI[12]. Israel withholding of revenues, is the primary cause of the PA liquidity crisis in 2006[13]. In May 2006, the World Bank considered that in case the financial situation did not change or, in case of intensification of fiscal strictures, the amount of the PA domestic revenues would decline to US$ 25 million and no banking system would be available to distribute this money[14]. Banks have already been applying restrictions on loans and some have refused to transfer money to the PA.
The fiscal compression has been worsened by the suspension of external donors’ assistance to the PA for almost 5 months. Direct assistance[15] was halted after the Hamas Government refused to agree on Quartet principles of non-violence, recognition of the State of Israel and the acceptance of previous agreements.
Since the end of May 2006, noting the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation, the UN has provided a monthly assessment of the situation and changes occurred, using both humanitarian indicators and field observation.[16] In both May and June, the UN reported about fuel shortages in the West Bank, including fuel destined to hospitals and the PA Ministry of Health (MoH) vehicles. According to the findings, the MoH have experienced shortages resulting in reduced medical supplies and essential drugs, non-maintenance of medical equipment and reduced number of surgical operations. Also the social assistance sector has already felt the deleterious effect of the crisis. Starting from January, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), have not been able to guarantee cash assistance to 45.000 Palestinian families, classified as social hardship cases and have stopped the job creation projects. As a result, the poorest of the poor in the West Bank have been deprived of income. The educational sector, on the other hand, has not being strongly affected by the crisis as yet and the UN predicts that the impact of the fiscal crisis will be fully felt only at the beginning of the new school year.
The IUED most recent survey points to the fact that this catastrophic situation has resulted in such a sharp increase in poverty, that it is estimated that the poverty rates in the oPt currently stand at 70% and more specifically, 71% in the West Bank, 35% in East Jerusalem and 79% in the Gaza Strip. Extreme poverty rates stand at 38% in the oPt, and respectively 33% in the West Bank, 17% in Jerusalem and 54% in the Gaza Strip. Poverty rates have increased substantially in refugee camps, from 39% in July 2005 to 52% in May 2006, reaching a peak of 45% in West Bank refugee camps and 55% in Gaza refugee camps. Living conditions drastically deteriorated also in villages, where in May, 74% of the surveyed households were poor. Apparently the most affected are the poor, who have been impoverished further and are now considered as extremely poor. [17]
Very alarmingly, an increasing number of Palestinians consider they do not have the capacity to keep up financially in the coming period and this is evident for those already living in extreme poverty (28%).[18] In addition, 53% of surveyed households in the West Bank, declared they felt insecure due to the economic crisis.
The same worrying situation is given by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), who estimates that poverty rates in the oPt, in the second quarter of 2006 have reached 65.8% of households if income data is used (70.3% of the Population in the oPt); by geographic location, they stand at 54.6% in the West Bank and 887.7% in Gaza. Deep poverty rates among Palestinian households have reached 55.6%, distributed by 43.2% in the West Bank and 79.8% in Gaza. [19]
Therefore, data by PCBS and the IUED does not differ much and shows a situation of massive poverty.
Poverty has increased more sharply among PA employees who have not received their salaries for five months, rising from 37% in 2005 to 46% in 2006 (of the 46%, 10% are the poorest and 36% are the poor).[20]
Furthermore, as in fact predicted by international institutions, the non-payment of PA security personnel, has led to a rise in insecurity and higher death rates and incidents, in particular in the Gaza Strip. On the one hand, internal clashes have intensified (as of June, 85 family or factional feuding incidents were recorded by OCHA, causing the killing of 36 people, including one child, and the injuring of 193 people, including 24 children) and factionalism has increased also as a consequence of the deployment of the 3.000 “Executive Support Force” created by the PA Ministry of Interior and declared illegal by the Palestinian President. On the other hand, violence has also been directed at Israel, as has happened with the attack on an Israeli army post at Kerem Shalom, the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and the abduction and killing of a civilian which caused the launch of operation “Summer Rain” in Gaza by the IDF at the end of June. The ongoing military operation has exacerbated the hardship and living conditions of the population and created a further spiral of violence.
2.4 The Quartet’ s
Temporary Mechanism
To face the serious situation, on 9 May, Members of the Quartet supported the creation of a temporary international mechanism, “limited in scope and duration, transparent and accountable” to ensure direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people, without the money passing to or through the PA government.
On 19/20 June, in occasion of the visit to Israel of EU Commissioner for External Relations, Ferrero-Waldner, the mechanism was presented. It consists of three elements:
Part one and two of the mechanism have been launched already, while the third part will start up in September.
Commenting on the cut of funds by donor countries and agencies, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories said that “the Palestinian people have been subjected to possibly the most rigorous form of international sanctions imposed in modern times” and expressed the opinion that the limited support provided through the Temporary Mechanism, “will ameliorate the humanitarian situation but will not alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people”[21]. Sharing the same opinion, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health stated that: although a step in the right direction, the emergency plan does not fulfil the donors’ responsibility to provide health assistance in the oPt[22].
In the meantime, to respond to the impact of the fiscal crisis facing the PA and the disastrous effects on the population, the UN have revised the Consolidated Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territories (CAP), which has been increased from US$ 215 million to US$ 385 million. As pointed out in the new CAP, launched on 31st May, “most of the new funding being sought is in the sector of temporary jobs and cash assistance to the most vulnerable, medical supplies to PA institutions and food to the growing most at-risk groups identified by UNRWA and the WFP”.[23] However, UN Agencies are still of the opinion that the new funding will alleviate the worst effects of the humanitarian crisis, but that: a lasting solution lies in a fully functioning PA and the easing of movement restrictions on Palestinians[24].
3. Poverty and the human rights framework
Poverty is not
only deprivation of economic or material resources, but a violation of human
dignity too. Indeed no social phenomenon is as comprehensive in its assault on
human rights as poverty.
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights[25]
3.1 The concept of
poverty
Conventionally, poverty is understood in terms of lack of income (income poverty) or lack of purchasing power to secure basic needs (consumption poverty) and is considered in absolute or relative terms.
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, poverty has been mainly referred to as “relative poverty” and “subsistence poverty”. The first is based on the standards of living in a society at a given time; the second, on the cost of satisfying the minimum caloric intakes as established by the Food Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO), plus a basic allowance for non-food items, such as clothing and shelter. The World Bank considers that in crisis situations, it is important to look at the former, as an indicator of the potential humanitarian crisis.
In the oPt, the “relative poverty line” is calculated by the World Bank as spending less than USD 2.20 per person per day, while the “subsistence poverty line”, sometimes defined as “deep poverty line” or “absolute poverty line”, is calculated as spending less than USD 1.60 per person per day[26].
In addition, in 1997, the National Commission for Poverty Alleviation developed an official definition of poverty, including both the concept of relative and absolute poverty.[27].
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics base their statistics on poverty on the official definition of poverty and accordingly, have developed two poverty lines based on a budget of basic needs for an household of 2 adults and 4 children: the absolute poverty line calculated to reflect a budget for food, clothing and housing and the relative poverty line, which also includes other necessities, such as health care, education, transportation, personal care and housing supplies.[28] In 2005, the relative poverty line was calculated as standing at USD 477 per person per month, and the absolute poverty line as standing at USD 385 per person per month. The poverty lines vary depending on the household size.[29]
The IUED uses the same poverty line as used by the PCBS for an household of 2 adults and 4 children, but then modifies it according to the variation in size of the household, using a different calculation methodology. In its studies, the extremely poor (those below the absolute poverty line), are defined as “hardship cases” , while the poor (those below the relative poverty line) are defined as “below the poverty line”.[30]
In this report, those below the absolute poverty line(IUED hardship cases) are defined as “extremely poor”, while those below the relative poverty line are defined as “poor”.
It is also worth mentioning that in the occupied Palestinian territories, consumption measurements are preferred to income measurements, because consumption can be measured more precisely and fluctuates less than income.
However, while the above mentioned measurements are useful in understanding poverty in terms of economic deprivation, they neglect the many other aspects of the phenomenon.
In the past ten years the development literature has contributed enormously to broadening the understanding of poverty and affirming its multidimensional nature.
In the Human Development Reports, the UNDP, has regarded poverty as deprivation of many elements of well-being, in addition to income growth or consumption capacities, and defined it as deprivation of human development.
The Human Development report on poverty[31] defined it as “deprivation in the valuable things that a person can do or be” and coined the term “human poverty”, making a distinction between this broad deprivation and narrower income poverty, which was limited to deprivation in income or consumption.
More specifically, in the human development approach, poverty draws from three different perspectives: the income perspective, the basic needs perspective and the capability perspective. In these terms, poverty is about lack of income, but also about deprivation of material requirements for “minimally acceptable fulfillment of human needs, such as basic health services, education and food”[32]. And most important, it is about the absence of some basic capabilities, such as to live a long, healthy and creative life, to be knowledgeable, to enjoy a decent standard of living, dignity and respect; it is about lack of “real opportunity to leave a valuable and valued life”[33].
Under the capability approach in particular, economic factors are therefore still considered as important causes of deprivation of human development and poverty, although not necessarily the only and main ones; furthermore, while recognizing the economic dimension of poverty, the capability approach places importance on the inadequate command over economic resources, rather than on economic resources per se.
In the past few years, human rights experts have suggested that the “capability approach”, be the bridge between the discourses on poverty and human rights and affirmed that “poverty deprives individuals of their capabilities to enjoy human rights”.[34]
As a matter of fact, under the capability approach, poverty can be defined as absence or inadequate realization of certain basic freedoms. Given that the human rights approach supports that every human being has human rights to those freedoms, from the human rights perspective, poverty can be defined as the non-fulfillment of rights to those freedoms. Moving from the capabilities approach, the OHCHR has recently developed the human rights approach to poverty, whose main features are described below.
The human rights approach to poverty is grounded in International Human Rights binding Treaties and in the United Nations Charter. As such, it introduces the important concept of rights, so that the poor are recognized as claim-holders, having entitlements that give rise to legal obligations. In particular, it emphasizes obligations deriving from International Human Rights Law (IHRL), requiring that duty holders, primarily States, be held accountable for their actions. [35]
Obligations deriving from specific human rights may be analysed by reference to the duties to respect, protect and fulfil. The first is a negative duty, requiring the duty-bearer not to breach directly or indirectly the enjoyment of human rights; the second and third are instead positive duties, requiring the duty-bearer to take measures to prevent third parties from interfering in the enjoyment of human rights and obliges the duty-bearer to adopt appropriate measures towards the full realization of human rights.
Under this approach, poverty reduction becomes an international legal obligation, and no longer a question of charity or welfare.
Main characteristics of a human rights approach to poverty are accountability, the principle of equality and non-discrimination, participation by and empowerment of the poor and the recognition of the interdependence of rights.
Notwithstanding the above, it is important to stress that the human rights approach to poverty does not equate poverty to the non fulfillment of human rights in general, neither does it impose an obligation on duty-holders to realize all human rights immediately.
Firstly, it has already been pointed out that from a human rights perspective, poverty consists of the “non-fulfilment of a person’s human rights to a range of basic capabilities to do and be the things he or she has reasons to value”[39] .
Since basic capabilities may differ from one country to another, due to different social perceptions of what are basic capabilities in order of priority, also the set of human rights to be analysed may differ.
This implies that in any specific context, it is necessary to follow these steps:
1) identify, through a participatory process, which are the capabilities considered to be basic (basic enough that their failure counts as poverty);
2) identify what specific rights to those capabilities are not fulfilled.
The UN Guidelines on Poverty Reduction Strategies[40], identify a common set of capabilities that are considered basic in most societies, including: the capabilities of being adequately nourished, avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality, being adequately sheltered, having basic education, being able to ensure security of the person, having equitable access to justice, being able to appear in public without shame, being able to earn a livelihood and taking part in the life of a community.
Secondly, considering the timeframe for the realization of human rights, it has to be stressed that the human rights approach to poverty allows for progressive realization of rights and for setting priorities among different rights due to constraint of resources.
Nonetheless, International human rights law recognizes that States have core obligations, deriving from the rights to life, housing and adequate food as part of the right to a decent standard of living, health and education. Those core obligations should be considered as binding constraints and States should always guarantee the immediate fulfillment of at least the minimum essential levels of those rights.
The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights[41] has recognized that:
the right to work, an adequate standard of living, housing, food, health and education, lie at the heart of the Covenant and have a direct immediate bearing upon the eradication of poverty.[42]
Anti-poverty strategies should reflect at least these human rights core obligations and should guarantee the respect of the minimum international threshold established by them.
4. Poverty, basic capabilities and human rights in the oPt
From a human rights perspective poverty is defined as the non-fulfillment of a person’s human rights to a range of basic capabilities – to do and be the things he or she has reasons to value.
Accordingly, to understand poverty in the oPt, it is necessary to identify the capabilities that Palestinians consider basic enough for their failure to count as poverty, meaning an extreme form of deprivation. To this extent, as pointed out in the previous section, the OHCHR suggests that there are capabilities considered basic in most societies. To verify if these capabilities are in fact considered basic in the Palestinian society and also to identify other capabilities to be possibly added to the given list, it has been necessary to refer to the perceptions of the Palestinians themselves.
For this exercise, the report produced within the Palestinian Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (PPA) jointly undertaken by the UNDP and the MOPIC[44] has been very useful.
According to the PPA results, poverty in Palestine is linked to the inability of a person to provide adequate income to meet basic needs such as food, clothing, proper housing and education; it is also related to the inability to access income sources (e.g. regular jobs, properties, private income-generating projects); further, it is identified with the inability to have good health as well as the inability to have proper housing (unsatisfactory housing conditions were identified in terms of inadequate utilities or incomplete housing construction, or small size and overcrowding); poverty is also linked to the incapacity of moving freely and feeling secure, due to the continuous Israeli occupation and Israeli security measures, including closures; it is also about lack of access to water resources, health centers and roads; lack of education or training, in particular for women, who also consider that poverty is about traditions restricting women’s freedom in terms of work and the taking on of an active role outside their homes and about their right to control their possession. The perception of poverty of women from the countryside includes: lack of job opportunities, limited income to meet basic family needs, continued unavailability of food, reliance on others for managing livelihood and improper housing. In general, women interviewed, felt that poverty is linked to marginalization, inferiority and consequent exclusion. In addition, poverty is viewed as social isolation, resulting from the inability to fulfill obligations in social and religious occasions, or due to particular conditions of mental or physical illness. This is mainly pointed out by refugees, while the youth perceive poverty as mainly linked to the lack of connections and mediations in the community. Finally, children consider poverty as deprivation in terms of security, feeling of powerlessness, lack of access to education, to adequate food and health facilities (such as mental health clinics), while the elderly give prior importance to the inability to appear in public without shame and be adequately assisted (they complained about inadequate assistance and about how the community looks at them, causing a feeling of worthlessness).
This short overview of the perceptions of poverty by the Palestinians, confirms that most of the capabilities that the OHCHR suggests are basic in most societies, are in fact considered as such in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Priority is given to: the capability of being adequately nourished; the capability of being adequately sheltered; the capability of being able to earn a livelihood; the capability of having basic education; the capability of feeling secure; the capability of appearing in public without shame; the capability of taking part in the life of a community.
In addition, the capability of being able to move freely, the capability of having control on one’s own natural resources, such as water and land, the capability of enjoying good health in general and having access to health services (including the capability of avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality) can be added to those suggested by the OHCHR.
The human rights approach to poverty requires that capability failures be read in terms of rights. This leads to the identification of a set of human rights and an assessment of the level of their respect, protection and fulfillment, through the application of the human rights legal framework. This is done in order to expose specific human rights violations that are causes and/or consequences of poverty in the West Bank.
Given the capability failures identified above, it appears that human rights whose violation is linked to poverty in the oPt are:
|
Basic
Capabilities |
Human Rights |
|
capability of being able to move freely; capability of feeling secure |
right to freedom of movement |
|
capability of being able to earn a livelihood |
right to work |
|
capability of being adequately nourished |
right to adequate food |
|
capability of enjoying good health in general and having access to health services |
right to health |
|
capability of having basic education |
right to education |
|
all capabilities |
right to equality and non-discrimination |
|
capability of having control on one’s own natural resources |
right to self-determination |
|
capability of taking part in the life of a community; capability of appearing in public without shame |
right to family and community life |
|
capability of being adequately sheltered |
right to adequate housing |
The monitoring of most recent reports and media
documents, documenting or giving updates on the current crisis, as well as of
events that occurred in the period January-June 2006, indicate that the
employment, food and health sectors are the most affected and that the
intensification of Israeli closure measures is still the main cause of concern.
Furthermore, data of IUED Poll n.10 on Palestinian Public Perceptions clearly
shows that in this specific moment Palestinians perceive poverty as being linked
in particular to their incapacity to be adequately nourished, earn a livelihood
and having access to health services.
In light of these considerations, the analysis
that follows will focus primarily on the right to freedom of movement, the right
to work, the right to food and the right to health. Shorter assessment will also
cover other rights. Equality and non-discrimination is considered as a
cross-cutting issue given the fundamental importance of this principle in human
rights law and the human right approach to poverty and will be addressed in the
analysis of each right.
5. Applicable Legal Framework
Article 55
(…) the United Nations shall promote:
Article 56
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55.
As mentioned in section 3.2, the human rights approach to poverty allows for progressive realization of rights and for setting priorities among different rights due to constraint of resources.
Most of the rights that will be addressed in the following chapters are economic rights, enshrined in CESCR. Article 2 of the Covenant, requires that the full realization of the rights enunciated in the Covenant be achieved progressively, by all appropriate means.[55]
Although the wording of art. 2, seems somehow to give wide flexibility in the realization of the rights, the Committee has interpreted the word progressively, as imposing an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the goal of the full realization of the rights enshrined in the Covenant.[56]
Furthermore, the Committee clarifies that: a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights, is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education, is prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.[57]
Core obligations therefore, impose on each State to guarantee the immediate fulfillment of at least the minimum essential levels of human rights. The following chapters will point out the core obligations arising from each right covered in the analysis.
All High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions, are obliged to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions.[65] Therefore, they have the responsibility to ensure that Israel satisfies its obligations deriving from the Conventions.
Since 1967, Emergency Regulations give to the Military Commander of the occupying Power, the competence to issue military orders applicable in the oPt.
A very complex system of laws that applied in the oPt before the 1967 Israeli occupation, still remains in force, these including: Ottoman Law, British Law (introduced under the British Mandate), Jordanian Law applicable in the West Bank and Egyptian Law applicable in the Gaza Strip.
The Oslo Accords are important in understanding water-related issues.
6. Closure measures and freedom of movement in
the West Bank
Human rights
violations and impoverishment
|
The closure
system is a primary cause of poverty and the humanitarian crisis in the West
Bank. OCHA, January 2006[66] |
This chapter, instead, explains what closure measures are and why they constitute collective punishment. It focuses on the principle of equality and non-discrimination and on the right to freedom of movement. And it gives an assessment of the impact of closures, including the West Bank Wall, produced in recent months.

RoNu 2006: Kalandia Checkpoint
Since August 2005, Israel has increased closures in the West Bank.
By “closures” it is meant measures imposed on the West Bank to restrict movements of Palestinians. Closure measures include physical obstacles and a permit system that regulates movements within the West Bank.
- Physical obstacles can be permanent, these including checkpoints, road blocks, road gates and the Wall; and temporary, such as flying checkpoints and road gates closed on a temporary basis.
According to the UN, the number of physical obstacles in the West Bank reached a peak of 536 in mid July, from 375 in August 2005.[68]
According to Israel, their function is to protect Israeli civilians from Palestinian militant attacks, therefore, they are justified on security grounds.
They are acts that punish and intimidate the whole Palestinian population for offences committed by a few of its members and as such, constitute a violation of IHL, namely of article 33 of Geneva Convention IV, that imposes on Israel, as the occupying Power, the prohibition of collective penalties stating that:
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Furthermore, closures are discriminatory. They are imposed on Palestinians because they are Palestinians and not on Israelis illegally living in the OPt, and as such violate the very fundamental principle of equality and non discrimination enshrined in several international human rights instruments, such as, CCPR (art.2 (1)), CESR (art. 2(2)) and CERD. Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, states that: State Parties (in this case Israel) undertake to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights (d) (i): the right to freedom of movement and residence…
Interpreting this article, the monitoring body of the Convention, considers
that: Whenever a State imposes a restriction upon one of the rights listed in
article 5 of the Convention…(it) must ensure that neither in purpose nor
effect is the restriction incompatible with article 1 of the Convention as an
integral part of international human rights standards.[69]
Article 1 of CERD, defines racial discrimination as: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
The prohibition to
discriminate is also affirmed in IHL, art. 27 of Geneva Convention IV which
states: Protected
persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their
honour…all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the
Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction,
based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.
Despite recognizing the right and duty of Israel to protect its own citizens, therefore adopting measures adequate to respond to its security concerns, it is nevertheless important that those measures meet the test of proportionality and necessity. Looking at the impact produced by restrictions of movement on the lives of Palestinians, those measures can be said to be disproportionate and indiscriminate.
|
The sole
purpose of the Security Fence, as stated in the Israeli Government decision of
July 23rd 2001, is to provide security. The Security Fence is a central
component in Israel’s response to the horrific wave of terrorism emanating
from the West Bank, resulting in suicide bombers who enter into Israel with
the sole intention of killing innocent people. |
The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order. The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.[87]
|
… the Committee is concerned that
the construction of the "Seam Zone", by means of a fence and, in part, of a
wall, beyond the Green Line, imposes additional and unjustifiably severe
restrictions on the right to freedom of movement of, in particular,
Palestinians within the occupied territories. The "Seam Zone" has adverse
repercussions on nearly all walks of Palestinian life…the Committee considers
that these restrictions are incompatible with article 12 of the Covenant. |

7. The right to work
Juan Somavia, ILO Director General[95] |
To this
extent, the UN General Assembly has recognised that:
Improving human development and fostering
productive workforce- in short, improving the employability of the working poor
–will enable the poor to participate in and benefit from economic
growth…improving the employability of the working poor is one element of a
rights-based approach to reducing poverty through unemployment. A second is to
eliminate discriminatory practices against the employment of certain groups.[96]
In recent years, increases in unemployment and
unemployment rates have resulted from several factors, such as the intense
Palestinian population growth, a declined in employment in Israel and lack of
domestic job creation in the oPt. Nonetheless, Israeli closure policies, defined
by the World Bank as a “drag anchor on Palestinian economic
recovery”[104], still remain the main cause.
Already in 2003, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, in its concluding observations on Israel, stated
that:
The Committee notes with grave concern the
severe consequences of closure on the Palestinian population…Workers from the
occupied territories are prevented from reaching their workplace, depriving them
of income and livelihood and the enjoyment of their rights under the Covenant.[105]
Recently, the ILO calculated the effective
workforce affected by internal closures in the last quarter of 2005. According
to its data, in the West Bank, 569.600 workers have been affected, the highest
number being in Hebron, Jerusalem and Nablus, followed by Ramallah and Jenin.
Observing trends in the period November 2004-December 2005, the ILO concluded
that increase of closure measures always resulted in rise in unemployment.[106]
Closures, as documented by OCHA, have sharply increased in the first six months
of 2006, further reducing employment and employment opportunities for
Palestinians.
The Poll n.10, shows that 55% of the respondents
consider that the inability to obtain permits to move in the West Bank is the
cause of their difficulty to go to work. This answer was given by more than half
of the poor (55% for extremely poor and poor). 74% also said that their
difficulty to go to work was caused by their inability to move in the West Bank
because of physical obstacles. This answer was given by 73% of the extremely
poor and by 78% of the poor. [107]
The right to work implies the right not to be
unfairly deprived of employment.[108]
There is no doubt that internal closures adopted by Israel, unfairly deprive
Palestinians, mainly the poor, of employment and as such, constitute a
violation of their right to work as enshrined in the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights.
Article 5, CERD
State Parties undertake to prohibit racial discrimination (…) Article 27 Geneva Convention IV Protected persons are entitled, in all
circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour…all protected
persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the
conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction, based, in
particular, on race, religion or political opinion. |
Israel also violate the prohibition of discrimination of
workers, set for in IHRL, IHL and specific ILO Conventions. Closures, movement
restrictions and the permits regime applied by Israel impact on the right to
work and specifically, on one of its essential elements, accessibility, which requires
that the labour market be open to everyone. The very first dimension of
accessibility is non-discrimination. Commenting on it the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights clarified that: Under its article 2, paragraph 2, and article 3,
the Covenant prohibits any discrimination in access and maintenance of
employment… which has the intention or effect of impairing or nullifying
exercise of the right to work on a basis of equality. [109]
Reflecting on the permit system that regulates
movements within the West Bank and on requirements that Palestinians have to
meet and restrictions on permit issuance, the ILO considers that: The
complexity and inconsistency of the regime for issuing permits underlines the
arbitrary and discriminatory way in which rights which are so fundamental to the
exercise of employment and occupation are granted or refused, without reference
to any perceptible rule basis and without any legal recourse or appeal. …In
terms of ILO’ s standards and rights there is abundant evidence of
discrimination among the population in respect of access to employment and
occupation (…). Such discrimination is contrary to the Discrimination Convention[110]
and the ILO Declaration of the fundamental Principles and the Rights at Work.[111]
The ILO Discrimination Convention, requires that State
Parties (in this case Israel), should declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods
appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and
treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating
any discrimination in respect thereof.[112]
As occupying Power, Israel should also respect article 27 of
the Geneva Convention IV. The ICRC Commentary specifies that the prohibition
established in this article is not only a negative duty: the occupying Power
should assume an active role in enacting the prohibition.
Israel, clearly does not satisfy this obligation.
Very often, to give enforcement to closure
measures, the IDF use lethal force. According to OCHA[113],
in the past six months, the physical protection of civilians has deteriorated:
between December 2005 and June 2006,
45 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank, including 4 children, and 747 were injured. The highest number of
casualties happened in May, when 21 civilians were killed during IDF military
operations, including search and arrest campaigns in the northern and central
West Bank, and 223 people were injured, mainly in Ramallah Governorate.
Observing the correlation between fatalities and
Palestinian unemployment in the period last quarter of 2004-first quarter of
2006, the ILO is of the opinion that: a higher degree of conflict, reflected
in a higher casualty toll, leads to a lower level of economic activity, which,
in turn translates into a higher degree of unemployment.[114]

RoNu 2006: Submission of work permit requests, Employment Office in West Jerusalem.
In addition to internal closures, also external closures, that regulate the flow of Palestinian workers into Israel, have contributed to job and income losses.
IUED Poll n.10 highlights that 64% of the
respondents identified the inability to obtain permits to go to East Jerusalem
or Israel from the West Bank as the cause of their difficulty to go to work.
This answer was given by a high percentage of the poor: 74% of extremely poor
and 62% of the poor. Furthermore, 62% said their problems in accessing their
work in Israel or East Jerusalem was caused by physical obstacles. 68% of the
extremely poor and 58% of the poor gave this answer. [117]
Israel is clearly not
meeting its responsibilities under the “Bertini Commitment”, in which Israel
agreed to increase the number of work permits of Palestinian workers in Israel.[118]
It is important to mention that with the
intensification of external restrictions and loss of jobs in Israel,
Palestinians have turned to local employment, mainly in the agricultural sector,
which, however, has also been
severely affected by Israeli security measures.
In the first six months of 2006, the sharp
increase in unemployment has also been largely caused by the fiscal crisis as
discussed in chapter 2.
- PA employees: approximately 160.000 PA employees, supporting 942.000 dependants, meaning one in four Palestinians, have not been receiving their salaries for 4 months. At the end of June, approximately 9% of over due salaries were paid to 120.918 families.[121]
-
Social hardship
cases: the beneficiaries of the emergency job creation
programme run by the MoSA.
-
Refugees: the number of applications to UNRWA job
creation programme in the West Bank has increased from 2.000 in December 2005 to
4.000 in April 2006 and is considered to have increased by eight times in the
course of the past two years.[122]
Particular attention should also be given to
women. The ILO points out that female employment rates in the oPt have
historically been low, but that they have furthered declined with the current
crises.[123]
According to the IUED Report n.10, this explains the high percentage of
housewifes excluded from the labour force: 43% in the West Bank, 47% in
Jerusalem and 43% in Gaza.[124]
It is important to note that highest unemployment rates in the oPt are for women with high education
level (33% in Q4/2005)
and that one third of PA employees are women who are
suffering the consequences of the current crises: they are believed to be among
the first who will not be able to continue to work, despite not being paid,
because of difficulties they are apparently already experiencing in affording
childcare.
IUED recent data on poverty and income evolution, reveals that in the period December 2005-May 2006, a high percentage of Palestinians indicated that their income decreased (44% or respondents, 40% in the west Bank and 58% in Gaza). The most affected are the poor: 55% of the extremely poor and 39% of the poor have perceived a decline in their income, primarily as a consequence of job loss or working hour loss (61% of the extremely poor and 41% of the poor indicated this as the main reason of their income deterioration).[125]This is common to both refugees and non-refugees and this situation has resulted in an increased percentage of underemployment among the two groups reaching 36% and 24% respectively.[126]
Furthermore, the IUED survey observes that: job loss is a reality for everyone, in each level of poverty but the poorest are still the one to be hit the hardest. Accordingly, 42% of the poor interviewed, said that at least one member of their households lost his/her job (29% extremely poor and 13% poor). As a consequence, the poor are those who feel the most economically insecure and consider it very probable that they will loose their job (43% of respondents in 2006 as compared to 49% in 2005), and 54% of the extremely poor indicate employment assistance as their main priority for the community. In 2006, employment assistance was received by 15% of extremely poor surveyed households and by 12% of poor households. [127]
|
Inevitably,
this economic strangulation has had a sever impact on the economic life of
Palestinians and their human rights. About one million of Palestine’s 3.5
million population are directly affected by the non-payment of salaries,
while, indirectly, the whole population suffers economically. UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories[128] |
Looking at
the impact produced by economic measures adopted by Israel and international
donors in recent months, it can be said that the right to work of Palestinians
have been violated. Specifically:
-
International Donors: the impact produced on unemployment
by the suspension of direct assistance to the PA can be said to be a violation
of the right to work of Palestinians. External donors are failing to comply with
their commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full
realisation of the right to work, in coherence with the spirit of Arts. 55 and
56 of the Charter of the United Nations and specific provisions of CESCR[129]. At the moment of writing, there is not
enough information to assess whether the Temporary Mechanism is able to
adequately address the gap created due to the suspension of direct assistance.
-
Israel: by withholding the transfer of VAT and taxes
collected on goods directed to the oPt, Israel does not respect its obligation
to give full implementation of the right to work in the West Bank and Gaza.
-
Palestinian Authority: it should as a minimum avoid taking
measures resulting in the restriction and limitation of the enjoyment of the
right to work. Therefore, it is the PA’s responsibility to consider the effects
produced by its political decisions and positions on the right to work of all
Palestinians and consequently modify them with a view to facilitating the
enjoyment of such right.
8. The right to food
|
The right to
food is the right to have regular, permanent and unobstructed access, either
directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and
qualitatively adequate and sufficient food, corresponding to the cultural
traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensures a
physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life
free from anxiety.
Special Rapporteur on the right to food[132] |
The definition of the right to food used in this report, which is the one given by the UN expert on the theme, includes elements of the definition of food security[133], considered to be the corollary of the right to food. The UN Special Rapporteur considers that:
Understanding food security is vital to understanding the right to food, as it gives us an understanding of the minimum standards that are considered necessary[134].
The overview presented below, clearly points to the fact that in the oPt, the right to food is largely violated.
Since January 2006 food security in the oPt has deteriorated sharply. While at the end of 2005, food-insecure people in the oPt were estimated to be 37%, the World Food Programme (WFP) and FAO are now projecting that 51% of the oPt population should be considered as food-insecure. This means a total of 1.547.229 Palestinians, 909.715 in the West Bank and 637.515 in Gaza[135]. In the West Bank, food insecurity is likely to increase more rapidly in the North, in Tubas, Nablus, Tulkarem and Jenin.
The 14% increase is mainly the result of the deterioration in food accessibility but also, although less significantly, of food availability.
In
general, since the outbreak of the second Intifada, closure policies have been
the main cause of food insecurity. Starting from December 2005, Israeli security
measures including internal closures and restrictions on movement of goods and
people, have been intensified, impeding physical and economic access to food and
water. In addition, after the
January election, the suspension of Israel tax revenues and external donors’
direct budget support to the PA has exacerbated an already difficult situation:
in April OCHA warned that limited PA funding was expected to triple the
deteriorating food security trend by the end of the year.
The UN considers that the emerging food insecure are the groups most affected by the fiscal-economic crisis: social hardship cases; low income PA employees (e.g., municipal cleaners, guards, security personnel); small shop owners and employees; and small farmers and agricultural laborers[136]. Furthermore, the WFP and FAO[137] have observed that the current food crises mostly affects people with heightened nutritional needs and poor income sources: the elderly, poorly educated people, lactating and pregnant women and households with many children. Lactating and pregnant women and children have been considered as the most vulnerable, because of problems in iron deficiency, lack of vitamin A and iodine deficiency.
|
A child suffering from undernourishment and/or malnutrition in the
first years of life will never recover. Special Rapporteur on the right to food[138] |
A nutritional assessment conducted in 2004 by CARE/John Hopkins University noticed that 22% of children between 12 and 59 months suffer from vitamin-A deficiency and 53.9% are borderline deficient[139].
Measuring chronic malnutrition[140], the WFP reports that in the past six years, stunting levels in children under five have been increasing. According to a review of nutrition situation in the West Bank and Gaza, conducted by WHO, PA Ministry of Health and UNICEF[141], stunting is strongly related to poverty. Therefore, children living in poor households are the most vulnerable. According to the study, refugee children and children living in rural areas are more stunted, because of the high levels of poverty.
Because of the current limited access to food, the nutritional situation of children is expected to worsen. In general, in 2004 and 2005 the nutritional status of Palestinians has remained stable and chronic malnutrition was estimated to be stable at the level of 9.4%. This figure is now expected to increase, in particular for the poorest.
In the oPt,
Israel is primarily responsible for the application of CESCR, the human right
treaty dealing with the right to food more comprehensively than any other
international instrument under international human rights law. Article 11 of
CESCR, states that:
The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognise the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing (…) and recognise the fundamental right of everyone to be
free from hunger (…)
The right to food, enshrined in CESCR as part of
the right to a decent standard of living, imposes three types of obligations on
Israel: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.
Israel should also ensure specific protection to
children, in accordance with article 24 (c) of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, affirming that:
Specifically, as far as the right to food is
concerned, under Geneva Convention IV, Israel has the main responsibilities as
follows: to provide food and water supplies to the Palestinian population (art.
55); to allow access for impartial humanitarian organisations (arts. 23 and 59).
Furthermore, Israel should respect the following prohibitions: prohibition of
collective punishment (art.33); annexation of occupied land (art.47);
destruction of property belonging to individuals or collectively to private
persons or to the State, unless it is rendered absolutely necessary for military
operations (art. 53). Israel is also bound to respect the following specific
provisions of the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land of 1907: prohibition of confiscation of private property (art. 46);
prohibition of requisitions except for military needs (art. 52).
Furthermore, all States of the International Community, who are Parties to the Geneva Conventions, are obliged to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions.[143] Therefore, they have the responsibility to ensure that Israel satisfies its obligations under IHL.
The Special Rapporteur on the right to food has
confirmed the view that since September 2000, Israel, as occupying Power
exercises effective control in most of the oPt and that the PA does not have
human rights obligations in this regard.[144]
Food accessibility
is one of the main components of the right to food. The Committee on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights considers that: The right to adequate food is realised when
every man, women and child, alone or in the community with others, has physical
and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.
In addition, Israel should take measures aimed
at strengthening Palestinians’ access and utilization of resources and means to
ensure their livelihood, including food security. This follows from its
obligation to fulfil (facilitate) the right to food.
Israel justifies the adoption of such measures on the
ground of security. Although recognizing security needs of Israel, facts on the
ground largely demonstrate that those measures are disproportionate,
discriminatory, constitute collective punishment and deprive Palestinians of
their right to food. Therefore, by adopting closure measures, Israel falls short
of its obligation under IHRL, to respect the
right to food requiring that it ensure that every Palestinian in the oPt has
permanent access at all times to sufficient and adequate food and avoid taking
measures resulting in the deprivation of such access.
In addition, Israel does not satisfy its
obligation to fulfil the right to food, requiring the adoption of measures
that facilitate Palestinians’ access and utilization of resources and means to
ensure their livelihood.
It also violates humanitarian law, specifically
the prohibition to collectively punish protected persons and not to take
reprisals against them[148].
|
-
Art. 47: annexation of occupied land is prohibited. -
Art. 53: destruction of property is prohibited, unless
it is rendered absolutely necessary for military operations. Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of 1907 |
The Wall largely cuts into the West Bank and creates areas of land that
lie between the Wall and the Green Line, also called “closed areas”. To enter
and also to live inside these areas, Palestinians are required to obtain permits
which, nevertheless, are increasingly rejected because of land-related issues.
Palestinians tenant farmers, labourers, spouses of land owners and second degree
owners, can not prove land ownership or to have a direct relationship to the
owner of the land. Land owners, living east of the Wall, who in the past relied
on extended family members and labourers in their agricultural activities are
badly affected by the tightening of the permit regime.
Farmers have also reported being given permits with wrong gate numbers,
jeopardizing their passage through the right gate, or being given permits to
cross gates located far from their land, therefore forcing them to cover long
distances and waste considerable time[157].
Furthermore, erratic operation of the Wall gates prevent farmers from accessing
their land regularly. Although agricultural gates should be opened three times a
day, for 20-60 minutes, very often, because of security reasons, they remain
closed for several days. Sometimes, tractors or other vehicles can not pass
through the gates, so that farmers can only walk or use donkeys, which results
in their inability to transport their agricultural produce. Consequently, to
face the uncertainty, many farmers have changed the types of crops they
cultivate, from high-maintenance, lucrative crops to crops less lucrative and
requiring less maintenance, such as wheat.
|
Expropriation of Palestinian land in the oPt
constitutes a violation of the obligation to respect the right to food when it
deprives Palestinians of their means of existence and when it is for the
establishment of settlements, as these are illegal under international law. Special Rapporteur on the right to food[158] |
Palestinians owing land in the closed areas, also face the additional problem of dispossession, which deprives them of their means of subsistence. These areas are classified as Area C, therefore are under Israeli civil control (see Box 1).
Much of Palestinian land in closed areas has already been expropriated, declared “State Land”[159] and area of construction of Israeli settlements. According to recent projections, once the Wall is completed, 76.5% of the West Bank settler population will live in these areas[160]. In some areas, despite the recognition of the land as “State Land”, Palestinians still cultivate their land, but are concerned about the possible enforcement of the State Land declaration which would deny them permits to access their properties, since they are not recognized as owners. Furthermore, land owners of unregistered land not yet declared State land, fear the confiscation.

RoNu
2006: Wall separating the village from cultivated land, Abu Dis.
OCHA regularly reports[161] on land confiscation and raizing of trees, which has continued in 2006 both for building the Wall and for expanding settlements, checkpoints, road barriers, fences and buffer zones.
In the period August 2005-January 2006, 7.884 dunums of land have been requisitioned throughout the West Bank[162], while between April and June 2006, 1.150 dunums have been destroyed or requisitioned, and 1.015 have been reclaimed[163].
Furthermore, according to the PA Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), between September 2000 and April 2005, 79.270 dunums of fruit trees, greenhouses and fruit and vegetables in open field were confiscated and/or destroyed.[164]
|
Box 1. The laws regulating land-issues in
the West Bank, Area C[166] The legal framework governing land administration in
the West Bank, includes Israeli military Orders and Ottoman, British and
Jordanian legislation. The land located in Area C, including the one
comprising Israeli settlements in the North evacuated under the disengagement
plan in September 2005, amounts to approximately 55% of the West Bank
(excluding East Jerusalem).This land remains under Israeli civil control, and
is subjected to Israeli restrictions, preventing registration of Palestinian
private land and authorising its confiscation. Prior to Israeli occupation in 1967, registration of
land ownership was very limited. Under the Ottoman Code of 1958, a possession
right on fertile land was recognised to farmers who paid a tax on crops to the
Sultan, which could be inherited or sold. British and Jordanian Laws (under
the British Mandate and Jordanian rule) gave to farmers the opportunity to
register their land in the Land Registry, to secure their title. Still,
registration was not a necessary requirement for recognition of ownership:
ownership of unregistered land was indeed recognise to farmers in possession
of the taxation document of the land (from the Ottoman era) or whose land
ownership was recognised by neighbours and the village leader. As a
consequence, most of the land remained unregistered. Since 1967, Israeli military orders suspended the
registration process, recognised to the Israeli military commander possession
of unregistered land not cultivated for three consecutive years and authorised
confiscation and declaration of this land as State Land.[167] Several sources consider that since then, 40% of the
West Bank has been confiscated, declared State Land and has been used to build
or enlarge Israeli settlements.
Approximately one-third of
land in Ramallah, Hebron, Qalquiliya, Nablus and Tulkarem Governorates is
unregistered and the risk of dispossession of land not yet declared State Land
is very high for land owners whose land is located in closed areas and who can
not cultivate it due to restrictions on permits to cross the Wall gates. They
are among the poorest and closure measures are the main cause of their further
impoverishment. |
|
Economic accessibility implies that personal or
household financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an
adequate diet should be at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction
of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised. Economic accessibility
applies to any acquisition pattern or entitlement through which people procure
their food and is a measure of the extent to which it is satisfactory for the
enjoyment of the right to food. |
At the World Food Conference of 1974, States adopted a declaration, reaffirming that: every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties.[187] On that occasion, for the first time, Governments recognized their common responsibility: to work together for higher food production and a more equitable and efficient distribution of food between counties and within countries.[188]
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers that:
In the Spirit of article 56 of the Charter of the United
Nation, the specific provisions contained in articles 11, 2.1 and 23 of the
Covenant (CESCR), the Rome Declaration of the World Food Summit, State parties
should recognize the essential role of international cooperation and comply with
their commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full
realization of the right to adequate food. In implementing this commitment,
States parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food
in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to
provide the necessary aid when required.[189]
The suspension of direct assistance to the PA, has impacted very negatively on the right to food and in particular on its constituent element of economic accessibility.
At the moment of writing there is not enough information to assess whether the Need Based Allowance Programme created under the International Temporary Mechanism will mitigate the effects produced by such suspension. However, all international donors should support this programme targeting those who have suffered a significant loss of income due to the financial crisis, as part of their human rights obligations clearly identified in the Comment on the right to food reported above.
Fiscal measures and the
responsibility of the Palestinian Authority
The Palestinian Authority has the responsibility to take all necessary steps to facilitate the provision of assistance by the International Community, this meaning that it should put human rights of Palestinians before its political positions and considerations.

Other than accessibility, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights considers that the core content of the rights to food also implies the availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals.
Specifically, the monitoring body observes that:
Availability refers to the possibilities either for feeding oneself directly from productive land or other natural resources, or for well functioning distribution, processing and market systems that can move food from the site of production to where it is needed in accordance with demand. [190]
In order to assess food availability in the oPt and specifically in the West Bank, it is necessary to focus on the agricultural sector, which has become increasingly important for the Palestinian economy in the past six years.
Unfortunately, as documented in the analysis of food and water accessibility, since January the construction of the West Bank Wall, combined with the intensification of security measures, has limited the ability of Palestinians to access and cultivate their lands and water resources, has lead to the requisition of the most fertile agricultural land, the razing of trees, the destruction of infrastructures and the isolation of agricultural communities. Ultimately, this means a substantial loss of agricultural produce and market outlets and an increasing dependence on humanitarian assistance, mainly from the WFP and UNRWA.
Security measures and the construction of the West Bank Wall have also fragmented Palestinian economic space into small, inefficient enclaves, resulting in contraction and inefficiency of markets[191]. As a consequence of the West Bank fragmentation into three separated areas, farmers are unable to market their produce and lose perishable products, trade flows have been curtailed, transaction costs have increased and local markets are likely to close.
The WFP considers that:
The Israeli
Defense Force controls all movement of people and goods within the occupied
territory, between Gaza and the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Israel through
dense networks of military checkpoints, physical barriers and roadblocks that
essentially truncate any “natural” trade flow of goods, people and transport
linkages…marketing and distribution systems have
incurred higher costs due to the security and closure considerations (…).[192]
Availability of food has been furthered eroded by the current liquidity crisis: reduced purchasing power and low level of cash in the local economy have already disrupted agricultural production cycles and increased the vulnerability of horticultural producers and smaller traders who may have to abandon their activity in the coming months.
The obligation of Israel to respect, protect and fulfil the right to food is extended to water.
As a matter of fact, the right to food includes access to drinking water and irrigation water necessary for agriculture.
Unfortunately, as it happens for food, water security in the oPt is jeopardized by Israeli closure measures, including the West Bank Wall: restrictions on water supplies, destruction of water infrastructures and confiscation of water resources has dramatically reduced both accessibility and availability.
The Palestinian Hydrology Group estimates that approximately 50% of Palestinians are under the “water poverty line”,[193] and that the average consumption of water in the West Bank is of 450 cubic meters per year. Given that the threshold of drinking water shortage has been defined as 1.000 cubic meters per year per person, below 500 cubic meters the situation is considered critical[194].
PCBS considers that once completed, the Wall will lead to
the confiscation of 12 million cubic meters of Western Basin, and estimates that
95% of water resources in the oPt will be appropriated. The Palestinian
Hydrology Group considers that as of
May 2006, the construction of the Wall has lead
to the requisition of already 45 wells, pumping 5.6 million cubic meters of
water.
Since January 2006, after the election of Hamas, Palestinians accessibility to water has worsened, as a result of the refusal of Israeli authorities to hold Joint Water Committee meetings with PA authorities. Lack of cooperation and also the cut of external donors’ direct assistance to the PA, has resulted in the suspension of projects on water and sanitation infrastructures. Not having financial resources, the Palestinian Water Authority as well as Municipalities are not able to guarantee the functioning of the water monitoring system, therefore an adequate quality of water, nor can they afford to operate their own wells, which means that water supplies are limited and intermittent. Between May and June, for example, Benized area, in Ramallah district, was left without water supplies for 23 days[195].
As a matter of fact, an IUED recent survey reveals that water network is considered as the most important infrastructure needed by Palestinian households (45% of surveyed households).[196]
WaSH also considers that most of the water networks currently available are old and in faulty conditions, this causing large loss of water through the network[197]. The Palestinian Water Authority estimates that water loss amounts to 45% of supplied water.
In addition, because of closures, West Bank fragmentation and also the ongoing economic crisis, the price of tanked water per cubic meter has increased from 11.09 NIS in 2005 to 14.03 NIS in April 2006[198]. According to the Palestinian Hydrology Group, 47% of Palestinians are unable to pay water supplies.[199]
Poor households are the most vulnerable in this situation,
since they can not afford to buy tanked water.
Most affected areas in the West Bank, are those near the
Security Wall, namely, Bethlehem, Jenin, Qalquilia and Tulkarem governorates;
and areas where movements restrictions have been intensified, such as the Jordan
Valley Enclave. In these areas Palestinian communities can not access adequate
quantities of water and the delivery of tankered water is delayed at
checkpoints or Wall gates. For example, OCHA reports that between 24 April and
14 May, the delivery of water to 19 Palestinian communities was delayed by IDF
checkpoints and that in one occasion a water tanker was denied access.[200]
In addition, in the
South of the West Bank, the poor hydrological season has further deteriorated
water accessibility to water of residents. Farmers and the poor, who can not
afford adequate supplies of clean water for family and animal consumption, are
those mainly affected.
|
Since 1967, with the occupation of the oPt, several
Israeli military orders have progressively confiscated “unknown Palestinian
wells”, assigned authority over water resources to Israeli area military
commanders, prohibited Palestinians from developing new water infrastructure
without an Israeli permit, expropriated five groups of water springs and
ultimately declared all water resources as Israeli state property.[201] In 1967 the Israeli Civil Administration assumed
control also over the West Bank Water Department (WBWD), originally managed by
the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority. The Oslo Accords (1993 and 1995) have been considered
by many as a turning point, since responsibility over water resources and the
supervision of WBWD was transferred to the PA and new institutions were
established: the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and a Joint Water Committee
(JWC). In spite of the initial
enthusiasm, in reality Israel has maintained control in the sector: Israel is
still responsible for control over flow and volume of water supply, and
Mekorot Water Company, a government owned corporation, water supplier for
Israel, still controls resources allocation and development on the ground, as
well as water access of approximately 38% of Palestinian communities. Furthermore, water management, development and supply
at local level, is under the responsibility of Palestinian local
municipalities’ Water Departments. Still, due to water resource constraints,
municipalities frequently have to purchase water from Mekorot. The JWC, composed of both Palestinian and Israeli
authorities, has responsibility for water and sewage issues, but not for
sensitive issues such as the disproportionate use of the Jordan River Basin
and water usage by settlers in the West Bank (illegal under IHL). In addition
to the limited mandate, another weakness of the Institution lies in the power
of Israel to veto water initiatives. Palestinian and Israeli NGOs are of the opinion that
Israel's control is evident in “its power to veto any new water project, both
through the Joint Water Committee and through the Civil Administration” and
that “the primary and nearly singular role of the WBWD has been to distribute
water quantities supplied by Mekorot to the related Palestinian communities
and Israeli settlements in the West Bank”.[202] |
|
-
Art. 55: The occupying Power has the duty of
ensuring the food …to the population. -
Art. 23: shall permit the free passage of all
consignments of essential foodstuffs… -
Art. 59: shall agree to relief schemes…and
shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. |
Under international
humanitarian law, Israel has the primary responsibility to provide food and water supplies to
the Palestinian population and humanitarian assistance.
To this extent, the Special Rapporteur on the
right to food, considers that:
The ICRC Commentary, clarifies that the
occupying Power has the obligation to ensure, to the fullest extent of the means
available to it, the food of the occupied population and that when the occupied
territory is inadequately supplied, the occupying Power has to accept relief
supplies destined for the population
and must facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.[205]
This obligation, under IHRL, is spelled out as
duty to fulfil the right to food, in the sense of providing food assistance.
Despite its obligations under IHRL and IHL,
Israel does not provide humanitarian assistance and sometimes restricts
humanitarian access.
Main providers of food aid in the oPt, are instead UNRWA and the WFP, in cooperation with the ICRC. Assistance is also given by the PA and NGOs.
Food is considered
by refugees and non refugees (46% and 12% respectively), as the most important
assistance item received.[206]
9. The Right to Health
The last resolution adopted by the WHO World Health Assembly (WHA)[207], on health conditions in the oPt, clearly points out that in the current situation, the two main concerns in the health sector are:
- health conditions and humanitarian crises resulting from the Israeli occupation and restrictions;
- health crisis caused by the decision of Israel to stop transferring VAT and custom taxes to the PA, and of external donors to cut their direct support.
|
The
Fifty-ninth World Health Assembly…CALLS UPON Israel, the occupying Power, to
halt immediately all its practices, policies and plans including its closure
regime, which seriously affect the health conditions of civilians under
occupation. World Health Assembly[208] |
With regard to closure policies, WHA expressed its concern for the consequences of the construction of the Wall on the accessibility and quality of medical services received by the Palestinian population and also for restrictions imposed on ambulances and medical personnel, having serious implications on pregnant women and patients in general.
Since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, several NGOs[209], the PA Ministry of Health and WHO have thoroughly documented the effects of such restrictions and closures on the health system and, more specifically, on the right to health.
They have criticised movement restrictions and delays, which have resulted in women giving birth at checkpoints, have caused medical complications and sometimes have caused the death of patients traveling in ambulances; the West Bank fragmentation, constituting an obstacle to the development of an adequate medical system and preventing patients from reaching health clinics; and the traumatic stress suffered by Palestinians, including children, living in fear and in a feeling of constant insecurity, dramatically affecting their psychological well being.
This situation has further deteriorated since January because of an intensification of internal closures and restriction as documented in this report.
Article 12, CESCR
|
Between January and June 2006, the freeze of direct assistance to the PA by external donors as well as the decision of Israel to withhold VAT and tax revenues have led to a rapid deterioration in the health sector.
External donors direct support amounted to approximately 50% of the PA MoH budget. The second most important channel for funding was payment of revenues from Israel. Not receiving funds, the MoH has been confronted with a crisis.
The public health system can not be replaced by the UN, NGOs and the private sector. Already in May OCHA warned that these actors do not have the capacity to duplicate or replace the role or the PA and its service delivery and also Pierre Krahenbuhl, director of ICRC operations, said that: Neither the ICRC nor any other humanitarian organization can replace the authorities in their role as provider of public services.[219] NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontičres (MSF) expressed the same opinion, saying that: humanitarian aid actors do not have the competence, the means or the responsibility to act as a substitute for the Palestinian Authority.[220]
The MoH is responsible for 62% of primary health clinics and for important curative and rehabilitative programs in the oPt. For example, according to WHO data, 72.4% of surgical operations are performed in MoH hospitals and 47% of maternity beds and 61% of general hospital beds are located there. [221] The MoH provides also important preventive and promotive services, such as immunization of children, supplementation programs (providing vitamin A and D supplements to children and iron supplements to pregnant women) and antenatal and postnatal services. [222]
Already in May the UN considered that the lack of fuel and other operating supplies prevented the MoH from continuing its normal operations. According to WHO[223], in Jenin and Salfit, the MoH was not able to provide services to the villages, not having fuel for MoH vehicles. For the same reason, vaccination for newborn was stopped in 74 village health rooms in the Hebron district. In June, diagnostic services were stopped in eight MoH hospitals and surgical services in seven, while out-patient services in five hospitals.
The UN also reported
that equipment was lacking maintenance and warned about drug and consumable
shortages in hospitals both in the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard, the MoH
confirmed: hospitals are suffering from acute shortages of medicines
necessary for the treatment of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, high blood
pressure and diabetes. There is also a severe shortage of medicines for kidney
patients, as well as of kidney dialysis solutions and disinfectants for dialysis
equipment. There is, in addition, an acute shortage of surgical material such as
thread, anaesthetics and medical gauzes. Hospitals are also suffering from
frequent shortages of food supplies necessary for their patients.[224]
In June, the UN Monitor reported that 27% of drugs from the essential drug list were out of stock, as compared to 19% in December 2005. According to the IUED most recent survey analyzing dissatisfaction for health services[225], the poor are mainly dissatisfied due to unavailability of prescribed drugs (52% of the extremely poor and 29.5% of the poor).[226]
Furthermore, since
February, at leat 50% of MoH employees, meaning approximately 6.000 people, have
not received their salaries and in June, WHO recorded that staff work attendance
dropped by between 10% and 20% in three hospitals in the West Bank (in Nablus,
Jerico and Beit Jala) and the MoH predicts that in the coming months, nurses may
significantly reduce their attendance in community clinics in the north.
Those most vulnerable in the crisis are people who were already considered vulnerable, such as patients affected by chronic diseases needing long term treatments, such as cancer patients; complicated pregnancy cases; children; and the poor.
In the West Bank, the poor living outside refugee camps, are main users of MoH services[227], as they can not afford to attend private health centers. Therefore if the public health system can not provide them services, they are left without any assistance.
The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, recognizes that:
…for those living in poverty, the full enjoyment of the right to health is a remote goal.[228]
This is true for the poor living in the oPt, whose situation has furthered worsened as a result of the crisis. The poor can not even pay for transportation to reach the clinics. For example, in June the number of patients receiving mental health treatment in MoH clinics was 2.131, still very high, although lower than in April and May, mainly because patients can not afford transportation costs to reach the clinics.
In April-June 2006, patients have increasingly relied on PA and UNRWA services, not being able to pay for private services. WHO specifies that in June, two thirds of women gave birth in MoH hospitals, where they do not pay for the service, as it is covered by governmental insurance, and only one third delivered in NGOs or private facilities.[229]
However, as documented in this chapter, the public sector is already facing difficulties in guaranteeing normal health and social services.
The number of applications for assistance by the MoSA has increased considerably in June (116 new applications were received compared to an average of 20-30 of previous months), although, due to lack of funds, since February the MoSA has not been able to provide health insurance to 47.938 beneficiaries, nor to provide equipment to people with special needs, including wheel chairs.[230]
Apparently, an increasing number of people can no longer afford any more prescription medicines, the demand for basic medicines and substitutes for expensive medicines has increased and pharmacies are offering credit to customers.[231]
Therefore, in the current situation, poverty is an additional cause of ill-health in the oPt. In the medium and long term, ill-health could lead to further impoverishment, because it could erode the capabilities that poor people need to escape from poverty. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health considers that:
Ill health causes poverty by destroying livelihoods, reducing worker productivity, lowering educational achievement and limiting opportunities. Because poverty may lead to diminished access to medical care, increased exposure to environmental risks, the worst forms of child labor and malnutrition, ill health is also often a consequence of poverty. In other words ill health is both a cause and a consequence of poverty: sick people are more likely to become poor and the poor are more vulnerable to disease and disability.[232]
IUED Poll n.10, seems to confirm this position, indicating that 69.7% of the extremely poor and 21.2% of the poor said that ill-health is the main causes (second) of their further impoverishment, in terms of income decrease.[233]
9.5 Violation of the right to health: availability, quality and
economic accessibility
Responsibility of
external donors
|
Donors have
promised to take measures to reduce poverty and alleviate suffering,
especially of the most vulnerable…but, in the oPt, their policies are actually
causing poverty and suffering. Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Health[234]
|
Commenting on the crisis, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health recognized that, by halting their direct support, international donors have breached their international responsibility to provide health assistance in the oPt.[235]
To this extent, it is important to emphasize once more, as recognized by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights[236], that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, is an obligation of all States, in accordance with specific provisions of CESCR[237], as well as with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the spirit of these international instruments, as well as the Alma-Ata Declaration on primary health care, States are committed to take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization of the right to health. In compliance with their international obligations, States have the responsibility to respect the right to health, to prevent third parties from violating this right and to facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services and provide aid and humanitarian assistance.[238]
The Special Rapporteur stressed that donors halted their assistance without giving any advance warning to the PA, who was consequently not able to put in place alternative funding mechanisms, jeopardizing the capacity of the MoH to ensure health services and leading to an acute crisis of the health system.
The International Temporary Mechanism[239] developed by the European Commission is intended to provide support to health services, covering running costs and providing essential medical supplies to health care centers and hospitals, delivering 1.5 million litres of fuel to ensure the continued supply of energy, in particular for hospitals, and paying allowances to about 11.500 Palestinian health workers. However, at the moment of writing there is not enough information available to assess whether the Mechanism will be a satisfactory response to the crisis.
Responsibility of
|
The Fifty-ninth World Health Assembly…DEMANDS that
Israel, the occupying Power, pay the Palestinian Authority regularly and
without delay its customs revenues
in order to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities with respect to basic
human needs, including health services. World Health Assembly[240] |
By withholding VAT and tax revenues, Israel has contributed and continues to contribute to the collapse of the health system in the oPt and violates the right to health.In particular, Israel does not comply with its obligation to fulfil the right to health, which includes: the obligation to facilitate, in the sense of taking positive measures to enable and assist individuals and communities in the enjoyment of the right to health; the obligation to provide assistance; the obligation to promote the right to health, by creating, maintaining and restoring the health of the population.
The crisis faced by the public health
sector seriously endangers the enjoyment of the right to health and
specifically, one of its essential elements, availability , which
requires that functioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and
services be available. These include the underlying determinants of health,
such as safe and potable drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities
(hospitals and clinics), as well as essential drugs and trained medical and
professional personnel receiving domestically competitive salaries.[241]
As also stated by WHO: the crisis is seriously affecting the ability of the Palestinian ministry of Health to deliver critical health care services and maintain public health programmes.[242] The crisis is also already affecting another essential element of the right to health: quality, requiring that health facilities, goods and services be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality.[243] Therefore, quality means availability of skilled medical personnel, unexpired drugs and hospital equipement, safe and potable water and adequate sanitation.Israel as well as external donors are equally responsible of these violations. The impact on economic accessibility Facts presented above demonstrate that the current crisis is seriously reducing the economic accessibility of Palestinians to the right to health, which requires that health facilities, good and services must be affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Economic accessibility is based on the principle of equity, which, according to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights:…demands that poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer households.[244] Since the MoH and the MoSA, as presented in this chapter, are no longer in a position to ensure social and health services, the poor, who are already disproportionately burdened with health expenses, find it increasingly difficult to access health services and therefore, are not able to fully enjoy their right to physical and mental health. This situation is very likely to deteriorate further in the coming months. Violation of IHL
Geneva Convention IVArticle 55To the fullest extent to the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring…medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate. Article 56To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory…Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties. |
Under international humanitarian law, Israel has the primary responsibility to ensure that the basic needs, including health needs of the Palestinian population are met. In particular, as clarified by the ICRC Commentary, Israel as occupying Power, is under an obligation to utilize all the means at its disposal to guarantee medical supplies and any article necessary to support life.[245] In addition, if hospitals and medical services are without necessary supplies and unable to meet the needs of the population, the occupying power must ensure that hospital and medical services can work properly.[246]
Nevertheless, the Commentary clarifies that if the national authorities are able to care for the health of the occupied population, then the Occupying Power must merely avoid hampering the work of the organizations responsible for the task.[247] There is no doubt that in the current crisis situation, it is Israel’s responsibility to provide health assistance and guarantee that health needs of the Palestinian population are met. However, in general, Israel should at least, as a minimum, avoid implementing security and economic policies that seriously violate the Palestinians’ right to health by jeopardising the activity of the MoH, UNRWA and other service providers.
10. Other human rights
11. Poverty reduction and human
rights: failures and responsibilities
It is worth mentioning that the Quartet Temporary Mechanism intends to create a social safety net, therefore, a cash assistance programme to directly assist “Palestinians in greatest need”. At the moment of writing no additional information is available on selection criteria to identify the beneficiaries.
[1] As better explained in the section, “The human rights approach to poverty”, this is the definition of poverty coined by the OHCHR and used within the human rights approach to poverty reduction.
[2] OHCHR, Draft Guidelines: a
Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, UN, New York, 2002. (Hereinafter: OHCHR, Draft Guidelines)
[3] OHCHR, OHCHR, Human Rights and Poverty Reduction, A Conceptual Framework, New York and Geneva, 2004. (Hereinafter: OHCHR, Human Rights and Poverty Reduction).
[4] See section: “The human rights approach to poverty” of this report.
[5] Information on the project is provided on the website: http://www.pro-poor.ps/viewpage.php?pageID=19
[6] Information on the project is available on the website: http://www.iued.ch/palestine/projects_living.html
[7] UN, Seventeenth Report, Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access, 28 June-11 July 2006, 18 July 2006. (Hereinafter: UN, Seventeenth Report, Movement and Access).
[8] OCHA, Territorial Fragmentation of the West Bank, May 2006. (Hereinafter: OCHA, Territorial Fragmentation).
[9] OCHA estimates that in the first four months of 2006, Karni has been closed for a total of 59 days. See OCHA, Revised Emergency Appeal, 31 May 2006, p. 4. (Hereinafter: OCHA, Revised Emergency Appeal).
[10] World Bank, Movement of Goods and People in Gaza, in West Bank and Gaza Update, April 2006. (Hereinafter: World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update).
[11] Protocol on Economic Relations between Israel and the PLO, Paris, 29 April 1994.
[12] Gross Disposable Income, which measures all resources available to the economy, including aid transfer and remittances.
[13] According to World Bank data published in May 2006, PA Budget resources declined from US$ 180 million per month in 2005, to US$ 130 million per month in the first quarter of 2006. Other factors determining the contraction are: OECD donors’ suspension of aid, incapacity of the Arab League states to grant the promised support and the refusal of commercial banks to operate with the new government. See World Bank, The Palestinian Fiscal Crisis, 9 May 2006. (Hereinafter: World Bank, The Palestinian Fiscal Crisis).
[14] Idem.
[15] Foreign assistance is classified as follows: budget support, meaning direct budget assistance to the PA, emergency/humanitarian assistance and development aid. After the victory of Hamas Party at the January election, external donors have considered to suspend or reduce their aid provided for budget support and development aid, although they never intended to alter their level of emergency/humanitarian assistance. See, World Bank, Economic Update and Potential Outlook, 15 March 2006, p.3.
[16] See, UN, The Humanitarian Monitor, Occupied Palestinian Territories. At the moment of writing, they are available for May and June 2006.
[17]
IUED Report N. 10, Chapter 2, Socio Economic Situation. See, Section 2.1,
Evolution of Poverty.
[18] In May 2006 only 34% said they could keep up as long as it takes or up to 1 year and 16% considered they were already in serious conditions to keep up financially. 28% of the extremely poor and 9% of the poor said they could not cope with the current economic crisis, they were in serious conditions and didn’t know how to live. For detailed information, see: IUED Report N. 10, Chapter 2, Socio Economic Situation. See, Section 2.5, Ability to Keep up.
[19] PCBS, Annual Report on the Palestinian Population, July 2006; Poverty in the Palestinian Territory, 2005, June 2006, (Hereinafter: PCBS, Poverty Report 2006).
[20] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 3, Evolution of the Labour Market. See, Section 3.5, Employment Status and Poverty Risk.
[21] UN Press Release, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian Territories, Professor John Dugard, Human Rights in Palestine, 21 June 2006. (Hereinafter, UN Press Release, Special Rapporteur on the oPt, June 2006).
[22] UN Press Release, UN health rights expert criticizes donors for failing to fulfil their humanitarian responsibilities in the occupied Palestinian territories, 22 June 2006. (Hereinafter: UN Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, June 2006).
[23] UN, Context Analysis and Humanitarian Response in Revised Emergency Appeal.
[24] Idem.
[25] See, OHCHR website, at: http://www.ohchr.org/english/
[26] See, World Bank, Deep Palestinian Poverty in the midst of economic crisis, October 2004, p.14, (Hereinafter: World Bank, Deep Palestinian Poverty); and The Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, December 2005, note 26, (Hereinafter: World Bank, The Palestinian Economy). In this last report, estimations already changed, so that the relative poverty line was defined as per capita consumption of USD 2.3 per day and the subsistence or deep poverty line as per capita consumption of USD 1.5 per person per day.
[27] See, Palestine National Poverty Eradication Commission, Poverty in Palestine, Poverty Report, 1998, Methodology.
[28]
See, PCBS, Poverty Report 2006.
[29] Idem.
[30] For more information, see: IUED Report N.10.
[31] UNDP, Human Development and Poverty, Human Development Report 1997
[32] Idem, page 16.
[33] UNDP, Human Rights and Human Development, Human Development Report 2000.
[34] Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/21, 2 August 2005; Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the Social Forum, Third Session, Implementation of the Mandate contained in Sub-Commission Resolution 2004/8, Poverty and Economic growth: challenges to human rights. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SF/2005/2, 16 June 2005.
[35] See, OHCHR, Human Rights and Poverty Reduction.
[36] Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2001/10, 10/05/2001, para.11.
[37] Narayan et al., Voices of the Poor, Vol.3, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, p.493.
[38] E/C.12/2001/10, 10/05/2001, para.10.
[39] OHCHR, Draft Guidelines.
[40] Idem.
[41] The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is the Monitoring Body of the International Covenant on economic, Social and Cultural rights, the main UN Instrument protecting this category of rights.
[42] E/C.12/2001/10, 4/05/2001, para.13.
[43] Report of the Independent Expert, Arjun Sengupta, Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, E/CN.4/2006/43, 2 March 2006, para.10.
[44] MOPIC in cooperation with the UNDP, National Report on Participatory Assessment (Voice of the Palestinian Poor), July 2002, Ramallah, Chapter 2. Additional information on the project is provided in chapter 1 of this report.
[45] See for example, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to food, E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31/10/2003, para.30; and Reports by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the oPt, available on his website: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=91 .
[46] This word is used to identify all Committees of experts that monitor the implementation of UN human rights treaties, such as the Conventions mentioned in this paragraph. Among them are the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Human Rights Committee, Monitoring Bodies of CESCR and CCPR.
[47] CESCR, ratified by Israel on 3/10/1991; CCPR, ratified by Israel on 3/10/1991; CERD, ratified by Israel on 3/01/1979; CRC, ratified by Israel on 3/10/1991; CEDAW ratified by Israel on 3/10/1991.
[48]
Concluding Observations
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.27, 4 December
1998, para.8.
[49] Concluding Observations of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel,
E/C.12/1/Add.69, 31 August 2001, para.12.
[50] Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.90, 23 May 2003, para. 35.
[51] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, CCPR/CO.78/ISR, 21 August 2003, para.11.
[52] CESCR General Comment N.3, The Nature of State Parties Obligations (Art.2, par.1), E/1991/23, 14/01/1990, para.14.
[53] CESCR, General Comment N.18, The Right to Work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6/02/2006, para.29; CESCR General Comment N.12, The Right to Adequate Food (Art.11) , E/C.12/199/5, 12/05/1999, paras.36-38.
[54] UN, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31/10/2003, para.31; UN Press Release, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, June 2006.
[55] CESCR, Article 2, para.1: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including, particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
[56] GC N.3, E/1991/23, 14/01/1990, para.9.
[57] GC N.3, E/199/23, 14/01/1990, para.10.
[58] Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949.
[59] Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907.
[60] ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, Article 27: Treatment. In: General Remarks. Historical Background.
[61]
ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, Article 27: Treatment. In:
Paragraph 1: General Principles, 1-First Sentence: Respect for Human Rights.
[62] ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, Article 47: Inviolability of Rights.
[63] Under International Humanitarian Law, (IHL), it is the responsibility of the State of Israel to ensure that the basic needs of the civilian population in the occupied territories are met. These needs include foodstuff, medical supplies, means of shelter and other essentials. ICRC, Press Release, 06/31, 10 April 2006.
[64] OCHA, Assessment of the
Future Humanitarian Risks in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 11 April
2006, p. 2.
[65] See, Geneva Convention IV, Article 1.
[66] OCHA, West Bank Closure Count and Analysis, January 2006.
[67] IUED Report N.10, Chapter 1, Mobility and Security.
[68] UN, Seventh Report, Movement and Access.
[69] CERD, General Recommendation N.20, Non-discriminatory implementation of rights and freedoms (art.5), 15 March 1996, para.2.
[70] CCPR, art.12 (3).
[71] General Comment N.27, Freedom of movement (Art. 12), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 2/11/1999, paras.18, 13, 14 and 16.
[72] E/C.12/1/Add.90, 23 May 2003, paras.19, 31and 40.
[73] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 18/08/98, para.22.
[74] ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, Article 27, Paragraph IV: Reservation in Regard to Security Measures.
[75] OCHA, Territorial Fragmentation.
[76] Idem.
[77] For a detailed analysis of the impact of closures on access to Jerusalem, see: OCHA, Access to Jerusalem-New Military Order Limits West Bank Palestinian Access, February 2006. (Hereinafter: OCHA, Access to Jerusalem).
[78] OCHA, Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Implications of the April 2006 Barrier Projections, Update 5, May 2006. (Hereinafter: OCHA, Preliminary Analysis).
[79] This statement can be found on the Israeli Ministry of Defense website, under the section “Security Fence”, at: http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm
[80] International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, para.151. (Hereinafter: ICJ, Wall Opinion)
[81] See the Ministry of Defense website, at: www.seamzone.mod.gov.il
[82] See: OCHA, Preliminary Analysis.
[83] On 24 July 2006, the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) rejected a petition filed by Palestinians residing in the seven villages North of Salfit, opposing the construction of the Wall in that area. The HCJ said that the approved route of the Wall is justified by security reasons, despite the State of Israel, in response to the petition, admitted that the route of the Wall was decided by taking into account unapproved plans to expand Ari’el in the area between the settlement and Salfit, which will be incorporated in the west side (Israeli side) of the Wall. The HCJ completely neglected the fact that this section of the Wall, running into the West Bank will destroy Palestinians’ “fabric of life”. See, B’Tselem, 24 July 2006: High Court Errs in Denying Petition against Separation Barrier around Ariel, B’tselem website: http://btselem.org/index.asp
[84] For a detailed analysis of the connections between the route of the security Wall and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, see: B’Tselem, Under the Guise of Security, Routing the Separation Barrier to Enable the Expansion of the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, December 2005.
[85] IUED Poll N.10, Bivariate analysis: 0164e x poverty3. Level of poverty * Separation Wall: forced move crosstabulation.
[86] ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, Article 47- Inviolability of Right, Annexation.
[87] ICJ, Wall Opinion, para. 137.
[88] CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21/08/2003, para.19.
[89] Idem.
[90] Military Order S/20/2003 declared the area between the Green Line and the Wall as “closed zone”.
[91] Law of Return, art.4.
[92] Permit requirements were introduced by Military Order S/20 of 7/10/2003. In December 2005, an amendment was introduced: Regulations Regarding Entry Permits into the Seam Zone and Staying There, (Amendment N.1) (Judea and Samaria) of the Order Regarding Security Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (N. 378), 1971. It revised the procedure regulating applications for permits to access agricultural land, specifying what additional documentation is required to prove direct connection to the land in closed areas.
[93] For a detailed analysis on the impact of the Wall on access to Agricultural land, see, OCHA, Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier, Special Focus. Crossing the Barrier: Palestinian Access to Agricultural Land, January 2006, Update N. 6. (Hereinafter: OCHA, Access to Agricultural Land).
[94]
See: OCHA, Preliminary Analysis.
[95] ILO, The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories, 95th Session, 2006. (Hereinafter: ILO, The Situation of Workers)
[96] UN General Assembly, The Centrality of Employment to Poverty Eradication, A/60/314, 30/08/2005.
[97] ILO standard definition of unemployment only includes people who are out of job and who are actively seeking employment and does not include discouraged workers. The world “relaxed definition” of unemployment, instead, generally include also discourage workers in the estimations.
[98] World Bank, Employment and Unemployment, in West Bank and Gaza Update, p.23.
[99] PCBS, Labour Force Surveys, 2000 and 2006.
[100] PCSB, Labour Force Survey, Q1 2006 statistics.
[101] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 3, Evolution of the Labour Market.
[102] World Bank, The Palestinian Fiscal Crisis, Scenario n.4.
[103] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 3, Evolution of the Labour Market, Figure 3.21 and Chapter 2, Socio-Economic conditions, Figure 2.8.
[104] World Bank, The Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery.
[105] Concluding Observations on Israel, E/C.12/17Add.27, 31/08/2001, para.18.
[106] ILO, The Situation of Workers, Table 2.1.
[107] IUED Poll N.10, bivariate analysis o361a x poverty3; and o361c and bivariate analysis o361c x
poverty3.
[108] See, normative content of the right to work, in CESCR GC N. 18, E/C.12/GC/18, 6/02/2006, para.6.
[109] GC N.18, E/C.12/GC/18, 6/02/2006, para 12
(b) (i).
[110] ILO Employment and Occupation Convention, 1958, (No. 111 ).
[111] ILO, The Situation of Workers, para.51.
[112] ILO Convention 111/1958, Art.2.
[113] See, OCHA, Revised Emergency Appeal; Access and Protection Reports; The Humanitarian Monitor, May and June 2006; Protection of Civilians. Weekly Brieefing Notes.
[114] ILO, The Situation of Workers, para.37.
[115] World Bank, Foreign Trade and Employment and Unemployment, in West Bank and Gaza Update.
[116] Idem.
[117] IUED Poll N.10, bivariate
analysis o361b x poverty3; and o361d and bivariate analysis o361d x poverty3.
[118] The term “Bertini Commitments” refers to the commitments made by Israel to Ms Catherine Bertini, Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the UN Secretary General, in occasion of her visit to the region between 12-19 August 2002. Her task was to assess the humanitarian crisis and identify the responsibilities of all parties involved. See: OCHA, Additional Commitments in Humanitarian Monitoring Report, Bertini Commitments, August 2005.
[119]
According to the World Bank, in the third quarter of 2005, youth unemployment
rate stood at 35%. World Bank, The Palestinian Economy.
[120] UN, Revised Emergency Appeal.
[121] OCHA, The Humanitarian Monitor, June 2006.
[122] UNRWA, West Bank Job Creation Programme, see UNRWA website: http://www.un.org/unrwa/index.html
[123] ILO, The Situation of Workers, para.79.
[124] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 3, Evolution of the Labour Market, Figure 3.5.
[125] IUED Report N.10, Chapter 2, Socio Economic Situation, Figure 2.8.
[126] IUED Report N.10, Chapter 7, The Refugees and UNRWA. See Section 7.1.2, Poverty Trend and causes of Poverty.
[127] IUED Report N.10, Chapter 3, Evolution of the Labour Market. See Section 3.2, Labour Market Restrictions and Income Insecurity, and Section 3.3, Job Precariousness; Chapter 6, Population Needs and Assistance Delivered, Figure 6.22.
[128] UN Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur on the oPt, June 2006.
[129] CESCR, Arts. 2.1, 6, 22, 23. See, GC N.18,
E/C.12/GC/18, 06/02/2006, para.29.
[130] GC N.18, E/C.12/GC/18, 06/02/2006,
para.22.
[131] Geneva Convention IV, Art. 52.
[132] Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to food, E/CN.4/2001/53, 7/02/2001, para.14.
[133] “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. 1996 World Food Summit Plan of Action.
[134] E/CN.4/2001/53, 7/02/2001, para 15.
[135] Interview with FAO/WFP staff, July 2006.
[136] OCHA, Revised Emergency Appeal.
[137]
WFP, Emergency Food Security Update, May 2006, (Hereinafter, WFP, Food
Security Update)
[138] E/CN.4/2001/53, 7/02/2001, para.16.
[139] CARE/John Hopkins, Food Security
Assessment, 2004.
[140]
Malnutrition means lack or shortage in food which, otherwise provides sufficient
calories, of macronutrients-chiefly vitamins (organic molecules) and minerals
(inorganic molecules). These micronutrients are vital for the functioning of
cells and especially of the nervous system.
E/CN.4/2001/53, 7/02/2001, para.16.
[141] Palestinian National Authority, World Health Organisation and United Nations Children Found, The State of Nutrition: West Bank and Gaza Strip, A comprehensive Review of nutrition situation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, June 2005
[142] E/CN.4/2001/53, 7/02/2001, para.31.
[143] See, Geneva Convention (IV), Article 1.
[144] E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31/10/2003, para.32.
[145] E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31/10/2003, para.41.
[146] WFP, Food Security Update; and WFP, Briefing Sheet, April 2006.
[147] GC N.12, E/C.12/1999/5, 12/05/1999,
paras.13 and 18.
[148] Geneva Convention IV, art. 33.
[149] OCHA, Territorial Fragmentation.
[150] This has been widely documented by OCHA field presence in Hebron and could be personally seen by the author of this report in a field visit.
[151] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 2,
Socio-Economic Conditions, Figure 2.4. and Chapter 3, Evolution of the
Labour Market, figure Figure 3.22.
[152]
IUED Poll N.10, Bivariate analysis o362c x poverty3; and Bivariate analysis
o362b x poverty3.
[153] IUED poll N.10, Bivariate analysis 0362e x poverty 3.
[154] PCBS, Impact of the Israeli Measures on the Economic Conditions of Palestinians Households, March 2006. (Hereinafter: PCBS, Impact of the Israeli Measures, 2006).
[155] IUED, Report N. 10, Chapter 1, Mobility and Security.
[156] IUED Poll N.10, Bivariate analysis: o164b x poverty3, Level of poverty * Separation Wall: separation from land Crosstabulation.
[157] OCHA, Access to Agricultural Land.
[158] E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31/10/2003, para.46.
[159] For a brief explanation of the Land law and State Land in the West Bank, see Box 1 of this report.
[160] OCHA, Preliminary Analysis.
[161] See OCHA, Weekly Breefing Notes, Access and Protection Reports and UN, Humanitarian Monitor Reports.
[162] OCHA, West Bank Closure Count and Analysis, January 2006.
[163] 4 dunums of land correspond to 1 acre, 10 dunums to 1 hectare. Data reported is given in UN, Humanitarian Monitor, June 2006, and the primary source is the Agricultural Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA).
[164] UN, Revised Emergency Appeal.
[165]
IUED Poll N.10, Bivariate analysis: poverty3 x o109v2a, If income decreased,
first cause (1/2) * level of poverty Crosstabulation.
[166] For a more comprehensive overview, see B’Tselem, Land grab. Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2003; OCHA, Access to Agricultural Land, Appendix 1; World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update, April 2006.
[167] Military Orders 58 and 59, 1967; Military Order 291, 1968.
[168] World Bank, Stagnation or Revival?
[169] The UN monitor the implementation of the agreement and publish updated reports every two weeks.
[170] UN, Seventeenth Report, Movement and Access.
[171] World Bank, Connecting Gaza and the West Bank, in West Bank and Gaza update, April 2006.
[172] The UN estimates that exported agricultural produce from the Gaza Strip in June decreased by 6% compared to May and did not exceed 23% of the average monthly exports during the period Sept-Dec 2005. See, UN, Table on Agriculture, in Humanitarian Monitor, June 2006.
[173] WFP, Rapid Market Assessment,
Occupied Palestinian Territories, May 2006. (Hereinafter: WFP, Rapid
Market Assessment).
[174] E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31/10/2003, para.53.
[175] GC N.12, E/C.12/1999/5, 12/05/1999,
para.13.
[176] PCBS, Impact of the Israeli Measures, 2006.
[177] The World Bank estimates that in 2005 food costs increased only of 0.5% above 2004’ s level. In January and February inflation was recorded to be virtually unchanged in the West Bank, although increased noticeably in Gaza to 2.7% compared to the same period of the previous year. See, World Bank, Prices and Inflation, in West Bank and Gaza Update.
[178] WFP, VAM/M&E, Market Monitoring Report-oPt, 19 April 2006: Report 6. Prices of basic commodities are also reported in: UN, Table on Food Security, in Humanitarian Monitor, June 2006.
[179] WFP, Rapid Market Assessment.
[180] IUED Report N. 10, Chapter 2, Socio Economic Situation, Figure 2.13.
[181]
WFP, Livelihoods, Shocks and Coping Strategies of WFP Beneficiaries in the
occupied Palestinian territories – oPt. Baseline Survey, September-November
2004, p.11. (Hereinafter: WFP,
Baseline Survey).
[182] UN, Humanitarian Monitor, May 2006.
[183] IUED Report N. 10, Chapter 2, Socio Economic Situation, Figure 2.10.
[184] PCBS, Impact of the Israeli Measures, 2006
[185] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 6,
Population Needs and Assistance Delivered. See Section 6.3.2.1, The
Reduction of Food Consumption.
[186] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 7, The Refugee and UNRWA, Figure 7.12; Chapter 6, Population Needs and Assistance Delivered, Figures 6.5-6.9.
[187] Declaration of the World Food Conference, Rome, E/CONF.65/20, 16 November 1974.
[188] Idem.
[189] GC N.12, E/C.12/1999/5, 12/05/1999,
para.36.
[190] GC N.12, E/C.12/1999/5, 12/05/1999,
para.12.
[191] UNSCO, Economic Fragmentation and Economic Adaptation of the Rural West Bank, 2005; World Bank, West Bank and Gaza, Country Brief, April 2006.
[192] WFP, Trade, Market and transports, in Rapid Market Assessment.
[193] For a definition of the water poverty line see, Palestinian Hydrology Group, at: www.phg.org
[194] Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Zigler to the General Assembly, A/56/210, 23/07/2001, para.61.
[195] Palestinian Hydrology Group, Interview of 20 June 2006.
[196] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 6, Population Needs and Assistance Delivered, Figure 6.14.
[197] Palestinian Hydrology Group, WaSH MP, Water for Life 2005, 2006, p.18.
[198] OCHA, Revised Emergency Appeal.
[199] Palestinian Hydrology Group, Interview, 29 June 2006.
[200] OCHA, Access and Protection Report, May 2006.
[201] See, Military Order 58, 23/07/1967;
Military Order 92, 15/08/1967; Military Order 158, 19/11/1967; Military Order
291, 19/12/1968.
[202] B’Tselem, Thirsty for a Solution,
June 2000. See also Palestinian Hydrology Group, Water for Life, WaSH
Monitoring Report, 2004 and 2005. For detailed information on management and
control of water resources, see, PHG and ARIJ websites:
www.arij.org and www.phg.org
[203] GC N.12, E/C.12/1999/5, 12/05/1999,
para.15.
[204] E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31/10/2003, para.54.
[205] ICRC Commentary, Comments to art. 55, para.1; and art. 59, para.1.
[206] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 7, The Refugees and UNRWA, Figure 7.10; and Chapter 6, Population Needs and Assistance Delivered, Figure 6.6.
[207] WHO, Fifty-Ninth World Health Assembly, Health Conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan, WHA59.3, Agenda Item 13, 27 May 2006. (Hereinafter: WHA59.3).
[208] WHA59.3, para.7.
[209] These include national NGOs, such as Physicians for Human Rights-Israel and Doctors without Borders; as well as international NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
[210] OCHA, Humanitarian Update, Access and Protection, May 2006
[211] WHO, Anecdotal evidence, June 2006.
[212] OCHA, Case Study-Augusta Hospital,
in Access to Jerusalem.
[213] PCBS, Impact of the Wall on Forces Displacement.
[214]
IUED, Report n.10, Chapter 5, Health.
[215] For more info, see: Physicians for
Human Rights-Israel, Collapse of the Palestinian Health System, May 2006;
and other reports available on their website: www.phr.org.il/phr/
[216] General Comment N.14, The Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/2000,
para.11.
[217] GC N.14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/2000,
para.12 (b).
[218] GC N.14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/2000,
para.12 (b).
[219] ICRC Press Release 06/31, Israel/Occupied and autonomous Palestinian territories: ICRC concerned over deteriorating situation, 10 April 2006.
[220] Palestinian Territories: MSF refuses to be a “social palliative” of EU & US policies, press Release, 13 April 2006.
[221] For more specific information on services run by MoH, see: WHO, Possible Consequences on the Health Sector due to Reduction of Support to the Public Services, April 2006.
[222] WHO, The Palestinian Public Health System at Serious Risk, in Bridges, April-May 2006
[223] Idem.
[224] MoH, Health Conditions in the
Occupiede Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, Report to WHO,
Fifty-ninth World Health Assembly, Agenda Item 18, Annex 1, A/57/INF.DOC/3,
22/05/2006.
[225]
IUED Report N.10, Chapter 5, Health. See, Perception of quality of
health care services.
[226]IUED Poll N.10, Bivariate Analysis: poverty3 x o380c, Availability of prescribed drugs: current evaluation * level of poverty Crosstabulation.
[227] This has been recently confirmed by IUED, Report N. 10, Chapter 5, Health.
[228] GC N.14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/ 2000,
para.5.
[229] WHO, Health Sector Surveillance Indicators, Monitoring Health and Health Sector in the oPt – June 2006.
[230] UN, The Humanitarian Monitor, June 2006.
[231] Idem.
[232] Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, The Rights of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, E/CN.4/2003/58, 13 February 2003, para.45.
[233] IUED Poll N.10, Bivariate analysis: poverty3 x o109v3b, Income decrease, second cause (2/2)? * Level of poverty Crosstabulation.
[234] Press release, UN Special Rapporteur on the oPt, June 2006.
[235]Idem.
[236] GC N.3, E/1991/23, 14/12/1990, para.10.
[237] CESCR, articles 12, 2.1, 22 and 23.
[238] GC N.14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/ 2000,
paras.38-40.
[239] For an explanation of the mechanism, see section 2.4 of this report.
[240] WHA59.3, para.6.
[241] GC N.14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/ 2000, para.
12 (a).
[242] WHO, Press Release, Averting a Humanitarian Health Crisis in the oPt, 13 June 2006.
[243] GC N.14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/ 2000, para.
12 (d).
[244] GC N.14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11/08/ 2000, para.
12 (b).
[245] ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, art.55, paragraph 1.
[246] ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, art.56, paragraph 1.
[247] Idem.
[248] PCBS, Impact of the Wall and its Associated Regime on the Forced Displacement of the Palestinians in Jerusalem, June 2006. (Hereinafter: PCBS, Impact of the Wall on Forced Displacement).
[249] Data reported in this paragraph refers to both households outside and inside the Wall. For specific statistics, see PCBS, Impact of the Wall on Forced Displacement.
[250] OCHA, Access to Jerusalem.
[251] UN, Revised Emergency Appeal, Para.2.3.7. Education.
[252] Interview in At-Twani village, June 2006.
[253] IUED Report N.10, Chapter 4, Education and Child Protection.
[254] PCBS, Impact of the Israeli Measures, 2006.
[255] PCBS, Impact of the Wall on Forced Displacement.
[256] UN, Revised Emergency Appeal.
[257] IUED, Report N.10, Executive Summary.
[258] For a comprehensive opinion of the Monitoring Body, see: CCPR, General Comment 12 (Article 1), The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, 13 March 1984.
[259] PCBS, Poverty Report, 2006.
[260] IUED, Report N.10, Chapter 6, Needs and Assistance Received.
[261] Interview with MoSA Staff, June 2006.
[262] WFP, Emergency Food Security Needs Assessment Report, June 2004.
[263] WFP, Baseline Survey.
[264] Bertrand Ramcharan, Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, Respect for human Rights Essential for the Eradication of Poverty, 17 October 2003.
[265] PA, Ministry of Planning, Emergency Support Programme to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2006.
[266] Interview with MoP Official, June 2006.
[267] E/C.12/2001/10, 10/05/2001, para.16.
[268] See, OHCHR, Human Rights and Poverty Reduction, p. 21.
[269] UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, UN
Press Release, SG/SM/10163, OBV/515,
17 October 2005.
[270] Statement by Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, on occasion of the international day on poverty eradication, 17 October 2005.
[271] The UN first decade for poverty reduction, 117-2006, was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly, see: UN General Assembly, A/Res/50/107, 26 January 1996.